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Abstract 
 
The undersupply of housing in England has created a pervasive sense of crisis 
about the delivery of sufficient new dwellings. Alternative forms of housing 
provision therefore merit further exploration, particularly those that can deliver 
low cost, stable accommodation in good condition. Potential remedies may be 
found in various models for collective ownership of housing. Housing collectives 
are organisations controlled by their members and residents, operating in a 
defined geography, which collectively own and manage land and housing for 
the benefit of a designated group. But why have such organisations consistently 
been a marginal form of provision? And do the patterns of benefits and costs 
they create make their future expansion desirable? Significant gaps in 
knowledge emerge in attempting to answer such questions. Furthermore, the 
relationship between the benefits and costs arising within collectives, and the 
form and function of these organisations, is poorly understood.  
Three housing collectives were studied intensively to address these gaps in 
knowledge. Ideas from realist social science and analytical sociology are 
brought to bear on processes of change. The study finds powerful constraints 
and enablements in the internal workings of collectives, as well as a series of 
external constraints and enablements arising through the structure of relations 
around the collectives.  
Residents and members of the collectives identified a range of costs and 
benefits. Causal mechanisms are introduced to show how these perceived 
outcomes are, in part, attributable to collective form and function. The rules 
governing collective forms blend with internal regulation, to generate certain 
costs and benefits. Furthermore, the history of each collective tends to shape 
current behaviours to preserve original ideals and achieve desired outcomes. 
The lessons from this research are far reaching for activists, support agencies 
and governments, revealing forms of agency and state intervention which can 
affect the conditions for future collectivism. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1. Questions from the practice of collectivism 
In 2010, working with a group of residents in one of England’s more deprived 
neighbourhoods, I listened closely as they discussed how to reduce the number 
of empty homes in their area. The complexity of their task seemed 
overwhelming. During a lull in proceedings, I remembered a cryptic statement I 
had once read from Oliver Wendell Holmes Junior; ‘I would not give a fig for 
simplicity on this side of complexity, but I would give my life for the simplicity on 
the other side of complexity’ (Wells, 2013, p.19). As those residents explored 
the possibility of collective ownership as a solution to their problems, I 
wondered whether there could be any simplicity beyond the seeming chaos of 
factors shaping their efforts. Could these complex processes be rendered 
explicable by simpler or generalisable models? Could the basic ingredients for 
such collectivism be established? And even if those ingredients were in place, 
did the individuals involved derive the benefits anticipated?  These questions 
were to set the platform for more detailed enquiry.  
1.2. A time of crisis: The relevance and timeliness of this study 
Whilst housing collectivism holds deep personal interest, it is also of relevance 
to contemporary concerns about housing. In England, a complex set of issues 
and policy challenges have emerged in recent times. For decades, the supply of 
housing has been significantly outpaced by new housing need and demand 
(Holmans, 2011). Reports suggest that 60,000 more homes are needed, above 
the levels of output seen in 2014/15, just to keep up with new household 
formation (Wilson, 2016). Across the dominant tenures of home ownership and 
private renting, price rises have created significant burdens on household 
finances, during a period of low wage growth (IFS, 2015). Simple ratios of 
house prices to earnings in England, reveal a rapidly widening ratio over the last 
20 years (DCLG, 2015). This has made homeownership unaffordable to many 
groups, particularly first-time buyers (Corlett et al, 2016). In private rented 
accommodation, as more households have entered this sector, average prices 
have increased in all UK regions, particularly in the two years preceding this 
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research (ONS, 2016). Further to these financial concerns are longstanding 
worries about the quality and condition of such rented accommodation (Davies, 
2013; Gousy, 2014). These represent major concerns about housing provision 
in the private market and whether current prices, being inelastic to changes in 
demand, can only be mitigated by strong government intervention (Archer and 
Cole, 2014: Barker, 2004; Lyons, 2015). These have profound consequences 
on public expenditure, not least in the burgeoning housing benefit bill, which has 
risen to mitigate the effects of price rises (Cooke and Davies, 2014).  
The problems apparent in English housing provision are not, however, confined 
to problems with markets. New housing developed by local authorities or 
housing associations might have countered these market failures (Rutherford, 
2013), but such production has grown only modestly in recent years. Between 
2010 and 2015, an average of 32,000 new homes were built by local authorities 
and housing associations each year (DCLG, 2016a). However, this did not fill 
the gap arising from reduced private sector development. One reason for this is 
that government grants for housebuilding by social landlords were significantly 
reduced in 2011. It was expected that such organisations would make up the 
shortfall by borrowing against projected rental income, boosted by the 
opportunity to charge 'Affordable Rents' at 80 per cent of the local market rent 
on new tenancies (HCA, 2011a). One outcome from this has been increased 
burdens on the finances of such tenants, and greater risk of poverty and 
material deprivation (Tunstall et al, 2013). Alongside changes to funding, social 
housing tenancies in England have undergone reform, reducing security of 
tenure for those entering the sector (Robinson and Walshaw, 2014). Alternative 
tenures, such as shared ownership, have emerged which arguably offer more 
tenure security, seeking to widen access to home ownership. However, 
shortcomings in this tenure have also become apparent, particularly in terms of 
its affordability in a large number of markets (Shannon, 2012; Nanda and 
Parker, 2015).  
Other housing related concerns have become visible. After several decades of 
government programmes seeking to regenerate urban areas (Crisp et al, 2014), 
new policies have emerged to focus on housing estates. These policies aim to 
improve the ‘worst housing estates’ or ‘knock them down and replace them with 
12 
 
high-quality homes’ (HM Government, 2016). Lessons will need to be learnt 
from past regeneration initiatives (Cole, 2012), particularly in accounting for 
resident opposition, and how they can be supported and involved in the process 
(Archer, 2012; Wilson, 2013). Whilst this and the other problems outlined above 
are not restricted to urban areas, the solutions to these problems, aside from 
new garden cities, will likely have to focus on such urban contexts (Javid, 2016). 
The above represents a complex set of inter-related problems, which 
commentators argue constitutes a crisis (Lyons, 2015; House of Lords, 2016). 
Whilst often presented as a crisis of supply, this is manifest in poor levels of 
housing ‘choice, quality and affordability’ (Wilson, 2016, p.35). Current models 
of provision are failing to meet demand and need, and are not providing secure, 
good quality, affordable housing in sufficient quantity. To address problems of 
this magnitude may require the expansion, enhancement and reform of the 
dominant tenures. However, there is also scope to explore and harness new 
forms of housing provision which target some of the issues outlined above. 
1.3. Housing collectivism: A role in remedying current housing 
problems?  
As social beings, working collectively is an innate human response to group-
level problems (Kropotkin, 1902; Ostrom, 1990; Sussman and Cloninger, 2011). 
Perhaps then part of the solution to England’s housing problems can be found 
in organisational forms which harness these predispositions. But what does 
collectivism in housing look like? What form does it take and what types of 
institutions embody such approaches? 
A full answer to these questions is offered in the following pages, along with a 
justification for the use of this key term ‘collectivism’. In England, such housing 
has a long history, emerging from the co-operative movement, first as co-
partnerships between investors and dwellers, then as formal co-ownership 
models, and in more recent times as common ownership and tenant 
management (Birchall, 1992; Rowlands 2009). Other legal and operational 
forms have emerged to secure wider community governance, such as 
community land trusts (Aird, 2009; Paterson and Dayson, 2011; Swann, 1972), 
and intentional communities prioritising social interaction and environmental 
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sustainability (Blandy, 2013; Macamant, 1994). Other forms can harness 
collectivism, such as self-help housing, which seeks to address empty housing 
(Mullins, 2010a), or group self-build schemes (Wallace et al, 2013).  
Such collectivist forms represent attempts to mitigate some of the housing 
problems identified above, but also offer more idealistic visions of how housing 
can affect quality of life and the relationships between residents. The 
international literature in this field suggests that collective forms of housing can 
mitigate housing costs (Birchall, 1988; Davis & Demetrowitz, 2003; Paterson 
and Dayson, 2011), provide housing in good condition alongside other services 
(Clapham and Kintrea, 1992, Rowlands, 2009; Satsangi, 1990), and offer 
enhanced security of tenure to residents (Sousa & Quarter, 2005; Haffner & 
Brunner, 2014; Bunce, 2012; Chatterton, 2014). In addition, it has also been 
suggested that such housing creates a range of quality of life benefits (CMHC, 
2003; Clapham and Kintrea, 1992; Moore and McKee, 2014; Saegert and 
Winkel, 1996). On the basis of this literature, housing collectivism may address 
some of the contemporary housing issues outlined above. However, this wide 
and varied literature has a number of shortcomings. It fails to capture the full 
range of benefits and costs that such housing models create for those involved, 
and crucially how those costs and benefits interrelate and offset one another. It 
also falls short on the critical issue of attribution, explaining how these 
organisational forms give rise to different outcomes for this involved.   
Another cause for reflection is the fact that claims about the potential of housing 
collectives, to remedy the housing problems faced, seem at odds with the scale 
and size of this sector. Whilst there is evidence of a recent growth in some 
collective forms (Heywood, 2016), the housing in this sector constitutes less 
than one per cent of the total housing stock in the UK. In other countries, 
housing collectives constitute a much higher percentage. In Sweden, for 
instance, co-operative housing constitutes 22 per cent of the total housing 
stock, and similarly in Poland (CHI, 2016). This begs fundamental questions as 
to why this sector is so small in the UK, and what constrains and enables the 
development of such models. Available literature provides some answers to this 
question. It identifies important internal factors, for instance, relating to the 
capacities, capabilities and co-ordinated action of residents and members 
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(Bunce, 2016; Moore, 2015; Sungu-Eryilmaz and Greenstein, 2007; Young 
Foundation, 2011). It also reveals external sources of constraint and 
enablement, for instance, in the advice and support provided by external bodies 
(CFS, 2008; Moore and Mullins, 2013; CCMH, 2009), in funding and the 
provision of finance (Birchall, 1988; Chatterton, 2015; CLT Fund, 2016; 
Rowlands, 2009), in the policy and practices of different tiers of government 
(Aird, 2009; CFS, 2008; Clapham and Kintrea, 1992; CMHC, 2005), and in the 
legal structures and practices which relate to property ownership and 
transactions (Clarke, 1997; Morris, 2012). However, a key gap in knowledge 
remains regarding how these factors inter-relate and interact with one another 
to constrain and enable housing collectives in practice.  
1.4. The aims of the study 
The literature relating to housing collectivism suggests that such models could 
help ameliorate contemporary housing problems for certain groups and 
individuals. However, the gaps in knowledge are significant. Firstly, the factors 
affecting their development are not sufficiently understood, and secondly, the 
benefits and costs they deliver are not adequately evidenced. This study targets 
these weaknesses in current knowledge guided by the following research 
questions: 
Research Questions One: What factors have constrained and enabled the 
development of housing collectives? 
Research Question Two: What are the perceived benefits and costs of 
housing collectivism for members and residents, and to what extent are these 
attributable to the form and function of the collectives? 
To address these questions, the study applies empirical research methods 
within a multiple case study design. It uses a set of ideas and techniques from a 
realist tradition and from analytical sociology, to collect and analyse empirical 
data to generate answers.  
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter two traces the lineage of housing 
collectivism, offers a definition of such organisational forms and practices, and 
explores the practical expressions of certain collective forms in the UK. Specific 
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gaps in understanding emerge, directing the empirical work towards specific 
themes and issues. Chapter three then presents lessons from the literature that 
directly address the two research questions. Chapter four outlines the 
framework of concepts and analytical tools which will be used to address the 
research questions, grappling with issues of causal analysis necessitated by the 
nature of the questions posed. The chapter proposes that certain analytical 
approaches can help simplify and explain the processes and relationships 
governing a collective’s development and performance. Chapter five takes 
these conceptual and analytical tools to outline a methodology guiding the 
empirical work of the study. The chapter justifies the adoption of a multiple case 
study design, and outlines the associated processes for case selection, data 
collection and a unique approach to data analysis grounded in retroductive 
reasoning. Chapter six presents short histories and features of the cases 
selected, to briefly outline the chronological development of the collectives. 
Chapters seven to ten present the case study findings, unpicking the internal 
and external factors constraining and enabling the development of the cases, 
and the perceived benefits and costs derived by residents and members of 
those collectives. The conclusion, in chapter eleven, summarises and 
synthesises this learning, offering reflections on its strengths and limitations. 
The chapter sets out the study’s contribution to current knowledge, its 
implications for a variety of different audiences, and potential avenues for future 
research. 
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Chapter Two: Housing Collectivism; intellectual 
origins, definitions and practical expressions 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In the following chapter, the historical and intellectual roots of housing 
collectivism are discussed, setting a context for subsequent discussions. On the 
basis of this context, a definition of housing collectivism is offered, to identify the 
legal forms, operations and practical expressions of such collectivism in 
England. This is followed by a discussion of the history and development of 
diverse types of housing collective in this national context, and draws 
comparisons with movements in other countries. This highlights recurring 
events and patterns which help frame a more detailed review of the literature in 
relation to the research questions. 
2.2. Tracing the intellectual origins of housing collectivism 
The simple idea of collectively owning and managing housing with other people 
has its roots in distinct and overlapping ideas.  As discussed below, modern-day 
housing collectives echo historical ideas linked to, among other things, the 
principles of co-operation and mutualism, the value and practices of common 
ownership or resource management, and ideas relating to pre-figurative action. 
The history and principles of co-operation and mutualism assert a strong 
influence on modern expressions of housing collectivism. The ‘‘voluntarily 
banding together for the common purpose of mutual assistance’ (Mutualist.org, 
2012a) has been depicted as an innate human tendency (Burns et al, 2004; 
Kropotkin, 1902; Sussman and Cloninger, 2011). In response to a variety of 
needs and desires among the working classes in Europe in the 19th century, co-
operation took distinct organisational forms (Thompson, 1966). These were 
premised on ideas of ownership by workers as shareholders in that 
organisation. After models for worker co-operation (Owen, 1827) emerged, in 
Europe prominent thinkers were setting out a vision of mutualism, based on a 
critique of the ‘centralised power of capital and the state’ (Mutualist.org, 2012b). 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s noted phrase ‘property is theft’ was a call for the 
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widest possible distribution of property, particularly land (Mckay, 2011). In terms 
which would be echoed by communitarians some years later (Etzioni, 1997), 
Proudhon espoused a notion of localised order and governance based on 
mutuality. Such ideas were being echoed by others, such as Bakunin, who was 
to introduce the concept of collectivism in his vision of ‘collective ownership of 
property by freely organized producers' associations’ (Dolgoff, 1971, p.262). 
Mutual forms of organisation are the derivatives of these ideas, with ownership 
being vested in the membership, rather than in individual member shares 
(Lewis et al, 2006).  
Borrowing ideas from this tradition of co-operation and mutualism, and how 
property should be owned, arguments for collective ownership of housing have 
been made (Ward, 1985; Birchall; 1988, Chatterton, 2015). Advocates draw on 
Proudhonian ideas in suggesting collective forms of housing, ‘avoid both the 
tyranny of strong state power and the individualism of the market’ (Clapham and 
Kintrea, 1992 p.171), and provide solutions and protections for those poorly 
served by these dominant forces (Swann, 1972). Highlighting the shortcomings 
of public and private housing, advocates suggest that markets turn private 
tenants and owners into ‘inert consumers’ (Ward, 1985, p.10), and that states 
turn social housing tenants into passive and dependent subjects through 
‘remote and paternalistic management’ (Ward and Conway, 2003, p.83).  
Other rationales for collective ownership of housing are found in ideas related to 
the use and management of common resources (Ostrom, 1990), or non-private 
goods held in common ownership. Given historic processes of the enclosure of 
common land in the UK (Wordie, 1983; Polanyi, 2002), and the centrality of land 
in housing provision, ‘commoning’ has a particular resonance with modern-day 
collective action on housing (Bunce, 2016; Thompson; 2015). This in turn links 
to Georgist critiques of landlordism and the need to capture the value of land for 
wider public benefit (Davis, 2014). Collectively owned and managed housing 
has therefore been increasingly presented as a form of ‘commons’ (Minora et al, 
2013), depicted as a response and counter to dominant systems of ownership. 
For instance, Bunce (2016, p. 135) suggests community land trusts (CLTs) are 
a route to creating ‘urban commons’, which can act as a ‘grounded form of 
resistance to land commodification practices’. And Thompson has presented 
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mutual housing organisations as ‘commons… that attempt to express mutual 
relations in institutional form’ (Thompson, 2015a, p.18). Such work highlights 
processes through which land and housing can be controlled for the common 
good. In exploring the forms of organisation that make this possible, 
connections are made to ideas of institutions and institutional theory.   
The notion of institution has a long history, with resurgent interest in recent 
decades as 'new institutionalism' has taken a sociological turn (Rhodes, 2011; 
Meyer, 2007). Early institutionalists sought to frame institutions as the forces 
which shape choices and options for rational actors. Running counter to this 
scholars have highlighted the limits of agency in social settings, or the 
'embedded non-actorhood in what were supposed to be political, economic, and 
cultural choices' (Meyer, 2007, p.789). Scholars have sought to highlight how 
institutions (including organisations like collectives) can shape individual 
behaviour. Scott (1995) sets out three pillars of institutions, as being regulative, 
normative and cognitive processes. Each of these components of an institution 
shape behaviour through, for instance, legal sanctioning (regulative processes), 
moral codes (normative processes) and cultural or taken for granted ideas 
(cognitive processes). The significance of such ideas to housing collectives 
become clear in light of; 1) their operation within legal systems governing 
property ownership and their ability to write binding internal rules; 2) the 
likelihood of normative processes being used to ensure collaboration and co-
operation between members; and 3) collectives being situated within, and 
having the capacity to preference, wider cultural factors. Housing collectives 
are, in this sense, institutions and they have increasingly become seen as 
institutions to create and maintain common property.   
Other arguments for housing collectivism have emerged from within wider 
economic debates, which inform differing models of ownership. In navigating 
the space between private and public ownership, dominant economic 
arguments in favour of markets (Lachman, 2000; Fama, 1970) and state 
ownership (Stiglitz, 2000) have had to be countered. One other particularly 
enduring argument against collectivism was made by Engels (1997[1872], 
p.42), who suggested that such alternative forms of housing merely transformed 
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workers ‘into capitalists without them ceasing to be workers’. As Hodkinson 
suggests; 
‘…capitalist social relations engender crisis in housing conditions as well 
as make housing alternatives both difficult and potentially reactionary… 
Any project aimed at creating alternative housing in the here and now is 
thus discouraged because it cannot transform the entire system 
(Hodkinson, 2012, p.435). 
Hence, attempts at ‘self-help’ are portrayed as merely useful additions to the 
discourse and praxis of capitalists, or doomed to fail by working within the 
dominant capitalist ideology (Engelsman, 2016).  
The response of advocates to such arguments reveals another important 
intellectual foundation and rationale for housing collectivism. This relates to the 
pre-figurative potential of housing collectivism, enabling residents to live-out the 
change desired in the wider world (Boggs, 1977; Hodkinson, 2012; Chomsky, 
1997). As John Holloway (2010, p.83) has noted ‘our only option is to fight from 
the particular, but then we clash against the force of the whole’. In his guide to 
developing mutual homeownership schemes, Chatterton (2015) states; 
‘…groups may be more agitational towards the big state and market…But 
whatever the stance, there are pragmatic moments when all projects have 
to deal with policy, red tape, bureaucracy and regulation…as it is trying to 
prefigure the future world they hope for’. (Chatterton, 2015, p.14). 
Here again housing collectives are located in the space between markets and 
states, with the potential to navigate (with certain pragmatism) the current 
systems and norms regarding the development of housing. This counter to 
Marxist critiques echoes early socialist ideas predating statist Marxism, where 
social injustice would be tackled through associations and local collectives of 
workers and producers (Schumpeter, 1994[1954]). This connects back with 
ideas of co-operation and mutualism as models for member ownership and 
control.   
The rationales for modern-day collective ownership of housing assert the 
importance of control and autonomy, drawing on a rich literature and set of 
political and economic ideas. Collective ownership of housing, in its varied 
forms, is depicted as a means to protect members from private interests and 
markets, as well as the interference of the state. It is presented as an alternative 
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to individual or public proprietorship by treating physical assets as common 
resources, whilst providing a pre-figurative means to assert some control over 
the ‘future world’. Whilst not all modern expressions of housing collectivism 
consciously draw on this lineage, it is woven into the language, legal forms and 
rationales which shape such activity. 
2.3. Defining housing collectivism in England 
From these common strands of thought housing collectivism can take varied 
organisational forms. There are various legal and operational models in which 
housing can be owned, and/or managed, by the people living in that housing or 
local area. In England, such forms can include community land trusts, co-
housing initiatives, mutual homeownership societies, self-help housing 
organisations, and collective self-build groups. Other models for tenant 
management are closely related, but may not comprise collective ownership of 
property. Such labels express, and emphasise, differences in some of the 
following; the legal form of the organisation; the operational and governance 
practices adopted; the desired outcomes and nature of the housing provided; 
and, how property is owned. Given that such labels try to express difference 
along these complex dimensions, it is no wonder that definitional precision is 
problematic.  
Definitional challenges might be exemplified with regard to ‘housing co-
operatives’. This term hints at a specific type of legal entity, a co-operative 
society (HM Government, 2014a), yet it also denotes a set of long established 
operational principles (ICA, 2015) and a more ethereal set of aspirations and 
values regarding reciprocity among members. It also signifies a range of 
approaches to ownership, of both equity and physical property. Separating 
these distinct elements to get to a clear meaning or definition can be difficult, 
particularly when comparisons are made across national jurisdictions (Lang, 
2015).  
To encapsulate activity across a range of different housing models where 
housing is owned and managed collectively, generic concepts have emerged. 
Important work has been undertaken by Aiken et al (2011) in defining the forms 
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and practices of ‘community-based organisations’ who own land or buildings. 
They define such organisations as those; 
‘…located within a physical community, which may consist of a 
neighbourhood, village, town, conurbation or small island but only 
exceptionally a county or wider region. The main (if not exclusive) focus of 
the organisation’s work is to seek benefits for certain defined people or 
places in the locality where it is based. It will have a governance structure 
independent of public or private sector organisations’ (Aiken et al, 2011). 
Whilst not specific to the provision and ownership of housing, a number of 
features appear prominent in this definition. These relate to the geographical 
remit of the organisations, the defined benefits for specified people and places, 
and the nature of the governance model.  
Additional concepts have emerged to delineate these types of organisations, 
focusing specifically on housing provision. A recent addition to the lexicon has 
been ‘community-led housing’, which is taken to mean; 
‘…homes that are developed and/or managed by local people or 
residents, in not for profit organisational structures. The detail of the 
organisational structure can be varied, but governance should be 
overseen by people who either live or work in the locality of benefit or are 
direct beneficiaries’ (Gooding, 2015, p.4).  
The government body in England charged with facilitating physical 
development, the Homes and Communities Agency, has used a similar 
definition, highlighting that community-led housing covers ‘a range of 
models…CLTs, mutuals and co-operatives, co-housing, self-build and others’ 
(HCA in Lang, 2015, p.24). Attempts have been made to draft a legal definition 
of community-led housing, to be enshrined in legislation (BSHF, 2016a). This 
aligns with much of the above, but with clauses to specify a maximum number 
of dwellings owned by the organisations in question. Whether housing 
collectives should be defined in terms of the size of their housing stock, and 
whether size effects the extent of local control, remains to be seen. However, 
this does reveal how community-led housing is demarcated from larger housing 
associations which purport to be ‘community-led’. This clause reveals how, as 
social housing in the UK has become increasingly provided by larger housing 
associations (Mullins, 2010b; Pawson and Sosenko 2008), models have 
emerged which assert the importance of localised ownership and control. 
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An arguably narrower definition of such housing forms is offered by Minora et al 
(2013), who use the phrase of ‘self-organised communities’ to explore the 
‘habitability’ of housing projects in England and Italy. The authors define ‘self-
organised communities’ as; 
‘groups of inhabitants sharing interests, living in specific localities, 
developing a set of rules and an organisational structure to own, develop, 
or manage housing assets for the common good’ (Minora et al, 2013, 
p.34). 
This definition highlights the importance of shared interests, rules and 
governance structures in such organisational forms. It directs attention to similar 
features of such organisations; their territoriality, their adoption of non-profit 
making structures, voluntary membership, their use of formal and informal 
contracts between members, their assertion of reciprocity and solidarity 
between members, and their desire to enhance their environment.  
Whilst such definitions of collective housing may fail to capture completely the 
phenomena being studied, the overlaps between these definitions reveal a 
certain coherence. They emphasise action in a specific geography, working for 
the benefit of a defined group, and acting in a non-profit making capacity.  
It is notable, however, that most of these definitions are disconnected from the 
historical roots of this activity, and fail to capture some of the inherent qualities 
of it. Minora et al’s (2013) definition rightly highlights how such organisations 
are constituted of collectives of individuals with shared interests, willing to co-
operate because neither states nor markets are delivering on their interests. For 
referential precision, the concept of collectivism is valuable here, as it connects 
these practices and organisations back with ideas about local control and 
mutuality, orientated around shared aspirations. Furthermore, the concept of 
collectivism directs us to important ideas and theories around collective-action 
by groups of people (Olson,1965; Ostrom, 1997). The empirical work in this 
study emphasises how the costs and benefits derived by members of the 
collectives, and the constraints and enablements which influence their 
development, are in part a product of these collective-action dynamics.  
Finally, the term collective helps link to ontological ideas about the properties of 
groups of people. Through enduring internal relations and shared identities, 
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groups can have properties that are not reducible to the aggregate properties of 
its members (Harre, 1993). These ideas about collective properties are 
important in understanding the processes and outcomes collectives can 
achieve.  
Given the above, this study uses the term collective housing, or housing 
collective, to describe organisations with different forms and functions. Such 
collectives are defined as; 
A set of people and shared interests organised within a non-profit making 
organisation, with a defined geographical remit, which owns and uses land and 
housing collectively for the benefit of a defined group of people. 
2.4. Housing collectivism in England: Forms and trajectories 
Having established some common characteristics for this activity, it is important 
to explore what this looks like in practice, and consider why it has remained only 
marginal in the English housing system. This reveals historical patterns in the 
constraint and enablement of collectivist forms, and how collectives have 
emerged to respond to new needs or desired outcomes.  
As noted above there are a variety of collective forms and functions in England 
which meet the definition presented above. Cohousing is a model of collectivism 
where the design of housing and operational processes focus on social 
interaction between dwellers, and their participation in maintenance and 
management (Blandy, 2013; Cohousing Network, 2016; Macamant, 2014). Self-
help housing is a model which focuses on ‘bringing back into use empty 
properties’, usually within a non-profit legal structure, and focusing on volunteer 
training and involvement in renovations (Self-help Housing.org, 2016). These 
models expanded in the 1970s and 1980s (Mullins, 2010a), and have seen a 
resurgence in recent years as a social enterprise sector has created new 
opportunities (Moore and Mullins, 2013). Other models worthy of note are 
collective self-build groups, particularly those which sustain some collectivism 
after the development of new housing (Diggers Self-build Co-op, 2012), and 
housing associations where, constitutionally and in practice, residents have a 
high degree of control over decision making (Rosenberg, undated). A new, but 
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rare, form of commonhold association might also be added to this list (Wilson, 
2001).  
Two specific collective forms are worthy of in-depth discussion here; co-
operatives and CLTs. These are of particular interest to this study for two 
reasons. Firstly, combined these forms of collective account for a large majority 
of such activity in the UK (Heywood, 2016; CCH, 2016). Secondly, these forms 
express subtle differences in collectivist approaches to housing, and different 
pathways to collective ownership and control.  
Co-operative housing 
Whilst a precise definition of housing co-operatives is difficult to secure (Lang, 
2015; Birchall, 1992), this term denotes, in its broadest sense, member-owned 
housing organisations applying co-operative principles (Lang, 2015; Rowlands, 
2009). In various countries worldwide, co-operative housing is a relatively 
mainstream model for housing ownership and control. In Sweden co-operative 
housing constitutes 22 per cent of the housing stock, with comparable rates in 
Norway (15 per cent), and to a lesser extent Austria (8 per cent) and Germany 
(6 per cent) (Moreau and Pittini, 2012). However, in England, co-operative 
housing, alongside other mutual housing models, constitutes just 0.6 per cent of 
housing supply. This directs attention to how national conditions might shape 
such collectivism, and the features of these conditions which are most 
significant. Outside of England, there are differences in other UK nations which 
have created varying contexts for housing collectivism. This is most obvious in 
Scotland, where devolved policy and law making functions have created a 
framework for co-operative and other collective housing forms which is 
markedly different to England (McKee, 2010; Scott, 1997). Outside of England 
the salience of homeownership appears less prevalent.   
Allowing for such contextual differences, common origins for co-operative 
housing in the UK may be posited. Commentators suggest there have been 
three phases in the development of this housing movement (Rowlands, 2009; 
Birchall, 1991), defined by particular models and dominant ideas. Rowlands 
(2009) presents these phases as; 1) co-partnership, 2) co-ownership and, 3) 
common ownership and tenant management. 
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Co-partnership models grew from the building societies/clubs of the early 
nineteenth century. From the Tenant Co-operators in 1887, through to the 
garden cities developed in early part of twentieth century, these were all 
experiments in forms of collective investment, control and/or ownership of 
housing by those who lived in them. However, recurrent patterns can be seen in 
how control and ownership diminished. As Birchall notes; 
‘…even in the cooperative movement, the ‘individual landlord’ has 
prevailed over the ‘collective dweller’ type of tenure’ (Birchall, 1991, p.4).  
The garden city and garden suburbs movement, whilst providing a model for 
collective financing of development and municipal services (Howard, 
2007[1901]), departed from the core co-operative principles (Rowlands, 2009; 
ICA, 2015). Whilst expressing ideals of co-operation and mutual benefit, 
management of these trusts was left to ‘gentlemen of responsible position and 
undoubted probity and honour’ (Howard, 1901, p.13), at the cost of dweller 
control. 
Such models, whilst building over 8000 dwellings between 1901 and 1912 
(Birchall, 1991), dwindled as local councils began developing housing on a 
large scale. This points to a major structural constraint on co-operative 
developments; in certain periods co-operatives thrived when the state receded, 
and dwindled when States were proactive in housing development. Ultimately, 
shifts in British politics, toward social democracy, determined the fate of co-
partnership (Tims, 1966). 
The development of co-ownership schemes marked a progression to a second 
phase, and one which focused on dweller ownership of housing. The idea of co-
ownership was imported to the UK from Scandinavia. The construction process 
for the housing was generally managed by founder members, who tended to be 
architects, estate agents and builders who were allowed to charge fees 
(Birchall, 1991). Once the scheme was completed ownership would pass to a 
collective of residents who would be co-owners and also individual tenants 
(Rowlands, 2009). 
Facilitated by the Housing Act 1961and Finance Act 1963, which led to grant 
funding and tax reliefs for such schemes, the number of co-ownership societies 
expanded rapidly, and by 1977 there were 1,222 in existence owning over 
26 
 
40,000 dwellings (Birchall, 1991). Despite the legislative backing, co-ownership 
societies were beset with problems. Unhindered by regulation, the schemes 
often went over budget and used poor quality or experimental materials. In 
many cases ownership of the housing never transferred to the dwellers 
(Birchall, 1991).  
A third phase in the development of co-operative housing, beginning in the 
1970s, might also be identified. This was marked by new co-operatives created 
to undertake housebuilding, short-life co-operatives to occupy empty dwellings, 
and other tenant-led co-operatives to own and manage social housing 
(Rowlands, 2009). 
Various legislation and grant programmes, notably in the Housing Rents and 
Subsidies Act (1975), enabled co-operative bodies to access public funds 
through housing association grant programmes. With the expansion of such co-
operative models, a number of secondary co-operatives were developed as 'co-
ops of co-ops'. These secondary co-operatives helped generate economies of 
scale in purchasing and provision that made housing more cost effective to 
provide (Rowlands, 2009). A number of such secondary co-operatives are in 
existence today, for example Radical Routes, which provides financial and 
technical support to housing co-operatives not in receipt of government grants, 
whilst also encouraging the adoption of certain principles and practices (Radical 
Routes, 2011a).  
Changes in public funding in 1988 meant that housing organisations had to 
raise significantly more private finance for development, acting as a major 
constraint on future co-operative housing. New co-operative models have 
emerged to work within this different financial environment. The Community 
Gateway model, such as that developed in Preston (Community Gateway 
Association, 2016), comprises a partnership body which includes the local 
authority, a housing association and five neighbourhood level co-operatives. It 
was devised as a vehicle for stock transfers, where tenant control and decision 
making is prioritised. Here connections are made with a rich tradition of tenant 
participation in social housing (Bradley, 2014; Hickman, 2006), and this 
provided the stimulus for collective ownership models to emerge in social 
housing. In recent times the language of mutualism has become more obvious, 
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as the mutualisation of certain housing associations has taken place (RBH, 
2011). 
From 2010 changes in the UK political context created a new set of conditions 
affecting the development of housing collectivism. Broad visions of ‘localism’ 
and a ‘Big Society’ emerged, which began to orientate policy (including housing 
policy) around certain communitarian ideas and notions of localised control and 
responsibility (Jacobs and Manzi, 2013; Moore, 2011). Communitarian ideas 
assert the need to not only re-stimulate civil society, but to ‘remoralize’ it 
(Etzioni, 1997, p.96). Such theorists suggest that social ties and mutuality 
should be ‘nourished’ to; 
‘…maintain social order while ensuring such attachments will not suppress 
all autonomous expressions’ (Etzioni, 1997, p.27).  
Localism agendas, therefore, have sought to increase the role and activity of 
civil society, to address local issues related to housing. In so doing it was hoped 
this would strengthen the social ties upon which societal norms and order can 
be maintained.  
This brief history of housing co-operatives raises important questions. Why is 
this form of housing comparatively small in England? What forces and factors 
have really shaped their development? And is this connected to their capacity to 
meet certain housing needs? These are critical questions if one is interested in 
the potential of such housing to tackle certain housing problems. The above 
history hints at possible answers, suggesting the importance of internal 
dynamics, relations and governance in shaping their development, but also the 
role of external agencies, such as governments and investors, in dictating the 
conditions and resources in which such organisations develop.   
Community Land Trusts (CLTs)  
The concept of a CLT has its origins in the United States (US), as a direct 
product of the civil rights movement, and guided by the Indian Land Gift 
movement and later Gramdan (Davis, 2010; Satsangi, 2007). The former had 
led to millions of acres of land being donated to poor Indian households by the 
mid-1950s. However, over time the new owners succumbed to pressure from 
speculators and repossessions by lenders, which meant their lands were lost. 
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The Gramdan movement ensured gifts of land were made to village councils, 
not individuals, who held the land in trust and then leased it to poor households.  
Swann (1972) and others saw the importance of this type of governance 
arrangement, and set out replicate it in rural America to address the plight of 
rural black communities. New Communities Inc. was founded in 1969 as a 'non-
profit organisation to hold land in perpetual trust for the permanent use of rural 
communities' (Davis, 2010). In such trusts, non-residents could become 
members so that the organisation could draw on their support and resources. 
This was an application of lessons learnt from Indian land movements, valuing 
networks beyond the narrow geography of where the land is located. Reflecting 
on Swann's ideas Davis notes: 
'These activists understood that such a radical experiment in racial 
advancement could survive in the hostile environment of southeast 
Georgia only through the continuing participation of sympathetic outsiders 
who might never live at New Communities themselves' (Davis, 2010, 
p.18). 
CLTs in the US grew, and large expressions of this, such as the Champlain 
Housing Trust (CHT), have developed as a model for collectivism that allows for 
equity to be held and released by individual dwellers. The model can be 
summarised as follows; 
‘…through a perpetual ground lease CHT gives owner occupiers full rights 
to the land for the duration of their occupancy (and that of their heirs), but 
requires that equity is shared on resale, thus ensuring permanent 
affordability’ (BSHF, 2016b, online). 
Under this conception CHT allows for a degree of dweller control, but also wider 
community participation and collective ownership of land. The organisation is 
governed by a board of trustees where; one third represent the people who live 
locally, one third are local stakeholders such as local government, and one third 
represent interests of people living in properties on CHT land. This points to a 
form and function of governance which can look very different to that of purely 
dweller owned housing. In the US, CLTs have emerged to tackle specific urban 
issues, such as housing abandonment and dereliction. For example, The 
Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative, in Boston, was set up to tackle a legacy 
of derelict and neglected sites in the area (DSNI, 2016) through a CLT 
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structure. This has resulted in the remediation of land and the building of 
several hundred affordable homes.  
In the early 2000s, there was increasing interest in the CLT model in England 
(Conaty et al, 2003; Countryside Agency, 2005). This led to a demonstration 
project which ran between 2006 and 2008, and a further support programme 
between 2008 and 2010. This sought to provide or broker support for newly 
forming CLTs, but also to try to ‘create the conditions for them to flourish 
independently’ through learning networks and advocacy (Moore and Mullins, 
2013, p.13). These programmes had a number of specific objectives; the 
promotion of the CLT concept, widening the understanding of how CLTs form 
and operate, encouraging CLT partnerships with housing associations, and the 
provision of direct support to emerging CLTs (Aird, 2009).  
In 2008 the definition of a CLT was enshrined in law (HM Government, 2008a) 
as advocates argued that; 
‘CLTs differ fundamentally from public housing providers and should be 
treated differently. They are more than just a vehicle for affordable housing 
provision, but are also vehicles for empowering both urban and rural 
communities’ (Paterson, 2008, p.3 cited in Moore and Mullins, 2013, p.14). 
This newly recognised legal status was helpful in negotiating new arrangements 
to access government grants through the then Affordable Homes Programme 
(HCA, 2011c). In 2008, the CLT Fund was created by several charitable 
funders, providing small grants for technical support for CLTs, along with 
development finance. This was then followed by the development of a National 
CLT Network in 2010, which would; 
‘…provide funding, resources, training and advice for CLTs and work with 
Government, local authorities, lenders and funders to establish the best 
conditions for CLTs to grow’ (CLT Network, 2016a).  
Subsequently this intermediary organisation has played a key role in the growth 
of CLTs in England (Moore and Mullins, 2013). Linked to this, has been the 
emergence of umbrella CLTs have emerged which operate within counties or 
across regions, providing advice and support to local CLT groups, but also 
acquiring and developing land for housing themselves where appropriate 
(Moore, 2010). 
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The number of CLTs grew rapidly from the late 2000s, taking the form of largely 
volunteer-run bodies operating in tightly defined geographical areas (CLT 
Network, 2016b; Lang, 2015), as advocates depicted them as a model to 
‘create a more diverse tenure pattern to suit local housing needs’ (Paterson and 
Dayson, 2011, p.11). In such narratives the echoes of early mutualist thought, 
and the importance of local control and autonomy, are observed. 
In 2014, charitable funding was secured to support the development of urban 
CLTs, in both high-value London property markets (London CLT, 2016), and 
low value regeneration areas (Archer, 2012; Thompson, 2015a). In contrast to 
the US, where 60 per cent of CLTs operate in urban areas (Sungu-Eryilmaz and 
Greenstein, 2007), in England CLTs have been a largely rural phenomenon. 
This new urban programme sought to create a ‘movement of successful urban 
CLTs on the ground, and active support for urban CLTs from local authorities 
and funders’ (CLT Network, 2016c). The impact of this on the CLTs supported, 
and the extent to which it has catalysed additional urban CLTs, is not yet clear. 
What is apparent is that certain government initiatives linked to a new ‘localism’ 
agenda have supported the growth of CLTs (Moore and Mckee, 2012). The 
emergence of new ‘community rights’ and dedicated funding for ‘community-led 
development’ (My Community, 2016a: 2016b), alongside regulatory changes, 
have created more conducive conditions for CLTs to develop. The sector has 
also been exempted from new government policies which require social 
landlords to reduce their rents (CLT Network, 2016g).  
At the time of writing there are approximately 175 CLTs in England and Wales 
(CLT Network, 2016b). By 2011 CLTs had developed 229 properties, with a 
projection that 3000 CLT properties will be built by 2020 (CLT Network, 2016d). 
Understanding the development of English CLTs is aided by comparisons with 
the Scottish CLT movement. Here, the land trust movement is much further 
advanced, in part, due to the creation of a government backed Community Land 
Unit in 1997 and the subsequent Land Reform Act (2003).  The impetus for this 
development in Scotland was the historic concentration of land ownership, 
giving the idea of land reform a long-run historical dimension (Bryden and 
Geisler, 2007). As Moore and Mckee note; 
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‘Community land ownership in Scotland has not been premised solely on 
its ability to deliver housing. Rather, it has been promoted as a remedy to 
historical patterns of concentrated feudal land ownership and associated 
socioeconomic problems’ (Moore and Mckee, 2012, p.281). 
The Land Reform Act introduced a series of rights for communities to purchase 
land in their area, which have become commonly known as ‘buyouts’ 
(Wikipedia, 2013). A Scottish Land Fund was created with an initial £10m to 
support community groups to buy-out landlords, and this has supported over 
239 buyouts. Over 500,000 acres of land has become owned by land and 
property trusts in recent years (Carrell, 2012). 
In the early 2000s, a hybrid CLT model was theorised which combined both a 
CLT and a co-operative body (Conaty et al, 2003). This aimed to create a 
structure to assure housing affordability (Rogers, 2009). The model suggested 
that a CLT could own land on which housing would be built, with a Mutual 
Homeownership Society (MHOS), a co-operative body, leasing that land to build 
and occupy subsequent housing. Following the construction of the housing, the 
total value of the development would be divided into equity units. The members 
of the MHOS would take up a certain amount of these units depending on their 
income and the build costs of their house, making monthly repayments towards 
this equity in return for the housing. When a member wished to leave, their 
equity units would be valued in a way that was indexed to local earnings, rather 
than the housing market. There are only a handful of emerging MHOS, perhaps 
the most prominent of which is LILAC in Leeds, which (legally) is structured 
more like an ownership co-operative. (LILAC, 2016).  
In summary, CLTs adopt different operational forms, and stress different 
organisational priorities, to many housing co-operatives. However, they still 
draw heavily on the central ideas of localised, member control, and on the 
holding of land and housing in common ownership. They allow for wider 
community participation beyond those housed, and embrace individualised 
ownership more readily. The factors which have constrained and enabled their 
development show some marked similarities to co-operative housing. Again, 
internal dynamics relating to forms of ownership, and member and resident 
involvement, emerge as significant factors in their development. External 
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bodies, such as governments, advisors and funding bodies have shaped their 
emergence in significant ways.  
2.5. Emerging questions 
Engagement with the literature on the historic development of co-operative 
housing and CLTs, raises persistent questions about why they have grown and 
receded in different periods. The patterns and changes in their development 
tells us little about the outcomes they have created for the people and places 
where they have formed.  
To understand the potential of housing collectives to address contemporary 
housing problems, requires elucidating the factors shaping how and under what 
conditions they develop, and understanding the patterns of outcomes, both 
positive and negative, that they create for different parties. Without answers to 
these questions the potential contribution of such collectivism will remain 
unclear. Such reflections were the basis for a more targeted review of the 
literature, from which this study’s research questions emerged.  
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Chapter Three: The development and outcomes 
of housing collectivism 
 
The preceding chapter set a broad agenda to explore the development and 
outcomes of housing collectives. This chapter presents the results of detailed 
reviews of literature relating to these two themes, exploring predominantly UK 
and North American literature, but also drawing on studies from other European 
countries. It presents insights on the varied factors influencing the development 
of housing collectives, introducing the key concepts of constraint and 
enablement, and using these to organise the insights from the literature. The 
second section of the chapter focuses on the literature regarding the outcomes 
of such activity for various actors, utilising the concepts of cost and benefit. The 
chapter’s conclusion draws this learning together, identifying the gaps in 
knowledge this research seeks to address, and therefore the research 
questions guiding the study.  
3.1. The constraint and enablement of housing collectivism 
When faced with the task of understanding how collectives develop, and what 
forces and factors influences this, it rapidly became apparent that other 
conceptual devices would be required. This was for two reasons; firstly, to 
identify and prioritise the most relevant literature, since nearly all of the literature 
in this field discusses development issues to some extent; and secondly, to 
organise that knowledge in a way that explains the marginality of such housing 
forms in the English housing system, and ultimately its potential to grow. 
The literature discussed above revealed factors affecting the development of 
collectives which were manifestly internal to those organisations, for instance, 
the relations between members or models of governance. Factors were also 
identified which flowed from their contexts and the actions of external bodies, 
such as governments or funders. The concepts of internal and external were 
used initially to identify and categorise any development factors evident in the 
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A further set of concepts was needed to differentiate between those factors 
facilitating collective development, and those that hindered it. Reviews of 
sociological literature, relating to the interplay between social structures and 
individual agency, led to Giddens’ (1984) use of the terms constraint and 
enablement. Giddens uses these terms to describe the structures which shape, 
and are the product of, agency. Such concepts offered the potential to bridge 
over structural and agential factors in the development of collectives, to 
understand the range of factors which help and hinder these activities.  
Using the concepts outlined above, literature was identified which promised to 
provide insights into these issues. Employing database searches, and cross 
referencing citations, a varied literature was identified from a range of 
academic, policy and advocacy sources, of both UK and international origin. 
From this review certain types of internal and external constraints and 
enablements were identified and organised. The table below summarises these 
factors, before discussing them in detail in the remainder of the section.  
Table 1: A summary of factors constraining and enabling housing collectivism 
 Factors constraining 
development 
Factors enabling 
development 
Internal 
Member and resident 
capacity and capability 
The time, commitments and 
needs of members and 
residents 
Member and resident self-
interest  
The organisation and co-
ordination of member and 
resident time and energy 
Low levels of participation 
by members and residents 
Governance structures and 
processes which encourage 
collective action and co-
operation  
 
Socio-economic conditions 
dis-incentivising collectivism 
Socio-economic conditions 
incentivising collectivism 
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External 
 
National policy making, 
programmes and regulation 
dis-incentivising or 
proscribing collectivism 
National policy making, 
programmes and regulation 
incentivising or prescribing 
collectivism 
Policies and practices in 
local governments dis-
incentivising or proscribing 
collectivism 
Policies and practices in local 
governments incentivising or 
prescribing collectivism 
Limited access to key 
resources, including land 
and finance 
Access to key resources, 
including land and finance 
The absence of supportive 
partner organisations, 
partners hindering collective 
development 
The presence of supportive 
partner organisations  
Limited access to technical 
advice and professional 
services 
Access to technical advice 
and professional services 
 
The following review of the literature teases out some of the subtleties of these 
factors, revealing variance in their influence, in light of collectives operating with 
different populations and members, with different external bodies, and in 
varying socio-economic and political conditions.  
The internal constraints on housing collectivism  
Studies reveal a varied set of internal constraints shaping the development of 
collectives. Of particular note are those that relate to the capacities and 
capabilities of collective members and activists, their motives and potential for 
self-interest, and issues of participation by those connected with the 
organisation.  
The reliance of collectives on the efforts of a small number of individuals, often 
acting in a voluntary capacity, can be a significant constraint (Aird, 2009; 
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Heywood, 2016; Moore, 2015; Sungu-Eryilmaz and Greenstein, 2007; Young 
Foundation, 2011). Housing collectivism is often predicated on individuals 
providing their time and energy voluntarily, and this may constrain even the 
initial formation of such organisations. As Clapham and Kintrea (1992) have 
noted, among possible founders of certain housing collectives there may be; 
 ‘…reluctance to bear the costs of running a co-operative in terms of the 
time, effort and acceptance of responsibility (Clapham and Kintrea, 1992, 
p.177). 
Reflecting on the potential for tenants to become collective owners of their 
social housing, Birchall highlighted further barriers to the formation of 
collectives, which relate simply to their ‘lack of awareness of opportunities’ 
(Birchall, 1988, p.194). If such groups do not possess knowledgeable activists, 
or housing policy specialists, then their awareness of such opportunities is likely 
to be diminished.  
Even when there is willingness amongst a group of individuals to bear the 
personal costs of running a collective, further constraints can arise. Firstly, such 
individuals can lack the skills required to navigate the complexities of 
transferring ownership and managing a physical asset effectively (Young 
Foundation, 2011; Aiken et al, 2008). Building the required knowledge can take 
time, and volunteers find themselves learning on-the-job, and relying heavily on 
the support of technical advisors. 
Developing organisations to collectively own and manage housing is a highly 
complex task (Paterson and Dayson, 2011). Complexities lie in the constitution 
and good governance of the organisation formed. Housing co-operatives, CLTs 
and other mutual models operate complicated legal structures, and their 
formation and continued operation can confuse and frustrate volunteers with no 
background knowledge (CMHC, 2005, Conaty et al, 2003; Minora et al, 2013). 
Yet, this understanding is critical to the continued ownership and operation of 
the organisation, as their financial viability may be marginal and therefore they 
need strong governance and decision-making procedures (Aird, 2009). This 
suggests that the organisational form a collective adopts may be a constraint in 
itself. Clapham and Kintrea’s work on housing co-operatives highlights how the 
development of such collectives ‘is long, often difficult and time-consuming’ 
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(Clapham and Kintrea, 1992, p.178). This highlights a specific set of barriers to 
entry for this form of housing, which are not present in owner-occupation or 
rented accommodation.  
Another constraint lies in the capacity of members and volunteers to handle the 
necessary transition such organisations must make, from an initial community 
mobilising and organising role, to a property owner and/or landlord. As Paterson 
and Dayson (2011, p.21) have noted, such organisations find themselves 
‘grappling with forming an institution…[whilst needing to be] aware of and ready 
for a long term management commitment’. 
The reliance on a small number of individuals often serves to jeopardise the 
long-term sustainability of the organisation. As Moore (2014) notes, 
dependence on a handful of individuals creates; 
 ‘…a concentration of knowledge and skills may affect the future 
succession planning of CLT boards’ (Moore, 2014, p.iv). 
In the housing co-operative sector this is similarly acknowledged, as studies 
have revealed it is ‘always the same people’ tasked with managing co-operative 
schemes (CCMH, 2009, p.51). Linked to this is the scale of demands on 
individuals often operating in a voluntary role. CLTs are often fuelled by 
volunteers who commit a ‘huge amount of time’ (Moore, 2015, p.5). Constraints 
therefore lie in the over-reliance on a limited number of people who are required 
to give up significant time and energy (Heywood, 2016). 
This issue has been explored more generally by scholars trying to understand a 
range of ‘collective action’ situations (Olson.1965). Olson introduced the notion 
of a ‘freerider’ as someone who uses ‘public or collectively provided goods, 
services and benefits without paying the costs’ (Calhoun, 2002, p.76-77). 
Because an individual’s contribution to a collective good may make only a 
minimal impact, the removal of that contribution may be tolerated or missed 
because of its marginal effect. Despite this, the non-contributing individual can 
still receive that good because it is a collective provision.  
Olson saw free-riding as a situation unique to collective goods where people 
could not be excluded from their use. This differs from housing collectives, 
which have mechanisms for exclusion, such as eviction. Nonetheless, his ideas 
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have a resonance, given evidence regarding member participation in housing 
collectives. Firmly based on a ‘rational choice’ understanding of human action, 
Olson asserts that ‘rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve 
their common or group interests’ without certain incentives (Olson, 1965, p.2). 
Individuals act collectively only if there are ‘selective incentives’ which reward 
those who contribute and punish those who do not.  
A key problem with Olson’s logic is that it is hard to explain the participation of 
active volunteers in housing collectives purely in terms of rational self-interest. 
Whilst such volunteers may well see individual benefits for their participation, 
and suffer consequences for non-participation, Olson’s theories leave little room 
for altruism or motives that flow from shared interests. Indeed, the work of 
Ostrom (1997) has provided evidence that; 
‘…individuals [can] achieve results that are "better than rational" by 
building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to 
overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest’ (Ostrom, 1997, 
p.1). 
Studies of co-operatives have revealed a more nuanced picture of ‘mutual 
incentives’ driving member participation, which comprises both individualistic 
and collectivistic incentives (Birchall and Simmons, 2004). The latter identifies 
motives among co-operators that flow from shared goals, shared values and 
feeling a sense of community (Birchall and Simmons, 2004, p.8). Other studies 
shed light on the inadequacies of such self-interest models in explaining 
collective action in urban development (Webster, 2003; Nelson, 2002). 
Whilst Olson’s conception of the free-rider fails to account for non-rational 
action, it does provide a useful set of propositions to help explain low 
participation in housing collectives. Olson’s theories make specific reference to 
freeriding in small groups (which is pertinent to most housing collectives). He 
sees in these scenarios a ‘systematic tendency for "exploitation” of the great by 
the small’ (Olson, 1965, p.30). Evidence for such scenarios is seen in the 
collective housing literature, and in related fields (Aiken et al, 2008; CCMH, 
2009). 
Further internal constraints flow from the economic status of those within 
collectives. The successful development of collectives may become a matter of; 
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‘…survival of the fittest’ where those with the time and affluence to engage 
in civic action benefit, while marginalised populations remain on the 
fringes’ (Moore and McKee, 2012, p.288). 
This assertion that only affluent communities have the time, energy and skills to 
own and manage housing collectively seems intuitive, but there is limited 
empirical evidence to support this. In the US, the majority of CLTs are based in 
very low or low income neighbourhoods (Sungu-Eryilmaz and Greenstein, 
2007). Other studies of housing co-operatives in the US suggest that ‘a 
willingness to work hard, an ability to stick with tough problems, [and] optimism 
about their own abilities’ are important traits of co-operative leaders, and 
question whether this will be more or less prevalent in low income communities 
(Saegert and Winkel, 1996, p.455). Saegert and Winkel go on to suggest that it 
is the broader involvement of all collective members in collective activities that 
is a bigger determinant of the co-operative’s success (Saegert and Winkel, 
1996, p.545). Where this is not in place, significant constraints emerge. 
Various literature relating to CLTs echo this (Young Foundation, 2011; Bunce, 
2016; Moore, 2014). Where there is minimal community involvement and 
backing for collectivism, collective forms will be less likely to emerge. This has 
been noted in Canada where there has been; 
‘…strong NIMBY (not-in-my-backyard) opposition from the community [to 
CLTs]…As a key lesson, it is essential to remember not to overlook the 
importance of community outreach to build support for a CLT’ (CMHC, 
2005, p.3). 
Where local support is secured, collective models can overcome such 
NIMBYISM to deliver more affordable housing than would have been accepted 
otherwise (Moore, 2015). However, it is easy to see how local residents, 
mobilised against housing collectives, might derail such initiatives. Some argue 
that this may become more likely in urban areas which are ‘densely populated 
[and]…less cohesive’ (Young Foundation, 2011 p.74).  
There are other internal constraints that act on members and residents, and 
determine their involvement in the collective. It has been acknowledged, by 
scholars in the UK and in Canada, that the price of housing in certain collectives 
excludes those on the lowest incomes or in receipt of state benefits (CMHC, 
2005; Hodkinson, 2012). This raises the possibility that, for those priced out of 
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private housing, and with the biggest interest in developing affordable collective 
housing, such models may not serve their ends. Constraints to participation 
may therefore arise from who the collective is seen to serve, which is linked to 
the pricing and nature of any housing provided.  
The external constraints on housing collectivism 
Beyond those constraints which arise from ‘within’ collectives, there are a set of 
additional barriers to collective development, which might be classed as 
external. Scholars such as Bunce (2016) and Birchall (1988) have highlighted 
constraints arising from wider societal norms around property ownership and 
market conditions, and national policy making and programmes which hinder 
collectivism. Furthermore, constraints on collectivism arise from interactions 
with public bodies and other housing providers, and in the financing of such 
activities and accessing appropriate technical advice. These constraints are 
explored more fully below. 
Prevalent in the literature related to housing collectivism is the notion that 
constraints arise from the dominant norms and structures of society. Bunce 
(2016), in her writing on the development of East London CLT, frames certain 
constraints in terms of the current economic mode, highlighting; 
‘…frustrations and compromises that are increasingly part of activist work 
within larger neoliberalized governance and market contexts’ (Bunce, 
2016, p.148) 
Unpicking these ideas, those developing collectives are constrained by current 
norms and rules related to property ownership, and how these create 
preferential conditions for individual ownership. Birchall has noted how the 
‘psychological climate’ works against collective forms of ownership in England 
(Birchall, 1988, p.195), as cultural preferences for individual homeownership are 
deeply embedded (Gurney, 1999). Within the legal system, rules regarding 
ownership have normalised individual ownership and at the cost of common 
property rights (Gordon, 1995; Clarke, 1997). Taken together this literature 
suggests a network of cultural norms and legal rules that are aspects of a 
broadly constraining structure. Highlighting an important dynamic, Elster 
(1989c) suggests that ‘…those willing to go against the current in any 
endeavour require qualities which do not always make for success in it’. In 
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simple terms, those attracted to housing collectivism, as counter to prevailing 
norms and rules, may struggle to develop such schemes within the confines of 
those norms and rules. Constraint and enablement of such activity may ebb and 
flow in line with cycles of political opportunity or contention (Meyer and Minkoff, 
2004; Tarrow, 1998), as the vulnerabilities of political groups present incentives 
to collectivise and challenge the status quo.  
National legislation has the potential to incentivise and dis-incentivise 
collectivism, and in the previous chapter key legislation was noted which 
enabled and constrained collectivism. More subtle constraints relate to policy 
making and political support for such activity. It is a recurrent suggestion in the 
literature that housing collectivism cannot grow without the backing of national 
governments (Paterson and Dayson, 2011; Clapham and Kintrea, 1992; 
Rowlands, 2009). Yet, in the history of the development of collectives in 
England, there has been only ‘marginal political support’ for collective models 
such as co-operatives (Clapham and Kintrea, 1992, p.172). In more recent 
times, national governments have provided a mixture of support for CLTs and 
other forms of collectivism (HM Government, 2008b; HCA, 2011b; HM 
Government, 2010). Policy documents have promoted certain forms of housing 
collectivism, and such activity has been encouraged, for instance, through grant 
programmes, legislation and streamlined regulatory procedures. Nonetheless, 
historically government and its various agencies have lacked the understanding 
of different collectivist forms to fully support their development (Clapham and 
Kintrea, 1992). Scholars have noted how regulation of housing collectives, by 
government bodies, has either been inadequate or heavy handed (Clapham 
and Kintrea, 1992; Rowlands, 2009). Furthermore, changes in policy which limit 
collectives' access to government funds or tax reliefs have acted as major 
constraints. 
The operations of local government have also hindered the development of 
housing collectives. Echoing Clapham and Kintrea above, Aird (2009) has 
suggested;  
‘There is a lack of awareness or misunderstandings at local authority 
level…about what a CLT is and how it operates, especially regarding the 
key element, which is community control (Aird, 2009, p.20). 
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The last sentence is particularly interesting as it reveals some of the difficulties 
that local authorities experience in ‘really letting go of management and control 
[of housing] to communities’ (Aird, 2009, p.20). CLTs, in particular, have 
presented a challenge to local authorities. As vehicles for housing development, 
as well as local representation, local authorities have become confused about 
the roles of various public sector and voluntary agencies in local democratic 
processes (Young Foundation, 2011). 
Certain practices in local government are more visibly constraining. 
Development policies and processes for procurement, for instance, can hinder 
new housing development undertaken by collectives. In Canada, federal 
government reports have reflected how ‘municipal policies and zoning 
regulations may also act as barriers to the start-up of a CLT’ (CMHC, 2005, 
p.3). Evidence from collectives in the UK highlights similar constraints emerging 
from bureaucratic processes in local government. For example, in seeking to 
transfer land from a local authority, one collective was recently required to 
tender through OJEU, a European procurement system. The process cost 
£40,000 and in the end the collective was the only bidder (Hopkirk, 2015).  
Other scholars have noted how proposals for collective ownership can run up 
against local authority-led regeneration programmes where large-scale, 
strategic intervention is preferred to small scale collective initiatives (Archer 
2012; Thompson, 2015a). Reflecting on the constraints acting on co-operatives 
Clapham and Kintrea have noted how it is easier for government agencies to 
fund ‘big bodies, rather than support newly constituted novices’ (Clapham and 
Kintrea, 1992, p.177). These prevalent perceptions can affect whether public 
sector owned land and housing is released to collectives (Moore, 2014). 
Working at the margins of financial viability, collectives often need low cost 
transfers of assets such as land (Aiken el al, 2011) and this can be difficult to 
negotiate with local authorities (Chatterton, 2015).  
This points to the complex relationships between collectives, local authorities 
and providers of finance. Financial constraints emerge in accessing capital 
provided by lenders, in terms of the restrictive processes that determine 
lending, and the conditions attached to any finance provided. Aird (2009) notes 
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how, post-credit crunch, institutional lenders became significantly more risk 
averse, and saw the unusual model of collective ownership as a risky 
investment. Advocates for housing co-operatives have revealed similar risk 
aversion to their proposals, and this approach by lenders spills into the other 
parts of the property industry. For instance, Morris (2012) has noted how some 
property auctioneers do not permit bids from collectively owned bodies.  
It is sufficient to say that access to finance has been frequently cited as a 
barrier to collective development (Rowlands, 2009; Paterson and Dayson, 2011; 
Conaty et al, 2003; Young Foundation, 2011). Collectives have had to be 
creative in making their schemes financially viable. Paterson and Dayson note 
how CLTs have used a ‘cocktail’ of funding from charitable trusts and 
foundations, though warn that this is ‘unlikely to be replicated’ and therefore 
other sources will ‘need to be sought with vigour’ (Paterson and Dayson, 2011, 
p.20).  
The provision of charitable funding does not completely remove constraints on 
collective development. Such grants may stipulate that the money can only be 
used for capital investment, and not on funding the operations of the collective. 
Similarly, government funding programmes, whilst providing enabling finance, 
have created various challenges in relation to bureaucratic burdens and 
restricted use (Davis, 2011; Moore, 2014; Clapham and Kintrea, 1992).  
Dilemmas emerge in securing sufficient revenue, for instance in the form of 
rents or the sale of equity, which is critical to servicing debt, and which may 
affect the collective’s capacity to provide housing at substantially less than 
market prices (Paterson and Dayson, 2011). This is particularly acute in the 
period during development, when revenue is not yet being received. 
Collectives have formed partnerships with other larger housing providers to 
navigate some of these issues, and to draw on their expertise (CLT Network, 
2011). Accepting the potential of such relations to enable collective 
developments, they can also act as an important constraint on what collectives 
can do, and undermine claims to local autonomy and control. Bunce (2016), in 
her observations of a CLT, noted how the group had needed to; 
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‘…yield to reliance upon partnerships with private sector actors in order 
to cultivate development interest in a proposed CLT site, and settle for 
compromised final outcomes regarding the CLT arrangement (Bunce, 
2016, p.136). 
To get access to publicly owned sites, or sites of significant public sector 
interest, collectives have been led to partner with bigger developers who 
provide the credibility, skills and reassurance to those public authorities. In the 
case of this CLT, working with partners required compromises in terms of site 
use, and the numbers of affordable housing units in CLT ownership (Bunce, 
2016, p.145). 
Moore and Mullins (2013) have provided valuable insights into some of the 
possible factors which shape these, at times, constraining relationships; 
‘…the interests of local community-led groups may be incompatible with 
those of larger partners such as asset focused housing 
associations…there are differences of institutional logic between 
community-led and large scale housing providers, and that caution is 
therefore required’ (Moore and Mullins, 2013, p.26). 
Whilst collectives may need partners, entering such partnerships often creates 
a clash of ‘logics’, and the partner with the most resources and strongest 
external relationships may have more power to set the terms of that 
relationship.  
Similar constraints emerge when collectives work with technical advisors or 
umbrella bodies who operate at a larger spatial scale but support local groups. 
Again, Moore and Mullins (2013) have raised questions about power 
differentials and issues of control. The operation of such umbrella bodies brings 
into question that critical issue of local independence, especially where the 
umbrella acts as the land owner for that local scheme. Similar concerns have 
been raised about the role and efficacy of secondary housing co-operatives that 
provide advice and services to smaller housing collectives (Clapham and 
Kintrea, 1992). Whilst structures like umbrella CLTs have emerged to support 
the development of local CLTs, critics suggest that in the co-operative sector 
there is not an effective mechanism for existing co-operatives to support the 
development of new ones (Morris, 2012). Hence, constraints can emerge from 
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both the presence and absence of a support infrastructure (Moore and Mullins, 
2013). 
Few would deny however that access to technical support and assistance is 
vital for such groups. The reason smaller collectives draw on such advice and 
support is that they may not have the necessary skills and experience among 
their members and volunteers. Hence, constraints arise when groups cannot 
access professional support on a range of legal, financial and development 
issues (Aird, 2009; CFS, 2008; Moore and Mullins, 2013).  
The internal enablement of housing collectivism 
A related literature identifies factors which enable the development of 
collectives, and which can again be dissected in terms of internal and external 
factors. Beginning with internal enablements, this section discusses; the 
importance of volunteer time, energy and motives; processes for the 
organisation and co-ordination those involved; and the role of governance 
models in balancing collective and individual interests.  
The development of collectives can be constrained by a reliance on volunteers, 
but the nature of this internal capacity brings with it important enablement. 
Firstly, voluntary effort, as Price Waterhouse (1995) noted in their analysis of 
housing co-operatives, does not appear on the balance sheet of those 
organisations. Where collectives can mobilise significant free hours of people’s 
time it is likely to reduce their costs. This means that such organisations can 
deliver better services and greater levels of affordability. This notion of the value 
of voluntary effort has been asserted by various scholars in reference to various 
collective forms (Moore, 2015; Minora et al, 2013; Rowlands, 2009; Young 
Foundation, 2011).  
The investment of voluntary time in collectives may flow from a range of 
motives, related to both self-interest and other aspirations to see improvements 
to a local area or to benefit others. Scholars have noted how unmet housing 
needs can drive the formation of, or participation in, collectives (Birchall, 1988). 
Other motives, for instance, to see an improvement in an area or meet 
another’s housing need, may motivate such voluntary input (Moore, 2015). 
Such local involvement can imbue collectives with a unique mandate and level 
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of buy-in from local residents. Perhaps because of this collective forms have 
been identified as new mechanisms for participative democracy and 
reconnecting people with processes of government and local governance 
(CCMH, 2009, Hill, 2014; Clapham et al, 1996; Thaden and Lowe, 2014). If 
such collectives are ‘anchored’ in a local area (Young Foundation, 2011, p.48) 
they can create the required local support and pressure to address housing 
issues, breaking through seemingly intractable politics and NIMBYISM to 
develop new housing (Moore, 2015). 
The development of collectives is enabled by processes which organise 
members and residents, and facilitate their co-operation. Mandates for the 
development of collectives can be created through processes which might be 
termed ‘community organising’ (Betten and Austin, 1990; Bunce, 2016). In his 
seminal work on community organising Rothman (1974) highlights how, in the 
search for improved material or social conditions, groups of people will organise 
in diverse ways. His notion of ‘social action’ depicts scenarios where people are 
mobilised and organised against institutions to affect how power is distributed. 
Alternatively, groups organise toward ‘locality development’, whereby cross-
sections of a community are supported to identify common issues and build 
consensus on solutions. These different processes and approaches to 
community organising can serve to embed common objectives, and create ties 
of mutuality and solidarity between individuals. 
It is unsurprising that certain collectives draw upon these traditions of 
community organising (London CLT, 2016). It is also not surprising, given the 
lineage of housing collectivism discussed above, that collectives often emerge 
through protest and organised action against a perceived threat or grievance. 
As Saul Alinksy noted in his popular text, Rules for Radicals, collectivism can 
form when masses of people see no other option;  
‘Any revolutionary change must be preceded by a passive, affirmative, 
non-challenging attitude toward change among the mass of our people. 
They must feel so frustrated, so defeated, so lost, so futureless in the 
prevailing system that they are willing to let go of the past and chance the 
future’ (Alinsky, 1971, p.xix). 
Hence, it becomes clear that collectives can be enabled when there is a shared 
despair or grievance among individuals, which creates the space for those 
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individuals to organise into some collective form. Literature concerning to social 
movement theory echoes this and shows how perceived grievances can 
mobilise people towards collective action (McCarthy et al, 1977; Snow, 2013). 
Hence, housing collectives are enabled when they can offer solutions to 
perceived grievances such as a lack of affordable, good quality housing with 
security of tenure. The development of convincing narratives about the potential 
products of collectivism, and the creation of robust plans for such collectivism, 
are critical enablements in this process of mobilisation and engagement 
(Chatterton, 2015; Paterson and Dayson, 2011). 
Even if people are willing to ‘chance the future’, what will sustain their 
involvement longer term? Bandura (1982: 2000) presents important insights into 
such processes, showing how an individual’s perception of the efficacy of a 
collective not only shapes their commitment to it, but also its success. As 
Bandura notes; 
‘Perceived collective efficacy fosters groups’ motivational commitment to 
their missions, resilience to adversity, and performance accomplishments’ 
(Bandura, 2000, p.75). 
When collectives achieve a goal, it may impact on member perceptions of 
efficacy in positive ways. Such processes point to important internal processes 
which enable collectives to develop and achieve their goals. At the heart of such 
enablement seems to be passionate activism. As Bunce observed in one UK 
CLT; 
‘…activist efforts for a CLT were successful in raising public awareness 
about CLT practices, identifying community-based needs for a CLT site, 
establishing a final CLT arrangement, and initiating future dialogue about 
the role of commonly held land in East London and the broader city’. 
(Bunce, 2016, p.148). 
Bunce suggests these significant developments were made possible by the 
‘activists’ involved. So, whilst a source of constraints, individual members and 
residents can be a powerful enabling factor when they are both committed and 
active in developing the collective. This concurs with a more general literature 
on how collective action is often initiated by leaders who are capable of 
‘inducing’ others to co-operate (Bianco and Bates, 1990). 
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Birchall (1988) has suggested that a key condition for developing co-operatives 
is the presence of proven and tested examples, which show that their 
governance systems work. Existing housing co-operatives, in implementing a 
‘one-member-one-vote’ governance systems, are putting into practice the ideal 
of collective control, and evidencing how different relationships to those seen in 
individualistic ownership are possible (CCMH, 2009). Evidencing the benefits of 
this form of governance becomes imperative. Rowlands (2009) notes; 
‘Co-operators as owners of the business have a vested interest in the 
business and are less likely to either fall into arrears themselves or 
tolerate arrears from their fellow co-operators’ (Rowlands, 2009, p.34) 
Rowlands is drawing attention to how the development of collectives is shaped, 
and can be sustained, by the unique nature of their internal governance and the 
control that each member can assert.   
The external enablement of housing collectivism 
External factors which enable collectivism include conducive conditions in wider 
society and the housing market; supportive national policy making, programmes 
and regulatory changes; enabling policy and practices in local government; 
dedicated grant making and financing; partnerships with other housing 
developers; and in a dedicated and supportive infrastructure for learning and 
technical advice.  
Just as multiple constraints to collectivism may be found in the structures which 
shape contemporary life (Bunce, 2016), so too these structures offer certain 
enablements. Scholars have suggested that what enables collectivism is the 
very necessity of it, in addressing complex problems. As Ostrom has noted, 
there is a human capacity to; 
‘…instill productive norms of behaviour…[and] craft rules to support 
collective action that produces public goods and avoids "tragedies of the 
commons”’ (Ostrom, 1997, p.1) 
Norms of behaviour in society have created human relations which allow for the 
holding of knowledge, property and other materials collectively. In certain 
contexts, a history of effective collective or co-ordinated action, or a culture of 
mutualism, might provide the psychological conditions in which collectivism can 
grow (Birchall, 1988). Where problems are urgent enough, so the theory goes, 
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collective action will emerge. The complexity of problems facing the housing 
system in England arguably calls for institutional forms capable of creating such 
norms of behaviour and rules which can produce goods such as housing. 
Indeed, the historic development of CLTs and housing co-operatives aimed at 
addressing housing shortages, poor affordability or inadequate management by 
landlords, shows how such conditions can stimulate collective action on housing 
issues.   
National governments can create the space and incentives for collectivism, 
often in response to some of these identified housing problems. Commentators 
have highlighted the importance of ‘political will’ in the enablement of housing 
collectivism (Young Foundation, 2011). Recent government policies highlight a 
broad, if at times rhetorical, support for housing collectivism (HM Government, 
2008b; 2010). Beyond the rhetoric, tangible enablement can take various forms. 
Legislation can and has been introduced which creates new types of institutions 
for collective property ownership (HM Government, 2002). Governments have 
also constructed packages of financial incentives for housing collectivism. 
These act upon those interested or engaged in collectivism, but also the 
external bodies which can enable such groups. Examples of this in the UK are 
numerous. They include legislation and policy to create tax reliefs on collective 
mortgages (Birchall, 1988), dedicated grant funding schemes (HM Government, 
2012), duties on local authorities to respond to collective proposals alongside 
rights for collectives themselves (My Community, 2016b) and simpler regulatory 
processes for such groups to access funding (HCA, 2011c). The range of 
financial incentives and disincentives that governments can create brings into 
sharp focus their enabling potential. 
Local government is another important source of enablement. Good relations 
with local councils are seen as a critical factor in accessing material resources 
such as land and housing, and also in navigating political barriers in the 
planning process (Minora et al, 2013; Paterson and Dayson, 2011; Chatterton, 
2015). Aird (2009) summarised the enablement offered by local authorities in 
some of the first English CLTs, which took the form of; 
‘...donating land; taking a flexible approach to planning, e.g. granting 
planning permission, allowing CLTs to receive ‘commuted sums’ or land 
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from development schemes; agreeing an allocations policy that suits the 
CLT’s aims; and providing enabling grants’ (Aird, 2009, p.13). 
Accessing land or housing at low-cost, either donated by local authorities and 
landowners, or via some other process of acquisition which minimises costs, is 
seen as a key enabler of collective development. 
The motivation for local authorities to support collectives comes from the 
frequent need for alternative options for housing development. An example of 
this is where local authorities have no resources to catalyse development by 
private construction firms in rundown areas (Clapham and Kintrea, 1992; 
Thompson, 2015a: 2015b). Collectives are then enabled by the failure of 
‘standard’ development processes, and the local authority’s liability to resource 
shortfalls. 
Enablement also flows from the external provision of finance. External bodies, 
in the form of grant making organisations and lenders, have developed financial 
support packages, which supplement that provided by governments. This can 
be woven into the infrastructure which supports collectivism, such as the grants 
offered through the CLT Network’s fund (2016e), or the ethical investment 
available for housing co-operatives through Radical Routes (2011b). In addition 
to such funding and finance, charitable funders have created dedicated grant 
programmes to support the development of collective housing in its various 
forms (for instance, the Nationwide Foundation, 2015). Furthermore, the 
emergence of an ethical lending sector (CAF, 2016; Ecology Building Society, 
2016; Resonance, 2016; Triodos Bank, 2016) has created a niche lending 
market for collectives, delivering finance critical to the development of certain 
collective housing projects (Chatterton, 2015). What becomes apparent is that, 
whilst access to finance is a constraint on housing collectivism, the emergence 
of new funders with dedicated capital is a key source of enablement.  
Added to this financial enablement, collectives are often only able to develop 
their schemes by accessing support and advice provided by other external 
bodies. Aird (2009) has emphasised the importance of these external advisors 
in her summary of the early development of CLTs;  
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‘A major factor in the success of the demonstration scheme in building 
properties has been the existence of secondary CLT support bodies, such 
as umbrella CLTs’ (Aird, 2009, p.11) 
Access to technical support and advice has enabled these collectives to 
overcome some of the constraints noted above regarding their capacity and the 
shortfall in their skills and experience. This advice may be provided by 
‘umbrella’ bodies, other secondary or primary co-operatives, or a host of other 
professional bodies. Irrespective of their source they can ‘reduce such burdens 
and provide technical expertise’ (Moore and Mullins, 2013, p.26). Research 
highlights the importance of such support, often provided free of charge, in key 
areas such as finance, development planning, the legalities of constituting 
organisations, the legalities of land ownership and use, and the construction 
and development of housing (Young Foundation, 2011; Paterson and Dayson, 
2011; CFS, 2008).  
This advice has often been provided by secondary co-operatives and other 
infrastructure bodes. What becomes apparent is that whilst there are 
differences in the support infrastructure for co-operatives and CLTs (Moore and 
Mullins, 2013), they provide a key enabling role, whilst also delivering an 
informal means of regulation and enforcement of norms or standards. The 
Commission for Co-operative and Mutual housing noted; 
‘…the success of such service provision depended on the service 
provider’s links to the co-operative housing movement through the CCH 
[the Confederation of Co-operative Housing] or other means, and that 
there had not been a serious governance failure in a co-op that receives 
support in this manner’ (CCMH, 2009, p.50). 
A further process of enablement flows from infrastructure bodies and advocacy 
agencies promoting the idea and practice of collectivism. Birchall (1988, p.88) 
saw the presence of ‘promoters: both charismatic individuals and organisations’ 
as a key condition for the growth of housing co-operatives.  
Having infrastructure in place provides opportunities for collectives to learn from 
their peers. ‘Co-operation among co-operatives’ is a key principle of this sector 
(ICA, 2015), and is facilitated by the membership body the CCH. This network 
of primary and secondary co-operatives provides both formal and informal 
support to newly emerging groups (CCMH, 2009). Similarly, among CLTs 
national networks have created a structure for CLTs to share learning and 
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resources (CLT Network, 2016a). Presenting lessons from the development of 
the first 150 CLT homes in the UK, Aird (2009) has suggested that; 
‘CLTs were quick to build on contacts made at seminars and networking 
events. Many had conducted site visits to other projects, shared template 
documents and emailed other projects for help. Informal networks had 
developed between CLTs in the same geographic regions, which saw 
offshoots and new projects and intermediary support bodies being created’ 
(Aird, 2009, p.13) 
It seems that irrespective of whether such networks grow informally, or in more 
formalised national structures (Moore and Mullins, 2013), systems have 
emerged to support and enable new collective schemes. 
As noted above, collectives have also formed relationships with housing 
associations, who have been important enablers of certain schemes (Aird, 
2009; Lang, 2015). These agencies have provided a range of advice and 
support on development processes, finance, regulatory procedures, risk 
management and capacity building, whilst also helping groups access grant 
funding and build credibility with local authorities (CLT Network, 2011). They 
have become an increasing source of support for local groups who lack certain 
resources. 
Key lessons and unanswered questions 
When these enablements and constraints are taken together, it becomes clear 
that for collectives to develop, they require the co-presence of a variety of 
internal and external factors. In discussing the development of LILAC, 
Chatterton summarised this in suggesting that such collectivism; 
‘…requires certain ingredients and capacities; key individuals who have 
deep and varied access to contacts and knowledge…plausible narratives 
about the future…enabling institutions that are keen to take and back risks 
and relinquish control…and a generally supportive social context’ 
(Chatterton, 2015, p. 14). 
What Chatterton is revealing here is that the factors shaping the development of 
housing collectivism form in conjunctions, an insight other scholars have noted 
(Thompson, 2015b). However, revealing the ‘ingredients’ for collectivism will 
only partially fill the gaps in current knowledge. Narrative descriptions and 
general categories of factors are not sufficient.  What is needed is an 
understanding of how these ingredients, contexts or conditions operate in 
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practice, or in processes which constrain and enable the development of 
collectives. This demands models which describe and generalise the 
conjunction of these factors over time, and the mechanics of how they operate. 
This is the critical task ahead. 
3.2. The costs and benefits of housing collectivism 
In exploring how housing collectivism in England has ebbed and flowed, and the 
various factors effecting such developments, little has been revealed about the 
outcomes this activity creates for different parties. The rationales and 
intellectual foundations for housing collectivism, discussed in the previous 
chapter, hints at certain potential outcomes, for instance, enhancing control and 
autonomy, capturing land values for collective gain, and creating mutually 
beneficial relations. Whether these constitute outcomes or ideals leads to more 
searching questions about the actual outcomes of collectivism in practice. One 
might ask, what do members and residents of such collectives experience and 
value in this activity? What identifiable benefits emerge from such housing 
forms, at the individual and collective level? And do any gains justify the 
sacrifices that must be made to form and manage these organisations? These 
are particularly pertinent if one is interested in the potential of such housing 
forms to ameliorate to current housing problems. Such questions motivated a 
deeper engagement with the relevant literature. 
To establish current knowledge on this issue of outcomes required a process for 
targeting and prioritising literature reviews. Initial investigations revealed a large 
quantity of relevant literature, predominantly from those engaged in public policy 
issues and from advocates of housing collectivism, but also from academic 
sources. As with the reviews of the development literature, conceptual tools 
were needed to structure this task. Engagement with the literature on collective 
action scenarios (Olson, 1965), and methodological literature about assessing 
outcomes in social situations (Boardman et al, 2006; Steven et al, 2008), 
introduced the terms benefit and cost. The term ‘benefit’ was understood in its 
everyday sense, as in any ‘advantage or profit gained’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 
2016a). Cost, similarly reflecting the common parlance, was taken to mean a 
‘loss or unpleasant consequence’ of some activity (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016b). 
To connect the two terms, a nuanced definition was adopted which took the 
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meaning of ‘cost’ to be ‘…that which must be given or surrendered in order to 
acquire, produce, accomplish, or maintain something; the price paid for a thing’ 
(OED, 2015).  
Using these concepts to review the literature meant clarifying the strata at which 
these outcomes were being identified. Initial literature reviews revealed 
examples where benefits and costs were being attributed to the collective itself. 
Whilst a picture of aggregated benefits might be useful, such evidence often 
begged further questions. Positing a benefit of, for instance, low housing costs 
for ‘the collective’, merely begs deeper questions about which households are 
experiencing that benefit, and any potential inequities in the distribution of that 
benefit. This means that whilst evidence of aggregate benefits and costs were 
valued, it was also important not to miss the experiences and quality of those 
outcomes for individuals involved. The literature reviews have sought qualitative 
descriptions of the experience of collectivism, alongside generalised or 
quantified evidence, and comparative evidence of outcomes against other 
tenures. Linked to these issues was the need to set parameters in the scope of 
such benefits. Housing collectives might generate benefits and costs in wider 
communities or neighbourhoods, but these might be difficult to trace and link 
back to the collective itself. It was decided to focus reviews on those outcomes 
derived only by residents and members of a housing collective. 
In the early stages of this literature review, sources were discovered which 
categorised the benefits which members and residents can derive from housing 
collectives (Davis and Stokes, 2009; CDS Co-operatives, 2016; CCMH, 2009). 
These posit a range of benefit categories related to; financial, social and 
psychological benefits, other benefits related to the quality and choice of 
housing, and the provision of housing and non-housing services, and a set of 
wider environmental or community-level benefits. Similar summaries of the 
costs incurred from this activity were not found, and identifying perceived 
negative outcomes required much more extensive searches.  
What arose from this literature review was a set of cost and benefit categories, 
which are summarised in the table below. 
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Table 2: A summary of the costs and benefits of housing collectivism 
Benefit category Cost category 
Low housing costs and other 
financial gains 
Lost assets and other financial 
losses 
Housing in good condition with 
effective housing management  
Time and energy demands 
Social, psychological and quality of 
life benefits 
Social, psychological and quality of 
life costs 
 
The following sections explore these costs and benefits in detail, and situates 
them where appropriate in wider theoretical arguments beyond the collective 
housing literature.  
3.2.1. The benefits of housing collectivism for members and residents  
Low housing costs and other financial gains 
Varied claims have been made about the financial benefits that accrue to 
residents of collectively owned and managed housing. It has been argued that 
co-operatives adopt ownership models which limit an individual’s equity stake, 
and therefore prevent inflationary pressures on the price of that housing 
(Birchall, 1988; Rodgers, 2009). Even in comparison to government-backed 
programmes for affordable housing in the UK, such as shared ownership, 
advocates argue that collectives preserve affordability for members and 
residents for the long term, not just on the first sale (Conaty et al, 2003; 
Paterson and Dayson, 2011). Evidence from CLTs internationally suggests they 
can deliver low cost housing costs for residents in high value areas, or low 
income areas where land prices are inflating rapidly (Aird, 2009; McStotts, 
2004; Medoff and Sklar 1994; Moore, 2014). Advocates for co-operative models 
suggest that member control leads to a natural suppression of rental prices for 
members (Birchall, 1992; Morris, 2012).  Given that dwellers can have ultimate 
control of rent setting, they are in a position to set rents as low as they 
collectively desire (accepting the need to repay any debt, undertake 
maintenance and pay for other running costs). Their participation and 
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engagement in decision making is therefore critical to securing these benefits, 
and this perhaps represents a trade-off decision to be made.  
Despite claims of low housing costs, there is little robust evidence in the UK as 
to the affordability of such collective housing. Rowlands (2009) has presented 
some comparative evidence about affordability in his study. The average rent 
across his sample is stated as £73.80 per week. At the time Rowlands was 
writing, the average social housing rent in England was £75 per week, and in 
the private rented sector it was £153 per week (DCLG, 2011). Without seeing 
from which housing markets his sample was taken, it is hard to say whether this 
average price represents an affordable rent. However, it suggests that such 
housing is priced below the market average. In Canada, government investment 
in co-operative housing has led to more robust evaluations of affordability. The 
Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) asserts that co-operative 
housing has provided accommodation at substantially lower ‘shelter cost to 
income’ ratios than the private rented sector (CMHC, 2003). International 
evidence points to members and residents benefiting financially from these 
housing models. 
In regard to CLTs in the UK, there is limited evidence about financial outcomes, 
and whether housing costs in this form of collective ever translate to individual 
level financial benefits. This is an acknowledged gap in the literature, as Temkin 
et al (2013, p.556) noted in their assessment of evidence on CLTs. They 
declared that ‘there are relatively few studies [in the USA] that empirically 
examine wealth creation and mortgage performance outcomes’. What little 
evidence there is does suggest that CLTs can secure the long-term affordability 
of housing, assisting residents to grow their equity which can later be released 
(Davis & Demetrowitz, 2003; Farrell Curtin & Bocarsly, 2008). In their 
assessment of the affordability of Champlain Housing Trust (CHT) homes, 
Davis and Stokes (2009) note; 
‘The average CHT home was affordable to a household earning 56.6% of 
AMI [area median income] on initial sale. On resale, it was affordable to a 
household earning 53.4% of AMI – a 5.65% gain in affordability’ (Davis 
and Stokes, 2009, p.2). 
Such studies show how CHT generated an equity return for residents, which 
was on average $12,500 for each property resold. This means that when people 
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left the CLT the majority entered the private market for housing (Davis and 
Stokes, 2009). Such scholars have suggested that this housing model creates 
individual wealth and enables residential mobility, whilst preserving the 
affordability of those homes.  
In the UK, proponents have suggested that collective forms of housing have 
enabled access to otherwise restricted mortgage finance. Affordability is 
achieved as, collectively, people are able to secure borrowing at preferential 
rates, where low income households on their own would not have secured such 
mortgages (Paterson and Dayson, 2011). One major proposition made in the 
community assets literature is that collectivism, in the form of non-profit 
organisations, is a model to create financial surpluses which can then be 
reinvested for wider community benefit (Quirk, 2007, Aiken et al, 2011). The 
evidence base, particularly in the UK, is limited, but tentatively suggests that a 
range of different financial benefits are being secured. 
Housing in good condition with effective housing management  
Thirty years of evidence suggests that housing co-operatives provide housing 
and services that, in comparative terms, exceed standards in the social housing 
sector. Satsangi and Clapham (1990) compared the performance of housing co-
operatives with that of other social housing providers in the UK. They found that 
co-ownership co-operatives had lower rent arrears than other social landlords, 
and scored generally higher tenant satisfaction ratings compared to local 
authorities and housing associations, on a range of performance issues. The 
authors did, however, question whether better performance should be attributed 
to the co-operative model, or their areas of operation or other characteristics 
such as their size. Such work acknowledges the importance of establishing 
attribution, but offers few firm answers. Despite the authors concerns, in a later 
publication, Clapham declared that;  
‘…housing co-operatives on the whole provide a more effective housing 
management service than mainstream, large scale landlords, (Clapham 
and Kintrea, 1992, pp.174-175) 
A subsequent Price Waterhouse study (1995) confirmed much of Satsangi and 
Clapham's (1990) findings, highlighting value for money in tenant management 
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co-operatives, and how service quality in co-ownership co-operatives matched 
that of the best social landlords. 
Using the above studies as a baseline, Rowlands (2009) conducted the most 
recent data collection and analysis of co-operative housing performance. 
Rowlands showed (albeit with a small sample size) that housing co-operatives 
outperformed other social landlords on a number of key indicators. For instance, 
rent arrears among co-operative tenants stood at 1.4 per cent, compared to the 
Registered Social Landlords (RSL) average of 5.2 per cent. General satisfaction 
was 15 per cent higher in co-operatives, and matching this was 99 per cent 
satisfaction with participation. Subsequently, the Commission on Co-operative 
and Mutual Housing (2009) compiled this evidence, with other sources from 
tenant management organisations (Cairncross et al, 2002), to present a picture 
of high levels of satisfaction in the co-operative housing sector. This was 
corroborated by the UK Tenant Services Authority in 2009, when it declared; 
‘…co-operative tenants were the most satisfied with their landlord 
compared to all other landlord types…co-operative tenants rate their 
landlord more highly across all of the specified services’ (CCMH, 2009, 
p.38). 
The TSA revealed consistently higher levels of satisfaction across service 
issues ranging from repairs and maintenance to dealing with complaints. 
Such evidence raises questions again about attribution. Is it the form and 
function of co-operatives that are delivering such performance outcomes, or 
other variables such as levels of expectation, or general housing conditions? 
Scholars have tentatively suggested that form and function do explain, in part, 
why such collectives provide high levels of service. Rowlands (2009) has noted 
that co-operative tenants offer;  
'…high quality intelligence about the management and maintenance 
issues facing the co-op in a way that other housing organisations find 
increasingly difficult to capture. As tenants have ownership of the co-op 
they are also more committed to keeping their properties and 
neighbourhoods in a good state of repair' (Rowlands, 2009, p.43). 
Whilst a welcome attempt at explaining attribution, these are far from well-
evidenced assertions. How does local intelligence feed through to better 
conditions? How does membership of a collective influence psychologies so 
59 
 
people keep their housing in better repair? These questions highlight a key gap 
in the literature, which empirical exploration of outcomes should seek to 
address. 
Social, psychological and quality of life benefits  
Others benefits have been highlighted by proponents of collective ownership, 
notably in relation to people’s quality of life or well-being (Browning, 2007; 
Thake, 2006; NEF, 2015). Moore and McKee (2014) summarised various 
sources of literature relating to housing collectivism and community owned 
assets, and posited ‘intangible benefits’ which flow from; 
‘…increases in participation and engagement…linked to feelings of 
increased community pride, identity and strengthening of local democratic 
decision-making over the use of assets’ (Moore and McKee, 2014, p.528)  
The authors highlight the importance of these ‘intangible’ benefits, though 
accept the limitations of the evidence base for them. Corroborating such UK 
evidence, government evaluations of housing co-operatives in Canada have 
highlighted similar benefits for members and residents. They have revealed that 
such housing has; 
‘…achieved more than other housing [tenures] on key quality of life 
indicators such as improved sense of community, improved relations with 
friends…and increased social support’ (CMHC, 2003, p.iii).  
Participation in housing collectives, it is argued, delivers a range of benefits that 
relate to social interactions, or psychological outcomes derived from working 
productively with others. Elster (1986) has argued that there is the potential for 
‘self-realisation’ through co-operation, whereby individuals gain self-esteem and 
stimulation from applying their powers and abilities with other members of a 
collective. This may apply to those heavily involved as they derive some 
satisfaction from leading collective efforts, or those who derive some 
psychological benefits from being part of a movement (Elster, 1989a). Whilst 
participation in collectives will be shown to carry costs in terms of time and 
energy, these costs arguably give rise to certain psychological gains. 
At the heart of these arguments are often claims as to how collectives empower 
their members and residents (Moore and McKee, 2012; Gooding, 2015; 
Satsangi, 2011). Whilst such literature is numerous, the specification of how 
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empowerment benefits people, and how it might be measured, is left somewhat 
under-developed. Valuable studies of empowerment have been undertaken 
(Pratchett et al, 2009), but these have not been applied to housing collectivism. 
Rare quantitative studies in the housing co-operative field are enlightening. 
Saegert and Winkel (1996) surveyed 129 residents across 16 different US co-
operatives, to assess members' sense of empowerment. Their data suggested 
that; 
‘…working co-operatively to achieve goals at the building level leads to 
greater willingness and ability to take on other problems, that co-op 
participation is empowering not simply functional…participation in co-op 
management is on average more empowering than debilitating’’ (Saegert 
and Winkel, 1996, p.546). 
The processes of being empowered to tackle housing issues, it is argued, 
creates benefits beyond the functional activity of building or managing housing. 
These processes would seem to have psychological benefits for those involved, 
though these are only partially understood. Literature in the CLT field has also 
suggested that certain benefits arise when people are empowered to play an 
active role in housing development and governance (Aird, 2009). CLTs, it is 
argued, are a ‘genuine model for community empowerment' (Young Foundation, 
(2011, p.27). Yet comparative studies of CLTs across England, Scotland and 
the United States have highlighted the lack of evidence about the processes 
connecting an increased sense of empowerment, and a change in psychology 
or material circumstance (Moore and McKee, 2012). These studies direct 
attention again to gaps in knowledge about if, and how, such outcomes are 
attributable to collective forms and functions.  
Other social and psychological benefits have been posited. The collective 
housing literature highlights benefits in terms of enhanced physical security 
(CCMH, 2009) along with security of tenure. Research in the UK, alongside 
studies in Canada and Germany, has found that housing co-operatives can 
provide security of tenure which may not be found in public or social housing 
(Sousa & Quarter, 2005; Haffner & Brunner, 2014; Bunce, 2012; Chatterton, 
2014). National evaluations of Canadian housing co-operatives have revealed 
average lengths of tenure to be longer than in private rental and other non-profit 
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housing. In addition, residents had a greater satisfaction with their ‘ability to 
stay’ in such housing (CMHC, 2003, p.27).  
Perhaps these issues relating to security connect with other deeper 
psychological processes. It has been proposed that being in control of your 
home and surroundings, and feeling that it is not under threat, has important 
psychological benefits (Dupuis and Thorns, 1998; Hiscock et al, 2010; 
Saunders, 1990). This literature draws on the notion of ontological security 
whereby; 
‘…people feel in control of their environment, free from surveillance, free 
to be themselves and at ease, in the deepest psychological sense, in a 
world that might at times be experienced as threatening and 
uncontrollable’ (Saunders, 1990, p. 361)  
Certain literature tries to connect these ideas about control with other benefits 
derived. Clapham and Kintrea, in attempting to attribute individual outcomes to 
collective forms and functions, note; 
‘Co-operatives allow residents substantial control over their housing 
situation, and it is this control which is at the heart of the material and 
social benefits to be derived from co-operative housing’ (Clapham and 
Kintrea, 1992 p.173)  
In a similar way, advocates have suggested that ‘the benefits of co-operative 
and mutual housing derive from their democratic community membership base’ 
(CCMH, 2009, p.46), or from ‘resident control’ (OPM, 1999; Clapham and 
Kintrea, 1992). Such research merely begs more questions about how 
democratic processes or resident control delivers these benefits. The question 
becomes causally orientated; how do benefits flow (or not flow) from the specific 
form and function of collectives. As Saegert and Winkel (1996, p.545) have 
noted ‘…the success of co-ops is anecdotally attributed to tenant participation 
and control…[but] tests of this hypothesis are scarce’.  
Finally, whilst not the focus of the current study, it can be argued that collectives 
engaging in more than just housing provision, can create wider benefits by 
delivering other forms of physical improvement, or valued local services and 
facilities (Aird, 2009; Aiken et al, 2008; Moore, 2014, CMHC, 2005).  
Reflecting on this literature regarding the benefits of collectivism, there are 
many and varied claims. Some of these are well evidenced, while others posit 
62 
 
slightly more intangible outcomes. What is clear is that there is a major gap in 
knowledge about attribution, and how outcomes link to the nature and 
performance of collectivism. This directs attention at causal processes; the 
physical and psychological resources of members and residents, the internal 
processes governing co-operation, and the relations upon which co-operation is 
based.  
3.2.2. The costs of housing collectivism for members and residents 
The literature relating to the costs that members and residents incur contains 
wide-ranging claims, but is at times poorly evidenced. Exploring the range of 
costs experienced by residents and members, certain categories were seen to 
emerge; financial losses or the loss of other assets, time and energy demands, 
and social, psychological and quality of life costs. Each of the categories is 
discussed in detail below.  
Lost assets and individual financial losses 
Elster (1986) has identified common arguments against co-operative 
governance which suggest inherently high running costs, and problems in 
creating sufficient incentives for those who work or live within them. Where co-
operatives are financially successful, they are likely to transition into private 
ownership, as this is a more efficient means of managing and owning property.  
Relying on volunteers and residents to manage housing may create 
inefficiencies which translate into financial costs for those members, for 
instance, in the form of higher rental charges or other financial sacrifices. 
Evidence from Canadian programmes to support housing co-operatives 
suggests such organisations are prone to financial difficulties, although their 
operating costs tend to be comparatively low (CMHC, 2003). Perhaps the 
reason for this is that the governance form creates a mechanism for keeping 
rents low, and this results in less surpluses being generated to re-invest in 
housing or other facilities (Morris, 2012). Short-term financial gains may accrue, 
but at a long term financial cost or risk of insolvency. What starts to emerge is a 
picture of potential financial costs for members and residents, in the longer 
term, which are related to the system of governance that collectives operate. 
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Other scholars have highlighted how the distribution of financial costs and 
benefits within collectives is shaped by the self-interest of members. It might be 
argued that self-interest plays a major part in collective endeavour, and a 
package of incentives is required to sustain the collective (Olson, 1965, Seyd 
and Whiteley, 2002). Where self-interest is left unchecked, members can strive 
to secure personal financial benefits from the collective at the cost of other 
current and possible future members (Morris, 2012). This may take the form of 
direct ‘carpet bagging’ where members put collectively owned assets into 
private ownership, or more passive carpet bagging in the form of low rent 
setting or deliberate under-occupation (Morris, 2012, p.6). It is this seeming 
tendency toward self-interest that led Lord Best to suggest that the co-operative 
organisational form contains within it ‘the seeds of its own destruction’ (Best in 
CCMH, 2009, p.49). The demise of the co-ownership housing sector in the UK, 
as individuals in such housing sought personal profit ahead of continued 
collective gain, is perhaps a demonstration of this. Whilst advocates have 
suggested collective models are not disproportionately prone to ‘problems of 
personal and self-interest’ (CCMH, 2009, p.52), the evidence above suggests 
that, in balancing collective and private goods, individuals can often lose out 
financially as a result of the self-interest of others. 
Whilst advocates for collectivism suggest that it is a model for a more equitable 
distribution of housing and wealth (Birchall, 1988), they also accept there are 
few mechanisms for ensuring comparable rents are charged across different co-
operatives. This is both a blessing and a curse; it allows collectives to structure 
their rents in accordance with their own needs and aspirations, but allows for 
inequalities in housing costs dependent on the collective’s financial position. 
This may lead to the scenario where some members pay higher rents for 
comparatively poorer housing; in essence a postcode lottery. 
A further cost to members and residents of collectives can flow from the poor 
management of the collective’s finances. As noted by Conaty et al (2003), 
certain types of housing collective can be susceptible to fluctuations in wider 
markets, which affect land values and debt repayments. For instance, in a 
Mutual Homeownership Society (MHOS), if interest rate fluctuations inflate 
mortgage repayments to the extent that they cannot be repaid, then everyone 
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could lose their home through repossession. This is irrespective of whether 
members individually can make their share of the repayment. Given that for 
many collectives ‘balancing the books is a challenge’ (Aird, 2009, p.14), this 
would seem a major potential cost to members and residents. Perhaps this cuts 
to the heart of such collectivism, a model where people’s securities and fortunes 
are deeply intertwined. Individuals may potentially lose out financially, not as a 
result of their actions, but the actions of other members and residents. Despite 
this potential, it may be argued that by acting collectively it is possible to 
insulate individuals from financial difficulties. Indeed, certain MHOSs have 
mechanisms to do this (Chatterton, 2015). 
Time and energy demands 
Various studies have highlighted the costs that certain members of collectives 
incur personally in terms of their time and energy (Moore, 2015; CCMH, 2009; 
Clapham and Kintrea, 1992). Questions have been raised as to whether, in 
collective models, individuals are willing to bear these costs over the timescales 
required (Thake, 2006). Conaty et al (2003, p.51) reflect that forming and 
managing housing collectives ‘is legally and financially more complex’ than 
owning and occupying housing in other tenures (Conaty et al, 2003, p.51). This 
places an additional burden on member and resident time. 
Such insights come from within the fields of community ownership and co-
operative housing, but also from the wider literature related to community 
development and co-operative governance. The extent of volunteer efforts in 
such collectives has been shown to lead to ‘burnout’ among those most active 
(Freudenberger, 1974; Heywood, 2016). In reference to CLTs this has been 
noted as a key risk to projects (Young Foundation, 2011), suggesting workloads 
can drain volunteer energy and lead to apathy. Literature on self-managed 
teams corroborates this (Elloy et al, 2001). Self-management, it is argued, 
creates the conditions for burnout through a combination of large workloads and 
inter-personal problems (Novelli et al, 1989), and this is a personal cost borne 
by certain individuals. The potential for burnout is significant in collectives which 
frequently seem to suffer from a lack of participation if certain incentives are not 
present (Bowles and Gintis, 2011). This connects back to the literature 
discussed above regarding free-riding in collectives, and the effects of non-
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participation (Bailey, 1990). If participation in collectives is reduced to a simple 
prisoner-dilemma situation, it would seem that free-riding by some, and the 
overburdening of others, will always prevail unless certain incentives (or other 
motives) are in place (Bengtsson, 2001). Cairncross et al (2002) have noted in 
reference to tenant management organisations;  
‘…few residents put themselves forward as committee members and 
elections are rarely contested…AGMs are often poorly attended and 
sometimes inquorate (CCMH, 2009, p.37). 
Member and resident participation in collectives is often posited as the 
underlying reason for their high service quality and financial efficiency. Clearly, 
however, certain individuals have to incur major costs in terms of their time and 
energy for the benefits experienced by others. 
Psychological and quality of life costs 
In the community assets literature, there are hints at the possible costs of 
collective ownership related to member and resident relations. The Local 
Community Sector Task Force identified the possible risks of division and 
tensions between groups in local areas as a result of ‘dividing up assets’ 
(LCSTF in Aiken, 2008, p.27). This is linked to the potential for groups within a 
community, or within a collective, to try to capture and use those assets for their 
group’s ends (LCSTF in Aiken, 2008; CCMH, 2009). The Commission on Co-
operative and Mutual Housing noted this when it highlighted the possibility of 
groups; 
‘…exploiting a democratic deficit…[so that] the co-operative and mutual 
housing organisation falls prey to dictatorial control by one member or 
group of members (CCMH, 2009, p. 52). 
Those within collectives can seek to control resources, leading them to become 
‘monopolised by unrepresentative groups’ (LCSTF, in Aiken, 2008, p.27), who 
may want ‘decisions taken to benefit them personally’ (CCMH, 2009, p.52). This 
calls into question some of the more idealistic presentations of collectives as a 
model for complete autonomy and control. Hypothetically, an individual within a 
collective may be free from the subjugations of states and markets, but under 
the control of other potentially oppressive members (Bailey, 1990). Linked to 
this, investigations by the Tenant Services Authority in the UK suggested that, 
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among small housing associations, housing co-operatives were 
disproportionately represented in their allegations register (CCMH, 2009), which 
highlights failures in the management and governance of such organisations. 
Critics have suggested that this shows how such organisations are prone to 
‘endemic governance failure’ as a result of members not working collaboratively 
(CCMH, 2009, p.49). How such difficulties shape outcomes for individuals 
involved is unclear, but suggests such governance issues are likely to cause 
stress, anxiety and other psychological costs. 
Evidence from Canada (Wasylish and Johnson, 1998) also suggests that 
difficult or oppressive relations in housing co-operatives can create 
psychological costs, and provides an interesting gender dimension to this, 
showing the effects on women with low incomes. From the socio-legal field, 
research highlights other psychological costs which arise in housing co-
operatives; 
‘Cliques form and threats are issued to other co-operative members who 
do not show proper deference and respect. This can lead to feelings of 
loneliness, rather than help to cure them’ (Bailey, 1990,p.82). 
A wider literature, related to co-operation and the functioning of self-managed 
groups, corroborates these insights showing how close working within such 
groups creates stress and anxiety (Novelli et al, 1989). The literature seems to 
connect such costs with the act and intensity of participation, highlighting the 
‘toll this responsibility takes on people’s lives’ (Saegert and Winkel, 1996, 
p.544). 
3.2.3. Key lessons and unanswered questions 
The above literature review focuses on the benefits and costs of collectivism as 
experienced by individuals. Reviewing a wide range of evidence, it was seen 
how scholars and commentators have asserted benefits that, in strict terms, did 
not meet the definition of benefit being used here. For instance, Aird (2009, 
p.15) in summarising the ‘benefits of CLTs’, suggests they enable ‘local 
fundraising’. How is local fundraising a ‘benefit’, and to whom? One might 
suggest that fundraising is an intermediate step to a benefit for a beneficiary, for 
instance, in providing finance to create affordable housing that a household 
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needs. Hence the focus on individualised benefits and costs helps pinpoint the 
distribution of any gains or loses.   
The above literature reviews also reveal how significant attention has been 
given to identifying, describing and measuring the benefits of housing 
collectivism. However, negative outcomes or individualised costs have received 
far less attention. This is a major gap in knowledge. If balanced assessments 
are to be made about the potential of housing collectivism, to remedy current 
housing problems, then greater evidence is required on the negative outcomes 
such models create. 
Furthermore, in identifying certain costs and benefits complex patterns and 
interconnections start to become apparent. For example, participation in the 
development and management of collectives offers the potential for individuals 
to become empowered or to self-realise, but also create costs in time, energy or 
stress. Analytical approaches are required which can capture these connections 
and trade-offs and explain how they are experienced.  
Whilst the various costs and benefits of housing collectivism have been 
identified, there are few insights into how these outcomes are shaped by the 
form and function of a collective. What becomes apparent is a crucial attribution 
issue, and a lack of causal models which explain why certain patterns have 
emerged in the perceived benefits and costs of collectivism. This is a significant 
gap in knowledge, and the lack of attributional analysis weakens the claims to 
certain benefits, since the causes of them may be external to the collective 
(Satsangi and Clapham, 1990). Hence, any analysis of benefits and costs 
should seek to establish the connections between these outcomes and the form 
and functions of the housing collectives concerned. 
3.3. Conclusions from the literature  
A wide and diverse literature reveals factors that shape the development of 
housing collectives. What is missing from the literature is a more holistic view, 
which shows how these factors overlap and conjoin to create complex 
conditions. Constraints and enablements are woven into the conditions in which 
housing collectives develop, and the external bodies which can affect their 
development. Constraints and enablements are also manifest in the internal 
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aspects of collectives, in terms of their resources, member capacities and 
actions, processes for co-ordination and systems of governance. What is 
required is a deeper understanding of how these factors conjoin to create 
different development pathways for different collectives. The study’s first 
research question directs attention to this gap in knowledge; 
What factors have constrained and enabled the development of housing 
collectives? 
There are also identifiable gaps in knowledge regarding the benefits and costs 
of housing collectivism, as experienced by individual members and residents. 
There is scope for an empirically-grounded view of the benefits and costs of this 
activity from the perspective of those involved. The benefits and costs of 
collectivism, for those engaged in this activity, are not received in isolation from 
one another but as a unified and integrated experience. Such individuals must 
weigh those benefits and costs to determine whether this model is meeting their 
needs, and the needs of others. Residents and members are, in essence, 
making trade-off decisions about their continued involvement, and an 
understanding of how such decisions are processed and rationalised is 
currently missing from the literature.  
To present the perceived benefits and costs of collectivism, from the 
perspective of those involved is, however, merely a first step. If a substantial 
contribution is to be made to this field, the study must address an often cited 
gap in knowledge, which relates to how perceived benefits and costs are 
connected to the forms and functions of collectives. Scholars such as Rowlands 
(2009) have noted the significance of this issue; 
‘…gaps remain, critically around...The contribution of mutualism and co-
operation to the benefits witnessed in these organisations. It is critical to 
understand how these values influence day-to-day activity, process and 
relationships’. (Rowlands, 2009, p.vi). 
This study therefore prioritises causal concerns through its second research 
question; 
What are the perceived benefits and costs of housing collectivism for members 
and residents, and to what extent are these attributable to the form and function 
of the collectives? 
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Both research questions direct attention to the processes, entities and 
relationships which cause collectives to develop in certain ways, and on the 
effects of such collective endeavour on those involved. If any progress is to be 
made in addressing the identified gaps in knowledge, what will be required is a 
set of conceptual devices, ontological and epistemological positions, and 
analytical techniques and methods which help develop causal explanations. 
The next chapter puts in place some of these foundations in the form of an 
analytical framework, which is then supported by a fuller definition of the 
methods employed in the study.  
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Chapter Four: The Analytical Framework 
 
4.1. Introduction 
To meet the ambitious research objectives set out in the previous chapter, a 
framework of concepts and analytical tools was developed. This provided a 
structure which guided the methods of data collection, the processes of 
analysis, and the procedure for presenting findings. At the same time this 
positions the study in certain systems of thought and research traditions. 
In the following section certain philosophical positions are discussed, showing 
how this study applies a realist interpretation of causation. On the basis of this, 
models of causal explanation are explored. Connections are then made to 
theories and methods for explaining causal processes as ‘mechanisms’, and 
how such ideas can be used to explore social phenomena. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of how this set of concepts will be used in the 
current study, and the need for a specific set of empirical methods and 
procedures. 
4.2. Causation and realism 
To understand if and how effects are attributable to certain causes, the nature 
of causation cannot be ignored. There is a diverse range of philosophical 
positions on the issue of causation, in terms of its ontological status and 
epistemic access to it. Some scholars have argued, as David Hume did, that 
human understanding of causation should be limited purely to subjective 
experience of regularities between events, or ‘constant conjunctions’ (Hume, 
[1748] 2000). Humeans, following this tradition, might suggest that it is not 
possible to observe causation in action, and that it is a human construct created 
by repeated observation of regularities between similar events. Alternatively, 
idealists might suggest that one’s understanding of causation contains within it 
ideas that are not obtained from the senses, but are given a priori (Kant, 
1998[1781]; De Pierris and Friedman, 2013). Hence, an understanding of 
causation should not be limited to what the human senses can observe or some 
derivative thereof. Working within a realist tradition, other scholars have 
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asserted metaphysically bolder positions, suggesting that the regularities which 
underpin the constant conjunction of events are the product of a mind-
independent objective world (Bhaskar, 1998a; Chakravartty, 2005;). Within this 
external world objects have causal powers and liabilities which, in interaction, 
give rise to those regularities. Such a position entails both ontological 
commitments to an external world, and epistemic commitments about the extent 
to which knowledge of that objective world is possible. This is the essence of a 
realist position.  
Such metaphysical disputes cannot be resolved here, but understanding these 
discussions has helped to develop an informed position on causation and what 
one can say about why events occur. Realists provide valuable models of 
causal explanation which articulate change based on interactions and 
relationships between entities organised in specific ways, and assert an 
ontology which explains collectively held powers and liabilities (Sayer, 1992). In 
exploring philosophies of causation, realism was seen to provide certain 
analytical tools to explore housing collectivism and the causal questions posed. 
This thesis therefore asserts and applies, through empirical methods, a realist 
understanding of causation.  
This tradition has a particular resonance for those working on issues of housing 
collectivism, since this phenomenon is a product of both human agency and 
material, physical forms. Realist ontologies provide a way of understanding the 
relationship between subjective experience and an objective, external world. In 
simple terms, realists suggest that what is real is not equivalent to what can be 
known (Bhaskar, 2008[1975]; Sayer, 1992). This avoids the 'epistemic fallacy', 
whereby;  
'…statements about being can be reduced to or analysed in terms of 
statements about knowledge; i.e. that ontological questions can always be 
transposed into epistemological terms' (Bhaskhar, 1998a, p.27). 
Why should past, present and future events be exhausted only by knowledge of 
them? Instead, it might be suggested that what can be known is governed by 
something beyond human experience; the structure and composition of an 
external world. Experimentation, through the creation of closed systems and 
manipulation of objects within that system, requires a certain structure to the 
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world in order to give meaning and productivity to this activity. As Bhaskar puts 
it; 
‘Science, then, is the systematic attempt to express in thought the 
structures and ways of acting of things that exist and act independently of 
thought’ (Bhaskar, 2008[1975], p.250). 
Critical realists, such as Bhaskar and Outhwaite, wish to go further in positing a 
‘complex ontology’ (Cloke et al, 1991, p.135). They suggest a view of reality as 
stratified, positing the existence of different domains beyond what can be 
observed. Causation, under such a model, is explained in terms of ‘generative 
mechanisms’, or the combined activation (or not) of the multiple powers, 
liabilities and tendencies of objects.   
In arguing that there is an objective world beyond subjective experience, it is 
also critical to stress that any understanding of this objective world is 
conceptually mediated. All knowledge is fallible, though there are some tools 
which can limit that fallibility (Danermark et al, 2002). In researching social 
phenomena, one cannot create the experimental conditions that can be 
established in the natural sciences. It is hard to ‘close’ the social world in order 
to understand the myriad of variables and causes of phenomena, in part, 
because of hermeneutic and double hermeneutic processes (Giddens, 1987). 
Subjects of social science are not passive, and through action and learning they 
adapt their subsequent behaviours. Hence, realists tend to treat social reality as 
an open system, where you cannot 'control for extraneous variables', but only 
try to understand how things work as ‘tendencies’ (Archer, 1998, p.190). 
Crucially for the purposes of this study, this has allowed for the importance of 
the human construction of knowledge, in shaping what those within collectives 
do and how they do it.   
Abstraction plays a key role in realist enquiry, and has done in this study. 
Abstract theory seeks to understand the necessary power and liabilities of 
things, by taking a ‘one-sided’ view of a phenomenon (Sayer, 2010, p.59). For 
the purposes of this study, that has meant isolating and theorising about the 
powers and liabilities of individuals, collectives and other related entities. 
Realists argue that this abstraction must be made on the basis of empirical 
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research, in order to understand the conditions upon which powers and 
liabilities are activated. In Sayer’s own words; 
‘…the understanding of concrete events and objects requires a double 
movement; concrete-abstract, abstract concrete. At the outset our 
concepts of concrete objects are likely to be superficial or chaotic. In order 
to understand their diverse determinations we must first abstract them 
systematically. When each of the abstracted aspects have been 
examined, it is possible to combine the abstractions so as to form 
concepts which grasp the concreteness of their objects’ (Sayer, in Cloke et 
al, 1991, p.148). 
Marxist scholars, such as Harvey (1987), argue that under such models our 
reality collapses into a ‘mass of contingencies’ at the level of the particular case 
or location (Harvey, 1987, p.373), and that no general theories can be 
established or applied. Accounting for Harvey’s criticisms, this study has sought 
to identifying causal processes which appear across disparate contexts and 
time-periods, and provide theoretical insights which have general application. 
Patterns, therefore, can be found in the ‘mass of contingencies’. 
This study has stopped short of a commitment to critical realist ideas, and works 
within a broad realist tradition. In developing the analytical framework outlined in 
this chapter, the many objections to critical realism have been explored, notably 
in reference to the bold and complicated ontology it presents (Steele, 2005), but 
also its approach to justifying movements from statements of fact to statements 
of value (Hammersley, 2009). Perhaps more pertinently for the current study, 
critical realism has also been critiqued for its lack of methodological guidance 
and underpinning (Harré, 2009; Allen, 1983). The philosophical position 
developed in this thesis draws on certain ideas from critical realism, but aligns 
more squarely with the realism of Andrew Sayer (1992). Sayer provides us with 
some of the conceptual devices needed to help move from philosophical ideas 
of causation, to methodological and analytical approaches to understanding 
causal processes. 
4.3. Causal explanation  
The alignment with Sayer’s work came after considering other approaches to 
causal explanation. The deductive-nomological tradition (Woodward, 2014), 
suggests that only covering laws equate to causal explanations; that only by 
reference to laws or general propositions which assert a correlation between the 
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types of events in question is a causal explanation offered. In addressing the 
research questions of this thesis an approach could have been taken more 
closely aligned with this tradition. It may have sought law-like rules governing 
the effects of certain constraints and enablements, or the creation of certain 
costs and benefits.  
Granger causality (Granger, 1969) provides such a mode of inference using 
predictive models. These are based on the theory that causes always 
temporally precede effects, and that causes carry information about their future 
effects, giving predictions the capacity to reveal causal relationships. Applying 
these models in the current study could have highlighted associations between 
certain causes and effects, and sought predictive models of how the presence 
of certain constraints leads to patterns in collective developments. However, a 
weakness of such models is that prediction alone provides little insight into the 
processes of change, or the nature of the causation taking place (Diebold, 
2001).  
Adoption of such approaches would have limited the potential to answer this 
study’s research questions. Understanding how constraints and enablements 
operate, and the processes through which certain benefits and costs are 
attributable to collective form and function, requires a different approach. 
Preference was given to models of causal explanation which established the 
‘cogs and wheels’ (Hedstrom & Ylikoski, 2010, p.50) of the development of 
collectives, and how they give rise to certain outcomes. 
Building on the work of Harré and Madden (1975) and Bhaskar, (2008[1975]), 
Sayer outlines a model of causation, and causal explanation, which is premised 
on understanding the interaction of objects that have specific causal powers 
and liabilities. The following sub-section looks at these ideas in more depth, and 
relates them to the current study. 
Describing how change should be understood, Sayer argues; 
‘…causality concerns not a relationship between discrete events (‘cause’ 
and ‘effect’), but the ‘causal powers’ or ‘liabilities’ of objects or relations, or 
more generally their ‘ways-of-acting’ or mechanisms…a causal claim is not 
about a regularity…but about what an object is like and what it can do’ 
(Sayer, 1992, p.104-105). 
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Objects possessing a certain internal structure hold a variety of powers and 
liabilities which are enacted when conditions allow. These conditions are 
constituted by the ‘presence and configuration’ of other 'objects, these having 
their own causal powers and liabilities' (Sayer, 2010, p.73). To depict this, Sayer 
presents a model of causal explanation; 
Figure 1: The structure of causal explanation 
  
Source: Sayer, 1992, p.109. 
To explain this model in practice, a preliminary application might be made to the 
phenomena studied here. An individual resident or member within a collective 
(composed as they are of certain biological and cognitive structures) possesses 
certain causal powers and liabilities. The presence of other members and 
residents or external entities, each having their own powers and liabilities, 
provide the conditions which govern the activation of the individual’s powers 
and liabilities. To take a practical example, one could look at a basic task in the 
development of collectives; the preparation of information about the collective to 
disseminate to others. A member of the collective might have the potential 
power to write information, due to their competent use of English language, 
ability to write/type and so forth. However, other individuals in the collective 
might also have that power and, given the nature of collective endeavour, 
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producing such information is likely to be a joint enterprise. The final information 
and process of dissemination will be the output of the interactions of different 
individuals with varying powers and liabilities. Using this small collective task as 
an example, a sense of the complexity of causal explanation is seen. This 
requires a means of simplification, an issue that is returned to in section four 
and five.  
Sayer is providing a basic structure for understanding how events occur, and 
what causes them, which goes beyond mere suggestions of regularities in 
events. What he advocates is an explanation of change that is based on 
mechanisms that give rise to that change. In certain physical change processes, 
such as the corrosion of metal, the ‘mechanism’ which gives rise to corrosion is 
known and well understood. However; 
‘In some cases, such as that of gravity or the connection between a 
person’s intentions and actions, we know little about the mechanisms 
involved…What we would like…is a knowledge of how the process works. 
Merely knowing that ‘C’ generally has been followed by ‘E’ is not enough, 
we want to understand the continuous process by which ‘C’ caused ‘E’. 
(Sayer, 1992, p.107). 
Given the causal orientation of the research questions in this study, this is 
critical. What has been required is a set of techniques which ‘…make visible 
how the participating entities and their properties, activities, and relations 
produce the effect of interest’ (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010, p.51). The 
meaning of the term ‘mechanism’ therefore becomes clear. Akin to identifying 
the cogs and wheels which make a clock run to time, a mechanism-based 
explanation reveals the workings of component parts in a change process. 
To understand what is causing something requires unpicking those factors 
which are decisive in changing events. This means asking ‘what if’ questions 
about a phenomenon to establish what is central to change and what is not 
(Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010; Woodward, 2002). For instance, in thinking about 
the development of a housing collective, one might compare the consequences 
of it losing a member of the group and becoming bankrupt. Losing a member 
might create no major change in the collective’s development, but becoming 
bankrupt probably would. This type of counter-factual questioning has provided 
valuable tools to help focus in on decisive causal factors in collectives, helping 
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direct data collection, and prioritise certain events and processes for deeper 
scrutiny. 
A collective may have properties which cannot be explained through reference 
to their constituent parts. In the same way that the act of thinking is not an 
aggregate function of each brain cells capacity to think (Harré, 1993), so too a 
collective’s power to house its members cannot be explained purely in 
reference to individual capacities or resources. It might be suggested that a 
collective’s power to represent its members, to other organisations, is 
qualitatively different to representations made by a disorganised group of 
individuals. Furthermore, it might be suggested that such collective properties 
are retained only so long as internal relations are maintained. As Harré notes; 
‘…at least one of the relations in which the elements of the collective stand 
should be invariant under a wide range of transformations’ (Harré, 1993, 
p.93) 
When this thinking is applied to collectivism in housing projects, it might be 
suggested that a collective’s form, (being a non-profit, collectively owned entity) 
and the beliefs and practices this gives rise to, set the basis for durable internal 
relations between members. It is these things (if invariant under transformation) 
which can create certain collective level properties. 
This has directed the research to studying the development and performance of 
housing collectivism at two strata; the individual level and the collective level, 
where different properties, powers and liabilities may reside. 
4.4. Causal mechanisms 
The basic premise of understanding change in mechanistic terms has been 
introduced. The next challenge to understand what is meant by the term ‘causal 
mechanism’, and how this elucidates the understanding of collectivism.  
One might pose a variety of searching questions in regard to the idea of causal 
mechanisms; what exactly is a mechanism under the above conceptions? Is it a 
real process, an event, or merely an intellectual construct to explain those 
events? Is a mechanism observable, and if not, how should it be identified or 
posited?  
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Various scholars, from a variety of scientific fields, have sought to provide a 
clear definition of a causal mechanism (Machamer et al., 2000; Woodward, 
2002), and specifically as a means to understand social change (Bunge, 2004; 
Elster, 1989b; Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010). 
Such definitions follow a general pattern, describing mechanisms as a function 
of objects which are organised in a certain form or structure, undertaking certain 
activities that produce regular changes. One particularly rich description of 
causal mechanisms is provided by Hedström and Ylikoski (2010); 
‘Mechanisms consist of entities (with their properties) and the activities 
that these entities engage in, either by themselves or in concert with other 
entities. These activities bring about change, and the type of change 
brought about depends on the properties of the entities and how the 
entities are organized spatially and temporally’ (Hedström and Ylikoski, 
2010, p.51) 
Mechanisms can be taken to be mind-independent things, as Bhaskar suggests 
(2008). In this thesis, however, an arguably more conservative position has 
been adopted. It uses the term mechanism in a more representational sense, 
following Hernes: 
‘A mechanism like a model is a stripped down picture of reality; it is an 
abstract representation that gives the logic of the process that could have 
produced the initial observation’ (Hernes, 1998, p.28) 
This description is central to the current study and in the insights into housing 
collectivism which are offered. What has been sought is a set of ‘theoretical 
constructs that provide hypothetical links between observable events’ 
(Hedström and Swedberg, 1996, p.290).   
The conceptualisation of mechanisms as models, rather than as ‘real’ things, is 
important because it acknowledges a limited epistemology. As noted above 
realists tend to adopt conservative epistemological positions which highlight the 
fallibility of human knowledge, and accept differences between thought objects 
and objects of thought. This does not mean that one should judge such work in 
purely in terms of its utility. What realist research, including the current study, 
should aim for is knowledge which is ‘practically adequate’ (Sayer, 1992, p.71): 
‘…knowledge must generate expectations about the world and about the 
results of our actions which are actually realised…our theories should 
explain the situation under study by giving an account of what produced it 
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and not merely a way of deriving or calculating results’ (Sayer, 1992, p.69-
71). 
Creating expectations about the world which are actually realised is an 
ambitious task. Exploring the development of long-run collective endeavours 
means accepting major causal complexity. As Lewis notes; 
‘Any particular event that we might wish to explain stands at the end of a 
long and complicated causal history…in the world as we know it the only 
question is whether they are infinite or merely enormous’ (Lewis, 1986, 
p.214). 
What my approach has sought to produce is ‘stripped down’ or truncated 
pictures of housing collectivism in practice; a model which does not purport to 
be a direct representation of reality, but is practically adequate in explaining 
events and unlocking the workings of the things that bring them about.  
4.5. Social mechanisms 
Providing examples of mechanism-based thinking in the social sciences is 
instructive at this point. This will help not only show the form that mechanism-
based explanations take, but also situate the work in wider empirical tradition. 
The following section seeks to do this by presenting numerous examples and 
introducing related ideas from analytical sociology and the development of 
middle range theories (Merton, 1968). 
Examples of sociological research which uses mechanism-based explanations 
are diverse and numerous (see Berkes, 1987; Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010; 
Hedström and Swedberg, 1998; Merton, 1968; White, 1970). For instance, 
Granovetter’s (1978) threshold model explains how individual participation in 
collective action, is a response to the number of other members participating in 
that scenario. Each individual has a threshold of other participating members 
that must have joined before they are willing to participate. Differences in these 
individual thresholds create variations in the manifestations and scale of such 
participation (Granovetter, 1978).  
In the urban studies literature, scholars have posited mechanism-based 
explanation of neighbourhood level change, via ‘neighbourhood effects’ (van 
Ham et al, 2012; Sampson et al, 2002). More specifically in the field of collective 
housing, Bengtsson (2001) has sought to identify ‘social mechanisms behind 
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the sustenance…of collective action’ in co-operative housing. Using empirical 
evidence from 26 Swedish housing estates, Bengtsson shows how collective 
action is ‘institutionalised’, through ‘norms of local utilitarianism’ (which leads 
tenants to think ‘I take part if it is needed and I can contribute to the collective 
good’). Co-operation occurs as a result of these norms rather than, as rational 
choice theorists might suggest, from pure calculations of personal gain. 
Bengtsson’s presentation of these mechanisms is interesting, as he grounds 
empirical evidence about co-operation in a range of broader collective action 
theories, which results in a more middle range theory about tenant co-operation. 
What these examples show is how mechanism-based explanations reveal the 
causal connections between individual-level beliefs and actions, and the 
dynamics and outcomes of this at a collective-level. They are, either implicitly or 
explicitly, grounded in an understanding of the causal powers and liabilities of 
individuals and other resources, which in interaction, give rise to collective-level 
change. They prioritise an explanation of the cogs and wheels of a process; 
how the individual people and resources in social settings interact to create 
certain effects. These features of mechanism-based explanations were used to 
construct the mechanisms outlined in this study. 
With a focus on social mechanisms, this study was guided toward a certain type 
of theorising associated with analytical sociology (Coleman, 1990). As 
Hedström and Swedberg note; 
 ‘…attention is called to an intermediary level of analysis in-between pure 
description…on the one hand, and universal social laws on the other…the 
essential aim of sociological theorizing should be to develop fine-grained 
middle-range theories that clearly explicate the social mechanisms’ 
(Hedström and Swedberg, 1996, p.281). 
This provided some direction to the current study; to develop simplified models, 
or mechanisms, which help us understand causal processes and pathways, not 
only in reference to individuals, but also in terms of collective behaviour and 
wider contingent conditions.  
As Hedström and Ylikoski (2010, p.59) suggest, different types of mechanism 
might be explored; ‘situational mechanisms’ which explain how conditions and 
social structures affect an individual’s beliefs; ‘action-formation’ mechanisms 
which link an individual’s beliefs to the actions they undertake; and 
81 
 
‘transformational mechanisms’ which explain how individuals, in concert with 
one another and other resources, generate intended and unintended 
consequences (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010, p.59). 
4.6. The application of the analytical framework 
The concepts and ideas above have provided some of the apparatus required 
to address this study’s research questions. They have offered a means to 
explore the phenomena being studied, and to understand and conceptualise 
causal processes. 
Answering the first research question in this study, has meant establishing the 
constraints and enablements acting on housing collectives in their development. 
The above set of concepts and ideas provided a framework for this, directing 
attention to the internal dynamics of collectives; the formation of beliefs of 
members and residents, their individual agency, and the products of collective 
action by multiple agents. They also highlighted the importance of relations with 
external bodies and conditions, which provide the contingent conditions, or 
structures, in which collectives develop. Through empirical research it was 
hoped that a simplified picture would emerge revealing causal processes 
explained in mechanistic terms. 
In reference to the second research question, the objective was to identify the 
benefits and costs of such activity to the individuals involved, and to assess the 
extent to which these are attributable to collective forms and functions. The 
framework outlined above has provided the conceptual tools to explore and 
depict such causal links. Existing studies provided examples of how these 
mechanism-based explanations could be presented (Bengtsson, 2001), making 
connections between the costs and benefits experienced by individuals, and 
those at aggregate level or for the collective as a whole. 
Major questions remained however about how, methodologically, such 
mechanism-based models could be developed. Such questions are the focus of 
the following chapter.  
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Chapter Five: Research methodology  
 
5.1. Introduction  
This chapter outlines the methodology of the study and provides a reflexive 
account of how the research was designed and conducted.  
Firstly, I set out my position in this research and how my existing knowledge 
and relations shaped the focus and conduct of the study. Following this, the 
reasons for adopting a case study design are presented, with discussions 
regarding the role and development of theory, generalisation from cases and 
issues of case selection. The chapter then discusses and reflects on the 
research methods used and associated ethical considerations. This is followed 
by a discussion of the approach to data analysis, and the forms of inference 
used in addressing the research questions.  
5.2. The position of the researcher 
Realists assert that all human knowledge is fallible and mediated by concepts 
(Sayer, 1992), and as such can be affected by the assumptions, bias and 
flawed reasoning of the researcher(s) involved. Knowledge is situated (Rose, 
1997) and the position of the researcher to the subject matter, and to research 
participants, is a key issue affecting a range of research tasks (McDowell, 1992; 
Mohammad, 2001; Valentine, 2002). Reflecting on my position in this field led to 
important considerations about how this might affect my ‘encounters...choice of 
processes, and…interpretation of outcomes’ (Foote and Bartell 2011 p. 46). 
Prior to initiating this research, I had worked for several years in various 
housing organisations, and in the field of community development. Immediately 
prior to beginning this PhD I advised and supported, through a contract with the 
National CLT Network, newly formed CLTs, particularly those located in urban 
regeneration areas. One such CLT became a case study in this research, 
raising specific investigative and ethical considerations. This professional work 
was framed by previous academic research, including a single case study of a 
proposed CLT in Stoke-on-Trent.  
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This experience, alongside work as policy advisor on community development, 
explains my interest in housing projects run by, and for, members of a 
community. It also gave rise to certain opportunities and challenges. This 
existing knowledge set helped quickly establish the current knowledge base and 
identify gaps in knowledge about this activity. Furthermore, I was able to 
harness my relationships in this field to develop a wide sample of housing 
collectives for the empirical element of the study. The trade-off from this was 
that I entered the research with a set of pre-existing views, for instance, around 
the operations of such organisations, and the nature of member participation in 
them. I had witnessed, and promoted, the power of such participation, without 
having had the opportunity to unpick the difficulties and tensions from a 
removed position. Throughout the study I have had to consciously challenge my 
established views, developing a methodology that encouraged deep reflection 
and foregrounded themes with a strong evidential base. As will be discussed, 
the use triangulation processes and counterfactual reasoning has been critical 
to this.  
The methodological considerations arising from my position are discussed 
throughout. Specific attention is given to my position in relation to case selection 
and in dealing with ethical challenges.  
5.3. A case study design  
The following section sets out the reasons for selecting a case study design, 
and provides reflections on important decisions made in the design process.  
5.3.1. Applying a case study design 
The research questions which emerged from the literature demanded that local 
contexts, processes and relationships were privileged, so that the conjunctions 
and combinations of development factors and outcomes could be understood. 
What was needed was a research design which provided both insights into the 
internal actions and processes of collectives, but also the influence of external 
stimuli. Drawing on the guidance of Miles and Huberman, it became clear that 
the priority was:  
‘…rich descriptions and explanations of processes in identifiable local 
contexts...[to] preserve chronological flow, see precisely which events led 
84 
 
to which consequences, and derive fruitful explanations (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p.1). 
Research training as part of the PhD highlighted the value of case study 
research in seeing the ‘holistic’ quality of events (Yin, 2003, p.2), and this 
approach was explored through the work of various methodologists (Flyvbjerg, 
2006; Gerring, 2007; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009).  
Alongside these investigations, other research designs were studied. Action 
research appeared to offer potential insights into the practices and contexts of 
collectives (Lewin and Greenwood, 1998), but given my position in the field 
greater distance, not closer involvement, was desired. Longitudinal approaches 
were also considered, as repeated cycles of fieldwork could have revealed the 
changing conditions or forms of agency shaping the development of collectives. 
However, practical issues relating to timescales became apparent.  
Other research designs were considered, including those involving quantitative 
methods, highlighting a set of critical methodological choices faced. Should I 
prioritise either external validity (the generalisability of findings to a population) 
or internal validity (the validity of the causal relationship identified within a 
case)? If one is interested in causal processes or attribution, internal validity 
becomes the primary goal; 
'…often, though not invariably, it is easier to establish the veracity of a 
causal relationship pertaining to a single case…than for a larger set of 
cases' (Gerring, 2007, p.43). 
Researching a large number of cases, or making large numbers of observations 
to enumerate causes and effects, would have come at the cost of 
understanding and depicting the complex flow of events and quality of the 
phenomena studied. Narrative forms held the potential to convey the richness of 
human actions and interactions, in shaping the development of collectives in 
their complex and differentiated contexts. This explains why quantitative 
methods of causal inference were not selected. Such models of inference often 
seek to quantify the variation in effects from identified (or assigned) variations in 
causes (Rubin and John, 2011). However, quantified variation would not have 
yielded sufficient data about the processes affecting a collective’s development; 
a central component of the study’s research questions.  
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Furthermore, quantified, or monetised, approaches to cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) were not adopted. CBA generally seeks to assess the financial value of 
investments, monetising the benefits flowing from this (Boardman et al, 2006).  
Whilst attempts have been made to adjust this to social settings (in the form of 
social cost-benefit analysis), problems with this approach have been well-
documented, particularly in how the method drives a focus on those impacts 
that are measurable in economic terms, and the assumption that all value can 
be equally quantified in this form (Hanley and Spash,1993; Vatn, 2000; NEF, 
2013). Social Return on Investment (SROI) models have sought to address 
some of these problems, seeking to capture outcomes such as those on human 
wellbeing (NEF. 2013). Yet SROI still asserts the need to standardise costs and 
benefits in monetised form. Furthermore, it can miss or underestimate the 
complexity of the causal claims upon which it is based (Yates and Marra, 2016).  
This study’s research questions focus attention on the experiences of 
individuals within collectives, and the literature in this field points to complex 
psychological outcomes arising from collectivism, which do not lend themselves 
to economic appraisal. Furthermore, with a focus on trying to understand causal 
processes, some of the issues noted above regarding SROI suggest this was 
not appropriate. A decision was made to develop a qualitative cost-benefit 
approach (Stevens et al, 2008; van den Bergh, 2004). Accepting this decision 
would affect the scope for standardisation and comparison of costs and benefits 
across cases, it has provided a means to deeply engage with causal processes, 
and interpret complex psychological responses by individuals involved in the 
collectives.  
Thought was given to how a case study design could support this form of 
qualitative, causal enquiry, and in developing the research design I drew heavily 
on the work of Gerring (2007). Gerring defines case study research as: 
'…an intensive study of a single unit or a small number of units (the 
cases), for the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units (a 
population of cases)' (Gerring, 2007, p.37). 
Given the research questions of this study, allowing for immersion in the 
complexities of the particular was seen as critical. As Yin suggests, case 
studies enable the researcher to ‘investigate a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context’, relying on ‘multiple sources of evidence, with data 
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needing to converge in a triangulating fashion’ (Yin, 2009, p.18). From these 
ideas a model of research started to emerge, utilising case study designs to 
bridge across collectives and their contexts, and as a way to explore change 
over time, and the processes shaping this (George and Bennett, 2005).  
In designing a case study approach the first task was to define the unit of 
analysis. This was relatively straightforward, with single housing collectives, as 
legally constituted bodies, being that unit of analysis. The definition of a housing 
collective, presented in chapter two, set the parameters of those cases.   
In focusing on particular cases there was a risk that the deeper structural 
components of society would be missed, so that only the epiphenomena of 
these structures were explored. However, it was also accepted that the reverse 
claim could be made of structural analysis, which could fail to articulate in 
sufficient detail the realisation of such structures in the concrete world. In 
defence of the case study approach, one of the most celebrated examples of 
this mode of enquiry (Foote-Whyte, 1943) provided a powerful insight into social 
structure, making general assertions about social structuring from an 
investigation of one U.S. neighbourhood. In exploring constraint and 
enablement of particular collectives, the causal influence of, for instance, 
government policy or wider social norms became apparent. In exploring the 
costs and benefits that members and residents derive from housing collectives, 
new insights were derived into how these were shaped not only by collective 
processes, but also the wider socio-economic setting, since the case study 
approach facilitated an analysis of contextual conditions.  
One danger of case study research, and a repeated criticism of it, is that it does 
not offer ways to prevent the verification of a researcher's ideas or theory. As 
Diamond suggests, case study designs lack the mechanisms of quantitative 
research to 'curb one’s tendency to stamp pre-existing interpretations on the 
data' (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p.234). This was important for the current study, given 
my experience and position in the field. Whilst scholars such as Geertz (1995) 
suggest that the field exerts a 'powerful disciplinary force; assertive, demanding, 
even coercive', it might be suggested that my position in this field opened up the 
possibility of unchallenged verification of my existing views. One way of 
mitigating this has been to develop procedures that foreground the evidence 
87 
 
collected, even if they are counter to intuitions or existing views. These are 
processes which enabled the field to exert a ‘disciplinary force’ on the data 
collection and analysis process.  
The methodology set out here has been devised in reference to four quality 
measures devised by Yin (2009, p.40-45). This study has sought to assure 
construct validity by using a number of concepts which have a rich provenance 
in the literature related to social theory and housing collectivism. It sets out clear 
definitions of the key concepts being used, for instance, the definition of housing 
collectivism in chapter two, or precise definitions of costs and benefits.  
The study has also sought to maximise internal validity, or the explication of 
causal processes. This study uses the case study design to support a process 
of particularisation that focuses on causal relationships within and across cases 
(Gerring, 2007). As will be seen, the study blends description of events and 
relationships with an analytical procedure targeting key causal mechanisms.  
The case study design asserts an approach to external validity to delineate the 
'domain to which a study's findings can be generalised' (Yin, 2003, p.40). 
External validity is maximised by providing a clear view of the population and 
nature of housing collectives to which the theories developed might extend. This 
is through a process of 'analytic generalisation' (Yin, 2009, p.15), whereby 
empirical evidence is used to generalise to new theory, rather than to a 
population of cases.  
Finally, approaches have been taken to assure reliability of the findings. Certain 
procedural conventions have been used, as advocated by Yin, to provide clear 
documentation of the conduct of the study through a 'case study protocol' and 
compiling the evidence gathered available in a 'case study database' (Yin, 
2009).  
5.3.2. Theory, hypotheses and generalisation 
In general terms, ‘theory’ is ‘an idea or set of ideas that is intended to explain 
facts or events’ (Merriam-Webster, 2016). The approach to the use and 
development of theory in this study is heavily guided by Gerring (2007). Rather 
than using case studies for theory testing, Gerring highlights the value of such 
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designs for theory development, encouraging reasoning processes other than 
deduction. Case studies, it is argued, can help generate new theories about 
either the causes or effects within cases (George and Bennett, 2005). Gerring 
conceptualises different case studies as either those which theorise about 
causes (X-centered studies) or those theorising about effects (Y-centered 
studies). In practice, Gerring notes;  
'…the real world of social science reveals that few studies are innocently Y 
or X-centered…In most circumstances the researcher is well advised to 
strive for a more fully elaborated hypothesis, one that encompasses both 
sides of the causal equation' (Gerring, 2007, p.72). 
This approach has been applied to the current study, with its two research 
questions reflecting both sides of the causal equation; the causes of constraint 
and enablement of collective development (Xs), and the effects of collective 
endeavour in terms of the perceived benefits and costs to members and 
residents (Ys).  
The merit of such research questions, as encompassing ‘both sides of the 
causal equation’, is that the insights derived on one side deepen the 
understanding on the other. Identifying and exploring the costs incurred by 
those within the collectives, for instance in terms of their participation, would 
help deepen knowledge of certain constraints. 
Following reviews of literature relating to collective action problems, 'generative 
questions’ emerged, which are defined by Strauss (1987, p.22) as those that 
‘stimulate lines of investigation…lead to hypotheses, useful comparisons, [and] 
the collection of certain class of data’. Hence as generative questions have 
emerged from reading the varied literature, this has shaped the direction of data 
collection, which in turn has led to further theoretical refinement. In the course 
of this study, theory has shaped the focus of the data collection, and data 
collection has refined and refocused any theorising. 
A separate concern is the extent of generalisation possible from this research. 
The product of this research is not a form of statistical generalisation which 
extends conclusions from samples to populations (Yin, 2009; Gerring, 2007; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006). As Yin suggests, case studies provide 'analytic 
generalisations', whereby theories are posited which support inferences to be 
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made about the population which the cases belong. Flyvbjerg (2006, p.225) 
demonstrates this form of generalisation in reference to Galileo's theorising on 
the velocity of falling objects. Showing that a feather and a piece of lead fall at 
the same speed in a vacuum, Galilieo was using two cases (vastly different in 
weight) to articulate the theory that weight is not related to falling velocity. 
Hence, careful selection of cases can provide the evidence to develop a new 
persuasive theory of general relevance. This evidence does not require 
statistical treatment in order to be accepted as generally applicable.   
Hence, the current study sought to develop theories which explain and simplify 
causal processes in the cases, but which can also be used to explain similar 
processes taking place in a wider set of cases which share similar 
characteristics.  
5.3.3. Case selection 
The selection of cases heavily influences the kinds of conclusions that can be 
drawn from such research, and the type of theorising that is advisable (Geddes, 
2003). Driving decisions about case selection in this study has been the 
methodological work of Gerring (2007) and Yin (2009). Gerring suggests, in 
asserting the value of case research for understanding causal processes, that 
case selection should seek diversity in cause and effect in the phenomena of 
study. In selecting cases, researchers might try to encompass ‘the full range of 
variation’ in the causes of the phenomena studied, and its effects (Gerring, 
2007, p.100). The implications of this for the current study are discussed below, 
but in practice this would suggest seeking variation in what shapes the 
development of housing collectives, and the varying effects they may have on 
different audiences, physical spaces and so on. Before exploring this issue in 
more depth, however, it is important to chart the study’s early efforts to 
understand the population of cases from which those selected would be drawn.  
Building a picture of the case population  
In the early stages of this research, efforts were made to explore the broad 
characteristics of organisations collectively owning and using land and housing 
in England. Three parameters were used to delineate this population; the legal 
form of property ownership, specifically those which allow current or prospective 
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assets to be collectively owned; the nature of the assets held, focusing 
specifically on organisations owning land, housing or a combination of the two; 
and the legal and operational forms of organisations, targeting those that 
ensure some degree of control by residents. These loose parameters helped 
identify subtleties and complexities in isolating collectives from other housing 
organisations, such as housing associations. It became apparent that it can be 
hard to distinguish between different organisations at the margins of each of 
these parameters. Using data from various sources (for instance, Co-operatives 
UK, 2013; National CLT Network (UK), 2013; Self-help-housing.org, 2013; UK 
Co-housing Network, 2013) it was possible to approximate the number of 
organisations collectively owning and using land and housing, with that estimate 
being around 1000. Recent studies, albeit using differing definitions of this 
activity, suggest that this estimate was relatively accurate (Heywood, 2016; 
CCH, 2016). This exploratory work, in conjunction with relevant literature 
reviews, helped develop and refine the final definition of a ‘housing collective’ 
presented in chapter two. Hence, exploring the population not only assisted in 
case selection, but in achieving some greater definitional clarity. 
Maximising diversity: key decisions 
Having drawn lessons about this broad population, I started to develop a 
process for selecting cases for intensive study. As noted above, there are 
strong rationales for choosing cases in terms of the variation in both their 
causes and effects. Early efforts to describe what diverse causes and effects 
would look like, in terms of the development and outcomes of housing 
collectives, highlighted some potential challenges. Firstly, achieving a ‘full range 
of variation’ in this field is demanding, if not impossible. These are often long 
running, multi-faced organisations, operating in complex social, economic and 
political environments, and therefore capturing the extent of variation would be 
difficult.   
Furthermore, the demands of variation had to be balanced against the 
resources available for this study. To achieve a degree of variation would 
inherently require a multiple case design, but anticipating a certain level of data 
collection for each case, only a small number of cases could be studied. On the 
basis of these resource constraints, the wish to undertake cross-case analysis, 
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and the desire to maximise diversity along certain criteria, the decision was 
taken to build the research around three cases.  
Diversity of cause could be maximised by selecting cases with, for instance, 
different governance and legal models, internal capacities and resources, and 
those working in different social, economic and legal contexts. This might help 
understand why a case developed in the way it did. However, on the other side 
of the causal equation, selecting cases with diverse effects would have meant 
including both collectives that had sustained collectivism and those that had not. 
Practical problems were foreseen in identifying and studying cases of 
abandoned, failing, or short-lived collectivism, notably in relation to the extent of 
empirical data that would be accessible or available for such organisations.  
Despite these problems, the importance of these considerations was 
acknowledged. A middle-way was devised. Certain cases were selected which 
represented long term, sustained housing collectivism, but these were 
supplemented by a case at an embryonic stage of its development. The latter 
case provided insights into collectivism which were highly contingent and 
uncertain, so their development and realisation of outcomes could be seen in 
‘real-time’. This helped to create a contemporary set of data to sit alongside 
more historic data from the long running cases. During the fieldwork, a change 
in local conditions allowed this embryonic collective to take full ownership of a 
small number of houses, and move to a more sustainable position. Hence, the 
causes of unsustainable collectivism were not captured, and this is a point of 
major reflection in Chapter 11.  
In the search for increased diversity, I explored the inclusion of non-English 
cases, which it was hoped would bring into sharper focus the variation in local 
and national contexts and conditions. A study of only English collectives might 
have missed the sheer power of the national context, for example, the cultural 
factors shaping member actions, legal rules particular to that jurisdiction, or 
variations in funding or policy regimes. Therefore, to see the power of the 
national context, an international case would provide a lens to bring this into 
focus. Cases in different contexts were considered, acknowledging that such a 
case selection strategy may affect the extent and quality of any generalisations. 
The decision was taken to identify a case from a context with a housing system 
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similar to that seen in England, but with sufficient differences to offer some 
diversity in contextual factors. What was being sought was an alternative 
context where the housing system was of a similar ‘type’ (Kemeny and Lowe, 
1998, p.170). In practice, this meant identifying collectives in countries with 
similar legal forms and governance models for collective housing, where there 
was a mixed housing economy, and where housing collectivism was an 
established form of provision. As discussed below, this eventually led to the 
selection a Canadian case, deemed appropriate in light of the similarities 
between the housing systems of England and Canada.  
Reflecting on these decisions, the impact of the Canadian case on this research 
was significant, since this case became a vital lens through which to see the 
English cases. Had I selected a case from a national context which was highly 
restrictive of such collectivism, the findings may have been very different. What 
the Canadian case helped to do, however, was reveal constraining and 
enabling contextual factors which can affect a collective’s development, but 
which are not present in England.  
To identify the international case study I explored housing collectivism in North 
America. As some of the literature in chapter two suggests, there is a history of 
this type of housing activity here, with longstanding collectives operating non-
profit making legal models, within largely privately-owned housing markets. 
Governments in both the United States and Canada have provided at least 
some policy and funding stimulus for collective housing projects.  
Studying cases from different countries has meant engaging with the 
methodological literature relating to comparative research. In the housing field 
this is substantial, and highlights the different drivers of housing systems in 
different countries. Kemeny and Lowe (1998), for instance, argue that national 
contexts and housing systems are neither incomparable nor unilinear; they are 
neither incommensurable nor follow standard developmental paths. However, 
‘typologies of housing systems’ can be developed, which highlight similarities in 
‘cultural, ideological, political dominance’ (Kemeny and Lowe, 1998, p.161). 
Stephens asserts that using ‘conceptual equivalence’ (Pickvance, 2001) in 
developing broad typologies across nations is not sufficient. What should be 
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sought is an understanding of the uniqueness of housing systems and their 
context: 
‘…that housing policies operate within housing systems and housing 
systems in turn interact with wider social and economic structures. In other 
words, it needs to identify the dynamic between policy and institutions 
including the market; and the interaction between the housing system and 
wider socio-economic institutions such as the labour market’ (Stephens, 
2011, p. 353). 
This study takes the work of Stephens (2011) and Kemeny and Lowe (1998) to 
show that comparative work requires contextual sensitivity. Whilst this study is 
not a strict comparative exercise, in engaging deeply with contextual factors, it 
refrains from general assertions about how certain practices or policies are 
unilateral or can be transferred across different national contexts.  
Using a non-English case has had implications for the inferences that the study 
could make. For instance, the Canadian case would come to reveal the 
importance of property and company law to the development of asset owning 
collectives. However, due to differences between English and Canadian law, 
insights into the specific legal form developed in the latter case cannot be 
directly applied to English contexts. Despite this, patterns across the cases 
show a tendency in all the collectives studied to work creatively within existing 
legal and legislative parameters to develop new collective forms. Hence, 
generalisation about practices can be made, even if generalisations about legal 
innovations cannot.  
Case selection: from principles to process 
Such thinking set a platform for the practical task of identifying, filtering and 
shortlisting potential cases for study. At this stage, a refined definition of a 
‘housing collective’ had been created, and this was operationalised in the 
criteria for case selection. The definition led to criteria which sought differences 
in legal and governance arrangements, geographical scales and remits, and 
identifiable costs and benefits for specified groups being foregrounded. The 
criteria which emerged were as follows: 
1. Organisations adopting a range of legal and operational models 
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2. Organisations operating in different geographic, social and economic 
contexts 
3. Organisations of different sizes and with varying geographical remits 
4. Organisations at different stages of development 
5. Organisations generating different costs and benefits for residents and 
members 
Using various sources (Co-operatives UK, 2013; CLT Network, 2013; Self-help-
housing.org, 2013; Co-housing Network, 2013) I created a long-list of possible 
cases which met these criteria, and within which there was significant variation.  
For instance, I tried to identify collectives with big and small housing stocks, 
operating varying legal models, and situated in varied social and economic 
conditions. This long list of cases was narrowed to a list of 24 cases, which it 
was felt provided diversity on the criteria being used. This was undoubtedly a 
creative rather procedural effort, whereby searches where used to identify 
cases with certain characteristics. It should be acknowledged that no list of 
cases could fully encompass all the variation across current housing collectives.  
My desire was to maximise that where possible.   
The sample of non-English cases was identified through different sources 
(BSHF, 2013; National CLT Network (US), 2013; NAHC, 2013; CHFC, 2013). 
The resources provided through BSHF’s World Habitat Awards were particularly 
helpful, given the detailed information from over 20 years of the awards. Key 
word searches were used to identify potential collectives, before deeper desk 
research was performed on five cases within BSHF’s database. 
Having identified 24 English and five non-English cases, more practical 
questions came to the fore; in which cases would it be possible to negotiate 
access? How would the location of the cases affect the quantity of data that 
could be gathered? And how would this affect the resources available for the 
research? Furthermore, practical considerations were explored in terms of the 
ethical implications of various case selections, and how my position in this field 
might affect relations with participants in each case. The English and non-
English samples were ordered on the basis of these practical considerations, 
and considerations regarding variation and diversity. The first two English cases 
were prioritised, along with the first case from the non-English list.  
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Each of these cases was contacted via email, with documentation provided 
which explained the study, what was required of the organisation in the 
research, and the approach to a range of ethical issues. In each case, my 
contact in the collective sought approval to participate via their Board. All three 
organisations prioritised for inclusion agreed to take part in the research, these 
being the Milton Park Community (CMP), Walterton and Elgin Community 
Homes (WECH), and Granby 4 Streets CLT (henceforth Granby CLT). A 
detailed description of the form and development of these cases is provided in 
chapter six, but in terms of how the cases met the sampling criteria and 
provided diversity along each criterion, table three below summarises this.  
The challenge in capturing the variation in this phenomena through a small 
number cases became clear throughout the process. This powerfully reveals 
the tension between intensive case study work in a limited number of cases, 
and the desire to maximise diversity among those studied. Having a less 
prescriptive criteria would no doubt have made this easier, and one might 
consider a study where more cases were included, at the cost of the intensity of 
data collection. However, the questions posed in the research have 
necessitated a focus on internal validity, or the ‘veracity of a causal relationship 
pertaining to a single case’ (Gerring, 2007, p.43). The extent of variation 
expressed within cases is perhaps the price to be paid. 
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Table 3: The cases selected and summary information related to the selection criteria 
 Legal and operational model Social, economic 
and environmental 
setting 
Size and 
geographical 
remit 
Stage of 
development 
Initial evidence of 
costs and benefits 
for residents and 
members 
Milton Park 
(CMP) 
A federation of housing co-
operatives and other non-profit 
organisations, within a 
condominium structure. The 
co-operative housing is owned 
by resident members, and the 
condominium is owned by 
each co-operative and OSBL 
as a ‘co-owner’. 
Operating in central 
Montreal. An area of 
large townhouses, 
and very close to the 
city centre, bordering 
the financial district. 
Historically deprived 
but now more 
affluent. A mix of 
Anglophone and 
Francophone 
populations. 
Comprising 146 
residential 
buildings, 
several 
commercial 
properties and 
common spaces 
across six 
blocks. 
A long period 
of gestation 
through the 
1960s/70s.  
The housing 
co-operatives 
were 
constituted 
between the 
late 1970s 
and mid-
1980s.  
There is evidence of 
varied costs and 
benefits arising from 
the highly 
participative model 
and location on 
prime real-estate. 
Walterton 
and Elgin 
Community 
Homes 
(WECH) 
An Industrial Provident Society 
(now Community Benefit 
Society) but also a registered 
housing association / provider 
of social housing. The 
collective is owned by its 
members / shareholders, 
which does include non-
residents. However, the Board 
composition ensures a majority 
of seats for residents. 
Operating in central 
London. An area with 
relatively high levels 
of deprivation.  
Housing is a mix of 
terraced properties 
and newer, denser 
developments.  
WECH owns 
640 homes, 
containing 500 
tenants and 150 
leaseholders. It 
covers two 
estates, but no 
geographical 
remit is stated in 
their 
constitution. 
Constituted 
as WECH in 
1988. 
There is evidence of 
costs and benefits 
relating to the 
location. Academic 
studies explore 
health and well-
being benefits. 
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Granby 4 
Streets 
CLT 
(Granby 
CLT) 
An Industrial Provident Society 
(now Community Benefit 
Society), defined in its 
constitution as a CLT. The 
collective is owned by its 
members / shareholders, 
which includes non-residents. 
The Board contains a third of 
seats for each of the following 
groups; CLT residents, 
members of the wider 
community and stakeholders. 
 
A deprived area, in a 
relatively deprived 
city. Housing is 
largely Victorian 
terraced properties. A 
diverse population 
and history of 
receiving new 
migrants to the city. 
The CLT owns 
10 properties, 
but operates 
across the L8 
postcode of 
Liverpool. 
Constituted 
as a CLT in 
2011. 
There is little 
evidence of costs or 
benefits in light of 
the early stage of 
their development. 
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One outcome of selection was that, whilst various aspects of their context 
are diverse, each collective is located in a major city. Whilst not a criterion for 
selection, each collectives’ urban location was an outcome of the selection 
process. Literature in the field of housing collectivism suggests that urban 
environments provide qualitatively different conditions for such activity (CFS, 
2008; The Young Foundation, 2011). Guidance on the development of urban 
CLTs, for instance, hints at the different 'resources, risks and accountability 
arrangements' present in urban environments (CFS, 2008, p.3), though little 
more differentiation than this is given. In practice, studying collectives in 
urban areas has meant accepting a common geography, and has required a 
certain reticence about generalising to more rural contexts. This issue is 
discussed further in chapter eleven. 
5.4. Data collection 
The methods employed in collecting the empirical data for this study have 
been guided by Yin’s three principles of data collection (2009, pp.114-123), 
which relate to; the use and triangulation of multiple data sources; the 
procedures for storage, organisation and transparency of data; and, 
specifying the ‘chain of evidence’ from research questions to data collection, 
through to the conclusions made. 
5.4.1. An ethical approach to the research 
In securing ethical approval for this study, a variety of ethical issues were 
anticipated and plans devised to mitigate these. A principle of non-
malfeasance was applied in designing and implementing the research, which 
led to certain decisions being made in reference to the data collection and 
presentation of findings.  
Specific ethical issues were considered given my previous professional work 
in this field. For example, some of the observations required attendance at 
the collective’s meetings. Given my past professional work there was a 
temptation to participate in discussions about technical and operational 
matters. This would have entailed going beyond ‘’doing no harm’ toward 
active beneficence. The temptation was most pronounced in the two UK 
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cases, where my experience of funding and support programmes was most 
extensive. Such participation could have radically affected relations in each 
case, so I consciously restricted any advice or guidance to simple 
signposting to relevant resources, networks or contacts. I remained 
disciplined in restricting my role to being largely an observer, and sought 
good practice guidance on how to initiate and maintain respectful but 
constructive relations. This meant respecting privacy on certain issues, 
avoiding therapeutic roles, and reflecting on potential power relations 
(Allmark et al, 2009). For group observations of Board meetings, participant 
information sheets were circulated to all attendees and my work and role was 
introduced at the start of the meeting. This led to a collectively agreed 
consent for me observe the meeting and use any data collected, allowing the 
group to speak ‘off the record’ if required.  
In planning and conducting interviews, a strict approach to securing informed 
consent was applied. Before the interviews, every participant received a 
written information sheet, which used plain language to set out the broad 
areas for discussion and assured participants that they could opt out of any 
question, or terminate the interview at any time. Furthermore, the participant 
information sheet provided contact information for staff at the university in 
case there were any questions or complaints about the research. 
Prior to each interview, this information was repeated verbally, for those who 
may have had reading/literacy difficulties. This process was geared toward 
securing informed consent, and each interviewee signed a consent form, or 
their consent was recorded on an audio file.  
In each case study a relationship with a key informant was established.  This 
was an important step to securing access to research participants. It brought 
certain dilemmas, however, in ensuring that they did not control any of the 
sampling process or have access to the final data. This relationship was 
negotiated in each case, and meant that interviewees could be reassured 
their participation would be anonymous, allowing them to be critical of the 
collective if desired. In conversations with key informants, I stressed that they 
abide by their own data protection protocols, and that the contact details of 
100 
 
participants were only shared with me after their prior consent. Differing 
agreements led to differing sampling approaches, set out in the section 
below. 
Differing relationships with people in the cases created different ethical 
considerations. I had no pre-existing relationship with people in Milton Park 
and Walterton and Elgin. However, my involvement in the development of 
Granby CLT posed certain intellectual and ethical challenges. Having 
provided advice to the CLT, prior to the starting the PhD, I approached the 
case with an existing knowledge and understanding of their efforts and 
context. Existing relationships with residents brought an ethical imperative 
not to abuse their trust or to do harm. In my communication with participants 
in Granby I adopted a different tone and style in my communications, to 
emphasis a change in role and a different type of relationship. Whilst it was 
not advisable to exclude from the research people I had met and worked with 
before, I sought to engage as many people as possible with whom I had no 
relationships. Interviews with the former group were valuable as they 
provided previously unheard reflections about their experience and motives. 
However, in some of these interviews it became difficult to get interviewees 
to respond to questions, as their responses focused on current dilemmas 
and opportunities. Interviews with those I had previously had little contact 
with were very valuable, highlighting perspectives that hitherto that point I 
had not appreciated. In the course of conducting the Granby CLT case study, 
I adopted a strict ethical and analytical discipline to include and analyse only 
those sources and pieces of evidence gathered during the study.  
In all of the cases pseudonyms were used to protect the identities of 
participants in the presentation of the empirical work. Each collective agreed 
to have their identity and location revealed, as attempts to conceal this would 
have meant essentially decontextualizing the cases. The challenge was to 
carefully balance protecting the identities of individual participants, whilst 
making sure their actions were sufficiently situated in their context. This was 
done through selective use of data and applying careful judgements guided 
by the principle of non-malfeasance.  
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5.4.2. Data collection processes and procedures 
Case study commentators stress that various sources of data should be 
gathered and triangulated, for instance, in the form of observations, 
interviews, documents, archival records and physical artefacts (Yin, 2009; 
Stake, 1995). Added to these potential data sets, Gerring (2007) includes 
survey data, or quantitative data from secondary sources, stressing that case 
studies can blend the analysis of qualitative and quantitative data.  
This study has primarily relied on three data collection methods; interviews, 
observations and document reviews. Where available, other data has been 
used to supplement the case studies, including secondary quantitative data 
and audio/visual data. These modes of data collection were considered 
along with other alternatives. Relying heavily on surveys or other quantitative 
methods was an issue discussed in section three, and on their own such 
methods would not have provided the required data to answer the research 
questions. Using other qualitative approaches, such as participative 
methods, was also discounted. Whilst providing valuable data about 
contemporary practices, processes and contexts, they would have failed to 
offer the historical insights required to understand the historic development of 
each case. The research design has, therefore, sought to combine data 
sources which would provide retrospective and contemporary insights, and 
which could be rigorously triangulated. The sub-sections below discuss the 
value of the different methods chosen. 
Interviews 
Interviews provided access to personal reflections and recollections about 
the development of collectives, and the benefits and costs that individuals 
perceived from this. Interviews were used to access and explore issues that 
might have been impossible to observe, for instance, historical events or 
individual psychological responses (Bryman, 2012). The intention for the 
interviews was that they allow participants to reconstruct events, condensing 
and generalising insights across long time periods. Semi-structured 
interviews were chosen. This gave participants the freedom to identify and 
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discuss development factors and outcomes they perceived most strongly, 
whilst enabling me to focus in on specific actions, entities or events to 
explore certain causal processes in detail. The combination of directive and 
non-directive elements (May, 2001), allowed me to ask for clarification and 
elaboration on certain issues (Fielding, 1988), and to cross-check data from 
other interviews, observations and documents (Beardsworth and Keil, 1992).  
The interview data had certain limitations however. It provided subjective 
perspectives, with events mediated by the interviewees' own experiences. 
Relying solely on this type of data would have undoubtedly have meant 
missing a fuller chronological picture of the cases. Furthermore, interviews 
offered little in the way of direct insights into collective action, as interviewees 
simplified the complexity of their collective’s processes. During the initial 
interviews, I sensed some post-event rationalisation in interviewees' 
responses, with the difficulties, errors, and flaws in collective governance and 
action being downplayed. In later interviews I became more adept at probing 
and challenging interviewees on these issues, but also in setting-up the 
relationship early in the interview to pose more exploratory questions. 
To secure a range of perspectives on collective development and outcomes 
the perspectives of people in different positions was needed. Building a 
sample of residents and member interviewees was handled differently in 
each case. In Milton Park, all residents were invited to participate by email, 
with people self-selecting and contacting me directly to take part. One 
strength of this approach was that it meant every collective resident and 
member was reached, removing any potential for manipulation by the key 
informants. Despite this, self-selection had its weaknesses, and created the 
potential to hear only supportive, positive voices. As will be seen, critical 
voices were heard, but questions about the adequacy of this approach are 
reflected on in chapter eleven.  
In WECH a random sample was generated from a list of all WECH residents, 
with those randomly selected being asked by WECH staff whether they were 
willing to be contacted by me. Whilst addressing issues of self-selection, this 
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process was a lot more time consuming as some contacts in the initial 
sample were slow, or failed, to respond to communication.  
In Granby a two stage approach was used, with existing contacts 
interviewed, before identifying other people with whom I had no existing 
relationship. Particular challenges existed in Granby in relation to the small 
numbers actively involved in developing the CLT, and the depopulation of the 
area. This explains the two stage approach which sought to snowball 
participants (Atkinson and Flint, 2001). Using existing contacts in the CLT to 
identify unengaged residents proved fruitless. Perhaps, having existing 
relationships with residents, there was a reluctance to expose me to others 
who objected to the CLT. This suggests my positionality and background 
may have affected the data collection. In efforts to address this, I asked 
representatives of stakeholder organisations to put me in contact with 
opponents of the CLT, which they told me was possible. After repeated 
requests for their contact details, this again proved fruitless. The Granby data 
therefore is heavily weighted toward those engaged in the CLT and its 
development, unlike in the other two cases, were people relatively 
unengaged were interviewed. The visibility of opposition to the CLT was 
much less apparent in Granby, making it difficult to locate and identify any 
potential opponents or critics.  
Efforts were also made to interview those outside the collectives, who had 
played some enabling or constraining role, or who could take a distanced 
view of the benefits and costs created by the collectives. This was achieved, 
though in differing proportions in each case. External bodies and 
stakeholders were identified as I built the chronologies of the cases. 
Identifying key individuals who had influenced the development of each 
collective, I sought to make contact with those individuals directly, or by 
asking the collectives to make an introduction.  
A target of ten interviews was set for each case, which was seen to strike the 
right balance between securing a variety of perspectives and ensuring the 
process could be handled within time and resource constraints. In total 12 
interviews were conducted in Milton Park, 11 in WECH and 8 in Granby. For 
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each case, interviews were sought with people in all of the following 
positions: 
 Members of the collective active in the governance of the organisation  Members of the collective not in an active role  Users of the collective’s services, or those experiencing some 
potential benefit or cost from participation in the collective  Representatives from local agencies whose actions had in some way 
affected the development of the collective 
The table below shows the spread of interviews by case and participant type, 
the focus and areas of specific inquiry, and the average length of the 
interviews: 
Table 4: The distribution, focus and length of interviews undertaken 
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Granby 
Resident 
/ member 4 
The interviewees' involvement in 
the development of the collective 
(if relevant); key events and 
development factors; immediate 
development priorities; 
participation in the collective and 
current/future perceived costs 
and benefits; the role of residents 
in the governance of the 
collective. 
 
56 mins 
Advisor / 
supporter 4 
The nature of support provided; 
key events and development 
factors; the effect of the collective 
on individual residents and 
members. 
 
54 mins 
Milton 
Park 
Resident 
/ member 9 
The interviewees' involvement in 
the development of the collective 
(if relevant); key events and 
development factors; participation 
in the collective and perceived 
costs and benefits. The 
62 mins 
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governance of the co-ops; CMP 
governance. 
 
Advisor / 
supporter 3 
The nature of support provided; 
the development and function of 
Technical Resource Groups; key 
events and development factors; 
the effect of the collective on 
individual residents and 
members. 
 
64 mins 
WECH 
Resident 
/ member 7 
The interviewees' involvement in 
the development of the collective 
(if relevant); key events and 
development factors; participation 
in the collective and the 
perceived costs and benefits; the 
role of residents in the 
governance of the collective. 
 
57 mins 
Advisor / 
supporter 4 
The nature of support provided; 
key events and development 
factors; the effect of the collective 
on individual residents and 
members. 
 
53 mins 
 
The lower number of resident / member interviews in Granby reflects 
challenges in identifying interviewees not in an active role within the 
collective.  In light of this, total interview minutes for each case were 442 for 
Granby, 613 for WECH and 763 for Milton Park. Reflecting on the range of 
interviews conducted, with people in a variety of roles and having different 
relations with the collectives, a diverse set of perspectives were captured. 
This provided views from inside and outside of the collectives. More 
interviews with people at the periphery of the collectives or completely 
unengaged would have been beneficial, and this is a point reflected on in 
chapter eleven. The historical nature of Milton Park’s development meant 
that those involved in the early community organising activity were absent. 
One individual called David Williams, pivotal in the development of the 
MPCC (the organisation which led early resistance to the redevelopment of 
Milton Park) was not interviewed. Similarly, early protagonists in Granby, 
who had moved from the area at the time of study, were not located and 
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interviewed. Nonetheless, activists involved in the collectives, from their early 
development, were interviewed in each case and they provided invaluable 
retrospective insights. Efforts were made to identify those who opposed the 
development of each collective before they were formed.  In Granby and 
WECH, despite suggestions that there were residents opposed to the 
collectives, no named individuals could be found after repeated attempts to 
identify them.  In Milton Park, a group of residents were active in community 
organising against the collective, but given this activism dated back to the 
1970s, it was suggested that few, if any, remained in the area. Despite failing 
to secure these opposing voices, residents, activists and advisors provided 
substantive critiques of the collectives.  Crucially, these were based on the 
experience of active involvement in the development of these organisations, 
and their continued governance and operation. The full schedule of 
interviews and observations is set out in Appendix One. 
Crucial to the interviewing process was the use of topic guides, which sought 
to create a loose sequence in the interviews moving through different 
question types (Charmaz, 2002). The topic guides, whilst containing some 
standard questions, where iteratively developed to explore issues arising in 
earlier interviews, and so that the process could respond to emerging themes 
or under explored issues.  
Two example topic guides are presented in Appendix Two. In all interviews, 
introductory questions encouraged the interviewees to position themselves in 
the case, and describe the places studied. Such questioning aimed to build 
rapport, starting with largely descriptive questions, as I and the interviewee 
navigated our differing positions and needs for the interview (Spradley, 
1979). The topic guides for residents (see Appendix Two) moved from 
introductory questions to those exploring interviewees’ perceptions of how 
the collective operated in practice, and the benefits and costs they had 
derived. This evidence would help address research question two. After 
introductory questions, the topic guide for advisors and supporters broadly 
focused on their role, key actions, involvement in key events, and specific 
barriers or enabling factors that shaped the development of the collective. 
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Such questioning targeted evidence that would help address research 
question two.   
Each interview was digitally recorded, with the audio file stored on the 
University’s servers and later transcribed in full in NVivo.  
As I began undertaking the interviews, certain challenges became apparent. 
In the interviewing in Milton Park, where a large percentage of the population 
had French as their first language. Whilst all interviewees were able to 
converse in English, in three interviews I had to converse partly in French to 
convey meaning, and the interviewee similarly had to clarify issues in part 
French, part English. Whilst I was confident that together we established the 
meaning of what the interviewee was trying to say, it was time consuming 
and limited the extent of questions that could be asked. 
Interviews with key activists and community organisers were particularly 
valuable, as these individuals were present through the course of each 
collective’s development, and could share reflections from this experience. 
However, such testimony was seen as partisan, with the views of opponents 
or critics receiving little attention. It therefore became imperative that 
documentary evidence was used to uncover tensions and conflicts, which 
could then be used in the interviews to prompt further exploration. This 
proved a useful approach to opening-up discussions about difficulties, 
differences of opinion and internal decision-making.  
Observations  
Given some of the limitations of interview data noted above, a series of 
observations were undertaken to view the collectives ‘in action’. If 
collectivism is, in part, constrained and enabled by internal factors, then 
seeing internal processes was deemed important. Observation enabled 
direct insights into how members and residents in the collective interacted, 
related to each other and performed in the process of developing and 
operating their collective. This contrasted with the interviews in a significant 
way; observations of collective practice provided empirical data about 
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internal dynamics from a distanced perspective, rather than mediated by 
those situated in those relationships.  
For each case study two types of observation were undertaken. The first 
type, or what were labelled 'locational observations', were based on street 
walks and observations of the collective's physical environment. In the 
development of each collective, it was hypothesised that a group's location 
and geography would have some causal role in terms both constraint and 
enablement of their development, serving to 'concentrate interactions in one 
way or another' (Giddens, 1984). The second type of observation, what were 
labelled 'organisational observations', entailed observing members of the 
collective whilst they were engaged in the organisation’s activities. 
Specifically, this meant observing the collective's Board meetings, working or 
sub-groups, annual general meetings, or social gatherings. In research 
training, undertaken as part of the PhD, ethnographic methods were trialled, 
helping shape the approach adopted in these case studies.  
During observations I sought to act as a non-judgemental, interested 
outsider, confining my role to a largely observational one, giving empathetic 
verbal and behavioural signals. Such a restricted role meant that I would, as 
far as possible, view the phenomena naturalistically. I adopted practices 
suggested by Van Maanen (1978) who described a process of observing 
from a supportive position, rather than interjecting and challenging in those 
group settings. This was particularly useful in observations with Granby CLT, 
as I constructed and navigated a new set of relations with residents there. 
This seemed to work well, as the audio files attest to very few prompts from 
participants for my contribution, or my pro-active engagement in discussions. 
For each case at least two organisational observations were undertaken, 
along with three locational observations, conducted at differing times and 
places. The latter observations were undertaken on an ad hoc basis, the 
organisational observations took place at specific meetings; 
i. Milton Park – The Annual Fête des Voisin and one CMP Board 
meeting (observed via Skype) 
109 
 
ii. WECH – The Annual General Meeting and two Board meetings  
iii. Granby CLT – Three Board meetings  
For all observations short fieldnotes were taken which recorded observations 
in chronological order. For the organisational observations, I developed a 
framework to capture basic information related to my research questions, 
and other operational or processual information. Note taking was kept to a 
minimum in these observations to allow maximum concentration on the 
proceedings (Jackson, 1990), and these were written up as soon as 
practicable after the observation. It was accepted that these would not 
'capture the depth and subtlety of the…intellectual and personal encounter 
with other ways of living' (Emerson et al (2001, p.355). Hence the fieldnotes 
served as an aide memoir, highlighting key observations I thought were of 
relevance. The fieldnotes were treated as data, being stored and analysed in 
NVivo alongside the other data from interviews and case related documents. 
Whilst the observations gave rise to some key insights, this was not to the 
extent that had been foreseen. Instead, the observations had a more indirect 
value giving me a general sense of the functioning of the collective, the 
relations between members and residents, and the tone and format of any 
formal meetings and governance procedures. The observations, therefore, 
functioned as a kind of context setting for the collective, which I later used as 
a reference point when exploring data from other sources. More frequent 
observations, using a more rigid framework, may have provided more data 
which was more amenable to analysis. Focusing the observations more 
heavily on internal relations between participants would have been valuable.  
Document reviews 
Documents have provided vital insights about key events and stages in each 
collectives’ history. Certain documents have also been seen to have their 
own causal powers in the cases. An example of this is the document 
produced by Kowaluk and Piche-Burton (2012), which is both an historical 
account of the collective in Milton Park, and written instruction to members 
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and residents on how to act and live collectively. Documents such as this 
seek to embed certain ideas, as May notes; 
'Documents, read as the sedimentations of social practices, have the 
potential to inform and structure decisions which people make on a 
daily and longer-term basis' (May, 2001, p.176). 
Efforts were made to understand the motives behind the production of the 
documents reviewed. This posed searching questions in terms of their use in 
this study. Should they be treated in positivistic terms, as corresponding to 
reality and as an accurate description of events? Or perhaps the documents 
should they be interpreted as a reflection of the author's intentions or 
aspirations, looking for 'unstated meaning structures' (Cicourel, 1964). The 
approach adopted in this study, in line with the realist position, was to accept 
that the documents described events, entities and actions that occurred in an 
objective sense, but which reflected a fallible and subjective experience of 
them.  
In reviewing the case study documentary evidence, documents were viewed 
as creating certain discourses; linguistic forms that present 'versions of the 
world' (Potter, 1997, p.146). The work of scholars orientated to a realist 
position was drawn upon. As Fairclough (2005) argues, one should look at 
the discourses produced on a subject as related to non-discursive entities 
and objects. As Fairclough (2005, p.931) states; 
'…while change in discourse is part of organizational change, and 
organizational change can often be understood partly in terms of the 
constructive effects of discourse on organizations, organizational 
change is not simply change in discourse'. 
Such ideas are of clear relevance to the current research. Documents 
produced by a collective or by external bodies should be seen as purposive, 
reflecting certain objectives and perspectives, but also as revealing features 
of the context and material conditions in which they were written.  
In practice, documents have played a more pivotal role in this research than 
had been anticipated. They were critical in the process of triangulating the 
different data types. Documents revealed historic events and scenarios not 
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discussed in interviews, particularly points of conflict and opposition, and 
also provided a fuller account of the influence of external agencies 
Nonetheless, limitations and difficulties emerged. It was challenging to treat 
documents simultaneously as an account of historic events, but also as 
discourse. How does one distinguish a statement of historical fact, and what 
is merely an interpretation of events to embed certain ideas or values? The 
actions of local authorities, for instance, were sometimes described in 
pejorative terms, revealing some normativity and a set stance on the nature 
of such institutions. Triangulation of such documents with other sources 
provided a means of getting different perspectives on the same events, so as 
not to rely on documents produced by those embedded in events.  
After the case selection, and in contact with the case study organisations, an 
audit of documents was made. Three types of documents were identified 
from this: 
 Documents produced internally by the collectives (for instance, Board 
minutes, historical accounts or planning documents);  Documents produced by external actors that provide context or 
commentary on events related to the collective (for example, press 
articles, documentary accounts, or research).  Documents produced by external bodies, whose actions have a 
potential impact of the impact on the collective (for instance, 
government policy documents, local regeneration plans or tender 
proposals); 
Documents which offered historic accounts of a case’s development, or 
insights into the experiences of members and residents, were prioritised. In 
practice, each collective had at least three documents which met this 
criterion, with WECH and CMP having commissioned their own historical 
accounts of their development, and Granby CLT describing their 
development in proposal documents, business plans and other sources.  
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A review matrix was developed for each document, so that key information 
could be captured and organised for future reference. The tables sought to 
capture information under the following headings:  
 Key events   The stated/unstated purposes of document  Constraints and enablement  Powers, liabilities and relations    Actions/Agency of the collective   Information omitted or implicit  Perceived benefits and costs to residents/members 
These tables were uploaded into NVivo alongside the other evidence from 
the interviews and observations, awaiting subsequent analysis. 
5.5. Data analysis  
Having collected a significant amount of data, a system was required for 
organising and interrogating that data, and generating findings in relation to 
the research questions. The following section details this analytical process, 
which took place in these two stages. 
5.5.1. Organising the data 
Analysis of the data began long before the formal activities of applying codes 
and categories to it. Transcription involved an immersion in the data, as I 
familiarised myself with it (Dey, 1993). At this time, key ideas and themes 
related to the data began to form in my mind.  
Before approaching any formal data analysis, I reflected on how theory was, 
both consciously and sub-consciously, guiding my approach. It is not 
possible to ‘literally ignore the literature of theory and fact on the area under 
study’ (Glaser & Strauss, [2012] 1967). Theory then can never be put to one 
side (Kelle, 2005). As I developed my research questions I had drawn 
heavily on various theories and theoretical propositions, and this provided 
the structure for my data collection. Remembering Yin’s (2003) assertion that 
case studies must preserve a ‘chain of evidence’, the analysis process 
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therefore sought to connect the research questions to the empirical data 
gathered, using the process of analysis. 
However, dilemmas still emerged in where and how to start such analysis, a 
noted challenge with qualitative data (Gläser and Laudel, 2013). Here Miles 
and Huberman (1994, p.58) provided valuable guidance, suggesting that a 
‘start-list’ of categories be drawn from research questions, hypotheses or 
conceptual frameworks. My research questions offered such a ‘start-list’, as 
they contained the critical organising concepts of the study; constraint, 
enablement, benefit and cost. These concepts fitted Dey’s (2005, p.110) 
notion of middle order categories, those which ‘draw some broad preliminary 
distinctions…without implying commitment to any particular theoretical 
approach’. 
Applying the categories of constraint, enablement, benefit and cost to the 
data helped perform some initial organisation, without significant theoretical 
implications. At the beginning of this process I drafted definitions for each of 
these categories, to ensure consistent application.  
These categories created a basis on which to develop more nuanced sub-
codes as a secondary process. This approach acknowledges the iterative 
nature of the development of categories and sub-codes, as they are applied 
and then refined in the process of application (Dey, 2005, p.101). 
One particular problem for an approach which categorises and clusters data, 
is that the context of that data can be lost, so that a segment of data is 
isolated from the wider contexts and conditions that give meaning to that 
segment. In essence, a process of thematic analysis across cases could 
mean the significance of each place is lost. Having selected a case study 
design as a means of retaining the ‘holistic and meaningful characteristics of 
real-life events’ (Yin, 2003, p2), maintaining context was therefore critical. 
This meant setting up a method of data analysis that allowed all data 
segments to be connected back to their case.  
One solution to this issue of decontextualisation was to build detailed case 
descriptions, so I and the reader could situate the case in any thematic 
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analysis that would follow. Using information from the multitude of 
documents reviewed, I built detailed narrative and visual histories for each 
case.  Using a piece of interactive timeline software called Tiki-Toki, I plotted 
key events, and referenced this to information in various documents, so that 
this could be brought together in the case description chapter of this thesis.  
This proved an effective way of managing the myriad of historical information 
about each case, and bringing this together in chronological narrative form.  
Despite this system, capturing the complexity of each collective’s 
development was difficult, with some cases having a wealth of documentary 
and video evidence, and other more recent cases having less written or 
retrospective interview testimony.  This created challenges in developing 
detailed case histories, and entailed relying on certain types of evidence in 
some cases more than others.  For instance, in Milton Park there was a 
wealth of documentary historical accounts of the collective’ development, but 
in Granby such documents were few in number, requiring greater reliance on 
online sources and internal documents. Drawing on such differing 
information effected the content and focus of each case description.    
Developing detailed case descriptions alone would not remedy the issue of 
decontextualisation however.  To retain context in any thematic analysis of 
the cases, I used functions in NVivo to apply lessons from the Framework 
approach to data analysis (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). This approach entailed 
attaching categories and codes to the data, but then summarising and 
presenting that data in a matrix, with categories on the horizontal axis and 
the individual cases on the vertical.  This structure of such a matrix is set out 
below, using the example of constraints: 
Table 5: Example structure of an analysis matrix 
 CONSTRAINTS 
 Constraint 
category 1 
Constraint 
category 2  
Constraint 
category n… 
Granby Summary of all data 
coded to category 
for this collective 
Summary of all data 
coded to category for 
this collective 
Summary of all data 
coded to category 
for this collective 
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WECH Summary of all data 
coded to category 
for this collective 
Summary of all data 
coded to category for 
this collective 
Summary of all data 
coded to category 
for this collective 
Milton 
Park 
Summary of all data 
coded to category 
for this collective 
Summary of all data 
coded to category for 
this collective 
Summary of all data 
coded to category 
for this collective 
 
Using outputs from NVivo these matrices were developed by hand for each 
research question. This approach ensured that data could be reconnected 
back to the context of each case. 
The categories of constraint, enablement, benefit and cost were initially 
applied to data within six interview transcripts. This piloting showed a good 
distribution of content across the categories. This piloting did, however, 
reveal some important dilemmas. This simple set of categories failed to 
attach significance to, and organise, what seemed like important data. Some 
examples of this were: 
 Information about the operation and functioning of the organisations, 
which did not explicitly relate to constraint or enablement, cost or 
benefit.   Comparative judgements, made by the interviewees, about other 
housing organisations or tenures, for instance, regarding the benefits 
and costs of living in other forms of rented or owned housing.   Historical events or conditions that were hard to categorise as either 
describing a source of constraint or enablement, but which seemed 
important.   Interviewees' reflections on the lifecycles, or development pathways, 
of collective housing projects in general. This was an abstraction from 
the case in which they were situated, and hence could not be 
categorised as enablement or constraint for that case.  
In response, new categories were developed to capture some of the above 
types of data. 
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When the four basic categories were applied to all the data, sub-categories 
were developed to provide a more refined and organised picture. This 
entailed reading and re-reading data within a category to develop labels 
which grouped and summarised that data, in a process that slowly refined 
and reworked these labels. An example of the sub-categories which 
emerged in relation to the enablement of the collectives is provided as an 
example below. 
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Figure 2: Sub-categories of enablement 
 
Using NVivo, data could be segmented and isolated in different ways. For 
instance, it was possible to extract all data concerning the financial 
enablements for all cases, or to extract all enablement data for just one case. 
This functionality within NVivo set up the second phase of the analytical 
process, triangulating evidence and finding corroborations in the data, to 
identify patterns within and across cases to answer the study’s research 
questions.  
This process reveals a difficult balance being sought between cross-case 
analysis and synthesis, and retaining the uniqueness of each case. 
Considerable time was committed to building case histories to address the 
latter dilemma. Despite this, each case’s development was a deeply complex 
process, with histories traceable across several decades, shaped by 
seemingly infinite, causally relevant actors and actions, events, resources 
and relations. Certain events in each case, for instance, have received less 
treatment, as my case histories focus the most attention on the critical events 
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leading up to, and during, the enactment of each collective. Inevitably, my 
case histories could only capture a snapshot of the complex journeys of the 
cases, but in doing so I have tried to adopt principles of triangulation, which 
draw out prominent causal features in the development of each case. In the 
end what is achieved is a ‘stripped back picture of reality’ (Hernes, 1998, 
p.28).  
5.5.2. Analytical procedure 
A matrix, exemplified in Table 5 above, was developed in reference to each 
element of each research question. For example, in addressing the 
enablement of the collectives, a matrix was developed which had with the 
enablement sub-categories on the horizontal axis, and with the cases on the 
vertical axis. Extracting enablement data from NVivo, I then populated the 
matrix, by hand, summarising the extracted data.  
These matrices helped establish a process of triangulation. This meant 
looking for corresponding evidence across each of the three cases and 
across the different data types. This helped identify cross-case patterns, but 
also patterns within one or two cases, which were not evident in the other(s). 
As an aide memoir, I developed a visualisation of the different possible 
points of triangulation, presented in Figure 3. This effort to triangulate data 
was, in practice, neither formulaic nor strictly procedural. There was a degree 
of interpretation and judgement whereby, spotting a pattern in the data, other 
evidence was sought which corroborated or conflicted this.   
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Figure 3: Triangulating data within and across the case studies 
Several prominent patterns were identified relating to constraint and 
enablement, benefits and costs. I moved back and forth between the data 
and the housing collectivism literature, finding points of corroboration and 
divergence. This helped shape and refine the theoretical developments of 
the study, stressing again the cyclical movement between data and theory.  
This effort led to the identification clusters of data, across cases and data 
types, which revealed patterns in the development and outcomes of the 
collectives studied. This formed the basis of the empirical chapters in this 
study. Whilst valuable, the research questions demanded a critical next step, 
in line with the stated desire to provide causal insights or a deeper 
understanding of attribution. Recalling the analytical framework above, the 
stated aim was to provide ‘…a stripped down picture of reality…that gives 
the logic of the process’ (Hernes, 1998, p.28). 
A certain mode of inference was required to help move from patterns in the 
empirical data to this form of explanation. Neither deductive nor inductive 
forms of reasoning could do this job, because of the required move from 
observed reality to unobserved relations and mechanisms (Danermark et al, 
1997). Abductive forms of reasoning on the other hand fitted this task, as 
they offered ‘a process of using evidence to reach a wider conclusion’ 
(Blackburn, 1996, p.1). Like induction, abduction is ampliative, moving from 
particular cases to general propositions. However, abduction focuses on 
developing explanatory models or mechanisms, rather than just appealing to 
frequencies or statistics (Douven, 2011, online). Abduction therefore entails a 
mode of reasoning; 
‘…that uses evidence to impute the existence of a causal mechanism 
that could reasonably have produced the observed effects, even if not 
themselves directly observable’ (Castrell, 2016, online). 
The patterns evident in the case study data were explored, to see if 
similarities and regularities might be explained in such mechanistic terms. 
This meant starting with a series of similar observations, for instance, 
regarding a type of constraint on collectives, and then ‘hypothesising a 
mechanism that might explain that particular outcome’ (Bygstad and 
Munkvold, 2011, p.4). Through this a number of mechanism-based 
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explanations emerged, depicting the constraint and enablement of the 
collectives in new ways, and suggesting how the benefits and costs 
perceived by members and residents, in part, flow from the form and function 
of those organisations. This was a time-consuming exercise, requiring 
repeated cycles of looking at coded data, revisiting known literature and 
searching for new literature, and then circuiting back to the data, so as to 
refine the mechanisms being posited. 
My position and background in the field gave me an important point of 
reference, enabling me to assess these emerging findings against a wider 
set of experiences. I was able to ask questions of my findings such as, does 
this pattern correlate with the other collectives I have observed? Are there 
other sources of constraint, enablement, or perceived benefits and costs, 
that might be missed because of my past experiences? Being able to reflect 
in this way served as a powerful, additional process for testing emerging 
findings. 
Applying this two stage analytical process, as will be seen in chapters six to 
ten, led to the positing of certain causal mechanisms. The value of this in 
addressing gaps in current knowledge, and the adequacy of the methods 
used, is a subject explored in chapter eleven.  
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Chapter Six: Case Descriptions 
 
The following chapter outlines the significant events in the development of 
each of the collectives, drawing on historical accounts and documents. The 
purpose of this is to build a basic chronology of the cases, describing the role 
of actors, resources and the legal and operational forms that the collectives 
have taken. As argued by (Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011), realist enquiries 
into causal processes should begin with descriptions of events, which are 
light on theory and interpretation, but provide a platform for more detailed, 
retroductive analysis. Hence, what follows is largely descriptive in nature. 
Relying largely on written documents, reflections are offered throughout on 
the reliability of these sources, and the positionality of their authors. These 
descriptions are, therefore, based on the interpretation of different sources 
as to significant events in the development of the cases. The chapter starts 
with Milton Park Community (or CMP, as it is known locally). This is followed 
by descriptions of WECH and Granby CLT, before concluding thoughts are 
offered which seek to identify similarities and differences between the cases. 
Each case descriptions starts by outlining the geographical context in which 
the collective sits, and the current socio-economic characteristics of the 
areas in which they operate. This is followed by a chronological summary of 
key events. 
6.1. The Milton Park Community 
The location of Milton Park 
The area known as Milton Park is located to the east of central Montreal and 
adjacent to the city’s downtown area (see Figure 4). Also known as the 
McGill ghetto, in light of its proximity to McGill University, Milton Park is not 
defined by an administrative boundary. Rather, it is defined by the perimeters 
of the collectively owned land, the area of CMP’s operation.  
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Figure 4: Montreal map with the location of Milton Park 
 
Source: OpenStreetMap (labels added by the author) 
As Figure 5 below shows, CMP’s area of operation is bounded by four major 
roads. Housing within these blocks is owned by various individual housing 
co-operatives and non-profit organisations, known in French ‘organisme sans 
but lucrative’, or OSBLs. The fifteen separate housing co-operatives 
(henceforth co-ops) provide over 600 units of housing. 
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Figure 5: The area covered by CMP and property ownership 
 
Source: Kowaluk and Piché-Burton, 2012, p.70-71 
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At the time of writing, a significant proportion of the local population are 
international migrants. The National Household Survey (Government of 
Canada, (2011a:2011b) suggests that, in 2011, within the two census tracts 
covering the Milton Park area (4620131.00 and 4620132.00), non-Canadian 
citizens made up 30 percent of the population. Unemployment in the two 
tracts stood at 10.9 and 12.5 percent in 2011, compared with a Montreal 
average of 7.7 percent, and a national average of 7.2 percent. Average total 
household incomes for the two tracts in 2010 were $38,000 and $39,000, 
compared with the Montreal and the national average of $70,000 and 80,000 
per annum respectively. The history of Milton Park and the development of 
CMP explains, and is explained by, some of these contemporary socio-
economic characteristics. 
Milton Park pre-1972 
Constructed in the late 1860s in a ‘Victorian Picturesque’ style, the grey 
stone housing of Milton Park was built for local merchants and professionals 
(Helman, 1987). By the mid-1900s these groups of residents began moving 
out of the area, as landlords bought up the properties and subdivided them 
for rental accommodation, mainly for students and low income families.  
Figure 6: The Milton Park 'grey stones' 
  
Source: Kowaluk and Piché-Burton (2012), p.13-14 
Item removed for copyright 
reasons 
Item removed for copyright 
reasons 
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By the 1960s the population had become relatively diverse, as Helman has 
noted; 
‘Young and old mingled harmoniously: students, drifters, alcoholics, 
immigrant families, single parent families, academics and professionals. 
There were experimenters trying the latest mind-expanding substances, 
political theory or social movement on the street’ (Helman, 1987, p.18). 
This quotation is an example of the rich sociological insights that Helman’s 
book provides. The Milton Park Affair (Helman, 1987), was published as 
CMP was being formed. The text is based on interviews and notes given to 
her by Milton Park residents, with a focus on individual ‘activists’, their 
‘tactics’ and the ensuing ‘power struggles’ (Helman, 1987, p.9). Whilst there 
are implicit signs of her support for the project, Helman’s work is invaluable 
in situating CMP in its historical context, being shaped by wider cultural and 
political movements, as social activism in Milton Park grew.  
Such activism led to the development of The University Settlement in the 
1960s, based on a model of social action originating in England in the 1880s 
(Smith, 1999). This organisation offered a range of services and support for 
the poorest people in the area. Social workers, community organisers and 
other activists in the University Settlement were to play a key role in events 
that would follow.  
From the late 1950s a private development company called Concordia began 
buying up properties in the area, with a plan for wholesale redevelopment. 
They had devised an ambitious plan to demolish all six blocks of Milton Park, 
and rebuild on a high-rise scale (Helman, 1987). Concordia were 
encouraged by wider political visions for the redevelopment of Montreal 
under Mayor Drapeau. As the Chairman of Montreal City Council’s Executive 
Committee stated at the time; 
‘We are in the process, during this decade, of erecting a totally new city, 
the aspect of which will easily overshadow anything that’s happened 
since the Second World War’ (Cousineau, 1980, p.34). 
This unique insight from Cousineau, points to the value of her work in 
understanding the development of CMP. This work provides substantial 
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detail about the period leading up to the creation of the housing co-ops, 
being based on interviews and documentary evidence. Cousineau provides 
some crucial insights into the tensions between residents, dilemmas and 
problematic developments of the case.  
Cousineau’s work reveals that by 1968 Concordia had secured ownership of 
96 percent of properties in the Milton Park area (Helman, 1987). In addition, 
they were garnering significant external investment to finance a $250m 
redevelopment scheme, which would be phased over ten years. Whilst the 
scheme had advocates in City Hall, there was some resistance from within 
the planning department. Andy Melamed, a local planner at the time had 
evaluated Concordia’s plans and concluded that; 
‘…rents would be 50% or more, even double or triple existing 
rents…Even if the project was a paradise it could not serve the needs 
of the people in the neighbourhood…it is not for them’ (Melamed in 
Helman, 1987, p.26). 
The objections of the planning department would later become critical in the 
rejection of applications to define Milton Park as an urban renewal area. As 
knowledge of the redevelopment plans spread, community organising activity 
began. A prominent community organiser, Peter Katadotis, active in other 
citizen’s movements in the city, was recruiting social work students to 
undertake community organising in Milton Park (Helman, 1987). A meeting 
was held with residents and other activists which explored the possibility of 
setting up a group to not only prevent redevelopment and lobby for 
renovation, but to explore alternative forms of use and ownership. This led to 
the creation of the Milton Park Citizens Committee (MPCC), which comprised 
residents, social workers and a professor at McGill University named David 
Williams. From an early stage the group was said to be ‘fiercely democratic’ 
(Helman, 1987, p. 59). The MPCC conducted a variety of organising 
activities, surveying local residents and meeting with Concordia and city 
council representatives to discuss the plans. As Helman notes; 
‘It was a place to belong in turbulent times. It was also a time for getting 
involved, for painting things black and white, for naming heroes and 
villains’ (Helman, p.34). 
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Whilst this sense of prevailing social activism is a recurrent theme in the 
narratives of commentators, it is also clear that only a ‘handful’ of local 
people were actively involved in counter-acting Concordia’s plans, and over 
time these individuals became increasingly over-stretched (Helman, 1987).  
Wider forces were to affect subsequent events. The Front de libération du 
Québec’s (FLQ’s) kidnap and killing of a senior politician in the October 
Crisis would have important economic consequences. As a result of these 
actions, and the increasing demands by Quebecers for sovereignty, the 
property market began to suffer (Helman, 1987). The ensuing municipal 
elections in Montreal in 1970, against the backdrop of the FLQ’s actions, 
brought additional demands for MPCC members. A number were involved in 
election campaigns which left them ‘exhausted’ and with less energy to 
invest in the MPCC (Helman, 1987, p.78).  
Having spent several years trying to negotiate with Concordia and City Hall, 
the MPCC was becoming more heavily reliant on tactics of direct action. In 
1971 Lucia Kowaluk, and her husband Dmitri Roussopoulos, came to live in 
the area. The former was a community organiser working at the University 
settlement, and the latter was an anti-nuclear anarchist campaigner. They 
were both to play a prominent role in the development of CMP (Helman, 
1987).  
1972-1980 
At the start of the 1970s a number of factors were impinging on Concordia’s 
plans. Certain funding was withdrawn and the 1972 Olympics was inflating 
construction costs. In the mid-1970s the election of the Parti Quebecois to 
the provincial government, promising a referendum on independence, also 
started to affect business confidence (Kowaluk and Piché-Burton, 2012).  
Added to this was a growing scepticism about the form of high rise 
development and urban renewal that had been promoted in Montreal in the 
1960s (Helman, 1987, p.99). During the early part of the 1970s activists in 
Milton Park had been involved in various protests and direct action, including 
occupying Concordia’s offices. One such protest in 1972 resulted in 56 
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arrests, though little change in the approach of Concordia. This left activists 
feeling ‘exhausted…they felt they had failed’ (Kowaluk and Piché-Burton, 
2012, p.10). Nonetheless, street protests, which were tangential to the 
primary effort of the MPCC, had reinvigorated residents and attracted new 
members to join the MPCC. As Kowaluk and Piché-Burton noted; 
‘The neighbourhood had nearly ten years of experience in “militant 
action”…understanding the role of non-violent direct action…Large 
numbers of residents wanted to form housing co-operatives’ (Kowaluk 
and Piché-Burton, 2012, p.12) 
It is important to note that this account of key events in CMPs history, from 
Kowaluk and Piché-Burton, comes from two key protagonists in its 
development. In one sense, the document provides a unique set of insights 
from the front-line of CMP’s development, giving it a richness of first-hand 
insight. On the other hand, there is potential bias in their account, and a 
general normativity toward collectivism. This is perhaps inevitable given the 
stated purpose of the document is to ‘remind the residents of the co-ops and 
OSBLs of their history’ (Kowaluk and Piche-Burton, 2012, p.5). This 
document is therefore both a historical account and a discourse trying to 
shape organisational change. 
Whilst Concordia managed to implement phase one of their development 
plans (King-Edwards et al, 2015), by the early 1970s they were suffering 
financially, and residents meet with them to explore the possibility of taking 
ownership of those assets. The MPCC formed a relationship with Heritage 
Montreal, an organisation set up to ‘protect the architectural, historic, natural 
and cultural heritage of Greater Montreal’ (Heritage Montreal, 2015). The 
founder of this organisation was Phyllis Lambert, and her connections in the 
federal government would later become critical to the development of CMP.  
In the late 1970s another relationship emerged with the Canada Mortgage 
and Housing Corporation (CMHC), the government body tasked with 
ensuring that housing provision is meeting the country’s needs. In 1973 a 
CMHC programme to support housing co-ops had been created, seeing 
various iterations leading up to 1993. Under the auspices of this programme, 
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CMHC purchased the property from Concordia which the former committed 
to transferring to residents once a model of ownership and governance was 
developed. A non-profit organisation called the Société du Patrimoine Urbain 
de Montréal (SPUM) was formed, which would manage the properties on an 
interim basis until the housing co-ops were developed (Cousineau, 1980). 
Montreal City Council and the provincial government were to provide $3m in 
subsidies to support the project. CMHC would provide a loan to each co-op 
to acquire the assets, offer guarantees on any co-op and non-profit 
organisation’s mortgages, whilst also writing down interest on such 
mortgages to two percent. The intricate pattern of relationships, within Milton 
Park and with external bodies, were depicted graphically with different 
agencies capable of ‘making the weather’ (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: Entities and relations in Milton Park  
 
Source: Cousineau, 1980, p.59 
Certain important obstacles were starting to emerge. Firstly, there were 
difficulties in deciding how to distribute the costs of the renovations and 
subsequent debt, across the co-ops and OSBLs. Secondly CMHC wanted 
the properties to be let at the ‘low end of market rent’ with the lowest level of 
rent increases being 20 per cent (Cousineau, 1980, p.96). Residents on the 
other hand wanted to ‘obtain a near 0 per cent rent increase’. Political 
events, in the form of the provincial referendum on sovereignty, created 
opportunities to drive a hard bargain (Helman, 1987). A new national policy 
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on the ‘acquired rights’ of existing tenants was devised by the government, 
which secured much of what SPUM had requested in terms of low rents. 
Concurrent to these events, in the housing blocks where the most active 
residents were based, housing co-ops were being constituted. Eight such co-
ops were formed between 1979 and 1980. The following period was, as 
Kowaluk and Piché-Burton (2012, p.16) suggested; 
‘…eight years of hard work…learning about the renovations, how to run 
co-ops, and…democratic functioning’. 
A group named Maison St. Louis (MSL) formed in the late 1970s to argue 
against the existing proposals, and propose forms of private ownership and 
other tenures. The scale of such feelings among residents is hard to gauge, 
with some commentators suggesting only ‘a dozen individuals’ (Kowaluk and 
Piché-Burton, 2012, p.20) sought to own their property, whereas others imply 
it was ‘almost 10%’ (Helman, 1987, p.126). Cousineau (1980, p.63-64) 
presents primary material from those supporting MSL that highlights their 
concerns of ‘ideologically bulldozering’. In a fierce and ongoing exchange, 
debates between local activists and members of MSL were played out in the 
local media. SPUM’s bulletin acted as a vehicle to promote the co-op ideal 
and argue the case for it. During this period both pro-collective activists and 
MSL members were going to door-to-door to convince households to support 
their arguments. In the end, it appears that CMHC’s own funding criteria and 
rules brought into question the possibility of MSL receiving a subsidy for 
private ownership forms. Furthermore, the agreement on low rental prices 
meant that plans for co-op ownership ‘overwhelming outweighed those of 
private ownership’ (Cousineau, 1980. p.105).  
In 1980, another non-profit organisation was established to side-step some 
of the restrictions on SPUM. The Société d’Amélioration Milton-Parc (SAMP) 
was duly formed in October 1980. It would appear that both SPUM and 
SAMP were largely composed of non-residents. The rationale for this was 
that ‘a community Board would not necessarily have the ability, let alone the 
will, to own and manage £6.9m worth of property’ (Helman, 1987, p.133). 
 133 
 
This raises questions about resident control at this formative stage of 
development. 
1981-1987 
From 1980 to 1984 a further seven housing co-ops were created, along with 
a number of non-profit organisations who would manage housing for 
vulnerable groups and also commercial assets. Recounting the rapid 
physical refurbishment taking place during this time Helman (1987, p.146) 
suggested that; 
‘By the end of 1983 there were 597 rehabilitated dwellings in 135 
buildings. The 14 established co-ops had 339 units…The total 
estimated capital costs of the project had soared to $30.7m’. 
Despite this, between 1985 and 1986, other OSBLs had formed to represent 
those wanting individual ownership, and were taking legal advice about 
different ways to secure their objectives (Kowaluk and Piché-Burton, 2012, 
p.20). 
The development of Communauté Milton-Parc (CMP), as a group structure in 
which to govern the project, emerged in mid-1980s. To secure the popular 
objective of anti-speculation on housing, a legal structure was required to tie 
each co-op and OSBL into certain rules and constraints (Altshul, 1989).  
Altshul, a lawyer, worked with another noted legal scholar, Francois Frenette, 
to proposed divided co-ownership under a condominium structure. Such a 
scheme would enable co-ops and OSBLs to own their buildings (and land 
under the buildings), whilst creating a set of rules that would constrain and 
guide each co-op and OSBL’s decisions and practices. Housing would be 
owned collectively in the co-ops, with residents being both tenants and 
members of the organisations. As Altshul noted, this model entailed that; 
‘Each co-operative and association would become a co-owner in the 
condominium scheme…Condominium rules would create a complete 
universe, bound by its own internal rules and regulations’ (Altshul, 
1989, p.3). 
Crucially, by agreeing to the Declaration of Co-ownership each co-op was 
required to allocate a specific amount of housing to low and moderate 
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income households, preserve the architectural heritage of the properties, and 
be bound by rules on the resale of property (Kowaluk and Piché-Burton, 
2012). CMP would be the representative body which enforced the 
declaration, protected rights to the properties, and owned and maintained the 
common spaces (Kowaluk and Piché-Burton, 2012).  
In the summer of 1987, all the existing co-ops and non-profits signed a 
Declaration of Co-ownership, including those that had been created to 
oppose collective ownership. A Private Members Bill was put before the 
Quebec National Assembly, sponsored by a local politician, due to a freeze 
on condominium schemes for existing buildings. This Bill was passed and 
CMP was constituted as a legal entity. In December 1987 SAMP transferred 
ownership of the properties to the individual co-ops and OSBLs. 
1988 onwards 
As Kowaluk and Piché-Burton (2012, p.25) note, the more recent past has 
been a period of much learning and experimentation, as residents were to 
‘become landlords…as well as tenants and members of co-operatives or 
non-profits’. This period brought new challenges, for instance, as one OSBL 
responsible for owning and managing commercial properties hit financial 
difficulties. Demonstrating the collective power of CMP, a resolution was 
found in the form of loans from the other co-ops and OSBLs, and technical 
support from the GRT. Beyond periods of difficulty, residents have been 
engaged in the day-to-day effort of collectively owning and maintaining 
property, and sustaining the relations required for this through various local 
events (for instance, the annual fête des voisins, or ‘festival of neighbours).  
  
 135 
 
Figure 8: The annual fête des voisins 
 
Source: Author’s photograph 
Residents have continued to demonstrate their activism. Various protests 
related to traffic problems and highway changes have been successful, as 
have attempts to prevent the demolition of certain properties. Significant 
effort has also been invested in ‘greening the neighbourhood’ (Kowaluk and 
Piché-Burton (2012, p.29). An Urban Ecology Centre was created which has 
supported various gardening and planting schemes, along with the 
renewable energy initiatives. Residents have also been engaged in a battle 
to retain a piece of disused land as green space (Parc Oxygene), although 
this is not owned by CMP, and exploring opportunities to acquire new sites to 
expand housing provision (CMP, 2016). 
Initial engagement with the history of this case reveals certain prominent 
events and factors in the development of the collective; social and political 
conditions in the 1960s/70s and the character of the local population; 
processes of property acquisition and planned redevelopment by an external 
developer; the central role played by individual residents; the role of 
government bodies and their investment; and, the critical sources of 
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technical and political support. The case history also highlights a unique legal 
and operational model, using a condominium structure to support localised 
collectivism in the housing blocks. 
6.2. Walterton and Elgin Community Homes 
The location of WECH 
Walterton and Elgin is located approximately three miles north west of the 
centre of London, north of Paddington and south of Maida Vale.  
Figure 9: The location of Walterton and Elgin in reference to Inner London 
 
Source: OpenStreetMap (labels added by the author) 
WECH was created to take ownership of properties located north of the 
Harrow Road, in two distinct areas (shown in Figure 10). The ‘Walterton 
estate’ is contained within an area whose triangular perimeter can be defined 
as Shirland, Fernhead and Walterton Roads. This area contains largely 
Victorian terraces. The ‘Elgin estate’ runs parallel to the Harrow Road, and 
contains largely flatted properties developed in 1960s (including Athens and 
Kincardine Gardens). 
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Figure 10: Walterton and Elgin Street map, with the areas containing WECH 
housing in black 
 
Source: OpenStreetMap (boundaries added by the author) 
WECH’s areas of operation are not specified in their constitutional 
documents. As a Community Benefit Society (formerly Industrial Provident 
Society), the organisation aims to serve ‘the community’ defined as those in 
‘necessitous circumstances’ (WECH, 2003, p.4). One can assume from this 
that the organisation seeks to benefit those currently residing in its 
properties, but also others in need of affordable housing.  
The area is comparatively deprived, with the lower super output areas 
covering the Walterton and Elgin estates being in the 20 percent most 
deprived in the country (ONS, 2011). Some variation in deprivation across 
the area is apparent when this data is explored at a lower geography. For 
instance, 20 percent of households in the output area covering Lydford and 
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Warlock Road are deprived on three or more deprivation dimensions1. This 
compares with only 13 percent in the output area just to the north. 
Ward profiles produced by Westminster City Council (2014) highlight 
particular issues related to worklessness, with around 17 per cent of the 
working age population not being in employment, which is double the 
Westminster average. Other local issues include premature mortality and low 
feelings of safety, when compared with other wards in the Borough. Whilst 
house prices are low compared to the rest of Westminster, average property 
prices are estimated to be £523,591, with average incomes of around 
£34,000 per year (Westminster City Council, 2014). Nearly half of all 
residents in the ward are in social rented accommodation. 
Pre-1984 
The Walterton estate was built over the period 1865 to 1885, with the 
freehold of the land residing with the Church Commissioners, before it was 
purchased by London County Council in 1953 (WECH, 2006[1998]). 
Landlords began buying up the leases to such housing prior to the property 
reverting back to the County Council in 1964. Such landlords included the 
infamous Peter Rachman, renowned for charging ‘exorbitant rents for poor 
quality housing’ (Cowan, 2011, p.63). Housing became increasingly derelict 
and when the properties were taken back they were left with several 
decades’ worth of repairs. This prompted London County Council to develop 
plans for the area, which were later taken on by the Greater London Council 
(GLC) when responsibility reverted to them. From the mid-1960s the 
Walterton and Elgin area was divided into zones, some of which would be 
demolished and others rehabilitated. During this period the Walterton estate 
was rehabilitated, with a 15-year lifetime, and the Elgin estate was 
demolished and in its place low rise developments called Athens and 
                                                          
1
 The four deprivation dimensions the ONS calculate at output area levels relate to 
employment, education, health and housing. Further information is available at 
http://www.neighbourhood.statistics.gov.uk/dissemination/LeadDatasetMetadata.do?a=7&b=
6340199&c=E00023593&d=15&e=10&f=31064&g=6340199&i=1001x1003x1004x1005&l=2
520&o=362&m=0&r=1&s=1427276546632&enc=1&dsFamilyId=2520  
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Kincardine Gardens were built, along with two large tower blocks named 
Hermes and Chantry Points (WECH, 1998). These historical details have 
been garnered from WECH’s own publication, Against the Odds 
(2006[1998]) which ‘…tells the story of how we saved our homes from sale to 
private developers and then set about improving them’ (WECH, 2006[1998], 
p.7).  Against the Odds is both a historical account, but also discourse on 
struggles against the local authority, and the value of collective effort. 
The document reveals how, despite GLC’s investment in the 1960s, 
dereliction and empty housing remained prevalent. It was at this time that 
GLC members, including the member for Paddington, Patricia Kirwan, began 
developing plans to dispose of housing on the Walterton and Elgin estates, 
with significant areas to be used to create housing for the private market 
(Dimoldenberg, 2006, p.15).  
Figure 11: Property conditions in Walterton and Elgin in the 1970s 
  
Source: WECH, 2006 [1998].  
In 1980, the property in GLC’s ownership was transferred to Westminster 
City Council (WCC), who then took on responsibility for managing the 
housing. Responsibility for the major refurbishments needed remained with 
the GLC, with the estimated cost of refurbishment standing at £21m, 
prompting the GLC to develop a plan for this. 
Wider political change was also afoot. A decline in Conservative voters in 
Westminster, led Labour Party politicians to develop plans to increase their 
number of seats on the council (Hosken, 2006). Such plans sought to win 
Item removed for copyright 
reasons 
Item removed for copyright 
reasons 
 140 
 
back marginal seats, and convert conservative-held wards into marginals 
(Dimoldenberg, 2006, p.11). 
Both Hosken (2006) and Dimoldenberg (2006) highlight key local events and 
how they connect with wider political movements. Hosken, as a BBC 
journalist, provides a relatively distanced account, though his motive in 
uncovering the ‘scandals of Shirley Porter’, discussed below, means that 
WECH’s development is framed through the lens of local politics. 
Dimoldenberg’s insights are grounded in his experiences as a local Labour 
councillor in Westminster, and as a political activist supporting the efforts of 
WECH. Whilst rich in first hand insights, it is unapologetically partisan. 
1985-1988 
As the GLC disbanded in 1985, WCC took over responsibility for improving 
the physical condition of housing in the area. On 6th September 1985, a 
special meeting of WCC’s Housing Committee took place. The Conservative 
administration had developed a proposal to transfer the properties on the 
Walterton estate to a private developer, Bellway, who would undertake large 
scale demolition and redevelopment, turning 850 properties into 1,800 new 
flats (Hosken, 2006, p.113). Existing tenants would be rehoused, and 600 
properties were to be sold privately. Patricia Kirwan, who had since become 
the portfolio holder for housing at WCC, argued that refurbishing properties 
was not an option, given the government’s restrictions on spending. Hence 
the redevelopment proposal was an ‘imaginative way of improving the area 
and people’s lives’ (Kirwan in Hosken, 2006, p.113). Labour Party members 
delivered letters to residents in the area suggesting that they voice their 
objections at the forthcoming Housing Committee meeting. Approximately 
200 residents attended this meeting.  
It was around this time that the Walterton and Elgin Action Group (WEAG) 
was formed. The group was led by Jonathan Rosenberg, who had moved to 
the area in 1978 and had links to the Labour Party. WEAG was to receive a 
grant of £8,000 from the GLC to support their activities, enabling it to 
undertake various community organising efforts. In October 1985 WCC’s 
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Housing Committee meeting was again attended by over 100 residents 
(Hosken, 2006, p.114). Bellway would eventually pull out of the proposed 
scheme, leaving WCC without a viable plan.  
In 1986 the then leader of WCC, Shirley Porter, ordered a ‘change of 
direction’, in light of the Conservatives narrow win in the 1986 elections 
(Dimoldenberg, 2006, p.16). As Dimoldenberg claims, Porter suggested that 
they would apply ‘social engineering’, through the management and disposal 
of the housing stock, to win back the marginal seats lost. Plans to achieve 
this were developed through a set of policies called Building Stable 
Communities, proposing the sale of council-owned housing into private 
ownership. Senior councillors made the decision to sell 500 of WCC’s 
properties a year across the Borough. Such policies and directives were 
being actively challenged by the then local Labour spokesman on housing, 
Neale Coleman.  
Concurrent with these political machinations was the growing opposition and 
organisation of Walterton and Elgin residents. In 1987, new plans for the 
development of Walterton and Elgin were devised whereby WCC would sell 
256 properties to a developer for sale, at low prices, on condition that a 
further 776 were refurbished for rent. As Hosken notes, local opposition 
emerged to the foreseen ‘mass eviction of the existing residents while 
building work was carried out’ (Hosken, 2006, p.167). 
WCC were to approach a company called Regalian to undertake the 
development. In response WEAG, through Rosenberg, announced their 
plans to block the proposals, in ‘an intense campaign against the scheme’ 
(Rosenberg, in Hosken, p.167). WEAG members acted directly, organising 
protests at Reglian offices, as the then Managing Director of Reglian 
recalled; 
‘We were taken aback to suddenly find 25 or 30 people - guitars, film 
cameras and all. Having been sung to by this amicable group it was 
resolved that a meeting would be held’ (Goldstone, in WECH, 
2006[1998], p.14). 
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Video evidence (Thomas, 1987) shows the protesters entering Reglian’s 
offices, with Rosenberg directing different actions and asking to see the chief 
executive, while other protesters make vocal (and musical) protests. 
At this time WEAG was building relations with other local housing and tenant 
organisations. In July 1987, WEAG helped form the Westminster Housing 
Forum, as a body to lobby against WCC’s housing policies. And around this 
time petitions against WCC’s plans where produced, signed by 1,100 people. 
WEAG’s campaign was building momentum, as other organisations and 
individuals supported their efforts; 
‘…short-life residents, local doctors and church leaders. The whole 
community supported the campaign and it attracted extensive media 
coverage. People prominent in the housing world also gave WEAG 
outspoken support’ (WECH, 2006 [1998], p.16). 
The group became adept at local communications, using posters and other 
written material to convey their messages. Posters were put up on the steel 
shutters of empty properties stating ‘This door costs you £50 a week – Tory 
waste’. Other posters, designed by John Phillips, a local printer, acted as a 
powerful narrative for the proposed development. 
Figure 12: WECH poster 
 
Source: WECH (2006[1998]).  
Item removed for copyright reasons 
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Prior to WCC’s Housing Committee meeting, scheduled for 22nd September 
1987, a letter was delivered to all residents on the estate, which was 
apparently from Rosenberg. The letter suggested that WEAG had ‘accepted 
help from politically extreme organisations including Militant Tendency…and 
even the neo-Nazi National Front’ (Hosken, 2006, p.170). It is suggested that 
this was an attempt to ‘smear’ Rosenberg, who immediately visited residents 
to deny that this had come from him.  
The campaigning efforts of WEAG were proving highly effective in convincing 
developers not to co-operate with WCC. WCC development proposals 
required three developers to take part in the procurement process. Through 
targeted protest and lobbying, WEAG pressurised several developers to pull 
out of the process.  
At this time a local doctor, Richard Stone, in trying to rehouse one of his 
patients, noticed that properties were being left empty; 
‘I began to wonder what was going on… I think how outrageous it was 
to keep homes empty and from those in housing and medical need’ 
(Stone in Dimoldenberg, 2006, p.36). 
Stone contacted the District Auditor, John Macgill, to investigate this issue. In 
so doing, Macgill uncovered what is now known as the ‘Homes for Votes’ 
scandal; the use of council assets to gerrymander the local population for 
party political ends (Hosken, 2006). 
In 1988, the UK government presented its Housing Act before parliament, 
giving approved bodies the ‘right to acquire from public sector landlords 
certain dwelling-houses’ (HM Government, 1988). Known as ‘Tenants’ 
Choice’ this power would play a key role in WEAG developing an alternative 
to the proposals for redevelopment. Arguably designed to enable social 
rented tenants to become tenants of private landlords, WEAG explored the 
potential of using the legislation to take ownership of WCC properties. The 
timing of the Act was also crucial as it came at a point when WEAG 
members were suffering fatigue. As Hosken (2006, p.242) notes; 
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'As residents from the estates were gradually moved to prepare the way 
for builders, it meant that the WEAG had fewer and fewer people to 
rally to the cause' (Hosken, 2006, p.242). 
WEAG began developing its bid under the Tenants’ Choice legislation, 
leading Conservative councillors to devise ways to obstruct the application. 
Minutes from WCC meetings suggest they planned to ‘destroy the financial 
viability’ of the scheme (Hosken, 2006, p.250) 
1989 to 1991 
WEAG, led by Rosenberg, with the assistance of the Labour Party Councillor 
Neale Coleman, explored the potential of using the Tenants’ Choice 
legislation. Quoting Rosenberg, Hosken (2006, p.243) writes; 
'We kept everything we were doing quiet for as long as we could. The 
council had taken their eye of the ball and so we were able to go round 
and get organised'.  
WEAG representatives started to meet potential supporters, including 
Paddington Churches Housing Association (PCHA). PCHA committed to 
helping WEAG prepare the Tenants’ Choice bid. A new organisation was to 
be formed under the name Walterton and Elgin Community Homes Ltd 
(WECH), constituted as an Industrial Provident Society (HM Government, 
2014a). As a non-profit organisation, owned by its shareholders and 
operating a one-member-one-vote system, WECH’s rules would ensure that 
at the Board level residents would hold a majority of seats (WECH, 2003).  
WCC were, at this time, trying to form a group to oppose WEAG, with council 
minutes proposing that ‘Walterton Residents against Takeover to be set up’ 
(Hosken, 2006, p.253). At the same time WCC officers and local 
Conservative MPs were lobbying the Housing Corporation, hoping they 
would reject WEAG’s application to become a landlord (Hosken, 2006, 
p.254). 
In spring 1989, WECH became an ‘approved landlord’ with the Housing 
Corporation, entitling them to make a formal Tenants’ Choice application. By 
the end of March those leading the WECH scheme had signed up three 
quarters of the residents in the area as members (WECH, 2006[1998], p.21). 
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In April 1989 WECH representatives and local residents delivered its 
application to take ownership of the properties to WCC. WECH asserted that 
ownership should transfer at nil cost, and with a dowry of £63m in light of the 
refurbishment costs. WCC argued that no dowry be paid, and that WECH 
purchase the properties for £1m.  
In July 1989, the BBC’s Panorama programme (BBC, 1989) uncovered the 
attempts to gerrymander the population in the Borough, with testimony from 
Patricia Kirwan. Deeper scrutiny of the governance of WCC and its political 
leadership created opportunities for WECH to further its proposals. 
1991 onwards 
In July 1991, the District Valuer gave his verdict that WECH should take 
ownership of the property at nil cost, and receive a dowry of £17.5m (£22m 
inclusive of interest) to pay for the required refurbishment work (WECH, 
2006[1998]; Hosken, 2006). In September 1991, WECH issued its manifesto 
to residents, which included commitments on restricted rent increases and 
the future direction of the organisation. A referendum was undertaken of all 
residents to gauge and evidence local support. As noted in Against the Odds 
(2006[1998], p.25) ‘82% of residents voted, of whom 72% were in favour of 
the transfer to WECH’. The properties were legally transferred to WECH in 
April 1992. 
Throughout 1992 WECH consulted residents on the first phase of 
renovations of the Walterton estate. The scheme comprised 212 homes, and 
properties were taken in small batches of between two and five properties at 
a time. WECH drew on £3.5m of grants from the Housing Corporation. 
In 1993 WECH began the refurbishment of Athens and Kincardine gardens, 
the low rise 1960s development on the Elgin estate. At a cost of 
approximately £4m the scheme renovated the blocks which comprised 96 
homes, giving them an additional 30-year life cycle. In the same year WECH 
consulted residents about the tower blocks, and ‘82% of residents agreed 
that the tower blocks should go’ (WECH, 2006[1998], p.42). The presence of 
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sprayed asbestos added significantly to the costs of demolition, and WECH 
had to use £1.4m from its reserves. A low-density development was created 
in place of the tower blocks, part-funded by WECH, and with additional 
subsidies from the Housing Corporation (WECH, 2006[1998], p.49).  
Up until 1996 the housing management and maintenance functions relating 
to WECH properties had been handled by PCHA. On the basis of a review of 
by a firm of housing consultants (HACAS), different strategies and 
operational issues were considered. It was concluded that WECH should 
take on the maintenance and housing management functions themselves. 
WECH subsequently began taking over these functions, along with 
responsibilities for major works and financial management. In 1998 WECH 
started major work on the Walterton estate as part of its second phase of 
refurbishments.  
Throughout the 2000s WECH was engaged in the expected functions of a 
social landlord, undertaking cyclical and reactive maintenance of its 
properties and also major works on batches of properties (WECH; 2007; 
2008; 2009). For a number of years during the 2000s, the redevelopment of 
parts of the Elgin estate was explored. In 2012 plans for redevelopment were 
submitted to WCC for planning approval, with WCC also offering to 
contribute £3m to support the development of affordable housing. The 
scheme planned to create an additional 43 units, with 12 for rent to key 
workers and 31 at affordable rents, in addition to some community facilities 
(WECH, 2015a). WECH would require loan finance estimated to be £11.5m 
to achieve this. At the time of writing, it appears this scheme has not yet got 
under way. 
This short case history reveals major events and turning points in the 
development of WECH. Local activism was a response to poor housing 
conditions, and a radical local authority wedded to large scale 
redevelopment. Dedicated activists, connected to political parties, aided by 
housing professionals acting as technical advisors, enabled WECH form. 
The timing of national legislation and local political upheaval created 
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opportunities. The model that emerged focused on resident influence and 
control, but within a community benefit society, rather than a highly 
participative model of dweller management. 
6.3. Granby 4 Streets Community Land Trust 
Introduction  
Granby 4 Streets CLT (henceforth Granby CLT) operates in an area south 
east of Liverpool city centre, as shown in Figure 13. South of the Georgian 
Quarter, the Granby area is largely residential comprised of red-brick 
terraced housing.  
Figure 13: The location of Granby in relation to the wider Liverpool area  
 
Source: OpenStreetMap (labels added by the author) 
The Granby four streets, referenced in the CLT’s name, run east to west 
through the area. They are Cairns Street, Beaconsfield Street, Jermyn Street 
and Ducie Street, as shown in Figure 14. To the west of the four streets is an 
arterial route, Princes Road, and on the east, Kingsley Road.  
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Figure 14: The 'four streets' and local geography 
 
Source: OpenStreetMap (boundaries added by the author) 
The Granby four streets area is not defined by any political or administrative 
boundaries, though the local authority, Liverpool City Council (LCC) has 
constructed boundaries for the purpose of regeneration programmes. Figure 
15 shows the areas defined by LCC as the ‘Granby Renewal Area’.  
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Figure 15: Granby renewal area boundary and planned HMR activity 
  
Source: LCC, 2009, p.9 
Whilst the CLT’s name suggests that its geographic remit would be the ‘four 
streets’, its constitutional documents suggest it serves those living in the 
wider L8 postcode area.  This takes in residential streets in the wider Toxteth 
area, Lodge Lane and towards Upper Parliament Street. 
The four streets area has, historically, had a diverse population. The 2011 
census, for the two output areas covering the four streets, shows those not of 
‘white’ origin outnumbering the white population two to one. This is in a city 
where the white population constitutes 89 per cent of all residents (ONS, 
2011). Profiles of the ward in which Granby is located suggests there are 
nearly 10 per cent more economically inactive residents than the Liverpool 
average (LCC, 2015). Housing in the area is largely privately owned, with the 
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number of long-term empty properties constituting 8 per cent of all housing, 
three times higher than the Liverpool average (LCC, 2015). In the Granby 
four streets this has been significantly higher, and in 2013 just 60 properties 
were occupied, with 128 houses and shops being vacant (Granby CLT, 
2013b). 
Pre-2010 
The Granby area was not immune to the wider processes of depopulation 
and industrial changes which affected much of Liverpool from the 1950s 
(Sykes et al, 2013). In the late 1960s, the housing charity Shelter chose the 
Granby area for an action-research project (entitled SNAP). At the time, 
conditions in Granby where particularly poor, as described by Couch (2003): 
‘This was a chronically deprived multi-ethnic and multicultural 
neighbourhood that had traditionally provided the first home to many 
inward migrants to the city...it was clear to SNAP…that the area 
suffered from multiple deprivation…the fundamental causes of 
deprivation lay in structural changes in employment and housing 
markets’ (Couch, 2003, p.77-78). 
Through this project, which was geared toward the renovation of disused 
properties, some of Liverpool’s first housing co-operatives emerged, as did 
some of the wider support infrastructure for such co-operatives (Holmes, 
2006). This led some to characterise these developments as a ‘co-operative 
revolution’ (CDS Co-operatives, 1994). Nonetheless, issues of demolition 
and displacement still loomed, and those involved in SNAP prevented major 
LCC plans for demolition to develop new road infrastructure (McConaghy D, 
1972). 
By the early 1980s, Granby had reached somewhat of a nadir (Beckett, 
2015). In 1981 the arrest of several black residents in the north of Granby 
was followed by what is now known as the Toxteth Riots. The causes of this 
event are a hotly debated topic (Marren, 2016; Frost and Phillips, 2011), but 
it has doubtlessly left a legacy of strained relations between the local 
population and public authorities. 
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Granby was declared a ‘General Improvement Area’ (Couch, 2003, p.78) in 
the 1970s, with funding to tackle poor physical conditions, and undertake 
selective demolition. However, problems persisted and the neighbourhood 
was designated Liverpool’s first Renewal Area in 1995, using powers created 
by the Local Government and Housing Act (1989). As a Renewal Area, the 
local priorities were deemed to be economic development initiatives and 
housing improvements. In the mid-1990s 32 per cent of dwellings were 
‘below national habitation standards’ (Couch, 2003, p.155), and a significant 
number of dwellings were empty. Group repair schemes, limited clearance 
and new build projects had led to some improvements in physical conditions 
by the start of the 2000s. 
The government’s Housing Market Renewal Initiative (HMRI) was 
established in 2002 and identified a number of Pathfinder areas, of which 
Merseyside was one. As part of this new initiative, Granby’s Renewal Area 
status was extended to 2005 (LCC, 2009). Under the Pathfinder’s plans a 
mixture of interventions for Granby were developed, including clearance and 
redevelopment along with refurbishments and environmental improvements 
(see Figure 15). Proposed demolition, particularly in the Four Streets area, 
was vehemently resisted by the local residents’ association (Liverpool Echo, 
2004). The Council began acquiring properties, and by 2009 they had 
acquired the majority of housing in the four streets area. In 2010, the 
incoming national government terminated the HMRI, and the associated 
central government funding ceased in March 2011. This led to uncertainty 
about the implementation of the redevelopment plans. The redevelopment of 
parts of Granby, such as the derelict Ducie Street, were put on hold. 
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Figure 16: Ducie Street in 2012 
 Source: Hughes (2012c) 
2010-2012  
As the UK national government changed in 2010, so did the administration of 
LCC, as the Labour Party took overall control. The new administration sought 
new solutions to the housing problems of Granby. Following the end of 
HMRI, residents began looking for their own solutions. The Granby 
Residents Association (GRA) had been the active voice of residents opposed 
to redevelopment. As this disbanded, some of these residents (along with 
others) engaged in direct action to address the physical environment. A 
group called ‘That Bloomin Triangle’ was formed, and began planting 
flowers, painting murals and gradually changing the aesthetic of the area 
(Granby CLT, 2014a), and subsequently received national press coverage 
(Leeming, 2010; Leeming, 2013).  It was in 2011 that residents began 
exploring different ways to address the empty housing, in the post-HMRI 
context. 
In March 2011 residents, with help from a local social enterprise specialist, 
Ronnie Hughes, conducted various consultation activities to explore the 
possibilities of creating a CLT (Hughes, 2012a). Shortly after these 
workshops, a local architect and member of a local housing co-operative 
contacted the CLT Fund for help. One of their funding streams was to pay for 
Item removed for copyright reasons 
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initial feasibility assessments. As their advisor I visited the group in the 
summer of 2011, I discussed with the group how the CLT might take 
ownership of empty housing and bring it back into use. This was written up in 
a ‘concept note’ (Archer, 2011). The CLT was subsequently constituted as a 
Community Benefit Society. with the help of a co-operative support agency, 
CDS Co-operatives. The CLT is owned by its members, who fall into three 
classes; residents of the CLT housing, community members from within the 
defined community, and stakeholders. The rules regarding the CLT’s Board 
ensure a tripartite structure, whereby at least two thirds of seats are held by 
residents and community members. 
As the idea of creating a CLT was being pursued, LCC was developing its 
own strategy for Granby. In June 2011 LCC issued an Expression of Interest 
(EOI), which sought proposals from developers to refurbish 177 properties in 
Granby and the surrounding areas (LCC, 2011). Whilst not explicit, LCC 
were offering the properties it acquired under HMRI at low or nil cost to 
developers. The timing of this proved critical for those residents seeking a 
local collectivist solution, as the EOI suggested LCC wished to procure a 
large developer who would offer significant capital resources. 
The idea of creating a CLT was shelved as residents sought to influence and 
negotiate with those developers entering an EOI. As the CLT’s own website 
recounts; 
‘We approached all of the developers…We wanted to make sure that 
our wishes were included within their proposals, and that the 
community would be involved’ (Granby CLT, 2016). 
The CLT spoke to two potential developers engaged in the procurement 
process, Leader 1 and Plus Dane, the former being a private sector 
developer and the latter a housing association. Having constituted 
themselves as a CLT residents awaited the outcome of the procurement 
process. Leader 1 was chosen as the preferred bidder for the refurbishment 
programme in March 2012. 
 154 
 
2012-2013 
Since the mid-2000s residents of Granby had hosted street markets during 
the summer months. Combined with the planting and painting of shutters, 
this activity was aimed at enhancing the quality of the physical environment. 
It was also part of a purposeful strategy to prevent the demolition of housing. 
A blog and video by Ronnie Hughes began to connect these local events and 
activities with the aims of the CLT, as preserving housing and establishing 
community ownership (Hughes, 2012b). 
In an unexpected turn of events, in November 2012 the Leader 1 contract 
was terminated by LCC. Journalists at the Liverpool Echo had uncovered 
evidence that Leader 1 was working with an investment company (Positive 
Property Investments (PPI)) to raise the capital for the Granby plans. Further 
investigations found that Leader 1 had only formed in October 2011 and had 
not filed any accounts with Companies House (Waddington, 2012).  
With the termination of the Leader 1 contract, the redevelopment of empty 
housing in the area looked uncertain. In November 2012 residents started 
writing a vision for the Granby area, entitled ‘Clouds and Silver Linings’ 
(Granby CLT, 2013a). The document was written by two active members of 
the CLT and sent to senior executives at LCC and other local bodies. It 
outlined their vision for the area which urged LCC to think about different 
development models and approaches; 
‘For some years, the City Council has focused on wholesale 
redevelopment that works with one big developer and requires big 
investment…It is an all or nothing scenario – which in our case, has 
turned out to be nothing…we believe different forms of ownership and 
renting should be mixed across the streets’ (Granby CLT, 2013a, p.2).  
The document goes on to highlight a variety of models including 
homesteading and sweat equity, community-owned housing and rent-to-buy 
schemes. In its conclusion it urged LCC to acknowledge the investments 
already being made by residents; the environmental work and food growing 
initiatives, the local market and the investments owner-occupiers where 
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making in their homes, stating that ‘…these are positive signs that this is a 
community worth investing in’ (Granby CLT, 2013a, p.3). 
The document is a crucial insight into the views and narrative construction of 
activists in the CLT. The position of the writers is important, as they had been 
engaged in opposition to LCC plans for Granby for several years. The 
document explicitly encourages ‘putting aside the causes of this collapse’ 
and how this was perceived as a ‘moment of great opportunity’ (Granby CLT, 
2013a, p.2). The importance of this document in shaping the views of 
individuals within LCC and partner organisations is unclear. However, it 
provides invaluable insights into how residents were starting to frame their 
ideas about the collective ownership of housing. 
In December 2012, the CLT started to develop relationships with two housing 
associations; Plus Dane and Liverpool Mutual Homes (Granby CLT, 2016). 
The intention was to jointly develop a bid for Empty Homes funding, 
administered by the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA).  
At around this time, a chance meeting occurred which was to shape the 
future of the CLT. Activists were introduced to a social investor, John Davey, 
who was keen to support the efforts of the CLT, via a local advocate for CLT 
and other co-operative ventures. Eventually, an informal offer was made to 
loan the CLT a significant capital sum at a low interest rate (Thompson, 
2015a; Hughes, 2016). It was also during this period that experienced 
housing professional, Erika Rushton, offered to join the Board of the CLT and 
has continued to play a key role in its development (Hughes, 2014).  
Also in March 2013, the CLT applied to the CLT Fund for additional support, 
eventually receiving a £5k grant to develop a business plan, and 
subsequently received funds under the CLT Network’s Urban CLT Project 
(CLT Network, 2014).  
During this period the CLT was also working with the social investor and a 
firm of architects to develop a ‘masterplan’ for the Four Streets area (Granby 
CLT, 2013b). This document proposed to LCC an alternative approach to the 
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regeneration of Granby. The language it uses is revealing, highlighting the 
need to be ‘grounded in what we can do now’ and planting the ‘seeds for the 
area’s longer term development’ (Granby CLT, 2013b, p.2). In essence, the 
plan proposed the ownership and refurbishment of ten properties by the CLT, 
alongside other housing association refurbishment programmes. In addition, 
it outlined how 12 properties on Ducie Street would be transferred to the 
social investor for refurbishment, along with the creation of retail space at the 
heart of the Four Streets.  The plan also made provision for other housing 
co-operatives, such as the Northern Housing Alliance Co-operative, and was 
subsequently presented to LCC in July 2013.  
In the summer of 2013 one of the CLT’s partners, Plus Dane had its financial 
position assessed by the housing regulator the HCA. The downgrading of 
Plus Dane’s ‘viability assessment’ created financial uncertainty for the 
Granby plans. In its written judgement the HCA declared; 
‘…some recent decisions on growth opportunities have not been 
considered within an appropriate strategic framework or demonstrated 
adequate attention to the protection of social housing assets’ (HCA, 
2013, p.4). 
The impact of this intervention on Plus Dane’s approach to Granby is 
unclear, but it is conceivable that it has led to a more cautious approach by 
their development partner. 
At the end of 2013 a representative from North West Housing Services 
(NWHS) started attending the CLT Board. NWHS is a secondary co-
operative that provides services to its members, such as housing 
management and maintenance (Granby CLT 2013b).  It was agreed that, for 
six months, NWHS would provide the CLT with administrative and 
accountancy support free of charge. In addition to this support, NWHS 
offered the CLT a small loan to conduct more detailed property surveys, and 
costs for the refurbishment work (Thompson, 2015a). Another emerging 
partners included Steve Biko Housing Association, a specialist BME housing 
provider, which offered to handle the CLT’s future housing management 
functions (Granby CLT, 2016). 
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In October 2013 the CLT learnt that it had been successful in its application 
to the Nationwide Foundation’s Empty Properties Fund (Nationwide 
Foundation, 2013). Increasingly, LCC were becoming receptive to the joint 
masterplan that had been present by the CLT, the social investor and the 
architects Assemble. Late in 2013 they put out a tender for the 
redevelopment of one of the four streets, Ducie Street, where housing was 
severely dilapidated.  
Whilst LCC had agreed that the CLT could take ownership of ten properties, 
it was unclear who they would allow to manage and conduct the 
refurbishment work. The CLT could employ their own architect and 
developer; or work with Plus Dane (HACT, 2014). 
As 2013 drew to an end, the CLT’s members helped organise the final 
Granby street market, and used this as a way of informing residents about 
the CLT and its plans (Hughes, 2013). The CLT was increasing the output of 
its communications with newsletters and a dedicated website. In addition, it 
was engaging more local groups in the activities of the CLT including; the 
Granby Somali Women’s Group, the Small Cinema, Methodist Youth Centre, 
Merseyside Somali Men’s Group and the Granby-Toxteth Development Trust 
(Granby CLT, 2013b). 
2014 onwards 
In January 2014, LCC announced their decision to award the Ducie Street 
tender to the social investor, working with the CLT and other partners. Some 
months later in 2014 LCC agreed to transfer the ten properties to the CLT, 
who took full ownership in the December. The CLT had been developing 
detailed business plans for the refurbishment of the properties, and set out 
an ambitious timescale for this process, aiming to create five low cost rental 
houses, and five shared ownership properties (Granby CLT, 2015). 
Other projects were beginning to take shape including efforts to renovate the 
shops on the four corners of Granby Street, Beaconsfield and Cairns Street. 
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The CLT received some initial funding through the Heritage Lottery Fund to 
support these efforts.  
By mid-2015 it was calculated that the CLT had catalysed the investment of 
£12.7 million of external funding (Granby CLT, 2015), and was seeking 
lottery monies, via a programme called Power to Change, to increase its 
internal resources and provide more capital for development projects. The 
CLT’s business plan presents the mix of funding and finance being secured; 
Figure 17: Granby CLT’s funding and finance 
 
Source: Granby CLT, 2015, p.11 
The above diagram shows the cocktail of funding being brought together, but 
also the recurrent issue of shortfalls in development finance. 
In 2015 the CLT was to receive significant international attention as its 
architects, Assemble, were nominated for the Turner Prize in respect to their 
work in the Granby area and with the CLT. This prestigious arts prize was 
duly awarded to Assemble in 2016 (Tate.org.uk, 2016). At the current time of 
writing, the CLT has completed the refurbishment of five of its ten properties, 
with these being let at 80 per cent of market rents (Granby, 2015). The five 
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other properties are to be offered for shared ownership, with a further 12 
planned using sweat equity models (Granby, 2015, p.41). 
From this short chronology important features of this case have emerged. 
Repeated cycles of decline and remediation in physical conditions, framed 
the contemporary resistance to private redevelopment. Previous activism 
concerning housing in the area, and other voluntary activity, laid the 
foundations for the active involvement of residents in developing a collective. 
The presence of advisors and investors was pivotal in seizing political 
opportunities. The collective, a community benefit society, aims to adopt 
various tenure models for its housing, and work on non-housing 
developments related to community facilities. 
6.4. The phases of development  
These case chronologies focus on the entities, relations and significant 
events in each case. They are intended to set a platform for a deeper causal 
analysis. Their presentation highlights the complicated processes and 
pathways of each case, and how that complexity is hard to reconstruct and 
condense. As Lewis notes (1986, p.214) any ‘particular event that we might 
wish to explain stands at the end of a long and complicated causal history’. 
Understanding the development of the collectives, and the processes 
through which they can create certain benefits and costs, therefore requires 
a method of simplification and abstraction. Ideas of causal mechanisms hold 
promise here, and the above descriptions of events provide the basis for 
their construction (Bygstad and Munkvold; Easton, 2009). 
The development of the cases, and their forms, reveal some important 
differences. CMP represents a federated co-op model, with dwellers in the 
co-ops owning and managing housing for their benefit. WECH is a 
community benefit society, where members are owners, but where 
governance is in the form of a representative model, with staff performing 
housing management functions. Granby, as a small CLT is a similar 
community benefit society model, but at the time of writing was wholly 
volunteer-run. Furthermore, the cases spread their histories across different 
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time periods, affected by differing political, social and economic factors 
nationally, feeding down to varying local contexts.  
Nonetheless, the descriptions reveal general patterns in the development of 
the cases. Other authors have tried to capture such patterns, for instance 
Ward (1973), who suggests effective direct-action on housing occurs in four 
phases; 1) individuals initiate and catalyse wider support, 2) this consolidates 
and threatens existing property rights, 3) effective action results in success 
and acceptance of this by authorities, and 4) authorities seek to placate or 
co-opt such efforts into the mainstream. 
In reference to the cases studied here, a simpler set of stages can be 
constructed, awaiting deeper analysis. These stages express different types 
of action undertaken, different forms of relations and contrasting types of 
events in the development of the cases. 
Figure 18: General stages in the development of the cases 
 
Stage 3: Sustainment 
Features of the stage: Building internal relations between members and 
residents, enforcing rules, and maintaining and/or growing the property base  
Stage 2: Enactment 
Features of the stage: Exploring alternative futures and vehicles to achieve this, 
legally constituting the collective, creating the required finances, gathering 
resident support, and building partnerships  
Stage 1: Opposition 
Features of the stage: Resisting redevelopment through protest and direct 
action. Organising against, and constructing narratives of, a common adversary 
 161 
 
Unlike CMP and WECH, Granby CLT has not yet evidenced long-term 
sustainability. But the former collectives have, and the recent past reveals a 
distinctly different character to the focus of their activities, internal relations 
and the challenges they face. Different constraints and enablement are 
apparent in each stage, and are particularly pronounced in stages one and 
two, as popular opposition and protest is translated into an organisational 
form for the ownership and management of housing.  
With this knowledge the thesis now turns to the empirical findings of the 
research. It offers, in the following two chapters, a deeper understanding and 
of the constraints and enablements shaping the development of each 
collective. 
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Chapter Seven: Internal constraints and 
enablements 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Addressing the study’s first research question, concerning the constraint and 
enablement of housing collectives, the following chapter focuses on the 
internal processes and dynamics of the collectives. This relates to a variety 
of constraints and enablements arising specifically from the actions of, and 
relations between, residents, members and staff within the collectives.  
Changes in social phenomena can be depicted as causal processes, or as 
explicable via certain mechanisms (Coleman, 1990; Hedstrom & Swedberg, 
1998; Hedstrom & Ylikoski, 2010). Such modes of explanation entail 
interrogating how the conditions in which actors are located, lead to the 
formation of certain beliefs; how these beliefs shape individuals’ actions; and 
how, when these actions are performed by multiple actors, in an organised 
way, then wider change can take place. Using these ideas data analysis 
sought to identify the conditions, beliefs, actions and combinations of actions 
which have shaped the internal processes within the collectives. From these 
internal processes, constraints and enablements emerged in complex 
conjunctions. 
Hence, the chapter is structured as follows. The following section discusses 
patterns in the beliefs and psychologies of collective members and residents, 
and how these may have been shaped by the conditions in which they found 
themselves. This is followed by an analysis of actions taken by those inside 
the collective, shedding light on their skills and capacities to affect change. 
The synergistic nature of such action is then discussed, and how co-
ordination and organisation takes place. The chapter concludes by proposing 
mechanistic explanations of some of the internal dynamics observed. 
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7.2. Beliefs and psychologies 
In each of the cases the beliefs of residents and members can be seen, in 
part, as responses to external stimuli or received conditions. The conditions 
shaping beliefs in each case pre-dated any conception or proposals for 
housing collectivism. Empirical evidence for each case shows how the belief 
in a collectivist alternative to physical redevelopment only emerged as their 
situation demanded or allowed. Important comparisons and differentiations 
can be made between each case in this regard.  
In Milton Park, the influx of diverse populations in the mid-twentieth century 
had created a heady mix of ideology and activism. Milton Park was, in 
retrospect, ripe for the spread of a shared belief that private development 
should be resisted. As one long-term resident recalled in his interview, the 
area had developed a reputation for attracting liberal thinkers and political 
activists; 
‘…you realise too that [there was] a lot of the militancy in the area 
before the beginning of the project to oppose Concordia 
estates…because this was an area where there was a high proportion 
of draft dodgers, who were very instrumental and had a lot of political 
experience and came here for political reasons’ (Alan, Milton Park 
resident). 
The presence of American citizens who had avoided conscription to the 
Vietnam War, is just one example of a sub-group occupying the area with 
distinctly liberal political views. Many residents were also engaged in forms 
of activism, and throughout the 1960s and 1970s the increasing presence of 
community organisers, influenced by visitors to the area such as Saul Alinksy 
(1971), provided residents with knowledge and techniques to direct this 
activism. 
For people such as Alan, a founding member of his co-op in Milton Park, 
these beliefs shaped resistance to Concordia’s plans. Alan highlighted how, 
being surrounded by and immersed in radical political ideas, he had come to 
see the potential of collective ownership of housing; 
‘…like myself, involved in left wing slash anarchist political milieu going 
on…because of my own politics it sounded like it would fit very well this 
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idea, and so I started to campaign for a co-op’ (Alan, Milton Park 
resident). 
The presence of a large group of residents with similar political and 
ideological outlooks created the basis for a certain type of agency. Whilst the 
prevalence or dominance of such beliefs was important, what seems equally 
significant is the firmness with which those beliefs were held by certain 
residents who would become key agents for change. Susan, an activist in the 
development of CMP, highlighted how her firm convictions underpinned her 
activism; 
‘The solidity of being very sure of your base, your philosophical base, 
has its advantages’ (Susan, Milton Park resident). 
Susan presented her strength of belief as a key asset in navigating the 
conflicts, disagreements and dilemmas in collective enterprise.  
In a context where private ownership was the dominant tenure, and where 
the cultural norm was to see housing as both an investment-good and use-
good, ‘being sure of your base’ would seem to be a crucial asset, particularly 
if you are developing and promoting unusual tenure models. Residents such 
as Susan highlighted how the strength of their beliefs came from a youthful 
confidence and naivety. Reflecting on the psychologies of some of the 
activists involved in the project, Susan noted; 
‘We were a handful of people, but gung-ho, really bleating, and you 
know when you're young and you've got positive energy you just get 
into this stuff, you love it and have so much fun’ (Susan, Milton Park 
resident). 
Whilst highlighting activists’ ‘gung-ho’ and ‘positive’ approach to tackling 
perceived problems, the final line in the quote above reveals something 
important. This effort was a key part of the lifestyles of those involved. 
Activism was not just a practical response to external threats, but something 
to be inspired by, to enjoy, and to engage in as a part of a way of life. A 
picture of an activist’s psychology emerges, underpinned by a set of social 
relations with others engaged in the same efforts. 
Other activists showed a determined belief that it was possible to learn the 
required skills for collective ownership of housing. Martin, an active member 
 165 
 
of his co-op and long term resident of the area, noted how another member 
of his co-op had; 
‘…through dogged determination become literate in finances and 
technical aspects [of co-operatives] (Martin, Milton Park resident). 
This perceived willingness to learn marks out some of the psychological traits 
held by key activists, and signs of perceived self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982). 
This would seem important in meeting the significant demands of forming 
and sustaining such collectives.  
In contrast to such enabling beliefs and psychologies, other residents 
exhibited different positions. Not every resident of Milton Park was of a liberal 
disposition, and even among those that were, not all agreed with the 
proposed collective model of ownership. This becomes clear when exploring 
the resistance to collectivism from a group named Maison St. Louis (MSL); 
‘…about a dozen individuals who declared their interest in owning, as 
individuals, the property they lived in. Their interest was not an unusual 
one in our society, in which the norm is exactly that’ (Kowaluk and 
Piché-Burton, 2012, p.19). 
MSL’s resistance was predicated on the desire for ‘normal’ forms of property 
ownership. Interviewees noted how, in a more general sense, advocates of 
co-operation had to battle against cultural norms of individualism;  
One of the barriers…is individualism…that’s the system of life we're 
brought into, every individual is possessive of his own belongings, so 
I'm a member of this co-op but this is my belongings and I'm possessive 
of it’ (Frank, OSBL manager). 
The formation of MSL, and its subsequent resistance to collectivism, is 
understandable given these wider beliefs and norms. Evidence from 
interviews provides crucial insights into how the beliefs of those involved in 
MSL, notably their preference for individual ownership, translated into actions 
which constrained the development of the collective; 
‘…they wanted to own, they wanted the federal government to pay to 
renovate these houses and turn them over to private ownership. Their 
politics were quite conservative, for many years through various 
legislative means they tried to block the general Milton Park project’ 
(Alan, Milton Park resident). 
 166 
 
This succinct causal summary reveals how certain beliefs and ideologies 
entwine with ownership preferences, to promulgate certain actions which 
constrained the development of the collective.  
In a similar way to Milton Park, there is evidence that the existing population 
and character of Walterton and Elgin made fertile ground for the 
development of WECH. Whilst far from a hive of liberal politics, interviewees 
highlighted the presence of ‘alternative lifestyles’ in Walterton and Elgin prior 
to any notion of collective ownership; 
‘…there was a mix of people, quite an ethnic mix that added a 
dimension to it, people who liked living in edgy areas, it was a bit edgy, 
alternative lifestyles that sort of thing’ (George, WECH supporter). 
Evidence from the interviews does suggest, at least initially, that there was 
not the same level of political activism in Walterton and Elgin as was seen in 
Milton Park. Indeed, interviewees were clear that the development of WEAG 
and resistance to demolition was not driven by a certain political or 
ideological persuasion, rather it was an organic response to an external 
threat; 
‘…so we were fighting the campaign and fighting to survive, and to stop 
them knocking down…the notion of taking over, forming WECH, doing 
our own thing etc that only grew from the opportunity…we wanted the 
council to get on with the repairs…it became apparent that they were 
never going to do that, so when Tenant’s Choice came along, there 
wasn't really, there was no ideology’ (Charles, WECH resident and 
Board member). 
Yet politics and ideologies did drive the development of WECH in a certain 
way. WEAG aligned with, and supported by, the local Labour Party, and was 
also shaped by the wider political context. As noted by Charles, polarisation 
in the national political sphere was reflected by polarised political beliefs at 
the local level; 
‘…the whole Thatcher thing was very…the national context was very 
polarised’ (Charles, WECH resident and Board member). 
Clearly this polarisation was accentuated in Westminster, as Shirley Porter’s 
administration implemented the Homes for Votes policy and embarked on a 
project to gerrymander the voting population (Hosken, 2006).  
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All this points to differences between the cases in how local beliefs were 
being shaped by wider conditions, but there are similarities in the 
psychologies of activists. Those helping form and support WEAG, with their 
links to the local Labour Party, use very similar language to describe how 
their activism formed part of their lifestyle. George, a local Labour councillor 
in Westminster, reflected on what drove his involvement in the WECH 
project; 
‘Well, we were all young and idealistic, and it was a great 
time…Paddington was one of the centres of political activity, there was 
a group of us in our 20s and 30s who came together’ (George, WECH 
supporter). 
Here, echoes of the testimony of Susan in Milton Park are seen, suggesting 
that youthful idealism fuelled activists’ involvement. Such psychologies 
underpinned the determined activism which enabled WECH to emerge.  
Like in Milton Park, the desire for a new form of collective ownership found 
root in quite disparate but overlapping beliefs and views. Francis noted in his 
interview how ‘a meeting of minds’ took place, as people from different 
backgrounds coalesced. Craig, a Board member who was involved in the 
WEAG campaigns, noted; 
‘We weren't entirely a homogenous community, cos there was the 
people, old time council, actual council tenants, there was the people in 
various forms of short-let like myself that were sublet out via the council 
etc’ (Craig, WECH resident and Board member).  
To build a sufficiently influential campaign, disparate groups needed to find 
common ground and shared objectives. These would emerge in the beliefs 
that redevelopment should be resisted, and existing residents should not be 
displaced. 
As the desire to resist redevelopment grew, so did the confidence of 
activists. Reflecting on this, Edith, a long-standing resident in WECH and 
early activist, remembers the growing resolve of residents; 
‘We were so determined that we just kept going, I mean over ten years 
is a long time to keep fighting…I enjoyed the fight…and getting 
together. And being determined, we were all determined’ (Edith, WECH 
resident). 
 168 
 
As the tactics employed by activists continued to frustrate WCC’s attempts to 
procure a developer, so the confidence and perceived efficacy of the 
collective grew. This is a major piece of learning about how collectivism can 
be enabled. Reflecting on this growing sense of efficacy, a WECH document 
recalls;  
‘We realised how strong we could be as a community and that politics 
starts at home with your neighbours on your street’ (WECH, 
2006[1998], p.14). 
It does appear that a recursive process was operating, whereby firmly held 
beliefs led to certain activities, for instance, direct action on developers’ 
offices, which when successful served to reaffirm those initial beliefs. 
One could overstate the universality of such beliefs in the Walterton and 
Elgin area. Indeed, interviewees and documentary evidence suggest that 
whilst many residents supported the development of a collective model of 
ownership, some did not. In the vote regarding the transfer of properties to 
WECH, 27 per cent of residents did not favour this option. Divergent beliefs 
acted as a constraint on development. Reflecting on the period before the 
ballot of residents, Charles, a key activist in the development of WECH, 
recalled; 
‘…you know at its height it was a pressure cooker and the polarisation 
was very sharp’ (Charles, WECH resident and Board member). 
Interviewees recalled how an opposition group, named the ‘Walterton 
Residents against Takeover’, was formed to object to WEAG’s proposals and 
‘put out stuff about how the council’s been good to us’ (Craig, WECH 
resident and Board member). A significant portion of the population did not 
actively oppose collective models, but would have preferred to stay as WCC 
tenants. This passive resistance was another important constraint on 
collectivism. Dylan, a supporter and advisor on the WECH proposals, 
reflected that in the run-up to the ballot on the transfer of properties; 
‘…there was a category called ‘better the devil’…so to change people's 
minds...to change their landlords...it was quite a big step in people's 
minds’ (Dylan, WECH supporter). 
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Dylan crucially points to efforts to change beliefs, and how activists tried to 
convince and persuade such tenants of the value and possibility of collective 
ownership, creating new visions and discourses about collective action, aptly 
demonstrated in banners and written literature (see Figure 19). 
Figure 19: WECH forms of communication  
  
Source: WECH, 2006[1998], p.15-17 
As in Milton Park, there were conflicting views and beliefs in the process of 
developing WECH. Notably, disagreements emerged between WECH’s 
tenants and leaseholders. Craig reflected on this issue in his interview, and 
how WECH had dealt with a legacy of mixed ownership; 
‘...the minute you own something you have a different agenda basically, 
and it doesn't mean good or bad, but it becomes more about you than 
about us’ (Craig, WECH resident and Board member). 
Craig suggests that the tenure of housing that residents occupied shaped 
their beliefs. It would seem the existence of leasehold properties created 
tensions and constraints in the overall model of collective ownership. 
Issues of tenure are less prevalent in Granby, where in contrast to Milton 
Park and WECH, the slow depopulation of the area has left only a small 
group of owner occupiers. These residents constitute the core group of 
activists developing the CLT, and their beliefs cannot be interpreted along 
traditional party-political lines, since the local Labour Party had long 
advocated large-scale demolition of housing in Granby. Hence, resident’s 
beliefs in the possibility of collectivism where not situated in traditional party 
politics. 
Item removed for copyright 
reasons 
Item removed for copyright 
reasons 
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Granby has historically received new migrant populations, and this diversity 
is something interviewees celebrated. The CLT, for some residents, 
represented a vehicle for preserving the diverse population of the area, along 
with its physical character. As Catherine, a long-term resident noted;  
‘…it seems to me to be important that we hang on to…to part of 
Liverpool’s heritage that's really important…My reasons for getting 
involved was that it’s really important that we keep this area’ (Catherine, 
Granby resident and CLT Board member). 
Such beliefs play an important function in explaining the activism of 
residents. Granby’s historic function in receiving and housing people of 
different ethnicities, underpinned a set of shared beliefs and ideas about 
what the area should be like, and the function it performs. This created the 
psychological conditions for collectivism to be proposed and explored.  
Residents had, for a long time, been active in opposing the redevelopment of 
the area, and in this they claimed some successes (Granby CLT, 2016). This 
experience had meant bonds between residents had formed, based on a 
shared belief that demolition should be resisted. As Catherine noted;  
‘Your community doesn't just happen for nothing, it happens for a 
reason where people collect together for a reason…and the greatest 
community movements have always been brought about because 
people have their backs to the wall’ (Catherine, Granby resident and 
CLT Board member). 
This history carries a number of similarities with the other case studies. The 
opposition to redevelopment pre-dates any notion of collective ownership, 
but nonetheless, it created the psychologies and relations upon which 
collective housing was possible. The presence of an opposing force enabled 
individuals to internalise, and coalesce around certain beliefs and co-
operative practices.  
Ultimately, residents’ activism can be seen as an assertion of control, as Avril 
a CLT Board member noted; 
‘The biggest thing is the lack of control they've felt they've had over 
what's happened in their area over the last couple of decades…this is 
people power, this is us taking back control in something that has a 
formal structure’ (Avril, Granby resident and Board member). 
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This belief, and growing confidence was founded on the view that the local 
council (LCC) had consistently failed to regenerate the area. Interviews, as 
well as documentary evidence, reveal a strengthening of the belief that the 
CLT was best placed to manage such a process. Helena, a non-resident 
Board member, highlighted this rationale; 
‘…some of the owner occupiers were looking at 'how can we find a 
solution for ourselves, everybody else has failed us’ (Helena, Granby 
CLT supporter and Board member). 
Documents produced by the CLT asserted an increasing confidence to tackle 
local problems, suggesting ‘we have ideas, energy, commitment and vision 
that…offer a way forward for the regeneration of our community’ (Granby 
CLT, 2013, p.4). Articulating and embedding some of these beliefs was a key 
task in order to convince residents and external bodies that they could act 
collectively. Documents such as this, hint at the role of this type of narrative 
in belief formation.   
As was noted above for Milton Park and WECH, a receptiveness to 
collectivism was not universal among residents. There is evidence in the 
interviews of a lack of confidence, and a lack of belief that collective 
ownership is viable. Beatrice, a key activist in the CLT and local resident, 
noted; 
‘Well I think it’s taken quite a long time for people to realise that it’s 
going to hold’ (Beatrice, Granby resident and CLT Board member). 
This shows that whilst collective ownership may be desired, it is not 
necessarily perceived as possible. Beatrice and others were trying to 
persuade non-believers that such ownership was viable, a key activity 
discussed in section three. 
The CLT was borne out of the demise of another resident group, the Granby 
Residents’ Association. Individuals in this organisation had very different 
views about how the same goal of preserving housing in the area could be 
achieved. Helena provided the following insight into this divergence of 
opinion; 
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‘…I think within the Granby Residents’ [Association] there was a little bit 
of a split, so a group of people took forward the CLT and I'm aware 
there were some people that weren't happy with that’ (Helena, Granby 
CLT supporter and Board member). 
Hence the CLT is the product of one set of views or beliefs, with the lack of 
consensus acting as a constraint on development. There is certainly 
evidence that a belief in collective ownership was not shared by everyone; 
‘…there are other residents who are being communicated with, but who 
aren't, who are outside of [names resident members of CLT], and there 
has been a little bit of friction there’ (Mike, LCC representative). 
Hence, the belief in a collective solution to the areas problems was not 
universal, but arguably gaining strength. The promulgation of collectivism 
was only possible as actions and events allowed them to have more 
confidence in it. Externally driven events, such as the offer of a loan from the 
social investor, or support from local housing associations, enabled 
momentum to build and perceived efficacy to grow.   
7.3. Individual agency  
Exploring the individual agency of those within the collectives, shows how 
the performance of certain actions has enabled and constrained the 
development of each collective. In this analysis, one type of action comes to 
the fore; how individuals were able to organise other members and residents 
to perform actions in synergy. Understanding these organising roles and acts 
provides important insights into how such forms of collectivism can develop. 
In the development of Milton Park, a complex phenomenon which emerged 
over a period of several decades, the individual acts which shaped the 
collective can be seen as either ‘infinite or merely enormous’ (Lewis, 1986, 
p.214). One could focus on the actions of David Williams (his real name), a 
professor at the neighbouring McGIll University, who is credited as the 
person who; 
‘…solidified the newly formed MPCC, obtained the charter, expanded 
the membership, made public the issue of the threat to the 
neighbourhood, and developed the strategy of presenting alternative 
plans to those of the developer’ (Kowaluk & Piche-Burton, 2012, p.34). 
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Other actors, such Dmitri Roussopoulos played a key role in ensuring that 
collective ownership model was not diluted, as one interviewee recounted; 
‘Dmitri really saved the day for that, when Dmitri wants to be very tough 
he can be, I'm not tough. I can persuade people but Dmitri said, 'no, no 
fucking way, we're not giving any private property to anybody that’s the 
end of it'. And so we just had to fight, and then he was giving 
orders…'no, you tell them no' (Susan, Milton Park resident). 
In Milton Park, as in the other collectives, when the proposal for collective 
ownership came under threat, there were specific individuals who were 
willing to actively resist that opposition. Each case study shows how specific 
individuals were willing to ‘tough it out’, to hold firm to the principles that were 
driving the projects, and to resist attempts to water-down or reject collective 
ownership.  
Behind the actions of these prominent individuals is the myriad of hidden, 
arguably more bureaucratic acts, undertaken by tens of other individuals in 
forming the co-ops and CMP. These acts were geared toward practical and 
technical organisational tasks, for instance; constituting co-ops, guiding 
refurbishment programmes, ensuring good governance, raising and 
managing finances, repairing and maintaining properties. Interviews with 
residents highlighted the importance of such acts in the process of 
developing the co-ops. Martin, who was heavily involved in the development 
of his co-op noted; 
‘…when we were developing the co-op, for example, Margaret…was 
spending 20 hours a week, while working full time, and I was doing the 
finances, and not being a book keeper by trade stumbling along, I was 
spending 15-20 hours a week also on that’ (Martin, Milton Park 
resident). 
Each co-op, and ultimately CMP, was born through the work of these 
individuals as they embarked on countless practical housing and governance 
related tasks, working alongside external supporters and professionals. For 
the commitment required for this to be sustained, activists needed a set of 
sufficiently powerful motives. Political and ideological views, a desire not to 
be displaced, and a perceived collective efficacy provided the drive for the 
critical actions which enabled the collectives to develop. 
 174 
 
Aside from the practical tasks of organisational development, individuals in 
Milton Park were engaged in another form of activity, what might be called 
processes of organisation. When data from all of the cases is compared and 
contrasted, there are clear sets of actions, undertaken by activists in each 
case, which fit a loose definition of ‘community organising’ (Smith, 2005). In 
Milton Park, the form of community organising undertaken was, using 
Rothman’s typology (1968), a mixture of ‘locality development’ and ‘social 
action’.  As residents began opposing redevelopment, there were clear signs 
of a social action approach by organisers, who sought active participation 
among residents, and used certain communicative forms to depict other 
organisations as symbolic 'enemies of the people' (Brager and Specht, 1973, 
p.26). Overlapping these efforts was a more typical locality development 
approach. Organisers worked with residents to build a representative base, 
and develop consensus around their interests and aspirations (Rothman, 
1968). 
Specific individuals stand out as key organisers in Milton Park. In reviewing 
the evidence relating to Milton Park one such organiser, Lucia Kowaluk (her 
real name), was seen as prominent. Excerpts from interviews reveal not only 
the nature of Kowaluk’s organising effort, but also some of her skills and 
influence; 
‘…Lucia went door to door, I mean literally, and convinced people who 
were sceptical that co-ops could be formed and this was practical and 
legitimate way to live your life in this area, and that it would mean 
people could stay’ (Margaret, Milton Park resident and CMP Board 
member). 
 
‘…if you don't have the core of people who are dedicated, like Lucia...it 
takes the work and then it takes…the temperament… you have to be 
aware that not everyone is going to agree with you…It takes a lot of 
energy to explain or try to convey or express your point of view, so it 
takes a lot of work and the capacity to make concessions’ (David, 
Milton Park resident). 
 
These excerpts reveal how Kowaluk fits the mould of the community 
organiser described by Rothman (1968) and others such as Alinsky (1971). 
They highlight the complex mix of practical skills, behavioural traits and 
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intellectual capacities which were applied in persuading others that 
collectivism was possible.  
Alongside Kowaluk others were prominent organisers, notably those active 
within residential blocks to promote and establish a co-op structure to take 
ownership of those blocks. Alan, a resident since the 1960s, recalled:  
‘…I would go up and down the stairs and I remember getting the doors 
slammed in my face…And other people were very curious like, I had to 
deal with people, I had a long attempt to try to persuade someone to 
accept the co-op formula’ (Alan, Milton Park resident). 
Not all community organising was aimed at enabling the development of 
collective ownership. As Cousineau (1980) notes, those in favour of private 
ownership, known as Maison St. Louis (MSL), were also trying to persuade 
and mobilise residents to oppose it. Such organising constituted a major 
constraint on development; 
‘Through organising and meetings, setting up contacts, drafting position 
papers and sending letters to neighbours, they built an effective 
coalition of residents who wanted to buy’ (Cousineau, 1980, p.144). 
Hence, individuals opposed to collective ownership were applying similar 
organising techniques as their opponents. This effort was undoubtedly 
effective, raising concerns in the Canadian Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation (CMHC), and mobilising enough effort to delay the progress of 
the collective model (Cousineau, 1980).  
Irrespective of the goal of each activist, it becomes clear that these 
organising skills were a relatively rare commodity. As Alan began organising 
his neighbours to form a co-op, the solitary nature of his effort, and the 
importance of his individual agency, comes into sharp focus; 
‘I was the only person that was kind of an activist, people who were 
there were not...they were students, elderly people, some people were 
not really aware, and I think this is a really important point in terms of 
the development of the Milton Park project as such…the hesitation 
came when some of the elderly people felt they were going to be asked 
to do manual labour’ (Alan, Milton Park resident). 
 
Alan reveals how existing residents had limited capacity to participate in the 
development of the collective, and harboured worries about their future 
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commitments and the investment of their time. The co-ops in Milton Park 
were made possible because key individuals such as Alan were able to 
persuade and reassure other residents that such commitments could be 
sustained. There is a certain irony, therefore, that the large scale collectivism 
which emerged in Milton Park was catalysed by individual agents. 
Understanding the importance of such individuals helps to explain a major 
source of constraint on collective development. Such were the demands on 
them as individuals that they risked becoming overburdened. As Susan 
recalled;   
‘There were some people that burned out…after all we had to write all 
this stuff from scratch’ (Susan, Milton Park resident). 
 
In chapter three it was noted how housing collectivism is often constrained 
by an over-reliance on volunteers (Heywood, 2016; Moore, 2015; Sungu-
Eryilmaz and Greenstein, 2007; Young Foundation, 2011). Susan is 
revealing how this happened in practice, with personal capacities being 
stretched to the limit.  
As in Milton Park, the individual action and competencies of residents and 
members was key to WECH’s development. Whilst one individual, Jonathan 
Rosenberg, is frequently referenced in interviews and documentary 
evidence, other individuals intervened at critical stages.  
Resistance to the redevelopment of Walterton and Elgin was promulgated by 
a number of strong characters. One interviewee described how a number of 
‘feisty ladies’ (Barbara, WECH resident) emerged as central characters, who 
would become the face of the campaign. Behind them Rosenberg and others 
were busy organising and structuring residents’ efforts. As Craig, a 
longstanding activist for WECH, recalled; 
‘…there were a couple of very vocal people, one of them was a woman 
called Irene Blackman, who was brilliant. She was the real deal, she 
was genuinely working class…she'd been involved in unions since the 
30s…she made great telly’ (Craig, WECH resident and Board member). 
The presence of defiant and vocal individuals, willing to confront the parties 
opposing the collective, was a critical factor in the development of WECH. 
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Individuals such as Irene Blackman (her real name) were to provide an 
authentic and persuasive voice for the collective, ensuring external bodies 
knew that residents would be a formidable force.  
As in Milton Park, interview data revealed sets of critical actions relating to 
organisational tasks in the development of WECH. Documents and 
interviews revealed a multitude of critical acts in securing registered status 
with the HCA, developing proposals to take ownership of the properties 
under the Tenants’ Choice legislation, and in planning and managing the 
technical work required to finance and undertake a large refurbishment 
programme. Whilst organisations like PCHA, and other external individuals 
supported the residents, they still had to undertake significant work to make it 
possible. This meant engaging deeply in technical legal, financial and 
operational matters relating to non-profit ownership and management of 
housing.  
Interviewees suggested that the reliance on a small number of skilled 
individuals created certain constraints. This was particularly acute when the 
proposal for transfer was made. Charles recalled how;  
‘…keeping all the facilities, organisations, and the people in place to 
help us, and the money and resources, and keeping that going. It was 
difficult looking back’ (Charles, WECH resident and Board member). 
 
As the organisation developed, the complexity of its functioning and 
operations became more pronounced. Francis recalled discussions about the 
organisation’s annual accounts;  
‘…they went through the financial audit, and it was like 'does anyone 
have any questions?' and everyone was like, looked at each other and 
never said anything…the majority of people in that room wouldn't make 
head nor tale of a balance sheet...I made a point of it when I first joined, 
when it came to finance…everyone is responsible. And there was a 
deafening silence most of the time’ (Francis, WECH resident). 
 
This is just one insight into the skills’ deficit as housing collectives can often 
be run by residents who are not housing or finance experts. This is a 
constraint on the collective’s development, leading to a reliance on 
professionals and advisors. 
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As WECH became operational, staff were employed to take on the bulk of 
responsibilities regarding housing management and the refurbishment 
programmes. Repeated references are made in the data about how Andy 
Watson, the Chief Executive, navigated the organisation through different 
challenges, maintaining rapport with residents. This excerpt from the 
interview with Dylan, attests to Watson’s influence; 
‘…they did succeed, and this is a credit to the staff, people like Andy 
and people who've been there for a long time, to manage the transfer 
from PCHA management to direct management...to achieve those 
things is pretty good, and to achieve them without tripping over’ (Dylan, 
WECH supporter).  
As in Milton Park, the commitment and persistence of key individuals 
emerges as a critical ingredient in the development and sustainment of the 
collective. As Barbara, a longstanding resident, asserted in her interview;  
‘If you have enough dedicated people, and honestly there's nobody 
more dedicated than Jonathan and Andy, and a number of other 
people, and I think that’s the reason why it works’ (Barbara, WECH 
resident). 
Watson’s influence is seen after the transfer, and the skills he demonstrated 
were markedly different to those required during the period of resistance to 
the redevelopment of the area, and in the building of a movement for 
collective ownership. This is a reassertion of qualitative changes in tasks and 
processes as collectives go through different phases.  
In the initial phase of WECH’s development, the skills and influence of a key 
community organiser, Jonathan Rosenberg, are clearly evident in the data. 
One can again differentiate this organising activity from the practical aspects 
of organisational tasks. As Rothman (1968) notes, an organiser seeks to 
build consensus among residents and build a representative base to push for 
change, whilst also organising for ‘social action’, building participation and 
creating symbolic enemies. These are processes of organisation. Rosenberg 
appears to have excelled in these forms of organising, as residents were 
mobilised into forms of direct action and protest; 
‘…at that time there was 1100 homes, it was massive…. we had a 
meeting on the street corner, literally all very impromptu stuff. Imagine 
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150 people assembling in the street, you know…told them 'oh my god, 
we're under threat, warning, warning, then hired three coaches and 200 
of us went down to the council, and it was mayhem’ (Charles, WECH 
resident and Board member). 
What becomes clear is that Rosenberg was orchestrating participation 
around short term events; public meetings, Housing Committee meetings, 
direct protests on private developer’s offices. Through participation in these 
activities, residents were buying-in to a movement, initially to resist 
redevelopment, but ultimately to collective ownership.  As residents’ 
participation matured, and they prevented WCC from attracting a private 
developer, so participants gained an increased sense of their capacities and 
efficacy. 
Rosenberg’s skills in community organising are neatly captured in WECH’s 
documentary video about its development (Thomas, 1987). In the video, 
during a protest at one of a developer’s offices, Rosenberg can be heard 
saying; 
‘…it’s no good going into the office right and having a static demo, we 
want to do what we did at the last one, which was send detachments of 
people running through the offices, and handing out leaflets, and that’s 
particularly appropriate for the younger people because there’s a lot of 
charging around and running round’ (Thomas, 1987). 
During these scenes Rosenberg is also observed committing those 
developers to future meetings, and to getting their agreement to withdraw 
from the tendering process if residents are not happy with their proposals. 
Perhaps there is a danger in overstating the significance of organisers such 
as Rosenberg. Nonetheless, asking counter-factual questions about WECH’s 
development in his absence, suggests he was pivotal, particularly in initial 
mobilisation, and in the organising of other activists.  
The development of Granby CLT reveals interesting similarities and 
disparities with the other two cases. Many of the patterns revealed above, 
relating to the actions of individuals, and the inherent constraints and 
enablements linked to this, are seen in the development of Granby CLT. 
However, differences in the organising effort which took place in Granby are 
significant, and these reveal something about the different routes groups can 
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take to collective ownership. 
Certain individuals played an important role in building initial momentum 
behind collective ownership, and securing funding for an initial assessment 
of feasibility. Interviewees noted how certain people were; 
‘…kind of the catalyst, he was involved with us for quite a while, and it 
was him actually that suggested the CLT would be quite a good model 
to look at’ (Shirley, Granby resident and CLT Board member). 
 
After this initial stimulus, other residents in the Four Streets visibly took the 
lead in developing the idea of collective ownership.  Helena, a Board 
member and external supporter, provides an insight into the impetus 
provided by certain residents, and one in particular; 
‘My goodness me, they’re driving it…they've all had their energy and 
have been passing batons on…she's learnt all those skills which is just 
fantastic. She probably knows more than me in terms of 
development...The passion from the residents has absolutely drove it to 
this point. I actually think the passion and determination of the residents 
will get it to its end’ (Helena, Granby CLT supporter and Board 
member). 
 
The quotation above reveals how a handful of activists have been at the 
centre of the development of Granby CLT. The language used by Helena 
also reveals something about the nature of their effort. Words such as 
‘energy’, ‘passion’ and ‘determination’, mirror much of the language used to 
describe activists in the other two cases. Furthermore, the reference to 
learning about ‘development’, which is taken to mean physical housing 
development, highlights the technical issues residents were trying to resolve, 
grappling with the legalities, financing, and construction and refurbishment of 
housing. Like in the other cases, these forms of agency can be delineated 
from the processes of community organising, as organisational tasks. 
Activists in Granby displayed an ability to persuade and build relations 
internally with other residents, and with different external agencies. Shirley 
highlighted how one of the residents had sought to build relations with 
external bodies; 
‘She’ll just ring someone up and say 'can we meet I want to tell you 
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about Granby'…individual actions over the last year or two…have led to 
real positive partnerships’ (Shirley, Granby resident and CLT Board 
member). 
As discussed in the next chapter, these relations would become a critical 
source of enablement.  
What is less clear, when judged in comparison with the other cases, is the 
extent to which activists were undertaking the typical community organising 
defined by Rothman (1968). Neither Milton Park nor Walterton and Elgin was 
ever depopulated to the extent of Granby. For those activists trying to resist 
redevelopment, and explore collective ownership, there were very few local 
residents in the Four Streets to organise.  
Like in Walterton and Elgin, residents in Granby had historically been 
involved in activities which might be classed as ‘locality development’ and 
‘social action’ (Rothman, 1968). Representative forums (such as the Granby 
Residents’ Association) were developed to influence the local authority, 
whilst some residents also engaged in more adversarial forms of action. It is 
noteworthy, however, that in the development of Milton Park and WECH, 
these historical acts were prominent in the narratives of interviewees. In 
Granby, this was less apparent, as interviewees focused on the short term 
tasks involved in forming and establishing the organisation.  
Any community organising effort was focused on increasing resident 
participation, so additional capacity could be generated to complete the 
many tasks associated with the governance and development of the CLT. 
Beatrice recalled how she had tried to;  
‘…break down all the different jobs in a more creative way, so they 
were accessible, but we haven't done that and that takes work as well.  
And kind of imagination as well’ (Beatrice, Granby resident and CLT 
Board member). 
 
These division of labour issues were critical for a group immersed in setting 
up formal Board processes, developing financial proposals and conducting 
negotiations with a range of partners. Beatrice’s interview contains significant 
references to concerns about the technicalities of organisational tasks, and 
the need to mobilise more internal capacity; 
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‘…because the work that’s required to sort of build organisations is 
fiddly, and time consuming…it’s quite small conversations and contacts 
what knits people together and enables them to have a role in it’ 
(Beatrice, Granby resident and CLT Board member). 
Perhaps the age of the CLT, at the time of study, has some influence on 
these different perceptions of ‘organising’. For those in Milton Park and 
WECH, having formed in the 1980s and 1990s respectively, sufficient time 
has elapsed to allow for a full historical account of their development to 
emerge. This enabled an almost nostalgic view of historic battles to surface. 
In Granby interviewees were, in real time, engaged in the formation of the 
CLT and this perhaps explains their focus on these more prosaic concerns 
about practical organisational tasks.  
Despite this, the crucial skills of a community organiser, to persuade and 
build relationships, were evidenced by the CLT’s key figures. Georgia, a 
supporter and Board member of the CLT, noted how certain residents had 
built relations with those on the periphery of the CLT to ensure they 
continued to support it; 
‘[she’s] been very critical in…doing stuff outside the meetings…to make 
sure they've stayed on-side’ (Georgia, Granby CLT supporter and 
Board member). 
References to this type of activity are rare in the Granby data, but they do 
hint at critical agency in terms of persuading and convincing other local 
residents about the value and possibility of collective ownership. 
More than the other two cases, the issue of resident participation was critical 
in Granby. With a small resident population to work with, building a critical 
mass of people to develop the CLT was going to be difficult. This quotation 
from Mark, a supporter of the CLT, shows this; 
‘…at the moment what we're saying is, there's only three or four of them 
that are residents of that area that are involved. I think they need to 
start recruiting more, more resident members, who've got that 
commitment and understanding and that will transform itself into good 
governance’ (Mark, Granby CLT supporter). 
 
Collectives such as these, which are engaged in highly complex and time 
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consuming activities, need willing and energetic activists. Without that, the 
burden falls on too few people, and this constrains the development of the 
collective. Reflecting on her own engagement in the CLT, Beatrice 
bemoaned their inadequacies in setting up the structures and groups to take 
some of the burden. This meant she was left ‘doing too much of the rest’ of 
the work (Beatrice, Granby resident and CLT Board member). Other 
members resisted deeper involvement as they were ‘just too tired’ (Georgia, 
Granby CLT supporter and Board member). All of this points to a critical 
source of constraint for the collective, which relates to the capacity and 
number of individuals involved. It might be suggested that when those 
individuals become over-burdened, the likelihood of a collective developing is 
greatly reduced. As individuals burn-out, this is likely to impact on people’s 
perception of the group’s efficacy. 
Further to the issues of time and capacity, are constraints related to the skills 
and knowledge of residents and members. In Granby evidence suggests 
that, whilst learning fast, individual activists knew very little about housing 
development. Reflecting on this fact, Mike, a representative from LCC noted;  
‘The CLT have come from a very low base, as in not really 
understanding the development process…When I first met them they 
were understandably a bit overawed’ (Mike, LCC representative). 
It is unsurprising that a group of residents, perhaps unfamiliar with the 
process of housing development, should struggle with its complexity. 
Nonetheless, the impact of this lack of knowledge was keenly felt. Avril, a 
long term supporter and advocate of the CLT noted; 
‘…they don't understand what’s required to get a development going, 
they're asking what are they bringing to the table...I think they [LCC] are 
still nervous about our capacity to deliver as well, and they do keep 
asking me about programme and timescale’ (Avril, Granby resident and 
Board member). 
 
Over time residents and external supporters have managed to negotiate the 
problems associated with this knowledge deficit. Nonetheless, this lack of 
skills and expertise was a clear constraint on the development the collective.  
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7.4. The synergised agency of individuals 
The section above emphasises the importance of individual agents being 
able to organise the efforts of their fellow residents and members, whilst also 
dealing with the practical tasks of developing an organisation to own and 
provide housing. The analysis so far, however, has not discussed a central 
characteristic of each collective’s development, which relates to the 
combined actions of agents and their effects. Each collective developed, in 
part, as a product of individuals acting in co-ordinated ways. This section 
therefore explores how actions, performed by a multitude of agents in a co-
ordinated way, or more aptly in synergy, can enable and constrain 
development. The term synergy is used purposefully as it denotes; 
‘…the interaction or co-operation of two or more organisations, 
substances, or other agents…[which] produce a combined effect 
greater than the sum of their separate effects’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 
2015). 
In each case there are examples of how the collective was enabled through 
such synergised effort. However, there are instances where a lack of co-
ordination between residents led to constraints, where co-ordination by 
opponents created constraints, and antithetically where the absence of co-
ordinated action by those opposing collectivism enabled its development.  
In the development of Milton Park, the way in which activists co-ordinated 
their messages and communications en masse, is one such example of 
synergised action. Susan, in her interview, noted how ‘…72 people from the 
citizens’ committee and the Settlement knocked on doors’ in an effort to 
persuade other residents to resist redevelopment (Susan, Milton Park 
resident). 
To affect a change in the beliefs of sufficient residents, large numbers of 
individuals needed to be mobilised to go ‘door-to-door’. This face-to-face 
persuasion was crucial in developing a shared psychology or set of beliefs, 
which would become the psychological platform on which collective 
ownership would be built. As Frank a manager of commercial property in 
Milton Park recalled, residents coalesced against redevelopment plans; 
 185 
 
‘…the residents, some owners but mostly tenants…said 'no way, what 
is this? This is not the type of city we want, we need to respect our 
tenants, we need to respect our architectural heritage, and this is not 
the way to go'’ (Frank, OSBL manager). 
A recursive process was in train. Activists delivered a coherent message on 
the door-step about the dangers of the redevelopment plans, and the 
prospect of collective ownership. This message led to the formation of 
certain beliefs about collective ownership, which would act as the basis of 
co-ordination between increasing numbers of residents. The activists had, 
through a co-ordinated message, created a kind of contagion. 
Further evidence of the causal impact of large scale co-ordinated action can 
be seen in an extract from the interview with Susan, who recounted a 
meeting organised by the City administration. Susan had undertaken 
significant community organising work to encourage residents to attend; 
‘Actually 250 people came from the community and I overheard these 
architects talking to each other saying 'where have all these people 
come from’…it was chaired by our city councillor who really got shit, 
one person after another got up…and said 'Michelle how can you let 
people do things like that, we don't want this'…it was incredible, and 
Michelle Prescott said ‘okay I promise you here in a public meeting we 
will not have any high rises on that piece of land?’’ (Susan, Milton Park 
resident). 
When groups of individuals co-ordinate their actions, it has amplified effects. 
Securing the above commitment from local politicians was achieved not only 
through having a large number of residents at the meeting. It was the co-
ordinated action of those individuals, delivering a consistent message based 
on a shared set of beliefs, which led to that commitment. 
The Milton Park case shows how public bodies find it difficult to ignore or 
oppose highly co-ordinated action by large groups of residents. It may be 
easy to ignore a multitude of individual, disconnected voices making a similar 
argument. However, it is seemingly more difficult for a public administration 
to ignore a coherent and consistent message which is presented as the 
views of many. During this phase of opposition, this type of synergised action 
was an important part of the resistance effort, but also central to building the 
internal relations required for collective ownership. 
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Such actions are closely tied to the development of certain organisational 
forms and functions. The case of Milton Park highlights the importance of the 
transition from organised protest to a formal organisation. When the CMP 
and co-operative ownership model was being devised, attempts were made 
to write into these structures the processes for co-ordinated action;  
 ‘…At this very early stage two major and important issues were 
discussed: what kind of structure would be created to govern the 
community… and what were the basic social values that would be 
applied in all the co-ops and other non-profits and how would they be 
guaranteed' (Kowaluk and Piché-Burton, 2012, p.16). 
The quotation above reveals the links between the structures being adopted 
and the underlying ideological components which formed the basis for co-
ordinated action. Co-ordination requires some shared psychology or beliefs, 
and it is interesting that activists sought to ‘hardwire’ these into the 
constitutions of the organisations being developed. Margaret, who was 
heavily involved in the development of CMP, noted;  
‘…those of us that were let’s say militant, at the co-op level, then 
became involved in drawing up clauses of the declaration. So the work 
was divided up by committee, so for instance I would go to a committee 
on the selection section of the declaration, and there were people from 
all over the community, from across the co-ops, OSBLs, they all met 
together’ (Margaret, Milton Park resident and CMP Board member). 
 
This involvement of residents in developing the declaration not only 
mobilised the physical capacity of residents, it also served to spread and 
embed many of the shared beliefs critical to co-ordinated action. 
Even after the initiation of CMP and the co-ops, processes emerged for the 
continued mobilisation of residents, and embedding of specific beliefs. As 
Arabelle, a longstanding member of her co-op noted; 
‘But it’s an ongoing thing, because new members come along, or 
somebody for some reason starts to go this way and the others going 
that way…in our group we've had two or three full day reflection 
meetings in the last 20 years…we usually come out of those with 
something new, we look at our byelaws, we change stuff, we talk, we 
try’ (Arabelle, Milton Park resident). 
Such organisational structures and processes do not always deliver the 
required co-ordination between members and residents. Susan highlighted 
 187 
 
how they have not achieved the desired state of cooperation, and that 
decision-making processes are sometimes far from ideal; 
‘…there are fights within co-ops, there's the odd fight between co-ops, 
which is less frequent, and there are co-ops that don't know how to 
function democratically…there are people that are not terribly co-
operative’ (Susan, Milton Park resident). 
Each co-op has tried to co-ordinate the actions of its members, using 
‘democratic’ processes to make decisions and agree actions. These are the 
processes which give rise to co-ordinated action. However, they are fallible 
and variable across the co-ops, so constraints lie in the failure of residents to 
find wholly effective ways to incentivise co-ordination.  
Furthermore, co-ordination in Milton Park has been hampered by the 
turnover of residents and members, and the need to refresh the ‘stock’ of 
activists. Overcoming this constraint, residents have sought a new focus of 
activity, or subject to coalesce around;   
‘But you see each time, I think what happened, each time a group got 
discouraged and couldn't see what to do next, another group would 
come along and say 'let’s do this, let’s do it this way' (Martin, Milton 
Park resident). 
In the lengthy process of fighting redevelopment and forming new models of 
ownership, this ability to find new members willing to co-ordinate their action 
was imperative. In the current phase interviewees bemoaned the same issue 
of turnover. As Alan, a founding member of his co-op lamented; 
‘…the vast majority are people who come into the project and are very 
good members while they're here, some of them are not…the vast 
majority would consider it some kind of failure on their part if they were 
still living there five years later. Because they tend to come in while 
they're just starting out’ (Alan, Milton Park resident). 
 
This marks out a different set of psychologies between founders and die-
hard collectivists, and those new entrants who are perhaps more distanced 
from historic struggles and its original values. The ability to co-ordinate 
action, in part, depends on some shared psychology between differing 
groups. This is potentially undermined by a high turnover in residents and 
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members, and the loss of longstanding leaders and advocates who can 
preserve the mechanisms for co-ordination.  
As in Milton Park, the development of WECH should be understood in 
reference to the co-ordinated action of multiple residents and members. Prior 
to the formation of WECH, campaigns by residents hampered WCC’s 
attempts to contract a private developer. Residents used direct action to 
persuade developers to pull out of a proposed barter deal. Reflecting on this 
effort by residents, one of the developers recalled how; 
‘…the Walterton and Elgin Action Group turned up at our offices. We 
were taken aback to suddenly find 25 or 30 people - guitars, film 
cameras and all. Having been sung to by this amicable group it was 
resolved that a meeting would be held’ (Lee Goldstone is Managing 
Director of Regalian Properties PLC, in WECH, 2006[1998], p.14). 
 
This form of direct action required a degree of co-ordination between those 
activists whom, with some shared set of beliefs and aspirations, were able to 
undertake different roles in that protest. In her interview, Edith revealed how 
a mass of mobilised and vocal residents were able to exert influence on 
developers, who were keen to protect their public image; 
‘So no we just fought on and on and got bigger and bigger, because 
Westminster's idea was that they had to get four housing people 
{Interviewer: Developers?} Yeah, and every time we'd find out where 
one of them was, the coach load would go down there and say do you 
think, do you realise you're taking our homes, and they didn't want all 
that agro so they pulled out’ (Edith, WECH resident). 
 
The history of the development of WECH includes numerous instances 
when, acting synergistically, residents were able to exert influence on 
external bodies. Notable examples include WCC Housing Committee 
meetings, where large numbers of residents attended to protest against 
planned redevelopment (Hosken, 2006; Dimoldenberg, 2006). As noted 
above, local government bodies are susceptible to influence by groups of 
individuals who co-ordinate their actions, framing their arguments in a 
coherent and consistent way. Their susceptibility is, in part, explained by 
their democratic processes and mechanisms for ensuring accountability to 
the public, though in Westminster the dominance of one political party 
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constrained the use of these mechanisms, even by highly organised groups 
of residents. 
Whilst some residents co-ordinated their efforts in attending Housing 
Committee meetings, interviews with those active in the development of 
WECH reveal how sub-groups of residents embarked on different forms of 
protest. As two interviewees noted, the short-life housing tenants explored 
other forms of demonstration, installing roof top banners and hijacking WCC 
photo opportunities; 
‘…short-lifers were an important component in the campaign. I don't 
think they went out and mobilised people particularly…’ (Dylan, WECH 
supporter). 
 
‘There's that photo of them on the roof, I think it was called ‘shout’, they 
were coming from a completely different angle’ (Francis, WECH 
resident). 
These forms of visible protest and campaigning synergised with other direct 
action and powerful public communications to exert a powerful influence on 
WCC. 
The capacity of WECH residents to exert external influence was, in part, 
reliant on a foundation of shared beliefs and objectives. This made co-
ordination possible. The processes employed to do this were strikingly 
similar to those used in Milton Park. This excerpt from an interview with 
Barbara, a longstanding WECH resident, reveals the critical role of ‘door-
knocking’ to persuade unconvinced residents; 
‘…we (me and my friends) were just foot soldiers more than anything 
else, and we knocked on doors and explained what it was we wanted to 
do to take it over if possible, and to have fair rents etc, and to put the 
interests of the tenants before anything else, and that did the trick 
because we got something in the region of 83% of the vote’ (Barbara, 
WECH resident). 
 
This powerfully demonstrates how a number of activists, the ‘foot-soldiers’, 
co-ordinated their actions to convert and enlist other residents. Rather than 
formalised, hierarchical systems of communication, messages were 
disseminated in a more viral fashion. As George, a key supporter of the 
residents recalled; 
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‘People felt part of something because they all knew what was going 
on, rather than a group of leaders having the information and 
selectively sharing it’ (George, WECH supporter). 
Despite such informality, a transition was required to move from co-ordinated 
protest to co-ordinated action in running a housing collective. Charles 
provided an insight into this transition; 
‘…what we had to do was set up an organisation…join people up to it, 
have a proper membership, proper committee, sort of formalise. We 
had to move from the action group thing…for us it was we've got to 
save the estates, this is how we do it now’ (Charles, WECH resident 
and Board member). 
 
As WECH developed, key processes were devised to ensure that different 
forms of action by residents could be co-ordinated. In addition to Board level 
processes, WECH’s annual general meeting became a key process for 
embedding certain beliefs and reasserting notions of collective action; 
‘They [AGMs] have always been massively well attended and it’s a 
point of principle for the organisation to try to get a very large 
percentage of the membership’ (Dylan, WECH supporter). 
 
Observations undertaken in this research, including attendance at a WECH 
AGM, attests to this high level of involvement by residents, and how it is 
used to solidify the collective ideals on which WECH is based.  
However, these processes are fallible, and residents often act in 
uncoordinated ways. There are examples in the history of WECH where 
residents’ and members’ failure to co-ordinate their actions has led to 
detrimental outcomes. Francis, a current WECH resident, recalled how an 
opportunity to transfer more properties from WCC to WECH was lost; 
‘I think they had a vote on it, but it wasn't organised as well as it 
should've been, a very low number of people voted. Anyway, that 
opportunity, rather than getting a resounding yes, if there'd been a real 
push the council would've been presented with 'out of 100 tenants 80 
have said they would like to be housed by WECH', it was something 
like 20 out of 100 voted. So it wasn't managed that well’ (Francis, 
WECH tenant). 
 
As in Milton Park there is a sense that co-ordinated action is frequently 
jeopardised by either apathy or self-interest among residents and members 
which constrains the development of the collective. The processes to foster 
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co-ordination are far from perfect. 
At the heart of the development of Granby are sets of co-ordinated actions 
by residents and their supporters. A notable difference to Milton Park and 
Walterton and Elgin is the scale of involvement of residents. As noted above, 
the depopulation of the area means that there are few residents there to be 
able to co-ordinate their actions. Despite this, residents have had to work 
closely together, to persuade those who do remain, and those external 
bodies that need to be convinced of the CLT’s credibility.  
The roots of this co-ordination are found in the shared views and aspirations 
of the key activists developing the CLT. Shirley had lived in the area a long 
time, but was not particularly close to other activists who originally proposed 
the CLT. Shirley recounted how she became involved, and the basis for co-
ordinating her actions with others; 
‘…as soon as Patricia met Francine and myself, and got into what it 
was that we were doing, there was a real sort of meeting of minds’ 
(Shirley, Granby resident and CLT Board member). 
The ‘meeting of minds’ suggests how co-ordinated action had its roots in 
shared beliefs, which enable those agents to act in synergistic ways. This 
was to be imperative, as the speed at which the CLT had to be formed 
required high levels of co-ordinated action; 
‘And there was quite a quick turnaround, you know it’s not as if we were 
poised for action, we went from being completely dormant in December 
to Jan/Feb thinking 'arrggh', having nothing apart from the articles and 
memorandums’ (Beatrice, Granby resident and CLT Board member) 
This ‘meeting of minds’ might explain how a handful of activists managed to 
co-ordinate their early actions, but what of those more sporadically or loosely 
involved? What becomes clear in the Granby case is that pre-existing 
opportunities for activism, in the form of street markets and guerrilla 
gardening, provided a platform for co-ordinating the development of the CLT. 
As the following two quotations suggest, these street-based activities 
provided a route for direct collective action, a chance to hone co-ordination, 
and engage new people in discussions about the area and the CLT; 
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‘It’s how can you have people involved in doing stuff which is, erm, 
invigorating, as opposed to the opposite, and so the planting group is 
invigorating because it’s, you have a sense of empowerment from doing 
it, there something anarchic about it really. The market is a doing thing, 
it’s trying to get a mix of activities, so it’s not a dead end kind of chore’ 
(Beatrice, Granby resident and CLT Board member). 
‘….you get lots of people involved that wouldn't necessarily be involved 
cos we sell loads of second hand stuff and we get people who've got no 
money coming to talk to us. We're getting the Muslim women who wear 
the full burkha…They'd never be allowed to come to a meeting, but 
they can come to a market to look for kids’ clothes’ (Catherine, Granby 
resident and CLT Board member). 
Interviews suggest that this pre-existing community level activity has created 
the internal relations for the development of the CLT; they have embedded 
shared ideas and practices which are the platform for co-ordinating actions to 
develop the CLT. 
As in the other case studies, the CLT’s legal form and governance structure 
provides a means for this co-ordination. The CLT provides a formal 
embodiment of the shared aspirations of residents and members; their desire 
to see housing protected from demolition, refurbished and reused. The CLT 
has become a conduit for co-ordinating action towards these ends. 
Despite this, the form and function of the organisation can hinder the speed 
at which action can be agreed and organised. Helena, a key supporter of the 
CLT, reflected on this link between the legal form adopted and the required 
speed of action; 
‘…the CLT model is fine but it’s the reality of nothing happening for 
ages and suddenly everything has got to happen really quickly’ 
(Helena, Granby CLT supporter and Board member). 
 
This is a salutary lesson in how organisational forms are not a panacea for 
better co-ordinated action by residents and members. What the development 
of the three collectives reveals is that co-ordinated action is a function of 
shared beliefs and psychologies, requiring organisation and effort by key 
activists, which may or may not be enabled by the organisational form 
adopted. 
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7.5. Internal constraint and enablement: A mechanistic picture 
The chapter has revealed how the beliefs of individual residents, members or 
staff, have shaped their actions, which in turn enabled or constrained the 
development of the collectives. It has been shown how these beliefs are 
formed through ideological and political persuasions, cultural norms, 
historical struggles and interpretations of place.  
Throughout the chapter a distinction has been made between the practical 
organisational tasks involved in the development of housing collectives, and 
the process of organising residents, members and supporters in pursuit of 
collectivism. The cases reveal how individuals have undertaken complex 
tasks including; constituting and running non-profit organisations; planning 
housing-related finances and raising funds; and, managing the physical 
redevelopment of housing and subsequent provision. However, the same or 
other individuals also engaged in a different form of action. This was geared 
toward organising people and resources, mobilising them against a common 
adversary, and building a representative base of residents around shared 
interests and aspirations (Rothman, 1968). Crucially, this process of 
organisation enabled individuals to co-ordinate their actions, formerly in 
opposition to local authorities and private companies, and latterly in the 
development of a housing collective. 
Numerous lengthy documents have sought to set out and guide activists in 
the myriad of organisational tasks outlined above, asserting their significance 
in constraining and enabling collectivism (for example, CFS, 2008; CLT 
Network, 2012; Radical Routes, 2004). However, only a limited literature 
discusses the processes of community organising in enabling and 
constraining housing collectivism (Bunce, 2016; Thompson, 2015b), and 
hence the insights provided here address an important gap. Counterfactual 
questions assert the importance of this process and the agents guiding them. 
It is hard to envisage the collectives coming to fruition without the central 
organisers, particularly in WECH and Milton Park. This poses searching 
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questions for the viability of collectivism in areas where these traits and skills 
are lacking.  
Focusing on such community organising, mechanistic models can be used to 
understand how this process operates, particularly in the phases of 
opposition and enactment. Merton’s notion of a self-fulling prophecy (Merton, 
1968), is instructive in simplifying the processes of community organising, 
persuasion and participation. Merton noted how, in certain scenarios, ‘public 
definitions of a situation (prophecies or predictions) become an integral part 
of the situation and thus affect subsequent developments’ (Merton, 1968, 
p.195). The exemplar of this situation used by Merton was a ‘run on the 
bank’, which Hedstrom and Ylikoski (2010) describe in mechanistic terms to 
link beliefs and actions; 
‘Once a rumour of insolvency gets started, some depositors are likely to 
withdraw their savings, acting on the principle that it is better to be safe 
than sorry. Their withdrawals strengthen the beliefs of others that the 
bank is in financial difficulties, partly because the withdrawals may 
actually hurt the financial standing of the bank, but more importantly 
because the act of withdrawal in itself signals to others that something 
might be wrong with the bank. This produces even more withdrawals, 
which further strengthens the belief, and so on’ (Hedstrom and Ylikoski, 
2010, p.62). 
The beliefs (B) of a group of people, group X, drive them to perform certain 
actions (A). These actions influence the beliefs of others, group Y, who then 
act in similar ways to group X. The actions of group Y only serve to validate 
the beliefs of group X, and further ‘publicise’ the beliefs adopted. The 
following diagram depicts this, with ‘B’ an abbreviation for beliefs, and ‘A’ for 
action;  
Figure 20:Merton's self-fulfilling prophecy 
 
Source: Adapted from Hedström and Udehn (2009) 
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This type of ‘self-reinforcing and belief-centered cycle’ (Hedström & Ylikoski, 
2010, p.62) can be used, with some refinement, to explain internal processes 
enabling and potentially constraining the collectives’ development. To do 
this, what is required is a differentiation of agents' roles in these scenarios, 
and ways to account for non-compliance and free-thinking among 
individuals. This chapter reveals some subtle differences between; 
community organisers, who led and orchestrated the participation of others; 
activists, who proactively participated in efforts to convince and mobilise 
others; and, a wider resident group that fitted neither of these descriptions. 
In each collective, but particularly in Milton Park and WECH, key individuals 
were driven to undertake organising roles, building a base of activists willing 
to participate in oppositional efforts, and later in the enactment and 
sustainment of the collective. This agency was underpinned by certain 
beliefs about the future of their area, their housing, and wider political and 
ideological views. In each case both organisers and activists invested 
significant time trying to persuade other residents of their beliefs, specifically 
beliefs in the value and possibility of collective ownership. When these efforts 
were successful, those persuaded would sometimes become more active. As 
this chain unfolded, increased participation by more residents acted as a 
feedback loop, validating the beliefs held by the organisers and activists. 
This belief/action cycle may explain the popularisation of collectivist ideas in 
the case study areas. 
The development of WECH can be used to explore this model in practice. On 
the basis of shared beliefs about WCC’s redevelopment plans, key 
organisers, in conjunction with other activists, engaged in acts of protest, 
persuasion and consensus-building around collective ownership. This served 
to shift the beliefs of other residents, including those who originally held the 
view of ‘better the devil you know’ (Dylan, WECH supporter). As a result, 
more residents became active in the various elements of the movement, and 
this in turn strengthened the beliefs of organisers and activists. One quote 
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from Barbara, who during the development of WECH tried to persuade her 
neighbours that collectivism was desirable, succinctly explained this process; 
‘…we (me and my friends) were just foot soldiers more than anything 
else, and we knocked on doors and explained what it was we wanted to 
do to take it over…and to put the interests of the tenants before 
anything else, and that did the trick because we got something in the 
region of 83 per cent of the vote’ (Barbara, WECH resident). 
The beliefs and actions of activists like Barbara became an ‘integral part of 
the situation and thus affect[ed] subsequent developments’ (Merton, 1968, 
p.195). As those opposed to WCC’s plans ‘fought on and on and got bigger 
and bigger’ (Edith, WECH resident), so did the perceived efficacy of 
organisers and activists. Bandura notes the critical function these 
perceptions play in shaping agents’ actions; 
‘Perceived collective efficacy will influence what people choose to do as 
a group, how much effort they put into it, and their staying power when 
group efforts fail to produce results’ (Bandura, 1982, p.143). 
As the perceived efficacy of the collective was renewed (by both increasing 
resident support and external factors), it served to validate the beliefs in 
resistance and collective ownership. Hence, Bandura’s work helps unpick 
some of the psychological subtleties of a self-fulfilling process. 
Whilst instructive, this type of simplified belief/action cycle does not account 
for important nuances of what happened in the cases studied. Firstly, it does 
not account for the beliefs and actions of those opposing collectivism. In 
Milton Park, members of the Maison St Louis group undertook various 
activities to oppose collective ownership, prefaced on certain beliefs about 
private ownership. Parallels can be drawn with the Walterton Residents 
Against Takeover group. It is therefore important to insert into the model, at 
certain points, what might be called circuit-breakers, which explain how a 
self-fulfilling prophecy can be interrupted or at least mitigated by other 
actions. Figure 21 reworks the Merton model with these circuit breakers 
included. 
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Figure 21: Self-fulfilling prophecy model of collectivism with circuit breakers 
 
What is being posited here is a mechanistic model which explains how the 
beliefs of those advocating collectivism translated into actions which, when 
skilfully applied and when other contingencies allowed, shaped the beliefs 
and actions of other residents toward collectivism. At each transition from 
beliefs to actions, finite cognitive and material resources were being 
mobilised, and this affected the range of actions which could be performed. 
For instance, without the skills of verbal persuasion, or material resources to 
print posters and disseminate leaflets, the action of those converting others 
to collectivism may have been diminished.   
As with any model, the subtleties of individual cases may be obscured, but 
the model does explain the momentum for collectivism which grew in each of 
the cases studied. What it does not sufficiently account for are the 
differences between the belief-action cycles taking place at different stages 
of development; the focus above has largely been on the phases of 
opposition and enactment.  
The model, as it stands, is also silent on the range of constraints and 
enablements which arose from interactions with bodies external. It is to this 
subject the thesis now turns.   
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Chapter Eight: External constraints and 
enablements 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the constraints and enablements that emerged from 
each collective’s relations with external bodies, defined as any individual or 
organisation that was not a resident, member or employee of the collective. 
The focus is directed to the powers, liabilities and actions of those entities, 
which created part of the contingent conditions in which collectives 
developed.   
Exploring these issues, the chapter proceeds as follows. In the following 
section a general typology of external bodies is offered from across the three 
case study collectives. This typology is then used to explore the causal role 
of each of these types of entity, presenting empirical evidence from each 
case. The chapter concludes by synthesising the learning, presenting a 
mechanistic description of the causal processes arising from relations and 
interaction with external bodies.  
8.2. A typology of external bodies  
When one appreciates that the cases studied developed through different 
historical periods, in different local contexts and within divergent political and 
policy frameworks, the similarities in their external relations are striking. It is 
suggested that the same types of bodies were important in the development 
of each case.  
Through the data analysis process a typology of external bodies has been 
created, presented graphically in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22: Types of external bodies constraining and enabling development 
 
Whilst encompassing most of the external bodies interacting with the 
collectives, this is not a wholly comprehensive picture. As noted in the last 
chapter, such is the extended period of their development, and complex 
chronologies, that such universality is difficult to achieve. In the cases one 
might also highlight interactions with state-sponsored regulators, other 
housing providers, national charities, and universities. For brevity, however, 
the focus has fallen on those relations and interactions that the data 
suggested had been most influential in the collectives’ development. 
Relations between the collectives and external bodies were highly fluid; fluid 
over time, in the sense that external bodies emerged and receded, and their 
influence ebbed and flowed over time; and fluid in type, with the same 
external bodies classifiable in two or more of the types defined above. For 
example, a local authority may be a government body, but can also act as an 
advisor and a funder.  
The 
collective 
Property 
developers  
Financers / 
funders 
Advisors / 
supporters 
Governmental 
bodies 
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The typology, whilst a useful organising device, says little about how and 
why these bodies affected the development of the collectives. Given that the 
current literature lacks sufficient attention to these causal questions, the 
remainder of this chapter attempts to explore this in the concrete world of the 
cases themselves.  
In unpicking the role of different external bodies, it has been helpful to think 
about their constituent parts. In addition to people, such bodies are also 
comprised of resources, which might be defined generally as; 
‘…anything from material resources – jobs, income, savings, and the 
right to material goods and services – to nonmaterial resources – 
authority, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skills, habits of industry, 
and so on’ (Oberschall, 1973, p.28).  
The term ‘resources’ is a helpful catch-all concept that summarises all of the 
things an organisation can mobilise in its relations with others, and this broad 
definition is used here. 
8.3. External bodies: actions and interactions 
Using this set of concepts and definitions it is possible to unpick some of the 
interactions between the collectives and the types of external bodies outlined 
above, revealing some of the causal processes at work in the cases. In the 
following sub-section each type of body is explored in turn. 
Government bodies 
Across the cases studied, governmental bodies (central, provincial and local) 
have played a pronounced causal role in the development of the collectives. 
In particular, each collective’s relations with their local authorities have 
shaped their actions, and in all the cases, they have acted as a source of 
both constraint and enablement. Local authorities applied their powers, 
notably in relation to physical planning and procurement, in a way that was 
initially opposed by collective members. Each collective was enacted and 
constituted in a context where the local authority, at least initially, supported 
large-scale redevelopment by private developers. And yet, in each case 
 201 
 
those local authorities eventually contributed various resources to make the 
collectives’ schemes viable. 
Despite these clear similarities between the cases, the relations between 
each collective and their local authority was qualitatively different. Exploring 
these differences reveals the nuances of how such bodies apply their 
powers, and suffer certain liabilities, to constrain and enable collectivism.  
In the early stages of the development of Granby CLT, it is clear that 
relations with the local authority were still framed by historic regeneration 
initiatives. Liverpool City Council (LCC), in conjunction with the Housing 
Market Renewal (HMR) Pathfinder for Merseyside, had developed plans for 
the regeneration of Granby which entailed the demolition of a number of 
existing properties. As discussed in chapter six, the HMR initiative was 
created by the UK government and encouraged certain forms of intervention 
through the provision of new resources, such as funding and additional 
planning powers (DCLG, 2009). It was the potential use of these resources, 
to pursue demolition of housing in Granby, that had shaped relations with 
local residents. Reflecting on the focus of these interventions in the late 
2000s, Shirley, a long-time Granby resident noted; 
'…they were getting fixed on that one solution [demolition]…And then 
the whole environment changed, suddenly they were looking at what 
they could do, 'we'd like to renovate but we can't afford it' that kind of 
thing' (Shirley, Granby resident and CLT Board member). 
As the funding attached to HMR was removed in 2010 as the programme 
ended, along with central government support for interventions like 
demolition, LCC lost certain powers and resources. This represents a liability 
of local authorities; their financial capabilities and mandate for specific forms 
of action are partially dictated by central government. This loss of resources 
was slow to filter into alternative plans for Granby. As Georgia, a CLT Board 
member, noted in her interview; 
‘I think the local authority is still hanging on to power, as if they are the 
regeneration agent… This bizarre schizophrenia that’s going on in 
terms of the power and resource they used to have and have no more’ 
(Georgia, Granby CLT supporter and Board member). 
 202 
 
Critical to the development of Granby CLT was the vacuum created by the 
end of the HMR Initiative. LCC’s loss of powers and resources allowed new 
relations and roles to be negotiated between themselves and the CLT. 
Space was created to explore alternative options for redevelopment, 
particularly those that did not rely on private developers. In the social 
movement literature these might be seen political opportunities (McAdam, 
1982; Tarrow, 1998). One can understand these as changes in relations 
which reduce ‘power discrepancies between authorities and challengers and 
increase the cost of repressing protest’ (Snow et al, 2004, p.62). 
LCC contracted a developer called Leader 1 to undertake large scale 
refurbishment of housing in the area, to both its own properties and owner 
occupied housing. LCC used its procurement powers and assets to make 
this possible. This contract came at a time when the CLT was starting to 
formulate an alternative to this type of large-scale intervention, and hence 
acted as a major constraint on the collective’s development. As Shirley 
noted; 
‘…it suddenly took the wind out of our sails, because if the properties 
were going to someone else, then our focus became on what we would 
want any developer to do’ (Shirley, Granby resident and CLT Board 
member). 
The continued focus on large-scale solutions, by contracting a large 
developer, closed down opportunities for the CLT. As Avril, a CLT board 
member noted; 
‘…when the Leader 1 thing was being processed you would speak to 
Council officers and say 'I'm not sure about this wholesale development 
approach, you're putting all your eggs in one basket' and they would 
say that’s just lower risk for us’ (Avril, Granby resident and Board 
member). 
This type of large-scale intervention, following specified procurement rules, 
was seen by LCC staff as mitigating the risks of any redevelopment process. 
When the Leader 1 contract collapsed, and rendered this perception invalid, 
it created space for alternative solutions. Enablement flowed from the failure 
to implement this type of procurement and intervention. The loss of 
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resources from HMR, combined with the failure of such procurement efforts, 
created the opportunity structure. In addition to this, the UK national 
government was at this time creating certain incentives for localised civic 
action on housing (HM Government, 2012; My Community, 2016a: 2016b), 
framed within broader rhetoric related to localism (Jacobs and Manzi, 2013). 
National politics and localised events were aligning to enable the 
development of a housing collective. 
Any opportunities, however, still emerged in a context where there were 
historic grievances. Even after the Leader 1 contract was withdrawn, 
relations between the CLT and LCC were clearly fragile, as Catherine a 
Granby resident and CLT Board member revealed in her interview; 
‘…and it continues where we are patronised and side-lined and the 
council are making ever bigger noises about how they want to work with 
the community and support and help us…they do not want to enable us 
to do anything that gives us any sort of power or control’ (Catherine, 
Granby resident and CLT Board member). 
Interviewees highlighted a residual paternalism in LCC’s approach, as they 
attempted to marginalise the role of the CLT. Georgia, who is not a resident 
of the area, but a Board member and supporter of the CLT, noted; 
‘…at the moment the CLT remain really marginalised in the sense 
that…well you can have that bit, and you can have that bit, 'we’ll give 
them 10 houses and that will shut them up'. Well they don't want 10 
houses, they want a community’ (Georgia, Granby CLT supporter and 
Board member). 
Interviewees noted how the approach of LCC was based on the sentiment of 
'you tell us your problems and your needs and we'll then find a solution' 
(Georgia, Granby CLT supporter and Board member). Through interviews 
with LCC staff, this view of marginalisation and paternalism appeared to 
have some validity, although there were signs that LCC valued the role the 
CLT played. When asked what LCC would have done if the CLT had not 
approached them regarding the empty properties, Mike, an LCC officer 
suggested;  
‘…well all we would've done is, instead of the CLT bringing back and 
occupying those 10 units, it would've just been improved for affordable 
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rent…But that’s not denigrating their role…because they have been 
good, they've been a good force for us, you know as with when you 
deal with any community, there's always issues…you just have to get 
on and do it’ (Mike, LCC representative). 
Whilst LCC’s perceptions of the CLT created certain constraints, it is also 
evident that LCC used their powers in critically enabling ways. Given the 
refurbishment costs that the CLT had to bear, it was important that LCC 
transferred the eventual properties at nil cost. Reviewing LCCs actions over 
the course of the case study period reveals their transition from rejection of 
collective ownership, to one where they were proactively supporting the CLT, 
for example, by reassuring funders and advising the CLT Board. As Avril 
noted; 
‘…so the fact that they've got the Nationwide [Foundation] money, that 
was only possible after the Council was clear they were looking at a 
different strategy that would involve several partners’ (Avril, Granby 
resident and Board member). 
By attending the Board in an advisory capacity, LCC representatives 
provided technical assistance regarding physical development and 
refurbishment programmes. Working closely with LCC representatives has 
presented the CLT with other opportunities in shaping the development 
activity taking place in the wider area. During one observation of the CLT 
Board, the group began exploring with LCC representatives their involvement 
in the procurement of developers for neighbouring sites. This marked a clear 
change in relations over time and may have been shaped by one local LCC 
councillor. As Beatrice, a founder member of the CLT recalled, the councillor 
with the portfolio for housing had acted as an important enabler; 
‘…we got political backing, the CLT did, from Anne O'Byrne, who has 
got cabinet responsibility for housing…she is supposed to have told her 
officers to give the CLT all the support it needs’ (Beatrice, Granby 
resident and CLT Board member). 
Changing relations then, whilst shaped by national and local events, can also 
be understood through critical points of individual agency.  
Similar renegotiation of once fraught relations took place between WCC and 
WECH. Hostile relations between WCC and residents of the Walterton and 
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Elgin estates were triggered by the proposed redevelopment of the area. As 
Hosken recounts; 
‘Around 850 Victorian slums on Walterton would be handed over to a 
developer called Bellway who would rehouse the existing council 
tenants, demolish the houses and build 1800 new flats’ (Hosken, 1997, 
p.113). 
WCC used its planning powers and its asset base to propose a certain form 
of redevelopment that would have resulted in some demolition and 
displacement of residents. These proposals sparked protest among a large 
number of residents, as described in chapter six, and marked a decline in 
residents’ relations with WCC. An independent enquiry would later suggest 
that WCC had declared ‘war’ against those residents (Hosken, 1997, p.246). 
It was also suggested that ‘bogus’ groups were established by WCC to 
counter WECH’s project along with a series of other ‘dirty tricks’ (HM 
Government, 1995). As Charles, a longstanding advocate for WECH recalls; 
‘…we had a libel problem and nastiness, and dirty tricks…you know 
that was all par for the course…when you've got the full might of the 
richest Council in the country onto you…it got very, extremely polarised’ 
(Charles, WECH resident and Board member). 
Such evidence highlights some of the ways in which WCC used its powers to 
constrain the development of WECH.  
The UK government’s Tenants’ Choice legislation (HM Government, 1988), 
provided an unforeseen source of enablement for collectivism. This 
legislation was introduced by a Conservative national government targeting 
the privatisation of local authority owned housing (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992). 
Ironically, this legislation would subvert the efforts of the Conservative 
administration of WCC, enabling WECH to force the transfer of properties. 
This highlights the importance of political opportunity, and how national 
government activity can shape local relations. It also, however, reasserts the 
importance of some the internal processes outlined in the last chapter, as 
such opportunities could only be realised if residents and members were 
able to respond in co-ordinated ways.  
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The fractious relations that ensued between WCC and WECH activists led 
the former to use their various powers to block WECH’s attempts to use the 
Tenants’ Choice legislation. As noted in chapter six, WCC attempted to block 
WECH’s registration with the Housing Corporation, a key step before 
Tenants’ Choice could be pursued. Minutes from Council meetings at the 
time show how WCC officers and the local Member of Parliament decided to 
write to ‘the Housing Corporation...[with] complaints about Paddington 
Churches Housing Association [PCHA]' (Hosken, 1997, p.253-4). PCHA 
were a key advisor and supporter in the development of WECH, and helped 
prepare their Tenants’ Choice application.  
The crucial causal role played by the introduction of the Tenants’ Choice 
legislation, overseen and regulated by the Housing Corporation, highlights 
the agency of government bodies beyond WCC. Such organisations, being 
comprised of people with varying beliefs and acting with varying levels of 
autonomy, can create a complex picture of constraint and enablement. The 
following quotations from two individuals involved in the development of 
WECH, reveal differing levels of support for the WECH plan within the 
Housing Corporation; 
‘…there were other people in the Corporation who saw this as an 
upstart group of tenants who were going against the wishes of the 
government and the wishes of the local authority, erm, so there wasn't 
universal support, and I think some of the people trying to block access 
to grant, there were people who felt sore that these upstarts had 
succeeded’ (Clive, WECH officer). 
‘The Housing Corporation was a bit, let’s say, there were a number of 
people in there that were of a small ‘L’ liberal disposition, and they'd 
been charged with promoting this Tenants’ Choice thing, so when 
something came along that was a version of what they agreed with, and 
relish, of course they went for it’ (Charles, WECH resident and Board 
member).  
It would appear that those supporting WECH’s application to become a 
registered provider won the argument, and this paved the way for the 
subsequent transfer of properties.  
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Following the ballot of residents, where the majority of residents voted in 
favour of transfer, WCC began using its powers to challenge the financial 
settlement being sought by WECH. WECH valued the backlog of repairs at 
£63m (WECH, 2006[1998]) and requested that a dowry be paid on the 
transfer of the properties. WCC rejected this assertion and asked for a sale 
price to be paid, later moving in homeless families to try to affect the 
valuation of their property, as evidenced in the inquiry by John Barratt 
(Hosken, 2007, p.246). These attempts to limit the financial settlement with 
WECH can be seen as further constraints on its development. 
Despite these constraining acts, it is apparent from the interviews with 
residents, staff and stakeholders that this long running ‘war’ had some 
unintended consequence in terms of enablement. Various interviewees 
suggested that the radicalism of WCC’s policies and actions at this time 
increased the convictions of residents and supporters. This was exemplified 
in interviews with Craig, a long-standing WECH tenant, and Kenneth, a key 
advisor during the development of WECH; 
‘But also that period of Toryism was so balls-out ugly. Shirley Porter 
really was a panto villain, apart from what she actually did which was 
horrific and I think that got people's backs up enough to really hack 
em off’ (Craig, WECH resident and Board member). 
 
‘But this was Homes for Votes, it was developers wanting to do the 
whole lot, then it got wound up by both sides, and suddenly you're into 
'these people are going to make me homeless, or I fight’. So WECH 
was well supported by its residents’ (Kenneth, WECH supporter).  
The strength of the conviction of residents and activists, and their 
commitment to resisting redevelopment, was a response to the forms of 
intervention WCC were making.  
This polarisation between WCC and residents took on a party political 
dimension, and was situated in a larger political battle between the local 
Labour and Conservative parties. The role of the local Labour Party in the 
development of WECH, particularly local Labour councillors, was significant. 
These councillors were able to access information from within the Council to 
highlight emerging plans for redevelopment. George, a local Labour 
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councillor, described how he worked with local activists to support their 
campaigning efforts; 
‘…so we put the pressure on the Tories, they had to turn up, we had to 
turn up, we instituted debates, we used the press…the local press, but 
also the national press…so we got lots of publicity for the issue, as did 
the residents, because of what they were doing, the direct action they 
were taking, it was just a proper campaign in every sense’ (George, 
WECH supporter). 
Further to this, councillors such as Neale Coleman played a major role in 
developing the plan for transferring the properties into collective ownership 
(Hosken, 1997, p.243).  
Whilst much of the early development of WECH was shaped by these 
adversarial relations, the relationship between WECH and WCC improved 
over time. WECH has ongoing commitments to take social housing 
nominations from WCC, and has worked with them to develop temporary 
accommodation for homeless people. In more recent times WECH has 
worked with WCC to plan the development of new housing, seeking WCC 
endorsement as it develops funding proposals. It could be argued that this 
was only possible after the cathartic inquiries and condemnations of the 
Shirley Porter administration of WCC. 
Relations between the city authorities in Montreal, and residents and activists 
in Milton Park, showed many resemblances to those in the other cases. 
These relations can be characterised as initially constraining, although they 
changed over time. As the proposal for collective ownership was being 
explored, such relations were affected by a wider set of contextual factors. 
With Montreal hosting the summer Olympics in 1976, focus turned to 
redeveloping large parts of the city. Cousineau quotes a senior politician 
who, in 1963, suggested the city council aimed to erect ‘a totally new city’ 
(Cousineau, 1980, p.34). 
The city council’s vision translated into practical support for Concordia, the 
private developers who sought to redevelop Milton Park. Financial 
considerations were a major issue at this time for Montreal City Council. 
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Redevelopment of a low density area like Milton Park, to a much high density 
such as that proposed by Concordia, would have meant significant gains in 
the form of income from property taxes (Helman, 1987). 
Despite these wider constraints arising from development ‘fashions’ and 
financial imperatives, it would be too simplistic to treat the city council as a 
unified source of constraint. Individuals within city hall were acting directly to 
support the Milton Park Citizens Committee (MPCC), and to prevent 
Concordia’s development. As Helman suggests, the submission of a report 
by the planners to the senior administration was important in blocking 
Concordia’s plans. It posed a series of critical questions, and led to key 
decisions; 
‘Why are you running interference for private developers, evicting the 
poor and being confronted with the problem of rehousing them?...On 
the basis of the report the administration decided not to support 
Concordia Estate’s application as an urban renewal project’ (Helman, 
1987, p.44). 
The eventual decision not to declare Milton Park an urban renewal area was 
of major significance, enabling collectivism to be explored. It prevented the 
acquisition of common land (such as the alleyways between blocks) and 
ensured that the process of design and consultation with residents would be 
far more extensive than Concordia had planned (Helman, 1987). 
Given this history, it is therefore surprising that the city council played a key 
enabling role in the development of the co-ops and CMP. It provided 
important subsidies to facilitate the refurbishment of properties, in 
conjunction with the provincial government and federally through the CMHC 
(Kowaluk and Piché-Burton, 2012). 
CMHC played a critical role in the development of the Milton Park project, as 
the Housing Corporation did for WECH. CMHC were tasked with 
implementing the national co-operative housing programmes, which were 
initiated by the Canadian federal government in the 1980s. CMHC delivered 
significant funds to the co-ops in Milton Park (discussed later), as well as 
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providing some oversight and guidance in terms of the governance and 
financial management of the co-ops. 
The extensive application of CMHC’s resources to support the Milton Park 
project, whilst a major source of enablement also created constraints. 
CMHC’s funding came with conditions and pressures, including pressure to 
set rents significantly higher than were being charged at the time. Other 
constraints appeared, as Margaret an active member of her coop and CMP 
recalls; 
‘CMHC insisted each year that this is how much you put into your 
reserve… because bureaucrats don't like a different amount each year, 
they like to know 24k each year’ (Margaret, Milton Park resident and 
CMP Board member). 
In order to protect its investment, CMHC created and enforced certain 
conditions on the co-ops. These conditions limited the financial freedoms and 
control of co-op members, having knock on effects on their investment 
decisions and rent structures among other things. 
Plans for collectivism in Milton Park were shaped by other important 
interactions with government bodies. As activists were exploring an 
appropriate legal vehicle for collectivism in Milton Park, they had to negotiate 
state support to create a ‘condominium for social purposes’ (Altshul, 1989). 
In the 1980s there was a freeze on the creation of condominiums for existing 
buildings in Quebec, with this model being reserved only for new 
developments. This presented a significant constraint on the proposals for 
collectivism in Milton Park. Responding to this constraint, Phyllis Lambert, 
the head of Heritage Montreal, was able to engage the local Member of 
Parliament to steer a Private Members Bill through the Quebec National 
Assembly. This was a crucial piece of agency to side-step government 
legislation, and it enabled CMP to adopt the legal form that it did.  
Advisors and supporters 
The development of each collective was shaped by a network of individuals 
and organisations who advised and supported them. There is evidence that 
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the technical support and advice provided to Granby CLT played a critical 
enabling role. The figure below tries to summarise some of the key external 
advisors and supporters of the CLT during its early development. This is far 
from definitive but highlights certain key actors, providing different forms of 
support and advice.  
Figure 23: Granby CLT's network of supporters and advisers during the early 
stages of development 
 
Ronnie Hughes and Jonathan Brown played two particularly important 
functions. Hughes would help the group explore ideas of collective 
ownership, facilitate discussions, and publicise their efforts on a popular 
blog. Brown provided advice on co-operative housing and helped build 
relations with social investors. Two other bodies also played a critical role, 
using their distinctive resources and powers to help the CLT develop its 
plans and function effectively. North West Housing Services (NWHS), which 
provides support to housing co-operatives in the north of England, played an 
important role in formalising the CLT, as Shirley, one of the CLT’s main 
protagonists noted; 
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‘At the moment North West Housing Services have been really 
good…they offer a service to small co-ops…little things like they’re 
going to be a proper address for us...and it helps that you know they'll 
keep the books for us for the time being’ (Shirley, Granby resident and 
CLT Board member). 
Such support in the basic administration of the CLT was clearly valued. In an 
interview with Mark, a representative from NWHS, it was noted how they 
were providing ‘secretarial support and finance services for six months free 
of charge’ (Mark, Granby CLT supporter). Within the constraints of limited 
finances, receiving this support free of charge was a crucial enabler. 
A further critical source of support came from a quantity surveyor who had 
helped the CLT develop costings for the refurbishment of the properties. The 
CLT had previous contracted other surveyors but bemoaned the quality of 
their work, saying it did not ‘cut the mustard’ (Avril, Granby resident and 
Board member). Previous contractors had seemingly not adapted to working 
with an organisation led by volunteers; 
‘…David [Haim] has really tried to interrogate and understand the 
project…He's very competent, but he kind of understands what they're 
doing, and he's willing to put his back into it a bit, because he knows 
that this is a different kind of project’ (Avril, Granby resident and Board 
member). 
David Haim’s capacities and powers, notably his ability to adapt to different 
types of client, is a key source of enablement to this project. In the interview 
with Avril she recalled how initial business planning, carried out by a private 
consultancy, had not been helpful. Rather than acknowledging that the CLT 
was a volunteer-run enterprise with a high degree of uncertainty, the 
business planning consultant ‘treated them more like a housing association’ 
(Avril, Granby resident and Board member). Reflecting on this relation, Avril 
also suggested that individual personalities played a critical role in how 
support was offered and received; 
‘It seems to be so dependent on the personalities involved. If a 
person…had given a presentation differently, or come across slightly 
differently, I think the discussions would have been different...Because 
David, whatever he says they'd trust and go with, that possibly comes 
from a lack of confidence and knowledge, so you find people who you 
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like and trust, and if 'they say that then it must be the case' (Avril, 
Granby resident and Board member). 
This highlights how the CLT’s development rested on the quality of personal 
relations, and the trust developed between CLT representatives and external 
advisors. 
The relations between the collective in Milton Park and external advisors 
reveal similar patterns, but also a different form of infrastructure to support 
collectivism. The Milton Park University Settlement was active in supporting 
residents, particularly during the period of opposition to redevelopment. 
Working closely with the MPCC, employees at the Settlement sought to 
mobilise residents in forms of protest and campaigning. As Kowaluk and 
Piché-Burton note; 
‘While the overwhelming leadership of this thrust was assumed by 
social workers and urban planners, residents slowly and cautiously 
became involved, and their numbers grew…From 1968 to 1972, people 
from the Citizens Committee and the University Settlement knocked on 
doors, signed petitions, demonstrated in the streets, marched to City 
Hall’ (Kowaluk-Piche Burton, 2012, p.9). 
Whilst the Settlement had been active in providing services for people in the 
area, they were not, at least initially, radical in their approach. Susan, a key 
activist in the development of CMP recalled how this began to change; 
‘…it was a charity, and it was straight charity work, do good ladies 
came and helped poor ladies do things for themselves…some of us 
were talking about Alinsky, so a few of us set up a committee of the 
corporation of social workers, [and] a social action committee (Susan, 
Milton Park resident). 
It appears this organising function, performed by the Settlement staff, in 
conjunction with Brian Knight and others from McGill University, was critical 
in mobilising and building the capacity of residents to oppose redevelopment. 
The Settlement provided an initial platform for residents, such as Susan, to 
develop their community organising skills. 
In Milton Park, the Technical Resource Group (or GRT as it is known in 
French) acted as a single source of technical support for the project, unlike in 
Granby where advice was provided through a disparate number of bodies 
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and networks. GRTs were developed all over Canada in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, with the financial support of CMHC and other government 
bodies, and housed a variety of development professionals. William, the 
individual who led the GRT for Milton Park, defined its role as follows; 
‘…the GRT would be the facilitator, they build the capacity, they make 
sure during development that they co-ordinate the professionals, the 
architects and the engineers and so forth, and make sure the permits 
are granted and so forth, so they provide the technical services…They 
also liaise with financial institutions to make sure the mortgage part is in 
place’ (William, CMP supporter).  
 
This marks out a striking difference with the processes described in Granby, 
where, at the early stages, volunteers had to identify and manage all the 
professional services themselves. In Milton Park an infrastructure was 
already in place for this through the GRT. Beyond their role in dealing with 
technical development issues, the GRT was also tasked with developing the 
skills of co-op members to develop good governance and work within legal 
constraints. As William again reflected; 
 
‘…they [the GRT] also give capacity to the groups in terms of 
accounting, what it is to govern an organisation, in terms one member 
one vote in co-ops…and the whole committee structure...they make 
sure the co-op is aware of it, and that they're making the decisions in 
terms of development (William, CMP supporter). 
 
The sheer range of support functions played by the GRT is notable. As 
Kowaluk Piche-Burton note, the GRT for Milton Park was comprised of; 
‘…20 skilled and committed people who were social animators, 
educators, architects, and administrators’ (Kowaluk and Piché-Burton, 
2012, p.12).  
The crucial feature of this body, and perhaps something overlooked by 
Canadian interviewees, is that it was orientated towards the development of 
co-op housing. In contrast to Granby, where a number of professionals were 
not experienced in supporting volunteer-led projects, this was the GRT’s 
specialism. Furthermore, as multiple professionals were housed within one 
organisation, linkages and co-ordination between different technical services 
were strengthened.  
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Further technical support and advice came from a legal specialist named 
Francois Frenette, who led the efforts to find a legal vehicle for ownership 
and governance that would satisfy the demands of residents. There was a 
need for a ‘creative application of the rules’ (Altshul, 1989, p.97) to preserve 
the affordability of the dwellings, the architectural heritage of the area and its 
broader socio-economic characteristics. As in Granby, the importance of 
personal relations seems to come forward in discussions with residents. As 
Susan, a long-time activist in the collective noted; 
‘But we were working with people we'd been working with for some 
time, and we trusted them that this would be the way to, the Notary 
Frenette was a wonderful guy’ (Susan, Milton Park resident). 
 
In understanding the limits of the current legal system, to support the set of 
collective objectives agreed, Frenette was able to propose adaptations to 
an existing legal form (condominium) to meet a purpose for which it was not 
devised. Furthermore, Frenette was able to build productive relations with 
activists and advisors working on the project to build their trust. The 
suggested model was merely a template for how CMP might be formed, 
leaving much to clarify, and this was largely undertaken by the GRT and 
others.  
Akin to Frenette’s individual agency is the influence of Phyllis Lambert. The 
involvement of this renowned architect, with significant personal 
connections, led to two things; firstly, it strengthened residents’ argument 
against redevelopment by adding a heritage dimension to their case; and 
secondly provided a source of enablement in navigating political processes 
and relations. These important consequences of Lambert’s involvement 
were summarised by Margaret, an active member of the CMP Board at the 
time of the study; 
‘We had Phyllis Lambert interested in preserving the grey stones. She 
had friends in the Liberal government at the Federal level’ (Milton Park 
resident and CMP Board member). 
 
Corroborating this evidence that Lambert had access to politicians, William 
suggested that she was able to ‘penetrate the power structure in a way that 
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few people can’ (William, CMP supporter). Furthermore, Lambert was able to 
influence organisations looking to purchase land in the area, to defend Milton 
Park residents’ interests; 
‘…there's some pieces of land that still belonged to the Concordia 
people…they wanted to put in a grocer there...and contracts were 
made with them, Phyllis knew the family (they were a major grocery 
chain) and they agreed they wouldn't go forward with their 
intent…there's now a cooperative there, new co-operative housing that 
was built there’ (William, CMP supporter). 
Whilst the presence of the above advisors and supporters clearly provided 
different forms of enablement, they also constrained residents in their ability 
to control the development process. As Helman notes, the Board of Société 
du Patrimoine Urbain de Montréal (SPUM), which was holding the housing 
prior to the transfer of ownership to the co-ops and OSBLs, was comprised 
largely of professionals. At the time SPUM justified this by saying; 
‘…a community Board would not necessarily have the ability, let alone 
the will, to own and manage £6.9m worth of property’ (Helman, 1987, 
p.133). 
This relationship between residents and advisors is a critical one in the 
development of such collectives. Rather than residents driving and shaping a 
process of development, the technical complexities of managing housing 
refurbishment programmes means that such professionals often exert 
significant influence and control. The trust between advisors and residents 
therefore becomes a critical component in such developments. During the 
setup of the co-ops in Milton Park, a local community organiser, reflecting on 
the extent of resident involvement, noted; 
‘…in terms [of] ordinary people from the area…there was a real 
shortage’ (Knight in Helman, 1987, p.96).  
The impact of this increasing control by professionals is hard to establish. 
Nonetheless, for a housing model premised on resident control, this issue of 
professional influence presents some dilemmas and contradictions. 
The role of advisors in WECH presents similar lessons. A significant source 
of advice and support in the development of WECH came from John Cotterill. 
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Initially involved in the financial planning of the project, and in applying to the 
Housing Corporation, Cotterill later became chair of the WECH Board and 
remained so until 2015. Interviews with tenants and WECH Board members 
revealed how Cotterill had been a key enabler in the development of WECH, 
as Dylan a local councillor noted; 
‘John has been a remarkable servant to the campaign and he was 
there right then. And he had to come in late in the day, because they 
needed a finance expert…they had 24 hours to find someone else and 
John stepped in then, and has been there ever since’ (Dylan, WECH 
supporter). 
As was noted in the dilemmas of Granby CLT members, the identification of 
advisors who can adapt their skills to volunteer-led projects comes to the fore 
in WECH. As Craig, a WECH Board member asserts; 
‘John Cotterill has probably been the most important…he worked at the 
GLC in finance and he was one of the people who steered it through 
the House of Lords, and you know they're kind of, good people, it’s very 
hard to find people in positions of power who do the right thing for 
unselfish reasons’ (Craig, WECH resident and Board member). 
The long-term commitment of Cotterill to the project, and his seeming 
adaption to this unique housing organisation, has been critical. There is 
evidence that Cotterill helped resolve some of the initial challenges relating 
to disagreements between Board members. Observations of WECH Board 
meetings revealed his strong approach to chairing meetings. Despite this 
flagging-up possible tensions between external advisor’s control and resident 
control, a number of interviewees highlighted the positive role played by 
Cotterill.   
Another major source of enablement in the development of WECH came 
from Paddington Churches Housing Association (PCHA). PCHA provided 
technical support to WECH in applying to the Housing Corporation to 
become a registered provider, and in developing the subsequent Tenants’ 
Choice application. It was noted in interviews how this placed PCHA in an 
important and difficult position. As noted by Dylan, this meant making difficult 
decisions; 
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‘...it’s a great credit to them [PCHA] that they were willing to put 
themselves so firmly supporting the residents, when they obviously had 
a great deal to lose given their relationships with Westminster Council’ 
(Dylan, WECH supporter). 
PCHA staff played an important function in developing financial projections 
leading up to the acquisition of the property, devising refurbishment 
programmes, and later providing housing management services to WECH. In 
an interesting reflection on the importance of this close partnership between 
PCHA and residents, Kenneth, a former officer at PCHA noted; 
‘…we had a little team of advisors and they would've been helpful. I 
mean it all went in the name of WECH but you know we would have 
helped with our expertise in finance and development and housing 
management. WECH could not have done it by themselves, but equally 
if there hadn't been an extraordinary tenants’ group this would never 
have happened’ (Kenneth, WECH supporter). 
The advice and support provided by PCHA seemingly gave the Housing 
Corporation some reassurance that WECH could become a credible 
landlord. Dylan highlighted the knock-on effects of PCHA’s involvement in 
terms of the credibility of WECH’s plans; 
‘…the involvement of a very solid and respectable and big housing 
association alongside the tenants’ group, who agreed to take on the 
responsibility for development and management, provided a lot of 
comfort’ (Dylan, WECH supporter). 
The role played by PCHA raises again questions about levels of control 
exerted by residents. In an interesting exchange with Clive, a WECH 
member of staff, he reflected on how the reliance on PCHA for support, and 
the importance of this relationship, led to a certain type of decision-making;  
‘I think there was a bit of a power imbalance between PCHA and 
WECH…the chair of the Board at that time was a particularly 
pessimistic character…he was very content to accept their approach 
‘cos they were the experts and we mustn't rock the boat because we 
need them’ (Clive, WECH officer). 
Whilst the overall message from the data for WECH highlights the significant 
enabling role PCHA played, the above quote highlights certain tensions in 
these relations. Clive is referring to a period when WECH residents and staff 
developed an approach to decanting residents during a refurbishment 
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programmes, and one which diverged from PCHA’s model. Deference to 
PCHA might have resulted in WECH having to sell off some of its stock as a 
result, so they developed their own more incremental approach to decanting 
and refurbishment. Hence, the control exerted by advisors, particularly 
professionals in technical fields, can be a subtle but important constraint on 
collectives.  
Developers 
Having released the tender for the refurbishment of housing in Granby, and 
selected a private developer, LCC was forced to withdraw this contract in 
light of several revelations (Liverpool Echo, 2015). This had various 
unintended consequences which both constrained and enabled collectivism. 
When the procurement process was initiated, bidders were encouraged to 
consult and work with residents. However, this did not materialise as Helena, 
a supporter and Board member of the CLT, noted in her interview;  
‘Yeah it was very much like that, and the developer came up with their 
solutions for the area and the properties and owner occupiers, and the 
owner occupiers were told this is what we're doing’ (Helena, Granby 
CLT supporter and Board member). 
Attempts to influence those developers did not result in any commitments to 
which they could be held accountable, though there is evidence that Leader 
1 sought to secure the CLT’s support; 
‘…the whole process of Leader 1, it almost felt a bit...although they 
talked to us initially, as soon as their bid went in they stopped 
answering phone calls’’ (Avril, Granby resident and Board member). 
These narratives about relations with developers reveal a constant fight for 
credibility and influence by residents and the CLT. The actions of private 
developers, offering LCC the promise of capital investment in return for 
ownership of the stock, lead to the marginalisation of the CLT in the 
development process. However, this marginalisation served to strengthen 
internal resolve and solidarity. Catherine, a long-time resident of Granby and 
Board member articulated this succinctly; 
‘…if there's someone to hate then the community will be pulled together 
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anyway, that’s why people like wars. You know, because you've got a 
common goal, and a common goal will always pull people together’ 
(Catherine, Granby resident and CLT Board member) 
 
The emergence and disappearance of Leader 1 cannot be underestimated in 
terms of its effect on the potential for collectivism. When asked what key 
events had shaped the development of the CLT, Georgia, a CLT supporter 
stated; 
‘I think the key thing that triggered it was the collapse of Leader 1, to 
hold a competition for a developer to come in and save the world’ 
(Georgia, Granby CLT supporter and Board member). 
Whilst the contracting of Leader 1 can therefore be seen as a constraining 
factor on the CLT, the withdrawal of their contract was a clear source of 
enablement for the CLT. 
Other developers have played an important role in facilitating the 
development of the CLT. As noted in chapter six, the social investor 
providing loan finance to the CLT had expressed an interest in developing an 
area of the Four Streets called Ducie Street, in partnership with another 
agency called Igloo Regeneration. Given the existing relations between the 
investor and the CLT, the latter was keen to support such a bid. Avril 
recounted the emergence of this partnership; 
‘Igloo Regeneration Ltd were keen to get involved in supporting 
community groups, so they then got in touch. I mentioned it to [the 
CLT’s architect] and [the social investor’s representative] …they got in 
touch with each other, and that's when the bid for Ducie Street…they 
teamed up together’ (Avril, Granby resident and Board member). 
The emerging partnership reveals interesting processes at work in the 
development of the CLT. An initial partnership between a fledgling CLT and a 
social investor was leading towards a bigger set of relations with other 
developers. In these relations the CLT had a more central role and a greater 
influence over the plans being developed. It was a radically different set of 
relations than those developed with Leader 1, and crucially, these relations 
enabled the CLT to exert its influence and desire for collective forms of 
ownership.  
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In Milton Park the existence and demise of the private developer (Concordia) 
bears some resemblances to the withdrawal of Leader 1 in Granby. Under 
such circumstances it is easy to present the developer as a source of 
constraint for the collective, as it proposed a form of development that 
residents opposed. In Milton Park, as in Granby, it appears that Concordia 
was unwilling to listen to the demands of residents. Members of the MPCC 
who met Concordia were not positive about the experience, as one attendee 
recounted to Helman; 
‘As L'Espérance recalls, one of the partners was like a "caricature of the 
rich capitalist. He was so contemptuous of the female committee 
members in particular that we were rigid with rage. He seemed to sum 
up the typical patriarchal arrogance of men”’ (Helman, 1987, p. 36). 
The above quote may reveal the incongruous behaviours and objectives of 
different parties, but more specifically reveals the disharmony between 
residents and the developers. These experiences led members to see ‘how 
unlikely any sort of co-operation or consensus with Concordia Estates was’ 
(Helman, 1987, p.37). The methods adopted by Concordia, which included 
acquiring property through several companies so as not to reveal their wider 
intentions, only confirmed residents’ suspicions.  
Despite the clear disagreements and opposing objectives between residents 
and Concordia, it is hard to present these as purely constraining relations. In 
Milton Park there was no conception of collective ownership until the 
struggles with Concordia had taken place. The developer became a major 
source of enablement as their actions served to mobilise and strengthen 
residents’ solidarity, which was the building block for future collectivism. As 
noted in reference to both WECH and Granby, a fierce adversary can be a 
powerful source of enablement. William, a key advisor in the development of 
CMP and the co-ops, noted how the threats to residents’ homes fed a 
process of activism. He noted how people were; 
‘…very anxious because there was this developer who came in and 
they wanted to stay there and this was clearly threatened …there were 
a lot of kitchen meetings and assemblies of the community…what you 
have is a community that is very mobilised…a lot of willingness to be 
involved in some way or another’ (William, CMP supporter) 
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The emergence of a perceived ‘enemy’ strengthened internal relations and 
collaboration, from which collectivism was made possible.  
As in Granby, this reveals important insights about the emergence of 
opportunities for collectivism. Concordia’s major liability related to financial 
resources, and changes in the wider economic context only exacerbated this 
liability. As Kowlauk and Piche-Burton (2012) note; 
‘The world-wide oil crisis of 1972 and construction activities linked to 
the 1976 Montreal Olympics, which caused a huge jump in inflation, 
had the effect of severely decreasing the value of the funding planned 
by Concordia Estates Ltd’ (Kowaluk-Piche Burton, 2012, p.11). 
Concordia’s power, and therefore relations with residents, were shaped by 
their access to capital. However, as the financing of the scheme unravelled, 
it created the opportunity for a new form of ownership. 
This absence of a private developer, who was able and willing to undertake a 
development scheme, created similar opportunities for collectivism in 
Walterton and Elgin. WCC’s repeated attempts to contract a private 
developer were hampered by residents’ direct action. Residents were 
repeatedly successful in getting potential developers to withdraw from any 
procurement process. 
However, as in Milton Park, the desire for a collective form of housing was 
not conceived until the threat of redevelopment became sufficiently likely. As 
Charles, a key activist against WCC’s redevelopment plans, noted in an 
interview the original motive of activists was to prevent the sale of properties; 
‘The objective was to improve the estate, we said under council control, 
but in fact what we meant was 'not being sold off to a developer for 
demolition' (Charles, WECH resident and Board member). 
Opportunities for collectivism emerged from the failure of WCC to gain 
interest from sufficient private developers, and as a result of new legislation 
which enabled tenants to force the transfer of properties to WECH. 
National and local politics shaped residents' responses to any 
redevelopment. The threat of ‘privatisation’ was clearly an active part of the 
narrative of why the interventions of developers should be resisted. This was 
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evidenced in the local Labour Party’s letter to residents, following the release 
of plans to redevelop Walterton and Elgin;  
‘…we have just been told of the councils plans to sell your flat to a 
private company…we are staggered by these proposals”' (Labour Party 
letter in Hosken, 2006, p.113). 
Whether this is, in strict terms, an accurate reflection of WCC’s plans is 
unclear, with most dwellings intended to be transferred to a ‘charitable trust 
for rent’ (Hosken, 2006, p.113). Nonetheless, the threat of becoming a tenant 
of a private company, rather than a local authority, was clearly a worrying 
prospect for some residents, and perhaps tapped into wider discourses 
regarding privatisation.  
The threat of privatisation, and the emergence of clear adversaries, only 
served to strengthen internal relations. George, a senior Labour Party 
politician at the time of these conflicts, reflected this sentiment in the 
following interview excerpt; 
‘I think the key ingredients were a diverse organisation, but with a 
common purpose, and the common purpose was to save our homes. It 
was out of adversity that people were forced together, and worked 
together, but it was a very well organised organisation’ (George, WECH 
supporter). 
WECH became possible because residents were sufficiently well organised 
to dissuade those developers from submitting proposals. This neatly 
presents the interplay between internal dynamics and external relations; with 
committed action undertaken by well-organised groups being able to shape 
the actions of, and relations between, other external bodies. 
Funders and Financers 
Each of the collectives studied developed relations with external funders and 
financing bodies. Similarities are evident across the cases, in terms of the 
type of body that provided finance and the nature of that relation. Certain 
differences in the provision of funding and finance, however, also explain 
different causal pathways for the cases.  It is notable that whilst activists in 
Milton Park and WECH had to work closely with a quasi-funder and 
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regulator, in Granby the sources of financial enablement and constraint were 
somewhat different. 
For WECH, a major source of financial enablement came from WCC in the 
form of dowry of £17m (rising to over time to £22m). Of course, enablement 
is not always a voluntary act, and indeed this dowry, was the product of long 
disputes over the valuation of the assets. Nonetheless, WCC’s dowry reveals 
something about their powers, specifically their ability to make such large 
capital transfers, and the powers of other actors in enforcing this transfer, 
notably the District Valuer.  
Another major source of financial enablement for WECH came about through 
relations with the Housing Corporation, who provided key financial support. 
In Against the Odds (WECH, 2006[1998]) it is revealed that the Housing 
Corporation provided a total of £4.37m to WECH in capital subsidies to 
refurbish the Walterton estate and build new properties on the Elgin estate. 
The importance of this funding was emphasised in a number of interviews, 
notably with a WECH member of staff. Clive noted how, before balloting 
residents regarding the transfer to WECH, the required finances for 
refurbishment were far from certain;  
‘…it was touch and go whether or not they could recommend to the 
members, to the residents, that they should proceed. But the Housing 
Corporation came in said we'll provide the £3.5m’ (Clive, WECH 
officer). 
The above quote shows what an important causal role the Housing 
Corporation played, providing a bridging subsidy to make the collective’s 
plans viable. 
It is an interesting feature of WECH’s development that all of its major capital 
programmes had, at the time of writing, taken place without significant 
mortgage or debt finance. This was unlikely to continue however as, whilst 
this fieldwork was being carried out, the organisation was busy planning new 
housing developments. In observations of WECH Board meetings, 
discussions were taking place about accessing a loan facility from a large 
bank. Their dealings with the bank reveal a fascinating tension between a 
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not-for-profit organisation and a commercial lender trying to minimise its 
contractual obligations.  
In Milton Park, financial institutions provided the central enabling finance, but 
with various guarantees and additional commitments from CMHC. Whilst the 
interviews with residents uncover some of the complexities of these 
arrangements, this financial support was usefully summarised by Kowaluk 
and Piché-Burton (2012): 
‘…each co-op and other non-profit association would hold a 35-year 
mortgage guaranteed by CMHC from a bank or financial institution in 
order to pay for its share of the renovations and the purchase 
price…CMHC paid the difference between the interest rate at the time 
and 2%. This meant that rents were calculated to finance the cost of a 
mortgage at only 2% plus property taxes, maintenance, insurances and 
utilities’ (Kowaluk and Piché-Burton, 2012, p.15). 
This ‘writing down’ of mortgage interest is a particular innovative feature of 
CMHC’s package of support. During a period when Canadian interest rates 
were at times over 20 per cent, such financial support became imperative, as 
William an advisor in Milton Park recalls; 
‘…they've shifted gears now in that they don't fund on a long term 
basis…But the interest rates were so high…writing down interest rates 
to make it affordable was just a logic in those days’ (William, CMP 
supporter). 
The above examples provide significant lessons in how collective forms of 
housing can be stimulated and supported. Where the economics of creating 
new affordable housing with simple commercial loans becomes unviable, 
then governments can innovate with financial products to support such 
schemes.  
The nature and generosity of this CMHC financial package was frequently 
emphasised in the interviews, and also how over time such programmes 
have changed. In addition to the amount of government investment being 
delivered, shifts have also been made in where responsibility sits, moving 
from a federal to a provincial level. Mary, a long standing and active member 
of her co-op noted;  
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‘…so we had more generous funding and more flexible rules than for 
instance the Quebec funded co-op just across there’ (Mary, Milton Park 
resident). 
This change in state funding reveals important implications for supporting 
collectivism, as the provincial funded co-ops have had to work within tighter 
financial arrangements.  
Despite the enablement arising from such funding and finance, the provision 
of this came with constraints, particularly those imposed by CMHC. In 
chapter six, it was noted how CMHC pushed for higher rents than residents 
had wanted. To de-risk their investment CMHC initially insisted on the co-ops 
charging close to market rents. This clearly conflicted with the core principles 
of the project; 
‘…[there was] certain resistance within the CMHC in terms of what the 
rents would be, considering all the money that was going in. They said 
it should be higher and closer to what the market rents are, given the 
investment’ (William, CMP supporter). 
 
Here is a vivid example of how a collective, with certain powers and 
liabilities, interacts with an external body with its own powers and liabilities, 
to create a certain pattern of events. The enablement of collectivism in Milton 
Park owes much to the capacity of residents and those working in CMHC to 
agree to the preservation of low rents. 
As each housing co-op’s mortgage nears the end of its term, and new 
finance may be required to carry out necessary maintenance, the prospect of 
borrowing money from commercial lenders becomes more likely for the co-
ops. This brings certain challenges for such lenders, as their standard means 
of de-risking their investments, by making a charge on properties, is not an 
option with the co-ops. Arabelle, an active member of her co-op provided this 
insight; 
'There's one bank that says they will lend money to groups once CMHC 
is out of the system, but they will lend us money only for the value of 
one years’ rents…in the case of this group it’s about 120k dollars… well 
we just did work on a very fancy Victorian balcony…the fricking thing 
cost 40,000 dollars’ (Arabelle, Milton Park resident). 
 227 
 
This quotation highlights how commercial lenders have to adapt their 
processes to provide finance to collectively owned schemes, and how such 
adaptations can lead to certain constraints in the amounts of finance that can 
be accessed.  Also, the nature of the physical buildings that the co-ops own 
is seen as a major financial liability, demanding significant restoration work 
which has to be funded. This presents a number of risks as some of the co-
ops enter a period of new financial autonomy. 
The relations between Granby CLT and various funders and financing bodies 
is markedly different to those discussed for Milton Park and WECH. The 
group’s early development took place in a period where there were no large 
government funding programmes for this type of housing, though there were 
a number of programmes offering small grants. The lack of access to large-
scale capital funding from government sources was a problem succinctly 
articulated by Catherine, a resident and CLT Board member; 
‘And what is stopping us moving ahead is a lack of money, and a lack 
of real positive intention from the council to work with us as a 
community’ (Catherine, Granby resident and CLT Board member). 
The CLT has had to develop a unique set of relations with private lenders, 
housing associations, infrastructure bodies, heritage organisations and 
others to raise the money to conduct the refurbishment work. Interviewees 
noted discussions with the local authority and housing associations about 
accessing government money to refurbish empty homes, or to access grants 
to provide homes for affordable rent (Granby CLT, 2015). This raised 
concerns about restrictions on the scope of any refurbishment, its higher 
costs and end tenures of the housing.  
One source of finance that has played a particularly pivotal role in the 
development of the CLT was the low interest loan offered to the CLT by the 
social investor. From the accounts of interviewees, this offer of finance 
radically altered perceptions of the CLT by LCC, giving the former increased 
credibility. Shirley and Beatrice, both long-standing residents and CLT Board 
members, provided insights into this critical causal role; 
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‘…cos we were suddenly able to go to the Council and say 'we've got a 
backer'. And that was hilarious, when we said it. Their faces dropped’ 
(Shirley, Granby resident and CLT Board member). 
 
‘Well the millionaire came to… a meeting with the Council…he 
contacted the Council…Everyone thought he was the figment of my 
imagination’ (Beatrice, Granby resident and CLT Board member). 
 
This reveals how the financial commitments of the social investor (the 
‘millionaire’), whilst important in funding future work, was also critical in 
shifting the CLT’s relations with other external bodies. This access to capital 
endowed the CLT with a new financial power. Xanthe Hamilton, who was 
working with the social investor, and would later become a project manager 
for the CLT, played an important role. Georgia, a CLT Board member and 
advisor, noted that;  
‘[a] key player was Fiona, who was looking for a project, got a 
connection, really liked the gardening and the painting, and the market, 
and that residents were making stuff happen’ (Georgia, Granby CLT 
supporter and Board member). 
The quotation highlights the opportune development of this relationship, 
between a wealthy individual looking to invest, and a group needing to raise 
significant finance. Such events show how the interactions of bodies with 
different powers and liabilities, under contingent conditions, gives rise to 
certain constraints and enablements.  
8.4. External constraint and enablement: The structure of relations 
This chapter has sought to understand the role of external bodies in 
influencing the development of each collective, focusing on different types of 
individuals and organisations. The influence of different local governments, 
advisors and supporters, private developers and those supplying potential 
finance has been explored.  
There will be external bodies in the development of each case, the role of 
which has not been fully captured here. For instance, in Granby, relations 
with local housing associations were important in building credibility with the 
local authority, and accessing government grant programmes. In Milton Park, 
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relations with individuals at McGill University shaped the early opposition to 
redevelopment. And in WECH, relations with private consultancies, such as 
HACAS, helped move the organisation onto a more autonomous footing. 
Entities and relations such as these, whilst shaping events in the cases, 
appeared to be less significant in the data than those that have been 
discussed above. 
The analysis above has focused on the relations between collectives and 
other bodies acting locally. It has, however, exposed how these relations 
were shaped by other entities and forces operating at a wider geographic 
scale. National governments constrained and enabled the collectives through 
their rhetoric and policies concerning civil society and housing, through their 
legislation in creating new powers for different groups, and in their provision 
and distribution of financial resources. These actions set conditions for both 
the collectives and the entities they were in relation with locally. The cases 
also hint at how these conditions were shaped by other external factors 
which were harder to pin-down; the operations of housing markets and the 
fluctuating value of land and housing, the function and health of the wider 
economy, political and ideological shifts, and social or cultural norms around 
mutuality, social activism and property ownership. 
Local relations seemed to be framed by some of these wider forces, but as 
realists advise, in trying to understand causality one must focus on; 
‘…the ‘causal powers’ or ‘liabilities’ of objects or relations…what an 
object is like and what it can do’ (Sayer, 1992, p.104-105).  
Hence, these wider forces are only understood here through the powers and 
liabilities they confer on certain objects or entities in relation with others.  
Focusing on the interactions between each collective and other external 
bodies reveals some of the processes constraining and enabling housing 
collectivism locally. In each case study developers and local authorities used 
their powers to assert a specific model of ownership and physical 
development, for example, by using their financial resources, construction 
skills and assets, or their planning and procurement powers. As long as 
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these powers were being activated in pursuit of a private development 
model, the potential for collective ownership was constrained, irrespective of 
the collective’s own capacities and agency.  
These constraining and enabling processes can be clarified by using 
structural diagrams. In each case studied, the local authority was initially 
supportive of redevelopment or refurbishment by a private developer, which 
closed down the opportunities for collective ownership. This was influenced 
by some of the wider forces and conditions discussed above. Figure 24 tries 
to depict this scenario at an early stage in the development of each 
collective, or before any notion of collective ownership had emerged. This 
point in time will be called T1. In this simplified model, the green lines denote 
enabling relations, red lines denote constraining relations, and non-existent 
lines show an absence of any relation.   
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Figure 24: The structure of relations and their constraint and enablement (T1) 
 
Whilst lines denote a type of relation, the text denotes a position in a 
structure, and this is critical to understanding the causal effects of such 
structured relations. As Margaret Archer notes; 
‘…interests, resources, powers, constraints and predicaments…are 
built into each position by the web of relationships’ (Archer in Bhaskar 
et al, 1998, p.201). 
It might be legitimately argued that Figure 24 does not account for how 
external bodies both constrained and enabled the development of collectives 
concurrently. Indeed, perhaps every relation has these dual qualities in 
different proportions. The intentional preference for private developer 
schemes by the local authorities, which were opposed by residents, had the 
unintentional consequence of solidifying collectivist ideas and internal 
relations. As interviewees noted, collective action is made possible when 
‘people have their backs to the wall’ (Catherine, Granby resident and CLT 
Board member), and each collective was stimulated by perceived external 
threats.  
Figure 24 also fails to account for how seemingly enabling relations can have 
unintended constraints. For instance, advisors and supporters in each case 
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were seen, at times, to diminish member and resident control. In Milton Park 
residents were judged to not ‘have the ability’ (Helman, 1987, p.133) to run a 
major refurbishment programme, and in WECH external bodies resisted the 
adaptation of their refurbishment programmes. Similarly, funders in providing 
enabling finance, were seen to set constraints on the use of that finance, in 
terms of the nature of any refurbishment and the tenure of future housing, 
such as in Granby. Alternatively, those providing finance can set conditions 
on the level of rents to be charged, a constraint initially imposed by CMHC in 
Milton Park. Even in the process of enabling collectivism, external entities 
can act in ways which constrain it. 
This model of relations might therefore be nuanced to account for subtleties 
in constraining and enabling relations; a red dotted line can be used to show 
relations that intentionally constrain but unintentionally enable; and a green 
dotted line to denote relations which intentionally enable but unintentionally 
constrain. A reworked model looks as follows;  
Figure 25: The structure of relations with dual constraint and enablement (T1) 
 
Moving forward to another time, a position in this structure was vacated 
when, in each case, private developers withdrew from the proposed 
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development. In doing so, developers took with them their investment 
potential and capacities to manage redevelopment. In each case, this 
exposed the local authority’s financial liabilities and limited capacity to act 
directly to address housing issues in those areas. Changes in the structure of 
relations, through the withdrawal of private developers, created opportunities 
for residents to gain support from the local authorities, and other external 
bodies, for alternative forms of ownership. This opportunity could only be 
exploited when the collectives secured the necessary finance and technical 
support from other external bodies, which each did in different ways. In 
addition, it could only be exploited when internal relations and actions were 
co-ordinated, the processes of which were revealed in the previous chapter. 
At T2 then, the proposed private development had not materialised, as those 
developers either experienced financial difficulties, succumbed to pressure 
from residents to withdraw, or had their contracts with the local authorities 
retracted. Within this vacuum, the opportunity to explore collective ownership 
emerged. In a further structural development, funding or lending was being 
identified through relations with government funders, private investors, 
charitable funders, or secured through valuation disputes. Alongside this, in 
each case advisors had or were being secured to provide various forms of 
support. Changes in wider conditions, for instance, in government policy and 
legislation, the health of the wider economy, and changes in ideology and 
forms of social action, provided other stimuli. What emerged at T2 was a 
different structure of relations capable of enacting collective ownership. 
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Figure 26:The structure of relations accounting for dual constraint and 
enablement (T2) 
 
What such analysis reveals is a process, or the mechanics through which 
relations with external bodies became more enabling. What these changes in 
relations perhaps represent are the emergence of opportunities, which serve 
to ‘enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims 
to be advanced rather than others’ (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004, p.1457). The 
vacuum created by the withdrawal of private developers, expanded each 
collective’s opportunities to advance a claim to collective ownership. But this 
structural change also created opportunities for the local authorities to 
consider and support alternative forms of development.  
The above insights are critical, as proponents of collective housing often see 
the development of such schemes as largely the product of each collective’s 
own agency. The 2016 national conference for CLTs in England was titled 
‘Housing: It’s in our hands’ (CLT Network, 2016h). The learning provided 
here suggests otherwise, and asserts the importance of the dynamic 
structure of local relations, and how positions within such structures 
constrain and enable such collectivism.  
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To conclude, this and the previous chapter provide new insights into the 
constraint and enablement of housing collectives. When taken together they 
provide a mechanistic view of change processes, in terms of residents’ 
beliefs, actions and relations, and the wider conditions and external relations 
which serve to constrain and enable. Together, these insights move current 
knowledge beyond ‘ingredients’ (Chatterton, 2015) for such collectivism, to a 
better understanding of the cogs and wheels of this phenomena in practice. 
However, this discussion has revealed little about the potential of such forms 
of housing provision to resolve identified problems within the current housing 
system. Such questions require a change of direction, and a focus on the 
costs and benefits of these activities for those involved.   
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Chapter Nine: The benefits of collectivism 
 
9.1. Introduction 
The following two chapters address the study’s second research question; 
what are the perceived benefits and costs of housing collectivism for 
members and residents, and to what extent are these attributable to the form 
and function of the collectives? In this chapter, the perceived benefits of such 
collectivism are the primary focus, where benefits are understood, in simple 
terms, as an ‘advantage or profit gained’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016a). 
What is currently absent in the literature is a clear identification of the range 
of costs and benefits arising for residents in collective housing schemes, and 
an understanding of how such outcomes are connected to the forms and 
functions of these organisations (Rowlands, 2009; Saegert and Winkel, 
1996; Satsangi and Clapham, 1990). Scholars have posed searching 
questions about the ‘contribution of mutualism and co-operation to the 
benefits witnessed in these organisations’ (Rowlands, 2009, p.vi). In 
response, this study has attempted to identify the benefits and costs of 
collectivism as perceived by members and residents, and how these are 
causally related, if at all, to the way such organisations are constituted and 
function. Critically, the focus falls on those benefits that the analytical 
procedure has identified as prevalent, recurring within and across cases and 
data types. 
This chapter focuses on benefits and is structured around four benefit 
categories. These categories present sets of perceived benefits relating to; 
1) financial gains, 2) security and control, 3) learning, health and wellbeing, 
and 4) the quality of housing and services received. The discussion of each 
of these categories starts by, firstly, presenting the empirical evidence for 
that benefit, then secondly exploring the relationship between that benefit 
and the forms and function of the collectives. Each benefit category is 
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explored in this way. A concluding section draws this learning together, and 
posits mechanistic explanations of the processes at work.  
9.2. Financial gains 
The empirical evidence 
Across the case studies there is substantial evidence of collectives seeking 
to maintain low housing costs, from which their residents and members 
derive financial benefits. This prominent pattern appears in triangulation 
across the cases and across the data types, as revealed below. 
In Milton Park, the issue of housing affordability was, and still is, prescient 
given its proximity to downtown Montreal. To understand the levels of local 
affordability achieved by the housing co-ops, some contextual information is 
required. Whilst some caution is needed in using simple income-to-rent 
calculations to assess affordability (Wilcox, 2013), secondary data analysis 
highlights critical pressures on those with low incomes wanting to live near 
downtown Montreal.  
Average incomes for households with families in Milton Park2 were 
approximately $38k per annum in 2010 (Statistics Canada, 2015). Private 
rental costs in the area are high. Studies by the Canadian Mortgage and 
Housing Corporation (CMHC, 2014) suggest that average monthly private 
rental prices in Montreal were $555 for studios, $651 for a one-bed, $730 for 
a two-bed, and $878 for three-bed or more sized properties. Table 4 
presents average prices for private rental properties within one mile of Milton 
Park, taken from advertised lettings on 15th December 2014. This evidence 
shows how prices in the downtown area near Milton Park are significantly 
higher than the city average. 
  
                                                          
2
 Census tracts 4620131.00 and 4620132.00 
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Table 6: Average private rents in Milton Park and the surrounding area 
 Studio One bed Two bed 
Average 
monthly rent 
$1010 $1400 $2625 
Average 
yearly rent 
$12120 $16800 $31500 
Source: kijiji.ca (2014) and rentalmontreal.com (2014) 
With average incomes of $38k per annum, rental prices appear unaffordable, 
even allowing for wage inflation from when income data was collected. A 
family earning $38k per annum, and paying $32k per annum for a two-bed 
property, would spend almost all of their gross income on housing costs, 
which is clearly unviable. The city of Montreal does provide subsidised ‘low-
rent’ housing, which is priced at 25 per cent of a household’s income 
(OMHM, 2016). However, this is a comparative small stock constituting 
around one per cent of total dwellings, the majority of which is used to house 
over 60 year olds (Statistics Canada, 2011; OMHM, 2016). Issues of housing 
affordability have become pronounced over recent decades, with residents in 
Montreal experiencing some of the highest income to housing cost ratios in 
Canada (Moore and Skaburskis, 2004). 
Collective forms of housing have therefore sought to address issues of 
affordability in Canadian cities like Montreal. Historically, a central motive for 
creating the co-operaties and CMP in Milton Park was to keep rents 
affordable. In the early years of residents' resistance to private development, 
local planners assessed the scheme proposed by Concordia. They 
suggested the development would lead to rental prices ‘double or triple the 
existing rents’ (Melamed, in Helman, 1987, p.28). Hence, the co-ops and 
CMP were conceived as a means of keeping housing affordable. 
From interviews with residents in the housing co-ops, one can suggest that 
this objective has been achieved and that low rental costs were a major 
benefit for those households. Mary, a resident of her co-op for 16 years, 
 239 
 
suggested that ‘the rents are a third to a half of what one would normally 
expect to pay’. Similarly, Alan noted the ‘enormous’ difference between the 
co-ops rents and that of housing a few blocks away, which was let for ‘$1000 
dollars a month’. Camille, a resident of a co-op since the mid-1990s, added 
to this comparative assessment suggesting that private rents locally were 
‘three times higher’. 
A founding principle of CMP is that ‘no original resident has to leave for 
economic reasons’ (Kowaluk & Piche-Burton, p.16). Asserting the 
importance of this issue, Mary stated; 
‘…the best bit about living here is it’s very urban…you’re close to 
everything. It’s amazing, close to the metro, close to downtown, and 
that’s incredible’ (Mary, Milton Park resident). 
Hence, the benefit being articulated is low housing costs combined with the 
ability to live in a certain location and access certain environments. Camille, 
a resident of Milton Park for nearly 20 years, suggested that the benefits of 
living in the co-op related to ‘location, location, then price’. 
Each housing co-op calculates its rent levels on the anticipated expenditure 
in future years, for example, likely maintenance work, debt repayments and 
other costs. There is no standardisation of rents between the co-ops, or set 
standards for affordability. Nonetheless, residents revealed how some co-
ops have set loose benchmarks for prices, and this is paid by members given 
their contribution to the running of the organisation. Non-members pay the 
full market price, though households in this category are few, as discussed 
below.  
The co-ops in Milton Park are required, under the Declaration of Co-
ownership (in Kowaluk, and Piché-Burton, 2012), to give priority to low 
income households. These are: households receiving benefits through Aide 
Sociale du Québec or a monthly guaranteed income supplement (category 
A); those having an income of less than 125 percent of accepted measures 
of low-income (category B); or those with incomes inferior to the median for 
large cities in Canada (category C). The Declaration requires that 15 percent 
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of all residents of the co-ops are on low incomes, and that their housing 
costs should be subsidised to less than 30 percent of those incomes. It can 
be argued that these built-in controls on allocations, and the processes for 
calculating sub-market rents, are a direct result of the organisation’s form. 
Irrespective of this, the evidence is clear, those housed within the co-ops in 
Milton Park are experiencing major financial gains, in comparison to others in 
private rents in Montreal, and particularly those in the downtown area. 
Similarly, WECH residents are paying comparatively low rents. Assessing 
WECH’s own rent data with comparable data for social landlords in London 
(HM Government 2014b; 2014c), reveals a marked difference: 
Figure 27: Comparisons of WECH average weekly rents (2013-14) with other 
local social housing providers 
  
Source: WECH (2015c), HM Government (2014b), HM Government (2014c)3   
                                                          
3
 The data relating to 4+ bedrooms is compromised by different data collections methods 
used by WECH and in the government sources, which detail rents specifically for 5-bed and 
6+ bed properties. To arrive at a 4+ figure for WCC and other large HAs has required 
averaging the average of 4, 5 and 6+ bed weekly rents. Hence, caution is required in 
deriving conclusions about the affordability of larger properties. 
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As Figure 27 above shows, WECH rents are significantly lower than those 
offered by Westminster City Council (WCC) and other large housing 
associations. For instance, the average WECH rent for a two-bed property in 
2013-14 was £99.98, approximately £27 per week less (or 21 per cent 
cheaper) than other social rented property provided by larger housing 
associations in Westminster.  
WECH’s stated aim has been to limit rent increases to match the Retail Price 
Index (RPI). The Chair’s Foreword to the 2014 Annual Report (WECH, 
2014), states that for the first ten years of WECH’s operation rents increased 
in line with this inflation index, and after that it has never increased by more 
than one per cent over the Retail Price Index (RPI). Secondary data analysis 
on the rents of other social landlords (HM Government, 2014b:2014c) does 
not reveal the same pattern. WCC’s rent increases for their own stock were 
in excess of one per cent over RPI for every year since 1998 (with the 
exception of 2000 and 2011). For a number of years, WCC’s rents increased 
by double the percentage increase in RPI.  
These purported benefits were corroborated in the interview data. 
Exemplifying this, Diana, who has relatives living in social housing provided 
by a different landlord, offered the following assessment; 
‘The rents are drastically low. I mean my rent here is about £109, my 
mum has got a two bedroom and hers is like £180 a week. Compared 
to Westminster Council, the rents are kept very low’ (Diana, WECH 
tenant). 
Such comparisons reveal local level differences in rent levels. However, 
WECH is not immune from the wider factors which dictate higher rent levels. 
One such factor is government mechanisms for influencing rent levels in the 
social housing sector, which affects WECH given their receipt of government 
grants. It is therefore revealing that, in observations of WECH meetings, 
government interventions to increase social rental prices were being 
resisted. WECH’s policy of rent increases in line with RPI has meant 
resisting the government’s target rent model, which aimed to converge rents 
to a target price by 2012, based on property valuations in a district and 
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annual earnings. More recent government policies, such as allowing social 
housing providers to charge up to 80 per cent of market prices, have also 
been resisted (Fieldnote from observations of WECH’s AGM, 24th September 
2014). Further to this, discussions in WECH Board meetings revealed how, 
even if these mechanisms were applied to new properties that the 
organisation built, the rents would ‘revert…to WECH levels as soon as the 
scheme has paid for itself' (Fieldnote observation, Board meeting, 2014). 
Restricting rent increases seems to be a key feature of WECH’s 
development, and how it has forged relations with its residents. In the offer to 
residents, prior to the transfer of properties under Tenants’ Choice, a 
promise was made to reduce rents by £1 per week. The financial imperative 
to keep rental prices down has clearly persisted, and continues to be 
something that residents see as a key benefit of being part of WECH. The 
extent to which this will persist, given the imperatives of stock improvement 
and building more homes, remains to be seen. 
For Granby CLT, as a fledgling organisation which only took ownership of its 
property in 2014, financial benefits were not evident at the time of study. It is 
possible, however, to look at what the organisation is proposing to do, and 
explore whether securing financial benefits for its members will be a key 
priority. One significant objective for the CLT is to contribute to the 
refurbishment and redevelopment of the area, alongside its housing 
association partners, to increase the value of existing properties in the area. 
Several decades of failed or stalled regeneration initiatives, and depressed 
house prices, have affected the value of assets owned by existing 
homeowners. This predicament was expressed by Shirley, a long-time 
resident of the area and CLT Board member, who conveyed how these 
difficulties lead to important constraints on households; 
‘…their assets have been stripped…as in any homeowner here, 
property values have been completely kept down to the cheapest in the 
country…most of us live here to live in a house not to make money from 
it, but it’s the principle that you couldn’t leave if you wanted to’ (Shirley, 
Granby resident and CLT Board member). 
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Shirley is highlighting the potential for negative equity among homeowners, 
and how low values had affected the mobility and housing choices of those 
households. It is therefore understandable that an aim of the CLT is to drive 
up those asset values, bringing financial benefits to existing homeowners, as 
well as other benefits in terms of mobility and freedom to relocate. However, 
interviewees acknowledged certain fears related to this, foreseeing possible 
gentrification which would change the character of the place. A number of 
interviewees saw personal benefits in being surrounded by ‘37 languages 
and every major religion’ (Catherine, Granby resident and CLT Board 
member) and did not want housing improvement to change this. Further still, 
being surrounded by empty properties was seen to have facilitated a more 
communal way of life; 
‘…all the empty houses are an extension of our gardens and you get 
used to that, so you've got those fears as well’ (Catherine, Granby 
resident and CLT Board member). 
There is a suggestion then that financial gains may be offset by changes in 
the character of the Four Streets, which may not be welcomed by all 
residents. 
As the CLT neared the completion of its first refurbished properties in 2015, 
proposals for the tenure of the units became clear (Granby CLT, 2016). Five 
of the ten properties would be offered for shared ownership. Under this 
model, 80 per cent equity would be sold and the other 20 per cent rented by 
the occupier. The end costs for such residents were unknown at the time of 
writing. The other five properties were to be let at ‘affordable rent’, and as all 
ten units would be two-bedroomed, this aids some local comparisons to 
assess their affordability. In reference to the rented properties, evidence 
suggested that the rental price would be £104 per week when let (Liverpool 
Echo, 2015). Average household incomes for the ward in which the houses 
are located was £23k per annum in 2015, and for Liverpool more broadly, it 
was £29k per annum (LCC, 2015). Simplistically, CLT rents of £104 per 
week would be less than a quarter of the gross annual earnings of 
households in the local ward, and less than a fifth of the average earnings of 
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households in the wider Liverpool area. This analysis of price to income 
whilst approximate, suggests that the CLT’s rents will be relatively affordable, 
especially in comparison to the average price of private rental housing. Two-
bedroomed properties in Liverpool (as of March 2016) were priced at £126 
per week (Home.co.uk, 2016), which is over £20 more than the proposed 
weekly rental price for the CLT’s houses. Despite this, average social rental 
prices for Liverpool in 2015 were approximately £83 per week across all 
property sizes (DCLG, 2016b). This is approximately £20 less per week than 
the CLT’s houses, accepting this latter data includes properties larger and 
smaller than the CLT’s two-bedroomed houses. Such data suggests a 
degree of affordability, almost certainly in reference to private rents. 
Further to these potential financial benefits for future residents, the CLT has 
placed an emphasis on creating local employment opportunities, particularly 
developing skills and jobs through the construction and refurbishment of the 
housing (Granby CLT, 2013a). As discussed in the next section, this has 
emerged from a particular view of how local people should benefit from the 
CLT’s activities.   
The evidence presented above suggest that the case study organisations are 
or will in future deliver certain financial benefits to residents and members. 
However, differences in the extent of those benefits are apparent in each 
case. This poses questions about whether the patterns of these financial 
gains relate to different collective forms and functions.  
The relationship between the benefits and organisational form and function 
In Milton Park, a crucial component in structuring low rents is the 
participation of co-op members in the maintenance and management of their 
housing. In an interview with Arabelle, a long-standing resident of her co-op 
and advocate of CMP, a connection was made between the non-profit model 
adopted and the pricing of rents; 
‘…because this is a…non-profit, we’re paying maintenance, taxes and 
insurance, that’s it. It’s as though we are already owners…so we’re just 
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paying the basic cost of housing, but we’re not capitalising’ (Arabelle, 
Milton Park Resident). 
A model based on the intensive participation of a community in the 
maintenance and management of property is likely to result in lower costs. 
This is a well-rehearsed argument in the community ownership literature 
(Price Waterhouse, 1995; Quirk, 2007), and is also clearly articulated in the 
longstanding principles guiding co-ops, notably the principle of members’ 
economic participation (ICA, 2015). In Milton Park because the co-ops have 
no paid staff, the running costs do not include salaries (in contrast, for 
instance, with WECH). Indeed, in a national evaluation of Canadian housing 
co-operatives, it was found that the operating costs per unit of such housing 
(even when volunteer time was monetised), was some 14 per cent lower 
than other non-profit rental housing (CMHC, 2003, p.33).   
Whilst such operating costs contribute to low rental charges, this 
phenomenon is also the product of land and property being held out of the 
open market. As Arabelle noted above, restrictions mean it is hard for the co-
ops to sell their property on the open market and this removes a major 
source of inflationary pressure. As Margaret, a member of the CMP Board 
revealed, there are strict conditions on the resale of property in Milton Park. If 
attempts are made to sell property, it has to be offered to the co-owners of 
CMP (the other housing co-ops and OSBLs) first, with the price evaluated in 
a way that is significantly below open market prices. 
In a similar way to social housing, such processes remove inflationary 
pressure on prices. Any increase or decrease in rents is based on the co-
ops’ running and maintenance costs, and other internal considerations, 
rather than on the value of the land and property. As noted above, there are 
additional restrictions on rental prices, stemming from the allocation 
requirements set out in the Declaration of Co-ownership. Furthermore, there 
were the ‘acquired rights’ of owners, which protected the original residents 
from rent increases when they moved into the housing co-ops.  
These facets of the CMP model, and the related rules which govern co-ops’ 
rents, all act to supress rental prices. The organisational form, and the rules 
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that govern how it functions, are playing a crucial causal role in keeping rents 
low.  
A further factor contributes to low rental costs. Residents are co-owners and 
landlords; they collectively have the power to keep their rents to a minimum. 
Such a duality of roles means that costs are minimised because members 
know that if they are not, then it will be reflected in what they personally have 
to pay. This asserts a recurring theme, prominent throughout the data from 
Milton Park; that the governance model leads to certain decisions (and 
decision making processes) that are distinctive from other forms of housing 
provision.  
The above gives a strong causal explanation as to why rents continue to 
remain low in Milton Park, and therefore why residents benefit financially. 
However, claiming this as a universal explanation would be to oversimplify 
the picture. Low rents have been made possible, in part, due to financial 
support from the different tiers of the Canadian government (as noted in 
chapter six). Mortgage interest relief and capital grants to purchase the land 
have all removed financial burdens on CMP’s co-owners. Without this 
financial support the housing co-ops and OSBL’s would have had to set 
much higher rents to finance the debt required to undertake refurbishment. 
Low rents are only partially explained by the organisational model of CMP.  
WECH’s approach to rents, and its low rental charges, are arguably the 
product of similar but distinct processes. In Milton Park the organisational 
form both compels and incentivises low rents. In WECH there is not the 
same structure of rules affecting rents, nor is there the same intensive 
involvement of residents in the maintenance and management of the 
housing. This means that such functions are largely carried out by staff which 
are a cost to the organisation, which then has a knock-on effect on the rents 
charged.  
How then can WECH’s low rents be explained? Rather than focusing on 
residents’ time investment, an explanation is found in a number of different 
processes.  For instance, one might highlight the influence exerted by 
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residents within the governance structure, the historic precedent of low rents 
which affects current decision-making, and the way executive staff have a 
keen eye on the financial deprivation of their residents.  
With its governance rules stating that a majority of the WECH Board must be 
residents, a strong influence can be exerted on decisions relating to the 
organisation’s finances. On the issue of rents, an interesting collective 
consciousness seems to emerge. Hinting at this Barbara, noted; 
‘…because everybody knows everybody else, and someone said 'well 
we have to put the rent up’ because that was the minimum amount we 
wanted to, it’s such a family orientated type of thing that it works’ 
(Barbara, WECH resident). 
Barbara is highlighting how, when decisions to raise rents need to be made, 
there is a level of buy-in from residents due to the representative processes 
of the organisation. Similarly, it can be argued that when there is no 
imperative to raise rents, then resident representatives can exert influence 
on staff to keep rents low. Such processes are similar to those in Milton Park, 
where residents have a dual role, being both landlord and tenant.  
Whilst the organisational form might make low rents possible, this can only 
be achieved where there are the resources to do this. In a number of 
interviews, residents and supporters noted how financial surpluses have 
been retained and used to keep rents low:  
 ‘…look at its balance sheet, that’s used to hold down rents. Through 
taking ownership of the land and making sure that its first priority is 
existing residents’ (Dylan, WECH supporter). 
The final point is a crucial one. Social housing providers have a balance to 
strike between the level of rent paid by existing residents, and the financial 
needs of the organisation and future development. Those organisations 
prioritising new development of housing clearly have pressures on their 
finances and this may result in rent increases for existing residents. 
Ironically, WECH was facing a similar dilemma in 2013/14 with its Elgin 
development which was likely to lead to rent increases, although still only 0.5 
per cent above RPI (WECH, 2014).  
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Increasing rental charges to support new development is made all the more 
difficult because of WECH’s historic approach to rent setting. When WECH 
was created, the organisation ‘reduced all rents by £1’ (WECH, 2006[1998], 
p.62), and the organisation committed to only increasing rents in line with 
inflation. Such historic commitments seem to have become embedded in the 
culture of the organisation and the expectations of residents, and seemed to 
play a key part of any explanation of current rent setting.  
Added to these historical factors, is the organisation’s general sensitivity to 
the financial hardship of its residents. How the organisation deals with issues 
of rent arrears and the Spare Room Subsidy (also known as the Bedroom 
Tax), reveals some distinctive processes unlikely to be found in comparator 
organisations. This quotation from Clive, a WECH officer, is revealing: 
‘So we ended up with some people…getting £2,000 housing benefit 
arrears, eventually, this might have been three years later, it was paid 
back. Other associations were evicting those people…if we evict people 
at the drop of a hat because it’s in our financial interests…then we’re 
ignoring some of the other reasons for being in the business that we’re 
in’ (Clive, WECH officer).  
The increasing commercialisation and conglomeration of housing 
associations in the UK (Mullins, 2010b), leaves little room for this kind of 
flexible approach to rent arrears. Yet WECH’s organisational form, and its 
legacy of low rents, makes this type of intervention possible and desirable. 
Dylan, an early supporter of WECH, suggested the organisation had ‘moved 
people around and de-bedroom taxed’ them, in addition to supporting 
residents to take cases to appeal. It is hard to conclusively attribute WECH’s 
approach on these issues to the organisation’s form. Any housing provider 
could potentially adopt similar processes. Nonetheless, a tentative 
suggestion can be made that WECH’s collective ownership model, and the 
influence residents play in the governance of the organisation, makes such 
processes more likely. 
For Granby CLT, clarifying the linkages between their aspired benefits and 
the organisational form and function is more difficult. The focus of the 
organisation on increasing local asset values is something most asset-
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owning housing organisations would want to do. Being a membership 
organisation, run by volunteers who live in the area where those assets are 
owned, may make such decisions more likely. 
The CLT, and its key actors, repeatedly stressed that financial gains will be 
made by local people through employment initiatives. This is an aspiration 
asserted in CLT documents and interviews with participants: 
‘I was like, well what about employment opportunities, it’s not just about 
ten houses for any of those residents, it’s about community and getting 
community benefit’ (Helena, Granby CLT supporter and Board 
member). 
This quotation from Helena, a stakeholder Board member, is interesting in 
that it uses the language of the legal form that the CLT has adopted. As a 
‘community benefit society’ (FCA, 2015), the organisation is rule-bound to 
identify a specific community and provide benefits to them. Hence, the 
quotation reveals how the organisation’s form, and the legal rules that govern 
it, are framing what the organisation does, who are its beneficiaries and the 
language used to describe its operations. The CLT Board is aware that its 
‘community’ is wider than the streets where it will own property. Its objective 
is to benefit residents in the L8 postcode, and one way they propose to do 
this is by ‘providing opportunities for employment and training’ (Granby CLT, 
2013b).  
However, the organisational form does not adequately explain why the CLT 
will try to deliver these benefits. The causal pathway from the CLT’s form and 
functions to the aspired financial and employment benefits seemed to hinge 
on the influence of a few key actors, highlighting that however assertive the 
collective form is, it cannot predict outcomes.  
The section above highlights the financial benefits that the case studies are 
delivering in terms of affordable, low cost housing, and how they have the 
potential to create other financial benefits in terms of employment. Crucially, 
the above analysis has revealed some of the processes which are 
embedded in the forms and types of functioning of the collectives, and which 
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partly explain why and how these benefits are achieved. In section 5, such 
processes are conceptualised as core mechanisms that are distinctive to 
these types of organisation. 
9.3. Security and control 
The empirical evidence 
Across the case studies there is evidence that residents perceive a sense of 
enhanced physical security as a result of their residency and membership of 
the collective. Exemplifying this, Camille, a resident in a Milton Park co-op, 
provided a comparative assessment of security against other rented 
accommodation. Camille did this with an anecdote about one of her friends;  
‘…she was on a job trip and she got robbed, when she arrived the door 
of her apartment was wide open and nobody called her, no body closed 
the door, nobody called the police. Nothing. And she wanted to move 
into a co-op because of that. That would not be happening if I pass in 
front of her house, and I see the door open, I will go in and ask [a] 
question and I will do something about it, at least call the police man. 
And she didn't like that idea of nobody knowing you and nobody cares’ 
(Camille, Milton Park resident). 
 
The enhanced sense of physical security gained from living in the co-op 
would seem to flow from a stronger set of relations between neighbours. A 
number of Milton Park residents linked the strength of local relations to 
feelings of security about raising children in the area. As Margaret, who had 
raised her daughter in Milton Park, noted; 
‘…we were always confident you know, when she went out to walk her 
dog, when she was playing with her friends in the street we knew there 
were many people keeping an eye on things’ (Margaret, Milton Park 
resident and CMP Board member).  
Interviews with residents in Milton Park suggest that residents experience a 
sense of physical security, and that their collectivism was a protection 
against physical harm by others. 
More variable sentiments were observed among residents in WECH. Craig, a 
WECH Board member and resident, suggested that there is ‘very little 
vandalism, very little neighbour nuisance…very little aggression’ in the area 
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(Craig, WECH resident and Board member). Other interviewees, such as 
Diana who was relatively unengaged in the running of WECH, reflected how 
she had ‘never been mugged, never been robbed…you hear about it’. The 
final element of this quotation hints at perhaps more threats to physical 
security in the WECH area than Milton Park. Ambrose and Stone’s (2010) 
report suggests that worries about physical security are prominent among 
WECH residents, which they argue is understandable given relatively high 
crime rates in the area. Feeling ‘safe walking after dark’ was one of the few 
measures where WECH tenants saw life under their previous landlord more 
positively (Ambrose & Stone, 2010, p.66). This hints at differences in 
outcomes when compared with Milton Park.  
Further analysis of the Ambrose and Stone data helps unpick this issue. 
Whilst feelings of insecurity were apparent, this seemed to be linked the 
wider environment. For residents who had lived in rented accommodation 
previously, the feeling of being ‘safe in your home’ was markedly higher 
under WECH. This serves as a reminder that each collective is operating in 
conditions not wholly within their control. 
In Granby, there was little mention of physical security, with exception of 
references to people living in terraces where a large amount of housing is 
empty. Shirley, a long-standing resident and activist in Granby, suggested 
there is an insecurity caused by the empty housing, and that the planned 
refurbishments and repopulation will address some of these issues; 
‘…homeowners…were all worried and getting freaked out by this living 
on their own on a terrace…so there is a kind of security…the big benefit 
is that the community becomes more sustainable and settled’ (Shirley, 
Granby resident and CLT Board member).  
Clearly, the CLT anticipates that its refurbishment programme will help bring 
new residents to the area resulting in a greater sense of security and safety. 
With little prospect of this happening without their intervention, collectivism 
may well be the vehicle to facilitate this. 
Linked to such issues of physical security, are more subtle issues regarding 
residents’ feelings of security of tenure. Evidence from across the case 
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studies attests to the important psychological benefits that are derived from 
such security. Interviewees shared their past experience of poor housing or 
homelessness, and how their current situation had remedied this. David, a 
member of a housing co-op in Milton Park, talked in detail about how housing 
plays an important function in residents’ quality of life. These thoughts are 
worthy of an extended quotation: 
‘Sometimes we tend to forget about it [housing] because the question is 
solved, but when you are confronted with the [lack of housing] issue 
your life can become a living hell…whatever the reason, it becomes the 
centre of your life, it takes all your energy… it has consequences on 
wellbeing, health and things like that… but I have experienced myself 
and what I see in people who I know more…it’s a sense of a certain 
freedom you know, it’s not a major preoccupation. As long as I want to 
stay in this neighbourhood the housing issue is not a major 
preoccupation’ (David, Milton Park resident). 
The quotation powerfully illustrates the links between secure housing and the 
quality of life individuals may experience. David is succinctly articulating 
some of the literature regarding the ontological security provided by stable 
housing and security of tenure (Dupuis and Thorns, 1998).   
WECH residents perceived a similar insecurity to life outside the collective. A 
number of interviewees joined WECH after spending time in short-life 
housing, a precarious form of tenure. Francis, a current WECH resident who 
had previously occupied WECH properties under a short-life agreement, 
noted how under such arrangements he had few rights, and was 
permanently under threat of 28 days’ notice to vacate. For Francis a 
permanent WECH tenancy was, in his own words, ‘like the holy grail’.  
For Craig, a WECH Board member, such security of tenure provides an 
‘operating platform’ on which to build the other elements of your life. Echoing 
David in Milton Park, Craig noted how a secure tenure meant that tenants did 
not have to ‘spend their life worrying about the roof over their head’. 
Similarly, WECH residents see the private rented sector as synonymous with 
insecurity of tenure and a lack of control. Linking security of tenure and rental 
costs Craig noted; 
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‘…in private [rented accommodation] A) you've got no security at all, 
and B) you've got rents that can go up at any point...they're busting 
places on the Harrow Rd where there were people living in basements 
under shops, we're right back to where we were’ (Craig, WECH 
resident and Board member). 
The extent to which this is linked to collective provision, rather than merely 
long and stable tenancies, is discussed in the following sub-section. Studies 
with WECH residents have revealed potential linkages between their sense 
of security and control under WECH and their general happiness. In their 
2010 study, Ambrose and Stone (2010, p.60) asked residents a number of 
important questions, requesting that they use a four-point scale to grade their 
level of agreement4. Responses were then averaged to find the mean figure 
for the sample, whereby anything over 2.5 indicated a positive response, and 
anything under 2.5 a negative perception. Two questions of particular note 
for this issue of security and control were: 
i. It makes me feel happier because I feel settled and in charge; and 
ii. I feel better because I have a greater sense of control over my 
housing situation 
Respondents were asked to provide a score for WECH and their previous 
landlord. Leaving aside the leading nature of these questions, some 
comparative judgements can be drawn. For those WECH residents who had 
been housed in other rented accommodation, there was a significant 
difference in their judgments. In response to the first question, residents had 
a generally scored previous landlords more negatively, the mean score for 
the sample 2.09, which suggests that their happiness was compromised by 
not feeling settled and in charge. Under WECH their responses converted to 
a positive figure, 3.59, suggesting a general feeling of being more settled and 
in charge under WECH. Similar conversions from negative to positive scores 
were evident for the second question. Such analysis suggests that under 
WECH residents do feel, comparatively at least, a set of distinctive 
                                                          
4
 Study͛s four point scale is as follows: 1=very negative response, 2=negative response, 3=positive 
response, 4=very positive response. An average score of 2.5 was taken to be a neutral verdict 
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psychological benefits that relates to the control of their housing. The 
linkages between these benefits and the organisational form and function are 
explored in more detail below. 
It is interesting that in the open response to the above two questions, many 
respondents highlighted a relationship between ‘feeling settled and in control’ 
and the rent levels of the organisation (Ambrose and Stone, 2010, p.60-62). 
Such reflections are clearly interesting in a context such as London where 
there is significant pressure on housing prices, and a shortage of affordable 
provision with tenure security. ‘Security’ then may come to mean various 
things; protection from price rises, feeling able to influence decisions, and 
feeling eviction or displacement is an unlikely prospect. 
The desire for control is not confined to those areas where market pressures 
are most substantial. In Granby, several attempts at addressing empty 
housing by the local authority, all of which had proven inadequate, had left 
residents feeling a sense of disempowerment and lack of control over the 
physical development of their area. For members of the CLT, their 
organisation is an assertion of (and vehicle for) control of that development. 
When asked why she thought the CLT had been created, Avril, a CLT Board 
member provided the following insight; 
‘...it’s definitely about people power, this is us taking back control, in 
something that has a formal structure that aids that’ (Avril, Granby 
resident and Board member). 
Avril’s comment is revealing as it not only highlights the desire for more 
control that is driving the development of the CLT, but also how the 
organisational form of a CLT is seen as a suitable vehicle for this. 
The relationship between the benefits and organisational form and function 
The interplay between organisational form, and the preservation of security 
of tenure, was a recurring theme throughout the case study interviews. 
Perceptions of control and security appear to be positively associated with 
the organisational form of the collective. Asset ownership, and the rights this 
confers, appears to be directly linked to perceptions of such security. The 
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legal forms that the case study organisations have adopted (community 
benefit societies or federated co-operative models) provide the structure 
within which residents can assert control over their houses and surrounding 
area, and ensure they can access these assets and locations for the long 
term. 
There are numerous expressions of this connection in the case studies. In 
Milton Park, the governance processes within each co-op, and within the 
wider CMP syndicate, underpin this. David described the relationships 
between the democratic processes within his co-op and perceptions of 
control as follows; 
‘…we have the capacity to govern ourselves, like when you live in a co-
op, there is a general assembly, the decisions are made by everyone, if 
there are things you don't like…its always possible to stand up in a 
meeting and say 'I do not agree' or 'I am concerned with that issue'…it’s 
very empowering. It gives us the sense that to a certain extent we are 
masters of our destiny’ (David, Milton Park resident). 
To pose a counter factual question, could the same outcomes be achieved in 
a different type of ownership model? What is it about these specific forms of 
ownership and governance that causally influences perceptions of control? 
There are two crucial features of the Milton Park model which suggest a link 
between the organisational form and residents’ sense of control. The first is 
the level of involvement in the management and maintenance of assets. The 
second critical feature is the form of property ownership. The quotation below 
from Frank sheds light on these interlocking features; 
‘…it gives you…the ownership feeling, that you own the place. You do 
not practically…legally you're a tenant, but you are also a member of 
the organisation that owns the place…I'm planting flowers in my yard, 
no landlord from outside can tell me 'no’…that won't happen because I 
participated in this decision to plant flowers here with my neighbours’ 
(Frank, OSBL manager).  
This neatly summarises the causal pathway from organisational form to 
perceptions of control. As a member of the organisation that owns the 
property they are protected from interference by other bodies. It is the unique 
configuration of legal rights and operational rules which, in part, explains 
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these protections. As discussed in chapter six, the unique model that 
emerged in Milton Park, as an adaptation of condominium law, is what 
underwrites these processes. A member of the legal team devising this 
model, described it as follows: 
‘Each co-operative and association would become a co-owner in the 
condominium scheme…Condominium rules would create a complete 
universe, bound by its own internal rules and regulations 
…Condominium rules also require a clause defining the “Destination” of 
such a universe…that could be used to promote community goals and 
exclude community taboos’ (Altshul, 1989, in Kowaluk and Piché-
Burton, 2012). 
In essence, property laws are being blended with localised rules to shape 
resident and member’s behaviour. Security of tenure and control of housing 
and land is a product of these legal and operational devices. In the ten 
principles devised when CMP was being formed, four relate directly to 
control and the security of tenure of the existing community, and these 
principles are reaffirmed in organisational literature to remind residents of the 
purpose and function of CMP (Kowaluk & Piche-Burton, 2012). It can be 
seen how the organisational model, and the narratives used to describe it, 
create the conditions for a perceived sense of control.  
If the Milton Park model is causally linked to residents’ perceptions, this is 
equally the case in WECH. However, the nature of the organisational form 
and the perceptions this gives rise to are qualitatively different. The 
ownership of land and housing, and the legal rights associated with this, are 
issues that are far less prominent in the WECH data. Any perceptions of 
control and security find their origins in a different set of processes.  
This arises from analysis of both interviews with WECH residents, and 
secondary analysis of the data produced by Ambrose and Stone (2010). This 
latter data is revealing in terms of WECH residents’ sense of ownership. Of 
the 82 WECH residents that responded to the open question ‘Who owns and 
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manages WECH?’, only 16 thought that it was tenants and/or residents5. 
Whilst such data is hard to interpret without comparisons or relative 
measures, it does suggest that most residents do not perceive themselves to 
be co-owners of WECH property. 
Running simple correlational tests on responses to survey questions asked 
by Ambrose and Stone, highlights some important findings. Whilst ownership 
may not be a significant factor in perceptions of control, feelings of influence 
are perhaps more important. Indeed, the correlational tests, performed on 
Ambrose and Stone’s survey data, suggest that being able to influence 
decisions is far more closely associated with perceptions of control, than 
actually being involved in the running of WECH. This is important given that 
WECH’s representative model dictates those ‘running’ the organisation 
through the Board will only ever be a few individuals. One of the strongest 
correlations found in the data related to residents’ answers to the following 
two questions6: 
i. To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "WECH 
empowers me because I am able to vote for Board members and it 
is responsive because it is easy to speak to staff members to get 
things done?; and 
ii. I feel better because I have a greater sense of control over my 
housing situation in WECH? 
The tests revealed a moderately strong association (Dancey and Reidy, 
2004) between responses. Other correlational tests exploring an association 
between involvement in WECH and feelings of control, revealed little or no 
association. This analysis, whilst far from conclusive, suggests that where 
respondents perceive some influence over decisions, for instance through 
the representative structures of WECH and/or through access to responsive 
staff, they also feel a greater sense of control. This appears to be the case 
                                                          
5
 This was an open response question, and therefore the data was coded into four categories: Don't 
know, Other, Staff, and Tenants & residents 
6
 Spearman rank correlation was used, given the ordinal nature of the data. The correlational co-
efficient was 0.470, significant at the 0.01 level 
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irrespective of residents’ perceptions of who actually owns the physical 
property. 
This linkage between the ability to influence decisions, and perceptions of 
control, comes into sharper focus when the governance arrangements of 
WECH are considered. WECH’s model is built on processes for 
representative democracy, rather than the more participative democracy 
inherent in the Milton Park model. WECH residents’ heightened perceptions 
of control are linked to their ability to influence decisions through these 
governance arrangements. The following features of these governance 
arrangements are key to this; residents holding a large majority of seats on 
the Board; residents electing representatives to that Board through 
competitive elections; and, resident access to responsive staff. The following 
extract from WECH’s ‘Against the Odds’ document reveals the levels of 
control and influence exerted by residents within WECH’s governance 
structure: 
‘Around three quarters of WECH tenants and leaseholders are 
members of WECH. The members elect the Board at the Annual 
General Meeting held in September. The Board is made up of 14 
residents and six experts’ (WECH, 2006[1998], p.57). 
Observations of WECH Board meetings and its 2014 Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) were conducted as part of the current study. Fieldnotes from 
these observations attest to a high level of resident control within the 
governance of the organisation. Whilst observing the AGM an approximate 
head count was made, and over 120 residents were in attendance (from a 
membership of around 600). The AGM is the process through which new 
Board members are elected, so this represents a degree of healthy 
engagement in the democratic processes of the organisation. It seems 
beyond reasonable doubt that WECH’s residents exert a strong influence 
through its Board structure. For those not sitting on the Board, competitive 
elections seem an important means to exert influence. Ambrose and Stone’s 
own analysis (2010, p.66) adds weight to this suggestion. They reveal that 
62 percent of WECH residents agree that they can ‘influence decisions’ 
affecting their local area, compared with only 42 percent nationally.  
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Tentative links can be made between WECH’s representative form of 
governance, and relations between staff and residents. During an interview 
with a WECH officer, Clive, the importance of asset ownership to perceptions 
of control was actually downplayed; 
‘In fact it may be possible to have an organisation where ownership 
exists but if you've got the wrong staff team, or a cliquey group of Board 
members, who are prepared to work to prevent other people from 
feeding their views through…so it [ownership] doesn't either necessarily 
mean that it will happen, and its absence doesn't mean necessarily that 
it doesn't have to happen’ (Clive, WECH officer). 
Perhaps this argument, that resident ownership is no guarantee of resident’s 
sense of control and security, suggests caution is required in making causal 
claims about how far collective form alone can deliver such benefits. The 
function of the organisation is also a critical factor in this. 
Perceptions of control and security in Granby are somewhat more difficult to 
link to the organisation’s form and function. As an embryonic CLT, which at 
the time of writing has only just taken ownership of assets, the benefits in 
terms of control and security are still unclear. Interviewees’ reflections on 
these benefits took the form of aspirations rather than well evidenced 
outcomes. Nonetheless, the interviewees’ language was revealing in terms 
of how a sense of control might be linked to the organisational form of the 
CLT. The frequent use of the term ‘ownership’ by Granby residents suggests 
that, like in Milton Park, perceptions of control are strongly wedded to ideas 
about proprietorship and long-term possession of the physical assets. The 
quotation below from Shirley, a long-time resident of Granby and CLT Board 
member, exemplifies this; 
‘…[the] CLT is so significant because it’s about the community 
regaining, albeit symbolically at the moment, regaining ownership of 
bricks and mortar and hopefully land… people will just get a sense of 
wow, 'we own this place' (Shirley, Granby resident and CLT Board 
member). 
The CLT’s legal form provides a structure for this ownership of assets, and 
for the use of those assets in a way that members and residents demand. As 
a result of the legal composition of the CLT, the assets have to be used for 
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‘community benefit’, and this dimension of the organisational form appeared 
to be linked to perceptions of control and security. This process was 
succinctly articulated by Helena, a CLT Board member and executive of a 
partner housing association;  
‘…but actually they can see the community benefit, and they know from 
the outset, the whole structure, it was setup for the purpose of the 
benefit of the community. So if any wider member of the community 
questions the actions or benefit, you can say actually this is a model for 
the benefit of the community...that's really important’ (Helena, Granby 
CLT supporter and Board member). 
Despite these perceptions of ownership and organisational form, these only 
provide a starting point or structure for certain processes. The way the CLT 
functions is a product of how the form is interpreted and enacted by its 
members. Avril, a CLT Board member, was keen to point out that whilst the 
CLT’s form creates rules for democratic functioning, effort needed to be 
invested in engaging people in those processes; 
‘…yeah there's possibly a greater concern over democracy, and talking 
to other people who might be living in those houses a lot more’ (Avril, 
Granby resident and Board member). 
Avril is drawing attention to the limitations of the CLT form. It does not 
guarantee representation of a wider constituency and therefore does not 
guarantee that all members and potential beneficiaries can influence it. 
Given that perceived influence over decisions may link to perceptions of 
security and control, the CLT may in future need to strengthen these 
democratic processes to deliver such benefits to a wider constituency. 
The above section has revealed links between the governance forms of 
collectives which are operationalised in various ways, and residents and 
members sense of physical and tenure security. Propositions, made in the 
literature, seem to have some validity for the cases studied. Advocates claim 
that housing collectivism can enhance physical security and this is derived 
from close relations with neighbours (CCMH, 2009), but as shown in WECH 
local conditions can be a mitigating factor. Similarly, the findings above add 
depth to the literature suggesting that collective forms of housing can deliver 
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benefits in terms of tenure security (Sousa & Quarter, 2005; Haffner & 
Brunner, 2014; Bunce, 2012), and suggests certain processes through which 
this might happen.  
9.4. Learning, health and quality of life 
The empirical evidence 
One of the striking findings from this research is that, in the act of developing 
and managing these housing organisations, residents were gaining new 
skills and knowledge. There is variation in the nature of this learning, but it is 
quite clearly a cross-case pattern.  
Interviews with those involved in the development of Granby CLT reveal the 
steep learning curve for volunteers. Helena, who works for a housing 
association supporting the CLT, provided an insight into this. Those residents 
active on the CLT Board had undergone an intensive period of experiential 
learning, specifically in terms of planning and managing construction and 
refurbishment programmes. This had entailed working closely with quantity 
surveyors, architects and business planners to devise and resource such 
schemes. Reflecting on this period, Helena recounted how one member had 
immersed herself in these issues; 
‘…she’s learnt all those skills which is just fantastic. She probably 
knows more than me in terms of development’ (Helena, Granby CLT 
supporter and Board member). 
Such a statement, from an experienced housing professional, highlights just 
how much has been learnt by volunteers.  
This has translated to certain psychological benefits. Avril, a Granby CLT 
Board member, noted how residents’ involvement had ‘given them a degree 
of insight and confidence’. However, expressing a potential set of costs and 
trade-offs, Avril also noted how such rigours might mean they ‘never want to 
do anything again’. Such costs are explored further in chapter ten. The 
Granby case gives one a sense of the hard earned psychological benefits of 
participation in housing collectives. 
 262 
 
WECH residents attested to similar intensive periods of learning, although 
this relates more specifically to how housing organisations are managed and 
governed. Whilst some of the residents involved in running WECH had 
learned about governance issues from past experiences, others had no 
previous experience of running non-profit housing organisations. Ellie, a 
WECH Board member, reflected on what she had learned about the 
governance of WECH, and the processes the organisation had put in place 
to support this learning; 
‘…well yeah it’s probably another reason I joined, to understand how 
the Board works…a lot of the emphasis is on finance…we’ve had an 
extra session with him [the Finance Director]…just to get our heads 
round it. But it’s interesting and I understand a lot more after one 
year…that’s useful skills’ (Ellie, WECH resident and Board member).  
Ellie seemed to value what she had learned, and the above quotation reveals 
the complex financial management processes she has had to get to grips 
with. Later in our interview Ellie also stressed how learning about ‘running 
Boards’ and ‘handling memberships’ were ‘transferable’ skills. Such 
statements clarify two distinct benefits linked to the processes of learning in 
the case studies; one relating to the psychological benefits of stimulation and 
new found confidence in areas of hitherto limited experience; and two, the 
benefit of acquiring transferrable skills. 
In Milton Park, residents and members of the housing co-ops are responsible 
for all aspects of housing management, this means that most individuals 
have to develop their knowledge in this field. Martin, reflected on how 
members in his co-op had become proficient in technical areas related to 
maintenance; 
‘…And she's a little expert on roofing materials, because she spent so 
much time with these roofers and engineers, looking at the materials 
and understanding what they are doing, all the different costs…she's a 
kindergarten teacher, she's not an expert’ (Martin, Milton Park resident).  
It becomes apparent, through the analysis of the case study data that such 
immersion in technical maintenance issues has knock on benefits. There is 
evidence that such learning stimulates members and gives them a sense of 
 263 
 
purpose. Mary, who sat on the maintenance committee for her co-op, 
revealed how her involvement in such property repair issues translated into a 
degree of intellectual stimulation; 
‘You do learn actually, it’s interesting...you meet the contractors and 
that’s really interesting, that’s fascinating…they’ll tell you what they’re 
going to do and it’s interesting talking to the architect’ (Mary, Milton 
Park resident). 
The frequent usage of terms such as ‘interesting’ and ‘fascinating’ reveals 
something beyond the pragmatic concern for building maintenance. A 
psychological benefit is being derived. Those residents active in their co-ops 
did allude, however, to a potential process of diminishing returns from such 
learning. Mary, reflecting on her own experience of managing maintenance 
issues, suggested that it had become ‘less interesting over time’. As 
discussed in the following chapter, these sentiments were echoed in other 
testimony which revealed how holding responsible positions in the co-op, 
over time, became more burdensome than stimulating.  
Across the case studies there is evidence that certain benefits, such as low 
rents, are leading to knock on benefits in terms of other learning 
opportunities and enhanced quality of life. In both WECH and Milton Park, 
low rents and security of tenure have created opportunities for residents to 
lead ‘alternative’ lifestyles. Residents in WECH noted how their housing 
arrangements allowed them to live ‘bohemian’ lifestyles, and that it allowed 
them to ‘travel’. Perhaps a more prominent pattern is that residents were 
using low rental costs, and the security provided by the collectives, to study 
or retrain in a new profession. Martin, a long time Milton Park resident, 
recalled how his experience of living in the co-op had allowed him to retrain 
in another profession; 
‘…I was doing the audited books for the co-op, when I found two years 
in a row major mistakes in the draft versions of the statements, she said 
you should be an accountant...I wouldn’t be an accountant if it wasn’t 
for the co-op, I mean I was a machinist…we were paying relatively low 
levels of rent, so my stopping work was financially possible’ (Martin, 
Milton Park resident).  
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The quotation succinctly evidences the link between active participation in 
the co-op, low rental costs and opportunities to explore new career paths. 
The learning developed through such participation, combined with economic 
freedom from low rents, had enabled Martin to become an accountant. This 
intricate set of factors would be hard to find in any other form of housing 
provision, suggesting that the collective’s specific form and function had a 
causal role to play in these outcomes for Martin. 
In an interesting variation on Martin’s story, Ellie saw her own career path as 
owing much to WECH. On becoming a resident Ellie began to study for a 
qualification, and saw the housing provided by WECH as a crucial factor in 
enabling her to complete her studies. In an expression of the mutuality of the 
model, Ellie saw the need to ‘give something back’ as a result; 
‘I always said I would put myself up and serve after my [studies], 
because the place has supported me in that sense. They don’t know 
that but it’s so hard doing it and not earning much’ (Ellie, WECH 
resident and Board member).  
Such a sentiment suggests a recursive process is in play. WECH had 
enabled a resident to undertake education and training, which was 
something valued by that individual. In return they felt compelled to give back 
to the collective, or use their new found skills to enhance the maintenance 
and management of the housing. This is a subtle form of mutuality in action. 
Other perceived quality of life benefits were in evidence among residents and 
members of the collectives. Across the cases, social events seem to perform 
an important function in enhancing the ‘fun’ experienced by members. 
Across the interview transcripts for WECH and Milton Park, the word fun is 
used no fewer than nineteen times, often in the context of social activities 
and functions. For instance, WECH plays a prominent role in co-ordinating 
such activities. As Edith, a WECH resident, explained, the organisation is 
active in co-ordinating street parties, yoga classes, and using their AGM to 
bring residents together. Observations of the 2014 AGM reveal the important 
social function that this event seems to perform. Fieldnotes recount a ‘long 
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period before the meeting started where residents catch up...lots of hellos, 
affectionate greetings, kisses, laughter’ (Observation fieldnotes, 2014).  
Similarly, Milton Park’s Fêtes des Voisins (the ‘celebration of neighbours’), is 
a significant social event in residents' calendars. Fieldnotes from 
observations of this event highlight its sheer scale and the general 
atmosphere created in one of Milton Park’s secluded alleyways; 
‘Lots of affection and ‘bises’ [kisses]. People are still there at 9.30pm in 
large numbers. There are 40 tables with approx. six people on each, 
which is a minimum of 240 people’ (Observation fieldnotes, 2014). 
Large scale social gatherings perform an important function in Milton Park 
and WECH, and similar processes are in evidence in Granby. A local street 
market, organised by members of the CLT Board, has been central to 
making the CLT’s work relevant to local people. It appears that few residents 
want to be involved in the formal governance and management of the CLT, 
and the market provides an alternative route to participation. Describing the 
market, Beatrice gave the following insight; 
‘…it’s energising. But is not easy finding people...who will step up and 
step out and be involved in doing stuff. It’s not easy with CLTs, it’s quite 
particular, it’s a lot of admin-y stuff. Lots of people round here just 
wouldn't be up for that form of participation’ (Beatrice, Granby resident 
and CLT Board member). 
Hence, the social activities that CLT members are involved in organising 
form an important function in involving a wider set of constituents.  
The psychological benefits derived from such social activities are hard to 
establish. It is difficult to attribute any tangible link between, for example, 
social events and the quality of life of residents. Despite this, however, there 
are suggestions that such activities are having a positive effect on the health 
and psychological well-being of residents. Studies with WECH residents 
have led to claims that this form of collective ownership and management 
mitigates ‘physical illness and fear of crime’ (Satsangi, 2011, p.5). 
These are grand claims, but Ambrose’s comparative study (1996), which 
looked at health data for residents on an estate in Stepney and WECH, 
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suggests that the latter had far fewer illness episodes. Ambrose shows there 
is a statistically significant difference between residents in Stepney and 
WECH in terms of incidences of, for example, stress and depression. 
Residents in Stepney recorded 0.2 incidences of stress and depression per 
household over the study period, compared to 0.03 in WECH households 
(Ambrose, 1996, p.68). Such evidence does suggest, tentatively, that there 
are differences in the prevalence of certain health conditions experienced by 
WECH residents, compared to residents in similarly deprived areas which 
were selected as a comparator group. The extent to which these health 
benefits are derived from WECH’s form and function, as opposed to some 
other variables, is left unclear. 
The relationship between the benefits and organisational form and function  
The evidence presented above suggests that for some members, 
participation in the collective has provided extensive learning opportunities, 
in particular, relating to physical development, the management and 
maintenance of housing, and the governance of organisations. Posing a 
counter factual question, it could be asked whether collective forms of 
ownership and management are necessary for such learning to take place? 
Ownership of the assets would seem to have no bearing on what learning is 
possible. A charitable housing association with no tenants on its Board could 
ask residents to co-ordinate a development programme, thereby creating the 
similar opportunities. The key question is how likely such a scenario is, and 
whether organisational form and function makes such benefits more likely? 
Collective ownership and control of assets increases the probability that 
residents will need to learn about housing management and development, by 
necessity, and this is where the organisation’s form and function is causally 
connected to such learning benefits. 
The evidence above also suggests that the collectives have enabled 
members to undertake further studies and train in new professions. Whilst it 
is hard to find evidence that this is a direct product of organisational form and 
function, it is arguably related to other features of the collectives such as low 
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rental charges. Hence there is an indirect relationship between learning 
benefits and the collective’s form and function. The collective’s mode of 
ownership, and its processes for ensuring resident influence in decision 
making, has a direct bearing on the rents it charges. This in turn translates to 
freedoms and opportunities to learn new skills and knowledge. 
The health benefits discussed in the section above seem to have a more 
tenuous link to the collective’s organisational model. Ambrose and Stone’s 
(2010, p.60) study argues that WECH residents feel qualitatively better as a 
result of their capacity to exert control over their housing situation. The study 
asked residents how much they agreed with the statement ‘I feel better 
because I have a greater sense of control over my housing’. Respondents 
were asked to grade their experience under WECH and their previous 
landlord (if they had one). There was a significant increase in scores under 
WECH. Similarly, Ambrose and Stone (2010, p.60) reveal that 89 percent of 
residents surveyed felt ‘healthier’ because they felt safe in their home. Such 
evidence points to potential connections between residents’ perceived health 
and their perceptions about safety and security in its many definitions. 
It is difficult to determine linkages between social events and psychological 
benefits for members. It would seem a bold claim to suggest these events 
are the intrinsic product of the organisational forms studied. Despite this, the 
range of social activities that the case study organisations are involved in co-
ordinating is quite striking. Bengtsson (2001, p.180) in his assessment of 
collective action across 26 Swedish housing estates noted how ‘estate 
festivities’ are a crucial ‘reproducing activity’. These activities, he argues, 
embed community spirit and norms of interaction and co-operation, and 
similar processes may well be at work in the cases studied here.  
What the qualitative data in the current study suggests is that psychological 
benefits are potentially derived from direct involvement in the running of a 
collective and its activities. Multiple references are made to how individuals 
gain a ‘sense of purpose’ from their involvement, how it is increasing their 
‘confidence’ and how it is providing a source of stimulation and ‘fascination’. 
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The operation of the collectives makes these psychological benefits more 
likely, because they are premised on the active involvement of members. 
Extensive participation has its costs however, and this is explored in chapter 
ten. 
The literature related to community ownership and co-op housing makes 
strong propositions about the health and wellbeing benefits of such models. 
One particularly useful concept in understanding these benefits is how 
participation and ‘work’ in a collective supports a process of self-realisation 
(Elster, 1986, p.101), as individuals engage in the ‘full and free actualization 
and externalization of the[ir] powers and the abilities’. Elster asserted how 
these processes are qualitatively different to simple consumption activities, 
and this has resonance with the idea that ‘housing’ is both a process or verb, 
and also a product or noun. Notions of self-realisation cross-over with the 
much hypothesised process of empowerment which, it has been argued, 
flows from engagement in housing collectivism (Moore and Mckee, 2012; 
Young Foundation, 2011). The evidence above does suggest that residents 
and members possess powers in the collectives unlikely to be possessed by 
those in traditional forms of private rented accommodation. As such the 
collectives provide the institutional form in which it is possible for residents 
and members to have powers to control rents, secure tenures, and in the 
process develop their knowledge and skills. 
In the sections above, various evidence for psychological, physical and 
quality of life benefits has been presented. Trying to retroduce the linkages 
between these benefits and organisational forms and functions is a difficult 
task, and must account for causal processes not of the collective’s making. 
What the above reveals is certain processes or features of collective form 
and function which play some role in the emergence of distinct patterns of 
benefits. These processes are generalised and simplified as mechanisms in 
the conclusion of this chapter.  
 269 
 
9.5. Quality of housing and services 
The empirical evidence 
The issue of housing and service quality does not appear as a strong cross-
case pattern. Certain references to housing quality were made in interviews 
with Milton Park residents, for instance, in discussing the maintenance 
problems in other condominium schemes, and the quality of housing 
provided for homeless groups. Those interviewed with some involvement in 
Granby CLT also made little mention of housing and service quality. In a 
number of the CLT’s documents, mention is made of the adaptations and 
structural work to housing, but little reference is made to the benefits of 
housing quality, choice or other services that the CLT might provide. Perhaps 
the exception to this is work on commercial properties, but this was not 
discussed in any depth. Perhaps in the case of Granby it was too early in the 
process of development to identify any current or future housing quality or 
service benefits. 
Despite the absence of such a pattern in the above cases, the benefits 
connected to housing and service quality were prominent within the WECH 
data. Interviewees highlighted how, on a number of housing management 
functions, WECH was performing well. This was borne out in comparative 
assessments made by interviewees about WECH’s services compared to 
those of other social landlords. The following quote exemplifies this from 
Diana, a WECH tenant who has never been actively involved in the 
organisation: 
‘Like I say I've been with Westminster Council and they are a waste of 
space as well. The rent you pay for their places and everything and you 
need done in their properties, the same as Genesis, I wouldn't rate 
them at all. If I send [name of housing officer] an email, within 10 
minutes I've got a reply’ (Diana, WECH tenant). 
A recurring theme throughout the interviews is WECH’s responsiveness on 
issues of repairs. Four different interviewees highlighted how WECH is highly 
responsive to emerging repairs issues, something which is corroborated by 
Ambrose and Stone’s (2010) research.
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who had lived under a previous landlord were asked to rate their experience 
of WECH’s repair service compared to their previous landlord. The difference 
is stark, with a generally negative response for the latter, converting to a 
highly positive response for WECH (Ambrose and Stone, 2010, p.52).  
On more general measures of ‘satisfaction with your landlord’, WECH 
residents are significantly more satisfied than tenants housed by other social 
landlords in Inner London, and in comparator areas with a similar level of 
deprivation (Satsangi, 2011, p.7). Satsangi suggests WECH’s ‘satisfaction 
with your landlord’ score is some 18 percent higher than the average for 
London’s local authority landlords.  
Unpicking the reasons for this, George, a local Labour politician familiar with 
the ward in which WECH is located, reflected; 
‘You know we get every other housing association everything and 
anything, I don't think I've ever had any case work from WECH, 
because they manage their property well’ (George, WECH supporter). 
It is important to note that George was heavily involved in the development of 
WECH, though this perspective seems plausible, when taken in conjunction 
with the evidence presented above. 
Another key piece of evidence to suggest that WECH residents are 
benefiting from high quality housing and services, relates to the number of 
transfers that have taken place since WECH was created. At the inception of 
WECH, all tenants had the right to stay with Westminster Council rather than 
transfer over. Since its creation WECH has seen a steady flow of 
Westminster tenants transferring over as Clive, a WECH member of staff, 
attested; 
‘So at the time of transfer there was 80 who wanted to be council 
tenants, now within three years 60 of them came over to us, and now 
there's only one who still is a council tenant’ (Clive, WECH officer).  
Such transfers arguably reveal a process whereby non-WECH tenants are 
making comparative assessments of WECH and their current landlord, and 
then deciding that life under WECH would be preferable.  
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An important factor in tenant satisfaction is the way WECH staff 
communicate with residents, and deal with their queries. One specific word 
that interviewees used to describe WECH is revealing. In various exchanges, 
WECH was perceived to be ‘caring’ towards its residents. This sentiment 
was articulated by Craig, a WECH Board member; 
‘What you're left with is something that is very caring. Our old people do 
very well. They live long here because basically Andy [WECH Chief 
Executive] knows everybody’s name… it’s hands on…anybody can go 
along to the office, it’s just open… Because it’s personal, because 
people go in and talk to Andy cos everybody knows him by name, 
because when someone dies he goes to the funeral’ (Craig, WECH 
resident and Board member). 
There are several insights that can be drawn from the above quotation. It 
potentially reveals levels of access that residents have to staff and to the 
WECH office, but perhaps more interestingly it reveals how staff go beyond 
what is normally expected to show that they ‘care’. The positive references to 
WECH’s chief executive in the interviews, and in Ambrose and Stone’s data, 
is quite remarkable. What this reveals is a set of positive relationships that 
have developed between staff and residents.  
Other services provided by WECH were valued by residents. WECH 
provides a solicitor to work with tenants on housing benefit issues. As Diana 
noted; 
‘They are well helpful with that. They have a solicitor…she sorts it out 
straight away…I’ve had problems with housing benefit which put me in 
arrears…anytime they can come and evict me. They don't have to take 
me back to court or anything. And that’s why I say [name of WECH 
officer] is such a good housing officer because she's compassionate. 
She's got empathy, she knows how hard life is’ (Diana, WECH tenant).   
This quotation is important not only because it reveals certain services that 
are valued by residents, but the language used also reaffirms the suggestion 
that WECH ‘cares’ about its residents. Evidence suggests longstanding 
empathetic relationships have developed between residents and specific 
WECH staff, and this translates to certain service benefits for such residents. 
One might argue that these outcomes are just as feasible within a well-run 
housing association, or in accommodation owned by an empathetic landlord. 
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A critical question becomes, to what extent is this attributable to collective 
forms and functions? 
The relationship between the benefits and organisational form and function 
The linkages between WECH’s seemingly high levels of housing quality and 
service, and their organisational model, are not immediately clear.  
Exploring the distinctive history and norms of behaviour in the organisation 
reveals processes which one might call accountability. WECH staff, unlike 
many other social housing staff, are held accountable in two powerful ways. 
Firstly, they are accountable to existing residents in a robust way through 
their Board arrangements where there is a large resident majority, an issue 
discussed at length above. In addition to this, staff are accountable in 
another powerful way; to WECH’s history and the collectivist commitments 
that were made when the organisation was formed. 
The following quotation from a longstanding WECH resident, Barbara, hints 
at how staff have been kept accountable to these original pledges made at 
the time of the transfer from WCC; 
‘…because they did exactly what they said they were going to do, and 
they did put the tenants first’ (Barbara, WECH resident).  
Barbara’s reflections subtly draw attention to the continuing relevance of 
WECH’s origins, borne from a campaign to protect existing residents from 
displacement due to redevelopment (WECH, 2006[1998]). This history helps 
understand how the original offer made to tenants, as part of the Tenants’ 
Choice process, has left a powerful legacy. 
How these original commitments to ‘put tenants first’ then influence the day-
to-day activities of WECH staff is a critical issue, and here form and function 
become relevant. One potential clue is in the effort invested in educating staff 
about the history of the organisation. The following quotation from a WECH 
officer highlights how WECH’s history is embedded in their operational 
practices; 
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‘…we work fairly, not hard, but we kind of keep reminding people and 
work at instilling into new people, so when people come…we go 
through the history with them, tenants and staff… I visit every new 
tenant, and the community workers visit every new tenant, they're 
signed up by the housing worker, so between the three of us the new 
tenant gets the WECH history’ (WECH officer).  
Both WECH staff and new tenants are educated in this way, and through this 
process staff are made aware of their dual accountabilities, to both their 
resident-led Board, as well as the history and origins of the organisation.  
How far do these processes of accountability provide a full explanation for 
the quality of housing and services received? This is hard to establish, but 
assessments in London boroughs of tenant satisfaction suggest that, in 
certain years and for certain housing associations, comparable scores have 
been achieved on ‘satisfaction with the overall service provided by the 
landlord’ (BMG Research, 2015). However, such examples are rare and the 
general picture of tenant perceptions is one of lower levels of satisfaction 
than seen in WECH. Perhaps similar benefits can be secured for residents 
through other models, for example, where there is less resident control, but 
arising in different conditions and through different processes. 
It is likely that some of the evidence seen in the WECH case relates to the 
diligent and sympathetic approach of staff, who may also be found in other 
social housing providers. However, it is likely that WECH’s form of 
ownership, its origins, and its governance processes play a strong role in 
shaping the practices of staff and the decisions that are made about the 
housing and services provided. The sets of relations that have developed 
between residents and staff, generally ‘caring’ in quality, have been forged 
over time, within a collectivist form. 
Various literature, reviewed in chapter three, suggests that housing co-
operatives deliver better quality housing and services than other social 
housing providers (Rowlands, 2009; Clapham & Kintrea, 1991; TSA, 2009). 
The case study evidence presented here adds weight to some of these 
arguments, whilst revealing some of the processes through which quality 
housing and services are produced.  
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Ambrose and Stone’s study sought to demonstrate the outcomes 
experienced by residents but also to ‘link them directly to the WECH style 
and management practices as landlords’ (Ambrose and Stone, 2010, p.71). 
In reality their study focuses more on correlations in quantitative data, than 
on explaining causal processes. The current study adds a retroductive edge, 
showing how the underlying form and function of the organisation influences 
certain day-to-day activities and decision making, which in turn can explain 
observed outcomes.   
9.6. The perceived benefits of housing collectivism: Mechanistic 
explanations 
This analysis adds weight to certain claims in the collective housing literature 
regarding the benefits of such activity to members and residents. This 
discussion supports arguments that, within certain housing collectives, 
residents and members can experience; relatively low housing costs, 
perceptions of control and security, higher quality housing and services, and 
opportunities to improve their quality of life. The picture presented is not a 
universal confirmation of the literature, however, revealing how the different 
models of collectivism in each case accentuate certain benefits over others. 
WECH is a good example, where benefits in terms of housing and service 
quality were prevalent in the data. This confirms an extensive literature which 
suggests collective models increase satisfaction on a range of housing 
management issues (Cairncross et al, 2002; CCMH, 2009; Rowlands, 2009; 
Satsangi and Clapham, 1990). Beyond such corroboration, new insights 
have been provided into the similarities and differences in the processes 
taking place within collectives which may give rise to such benefits.   
For members of the collectives, the benefits they derive must be weighed 
against some of the costs discussed in the next chapter. Commitments in 
terms of their time and effort may well be justifiable on the basis of low 
housing costs, access to certain locations and other benefits. This can be 
conceptualised as a set of trade-offs. To add subtlety to this picture, one 
could also envisage a scenario where a single action, performed by a 
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member, is simultaneously a cost and benefit. As Jon Elster notes, 
involvement in collective decision-making is often rewarding because it is 
difficult and demanding (Elster, 1989c), therefore it is the cost that gives rise 
to that benefit.  
The benefit categories represent an organised picture, but in reality the 
benefits perceived in the collectives are intertwined in complex ways, making 
neat categorisations difficult. Low rents and other financial benefits flow, in 
part, from the levels of control exerted by those members and residents. This 
control shapes other psychological benefits related to residents’ ontological 
security and perhaps underwrites a deeper sense of physical security. 
Control of land and housing also creates processes where security of tenure 
may be maintained. Control necessitates a degree of participation, which 
may enable residents and members to learn new skills and knowledge, 
giving them a sense of purpose or confidence. Dissecting these inter-
relationships is not an easy task.  
Understanding how the perceived benefits arose requires understanding the 
key processes which made them possible. For each benefit category these 
processes have been discussed and explored in detail. Taking the above 
discussions, it is possible to articulate some of these processes in 
mechanistic terms, so that they are ‘explained by postulating (and identifying) 
mechanisms which are capable of producing them’ (Sayer, 2000, p.107). 
This analytical step helps present such processes in a generalised and 
stylised form.  
1. The form, rules and regulation (FRR) mechanism  
How legal and constitutional rules combine with internal regulating activity 
to shape actions and resource usage.  
Certain benefits were seen to arise as result of the legal form of the 
collectives, as non-profit vehicles for holding property in common for the 
benefit of certain groups. The organisational forms adopted were a means to 
secure long term ownership of land and the associated property rights. Such 
rights were then conjoined with a set of legal rules governing the operations 
 276 
 
of these organisations, and internal rules governing behaviour and ensuring 
the property was used for certain beneficiaries. These rules were set out in 
either national or provincial laws or the collective’s own rules in its 
constitutional documents. These rules were then operationalised through 
internal practices and actions which enforced and regulated activity, and the 
benefits experienced by members and residents would be dependent on that 
regulatory effort. The rules and regulations mechanism underpins, for 
instance, the removal of inflationary pressure on rental prices in Milton Park, 
as the Declaration of Ownership prohibits marketisation of the property. It 
explains the aspired benefits for current and future residents in Granby, as 
property ownership in a collective form is seen as the means to prevent 
future displacement and increase asset values. And in WECH, the 
representative model of governance, hardwired into its constitution through 
its official rules, provided the means for residents to hold staff to account on 
rental increases.  
2. The dual-role mechanism  
How being a resident and/or beneficiary of the collective combines with 
roles in collective governance to shape decision-making and actions.  
Other processes, linked to those above, appeared to play a role in creating 
the benefits observed. In particular, benefits appeared to be connected to the 
nature of decision making processes, and how residents were acting as both 
tenant and landlord, or more precisely resident and co-owner. This might be 
conceptualised as a dual-role mechanism.  
Patterns of benefits arose relating to tenure and ontological security, housing 
quality and low rents. In perceiving themselves as a co-owner (or at least 
being able to influence the decisions of the collective) residents derived a 
sense of control, seeing themselves as ‘masters of our destiny’ (David, 
Milton Park resident). The functioning of this dual role, in WECH at least, was 
seen to be separate from the issue of ownership. The ability to apply 
influence through the governance system was seen as the key factor which 
underpinned perceived control, not proprietorship.  
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Acting as co-owners necessarily meant that certain individuals had to learn 
about, and build confidence in managing, a variety of housing related tasks. 
Learning and acting as a co-owner appeared closely connected, and the co-
op model in Milton Park demonstrated how learning benefits can flow from 
the participatory demands of this model, though with perhaps diminishing 
returns. But having a stake as a co-owner also appeared directly connected 
to perceptions of stability, or at least the removal of worries about eviction or 
displacement. In WECH and Milton Park the dual role enabled residents and 
members to guide the delivery of housing and services, and also the setting 
of rents, so that it prioritised existing residents and gave households 
‘acquired rights’. Through this dual role interesting decision making 
processes are explained, notably in terms of rent setting. As residents and 
co-owners, self-interest was being balanced against collective-level or wider 
outcomes. In their dual-role residents could influence financial priorities and 
budgeting in a way that minimised rental increases, whilst trying not to 
jeopardise the collective’s financial position.  
3. The residual history mechanism  
How the history of the collective is used in the present to influence those 
inside the collective in terms of their actions and use of resources.  
A final set of processes, which may be expressed in mechanistic terms, 
relates to the active role that each organisation’s history and origins play in 
current events. This may be named the residual history mechanism. In each 
collective, the history of their development shaped resident, member and 
staff perceptions and affected how those individuals acted. This led to the 
reproduction of the collective’s initial objectives and certain prescribed 
benefits for members. In Milton Park and WECH historical conflicts against 
developers, and threats of displacement, were so deeply embedded that the 
rights and interests of existing residents were privileged to ensure stable long 
term housing. WECH’s approach to the Bedroom Tax and handling of rent 
arrears shows a sensitivity to these issues of stability and financial hardship, 
perhaps revealing the accountability of staff to the organisation’s history. 
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WECH’s story is reasserted through training and information for new staff 
and residents, expressing this residual history mechanism in action. In 
Granby, historic battles frame the aspiration to create benefits for existing 
owners, and address the ramifications of high vacancy rates. History is made 
present and activated in the pursuit of certain benefits. 
These mechanisms, whilst valuable devices for linking benefits and the 
processes which may give rise to them, are partial causal descriptions. What 
is hard to establish is the effect of those mechanisms as distinct from other 
external factors. For instance, in Milton Park, these mechanisms may explain 
the processes for keeping rents low, but this was only possible because of 
the financial packages offered by CMHC, and similarly in WECH the nil-cost 
transfer of the properties and large dowry made low rents possible. In 
disentangling these causes and effects further work remains. One might also 
argue that the mechanisms themselves overlap, and do not articulate 
different processes but the same ones. As the next chapter turns to the 
perceived costs of collectivism, these mechanisms undergo further 
refinement to account for the losses experienced by members and residents. 
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Chapter Ten: The costs of collectivism 
 
10.1. Introduction 
The preceding chapter suggested that the benefits perceived by residents 
and members are intrinsically linked to certain costs that had to be borne. As 
discussed in chapter three, perceived costs for those within the collectives 
might be understood simply as a ‘loss or unpleasant consequence’ (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2016b). However, a more nuanced understanding of the term 
refers to anything;  
‘…which must be given or surrendered in order to acquire, produce, 
accomplish, or maintain something; the price paid for a thing’ (OED, 
2015). 
This definition entails an understanding of benefits and costs as inter-related, 
with the acceptance of costs justified as a trade-off for a perceived benefit. 
Through an analysis of the case study data, a number of categories emerged 
in relation to the costs of collectivism as perceived by residents and 
members. These related to; 1) time and energy costs, 2) the costs 
experienced as a result of the location of the collectives, 3) financial losses 
arising from living within and participating in the collectives, and 4) costs 
arising from relationships and interactions with other members and residents. 
Each category is discussed in turn, presenting the empirical evidence for the 
costs, and then exploring the relationship between that cost and the form and 
function of the collectives. The final section draws this learning together, 
supplementing and refining the causal mechanisms proposed in the 
preceding chapter.  
10.2. Time and energy costs 
The empirical evidence 
The demands on residents and members, in terms of their time and energy, 
were most pronounced in Milton Park. This is not surprising given the 
organisational model adopted, and the reliance within the housing co-ops on 
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the active participation of members in the management and maintenance of 
their properties. The longevity of the collective also gave a picture of 
participation over several decades, with revelations about the ebb and flow of 
time and energy costs during different periods. 
Interviews with residents revealed how the requirement to participate in the 
running of their co-op was written into their tenancy and membership 
agreements. Despite these rules and expectations, time and energy costs 
were not evenly distributed across members, and there is evidence of some 
individuals putting in significantly more effort than others. This is not just in a 
cyclical sense where participation changes over time. Some members 
appear to be more actively participating on a permanent basis, and this 
inequitable distribution of effort contrasted with the relatively equitable 
distribution of benefits such as low housing costs.  
Interviews in Milton Park revealed the extensive demands on residents as a 
result of their collective ownership. As might be expected, this was 
particularly pronounced during the years where the co-ops were being 
developed. Martin a founding member of his housing co-op recalled: 
‘…when we were developing the co-op, for example, [named 
individual]…was spending 20 hours a week, while working full time, and 
I was doing the finances…I was spending 15-20 hours a week also on 
that’ (Martin, Milton Park resident). 
As the co-ops have developed, the amount of hours being invested by the 
vast majority of participants has significantly decreased. Nonetheless, time 
and energy costs affect nearly all residents, as there is a significant range of 
tasks which need to be performed for the collective to function. Frank, a 
manager of one of the OSBLs in Milton Park, provided an external 
perspective on this workload. Summarising the sheer range of 
responsibilities placed on residents of the housing co-ops, he noted; 
‘…to live in the housing co-op you must become a member of the co-op 
you must commit to being involved in the tasks of the co-op, physical 
tasks and administrative tasks, so you must commit to go to meetings, 
to assemblies…participate in the administration of your housing 
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complex...the physical tasks of cleaning and repairing your house and 
common areas’ (Frank OSBL manager). 
The hours each member contributed was dependent upon the positions they 
held within the co-op. During an interview with Camille, an organisational 
chart was presented which revealed the positions each resident in her co-op 
was currently occupying. Camille noted that, with a few exceptions, every 
resident was represented on the chart and given a dedicated role, though 
each position entailed varying amounts of time and effort. Positions on the 
Board brought the heaviest burden, and as Camille revealed, this could 
require two or three hours of work a week if you were the treasurer, and 
significantly more if you were responsible for maintenance. Claudia had held 
a number of demanding positions in her co-op, although she was currently in 
a less taxing role. She recounted; 
‘…the administration committee [the Board] is the most demanding, and 
also being the manager that is the top head of all the works and repairs, 
that is a huge job. Those would be the biggest jobs’ (Claudia, Milton 
Park resident). 
As each co-op and OSBL has a representative on the CMP General 
Assembly, a number of residents had this additional time commitment. 
Furthermore, five residents formed the Board of Directors for CMP, creating 
an enhanced set of responsibilities and time commitments. Add to this the 
periodic ‘reflection days’ that are held by CMP, and a picture emerges that 
suggests residents in Milton Park are investing a substantial amount of time 
in housing-related activities. The crucial feature of these time and energy 
costs, however, is that they are unevenly distributed, and this creates 
concentrations of effort and burdens on specific individuals. 
One response to this unequal distribution is to rotate responsibilities on a 
cyclical basis. A number of interviewees revealed how their co-op tried to 
change those holding senior positions, in order to mitigate ‘burnout’ by 
members. This approach was not without its difficulties however, and 
attempts to implement this in some co-ops had been difficult. Camille 
reflected; 
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‘…that’s why it has to rotate and new blood has to come in because we 
had that problem to a certain point. At one point nobody wanted to be 
on the Board anymore so we tried to…vote those type of regulations in 
and it didn't pass. But new people that never went on the Board 
decided to, they felt a little bit guilty and they went on’ (Camille, Milton 
Park resident).   
This picture of participation, and the processes for ensuring members take 
up more demanding Board positions, is a valuable insight. There is evidence 
of group pressure being exerted to address non-participation by members, 
which is discussed more fully below.  
In a critical insight, Frank, the manager of one of the OSBLs, highlighted how 
the time and energy costs of participation linked to certain benefits; 
‘Where people complain the most is about the participation 'again I 
have to go to this stupid meeting' yes, you have to, you're a member of 
this co-op and you have a few obligations and one of them is to 
participate in the administration of the co-op…[if it was owned by a 
private landlord]…they will not ask me to go to meetings…They won't 
ask me to participate in the cleaning of the common areas…But most 
probably you will pay a little more, and you will not have the privilege of 
participating in the making the decisions of the landlord’ (Frank OSBL 
manager). 
The passage reveals not only the resistance of some members to participate 
in the running of the co-ops, but neatly expresses how this participation is a 
trade-off for the benefits described in the previous chapter. This is crucial in 
understanding how the perceptions of benefits and costs affect the function 
of the co-ops. All members benefit from low rents, albeit with some variation 
depending on their individual finances and the rent structure of their co-op. 
However, the associated costs, in terms of time and energy, which make 
these benefits possible, are not borne equally. This creates the potential for 
substantial ‘free-riding’ (Olson, 1965). Exemplifying this problem, Camille 
recounted a story of non-participation; 
‘I saw once, that one person was laughing her head off and talking to 
friends saying 'they're so stupid doing those things and I don't have to 
do it' and she doesn't do anything and she's been there for the last ten 
years. That’s the tough part and you get frustrated by those types of 
person’ (Camille, Milton Park resident). 
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Such a sentiment reveals the costs incurred, not only in terms of member’s 
time and energy, but also psychological costs stemming from such 
asymmetric participation. Camille was expressing frustration and annoyance 
at someone visibly free-riding on her time and energy. Mary, an active 
participant in her co-op’s maintenance committee, highlighted similar 
variations in participation; 
‘There's a group of people who will always step forward, and then there 
are a lot of people who will do stuff, but not at the same rate, and then 
there are the people who you drag kicking and screaming’ (Mary, Milton 
Park resident). 
The stark language used by some Milton Park residents, in describing those 
not actively participating, reveals how this was a source of division. For 
instance, Claudia in describing non-active members in her own co-operative, 
declared them to be ‘parasites’, connoting a clear sense that they were 
benefitting at the cost of others. 
This issue of the distribution of costs, in terms of time and energy, was also 
seen in WECH. Under its more representative model of governance, WECH 
Board members dedicate substantial amounts of time to the running of the 
organisation. In contrast to Milton Park however, a more polarised picture of 
participation was evident, with Board members investing considerable time 
and most other residents having little requirement to participate. Board 
members bear the brunt of the costs in terms of time and energy spent. As 
Ambrose and Stone (2010, p.64) note, some residents are involved in other 
WECH-related activity, but this does not match the scale of participation in 
Milton Park. 
Some of the benefits discussed in the previous section, related to active 
participation in the collectives, are mitigated under this representative model. 
In terms of control and the ability to influence the organisation, there is a 
sense in which WECH residents are perhaps less able to influence decisions 
affecting their housing, compared to Milton Park. One interviewee suggested 
that, whilst WECH is resident-led, there is still a hierarchy which means that 
things ‘get approved at the top’. Clearly, this articulates a difference between 
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direct participation in the management and maintenance of housing, and 
representative control. 
The costs of participation incurred by WECH residents in terms of time and 
energy are, generally speaking, far less extensive. This is largely because 
WECH has paid staff to handle the day-to-day affairs of the organisation. A 
different set of trade-offs is therefore evident when one compares WECH 
and Milton Park, with the costs in terms of time and energy distributed in 
different ways. That is not to say that WECH residents avoided participation 
or providing their time on a voluntary basis. Research by Satsangi (2011) 
revealed that 29 per cent of WECH residents were involved in voluntary 
activities compared to 21 per cent of people nationally, highlighting a 
difference albeit a relatively small one. Perhaps a fairer comparison was with 
levels of voluntary activity in other deprived areas of London, where 
participation stood at 18 per cent.  Hence, voluntary activity among WECH 
residents appeared markedly higher compared to similar areas. 
As noted above, Board members within WECH appeared to incur 
considerable time and energy costs, and interviewees recounted the effort 
they had needed to invest in learning about complex housing issues. As 
Ellie, a new Board member noted, getting to grips with the language used in 
the housing field had been difficult; 
‘My expectations were that it would take up some of my time, and alot 
of it my husband said I wouldn't understand… a lot of jargon and lots of 
organisations are discussed as if its general knowledge… I do feel 
confused alot of the time’ (Ellie, WECH resident and Board member). 
Costs were incurred by such members not only in terms of their time, but 
also mental energy in getting to grips with new sets of rules, norms and 
language. Such sentiments also reveal how, due to the complexity and time 
commitments required, these demands could have an exclusionary effect. 
Across the cases studied interviewees revealed that different factors 
diminished participation, ranging from ill health, a lack of free time, and the 
ability to access electronic information. These are factors which shape who 
can participate, and therefore who bears the costs of participation.  
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Members of Granby CLT’s Board described the challenge of developing an 
organisation in such a complex field, and the individual costs incurred as a 
result. These findings were pronounced because of the CLT’s stage of 
development during the fieldwork. Catherine, a long-time resident in the 
Granby area and Board member, revealed the scale of time and energy 
costs she had borne in developing the project; 
‘I work part-time to do this, so I can devote almost half my life to doing 
it…It’s aged me so much I can’t possibly see it as an investment any 
more, cos I don’t think I’m going to live long enough to enjoy it’ 
(Catherine, Granby resident and CLT Board member).   
Whilst again this elucidates a set of heavy individual costs, Catherine is also 
highlighting how these costs are disconnected from certain benefits that she 
may have hoped to receive. The central message from across the case 
studies is that participation in such collectives, through the commitment of 
time and energy, is not a process of exchange; it cannot be simplistically 
conceptualised as a set costs incurred for individual gain. Scholars with 
differing views on the nature of co-operation, highlight processes in large 
groups whereby individuals accept some sacrifices for the collective good 
(Axelrod, 1997; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Manbridge, 1990). There is clear 
evidence from across the case studies that such processes are taking place. 
Collective members and residents responded differently to the imbalances 
between the costs and benefits for them as individuals.  
The relationship between the costs and organisational form and function 
It is legitimate to ask whether the costs identified above are, in some way, 
the product of the form and function of the case study organisations. Is the 
uneven distribution of time and energy costs the consequence of a set of 
processes that are intrinsic to these organisational forms?  
Firstly, and at the risk of stating the obvious, resident-led organisations will 
place burdens on residents' time and energy that other organisations will not. 
If a mode of housing demands no role for its residents or members in the 
governance or functioning of that housing, then time and energy will be 
mitigated. In this sense the organisational form of the collectives is directly 
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linked to the costs experienced by its members by necessity. Perhaps a 
more interesting line of enquiry is how the different organisational forms 
studied here have led to different patterns of time and energy costs. 
In Milton Park it is clear that how the co-ops function, being almost wholly 
reliant on member participation, creates the potential for divergent 
distributions of costs among members. Extensive evidence from Milton Park 
suggests that some members free-ride on the efforts of others, the costs of 
which are keenly experienced by those who actively participate. Where some 
members opt out of their responsibilities, other members have to take up the 
slack.  
This ‘problem’ in the logic of collective action (Olson, 1965) has been a 
deeply contested issue in the philosophy and economics literature, as 
discussed in chapter three. Because an individual’s contribution to a 
collective good may make only a minimal impact, the removal of that 
contribution may be tolerated or missed. Despite this, the non-contributing 
individual can still receive that good because it is a collective provision. Low 
rents in Milton Park are a prime example of such a collective good, which 
can be sustained even if the marginal contributions of some individuals (in 
terms of their time and energy) are removed. In strict terms this example 
from Milton Park is not a free-rider problem, as non-participants can be 
excluded from benefiting, by the removal of their membership status. 
Nonetheless, in the absence of effective incentives to guarantee 
participation, some members in the Milton Park co-ops have continued to 
benefit despite their non-participation. 
This issue was not lost on interviewees in Milton Park, who made the link 
between this notion of free-riding and ideas related to common ownership. In 
this insightful passage, David discussed the concept of the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ (Hardin, 1968) in reference to Milton Park; 
‘I've read some things by economists, who talk about the tragedy of the 
commons, so this is another aspect of CMP, it belongs to everyone and 
it belongs to nobody. If it's everyone’s responsibility it’s no-one’s 
responsibility, so we cannot afford to have too many people in the 
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community not committed, caring for it, because otherwise it is 
dangerous’ (David, Milton Park Resident). 
Herein lies the collective action problem in Milton Park. Advocates of the 
Milton Park model often present individual interests as neatly aligned with 
collective interests. However, as Hardin (2003) notes, this is a fallacy of 
composition. It should not be said that because a co-op wants to lower rents 
as a collective good, that each individual member wants it for the same 
collective reasons. Collective decisions and action may arise from the 
disparate interests of individual members. Scholars argue that to overcome 
this issue, selective incentives (or sanctions) need to be used to ensure 
those individuals contribute (Olson, 1965).  
Following this logic, certain co-ops in Milton Park have developed sanctions 
to ensure members participate. Arabelle, an active member of her co-op, 
recounted an incident with one member who did not occupy their property for 
an extended period of time. By doing so they were unable to contribute their 
time and energy, and were therefore free-riding on the participation of others, 
as they continued to pay low rents. After a prolonged period, where the 
individual was granted a leave of absence, the co-op decided to implement 
sanctions on that individual. As Arabelle recalls, ‘we can’t kick her out of the 
apartment, but she will be paying full rent’. Hence the sanction for free-riders 
in the co-ops is the removal of their membership status and the requirement 
to pay market rents. Whilst this was a clear punitive measure, having large 
numbers of tenants who are not members, would weaken the structured set 
of relations on which the co-ops function, and hence it was seen as a last 
resort. These examples highlight important dynamics and processes which 
shape the patterns of benefits and costs derived.  
As Hardin (2003) notes, ‘if we all attempt to free ride…there is no provision 
and no ‘ride’’. Applying this thinking to Milton Park, there is a potential 
scenario where no-one is a member and therefore no-one is obliged to 
participate in the running the co-ops, the net result being that collective 
benefits (such as low rents) are not possible. However, the use of sanctions 
in the form of charging market rents for non-members, seems to be a 
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powerful intervention. However, these sanctions require co-ordination among 
members. This may be easy in extreme cases of non-participation, but for 
individuals where there are legitimate reasons for non-participation this is 
more difficult, as highlighted by Mary; 
‘…someone from Board phoned me up and said ‘has this person been 
going to meetings?’...it was all kind of creepy. There's another person 
who has done very little over the years and finally, people started 
making her, I wouldn't say shaming her to do things, but making sure 
she did some things’ (Mary, Milton Park resident). 
Whilst revealing the strains that the free-riding places on member relations, 
the above quotation also reveals a set of processes whereby members apply 
pressure on their peers to participate. This arguably flows from member’s 
awareness of their dual role as tenant and co-owner. What becomes 
apparent is that in their dual role, members rely on their internal rules to 
arbitrate on such cases, and in instances where there is no clear infraction of 
these rules, difficult judgement calls have to be made.   
The issue of freeriding seems a particular challenge in the Milton Park case. 
The organisational form and function is reliant on all member participation, 
and with non-participation sometimes tolerated, or with individuals escaping 
sanctions, free-riding becomes possible. Self-interest starts to undermine the 
benefits witnessed, and as David suggested, this may explain why 
collectives like Milton Park are relatively rare; 
TA: ‘…why are there not more Milton Parks if it’s a good way of keeping 
rents low? 
David: ‘Because it’s a lot of work, that’s the reason, it takes so much. It 
is so demanding for the people’ (David, Milton Park resident). 
The extent of participation required to establish and sustain the Milton Park 
model, is hence a very real trade-off for the benefits derived by those 
involved. 
The data relating to WECH suggests that most residents and members do 
not incur prohibitive costs in terms of their time and energy, and if they do it 
is isolated to a small number of Board members. The problem of free-riding 
was not evident in this data, and there were few signs of tension between 
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those actively participating and those not. This is related to the organisations 
form and function, notably its representative model of governance. The day-
to-day running of the organisation is not dependent on widespread 
participation as a result of having paid staff. Summarising the role of active 
Board members, Craig suggested that their function was not to; 
‘…get involved in the day to day management stuff, what we get 
involved in is cost oversight, fiscal responsibility and where we're going 
as an organisation and what we're committed to’ (Craig, WECH 
resident and Board member).   
It may be argued that whilst it is a less demanding organisational form, in 
terms of resident’s time and energy, the benefits that are derived are less 
pronounced. This would seem to be the case in terms of the reduction in 
housing costs, in comparison to Milton Park, but also perhaps residents’ 
sense of control. Members' participation in WECH is not required to reduce 
housing management costs as these costs are factored into expenditure. 
Furthermore, there are few ‘selective incentives’ to participate (Olson, 1965), 
in the form of rewards or punishments for non-participation. Another 
important factor in participation is the scale of WECH (approximately 600 
dwellings), compared to the individual co-ops in Milton Park (which average 
38 dwellings each). Accepting the presence of paid staff, participation in 
WECH has a much more marginal effect due its scale, and hence non-
participation is less keenly felt (Olson, 1965). In essence, non-participation in 
WECH results in little transference of time and energy costs to other 
members, or hindrance to the provision of the collective good.  
There is however clearly a threshold beyond which non-participation by 
members would be detrimental to the collective good, and the benefits 
secured through member involvement. The consequences of all residents 
refusing to participate in the governance of WECH would essentially mean 
outsider or staff control, removing a key mechanism by which certain benefits 
are secured. For instance, it was noted in the previous chapter that pressure 
to preserve low rents flows from resident influence in the governance 
processes. Nonetheless, whilst a level of active membership is critical, 
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WECH can tolerate a much higher level of non-participation than the co-ops 
in Milton Park.  
Granby CLT, which is similar to WECH in its legal form, also had little 
evidence of perceived costs arising from free-riding. Like WECH, the 
incentives for participation in the CLT are grounded in a sense of collective 
interests and common goals (Bengtsson, 2001). As noted above, many of 
those involved in developing the CLT question whether they will derive any 
personal benefits. The reasons for accepting such time and energy costs are 
better explained by notions of ‘strong reciprocity’ (Bowles and Gintis, 2011) 
or local utilitarianism (Bengtsson, 2001), than they are by the rational-choice 
model of self-interest (Olson, 1965). The form of the CLT as a community 
benefit society goes a long way to explaining this. It specifically requires that 
the organisation serve a wide constituency, not just the people it houses. 
This is clearly different from an organisation which is wholly owned and 
controlled by, and for, those dwelling in the housing. This arguably creates a 
hazier picture of motives and incentives, and relies more strongly on altruistic 
motives or the desire to create the greatest utility for the greatest number of 
existing and future residents. 
The evidence from the case studies suggests that active members of the 
collectives can pay a heavy cost in terms of their time and energy. Data from 
interviews in Milton Park reveal an interesting set of processes relating to 
participation, and the potentially corrosive effect of non-participation on 
collective provision. The alternative organisational models in WECH and 
Granby mitigate some of these risks to collective goods, but in so doing 
potentially diminish the benefits that collectivism and more intensive 
participation can produce.  
The different organisational models were seen to create different sets of 
trade-off decisions for members. Certain benefits entail that members incur 
certain costs, and it is for members to decide if these trade-offs are 
worthwhile for them personally.  
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10.3. Locational costs 
The empirical evidence 
Data from interviews in Milton Park suggests that residents perceive little or 
no individual costs associated with their geographic location. On the 
contrary, as noted in the previous chapter, low housing costs and the 
downtown location of such housing merge to constitute an important 
perceived benefit. Perhaps the only negative issue or cost raised in relation 
to location concerned anti-social behaviour from a growing student 
population. In contrast to Milton Park however, residents and members in 
Granby CLT and WECH raised the issue of locational costs more frequently.  
This related primarily to the quality of their physical environment, but also to 
local incidences of crime and anti-social behaviour.  
One of the few issues where WECH residents view their experience under a 
previous landlord more positively was in ‘feeling safe walking after dark’ 
(Ambrose and Stone, 2010, p.44). Whilst WECH residents generally feel 
safer in their home compared to previous accommodation, it is safety in the 
wider location that is a concern. A comparative study by Satsangi (2011), 
building on the above research, adds weight to such findings. This research 
highlighted comparatively low scores for neighbourhood safety as perceived 
by WECH residents.  
Threats to physical security and incidences of anti-social behaviour were 
topics raised in a number of interviews with WECH residents. Ellie, a 
relatively new WECH tenant, highlighted problems with prostitution in the 
house next door to her, and other drug related activity. Diana, who had lived 
in the area for several decades, recounted a number of episodes where her 
safety had been jeopardised; 
‘…there was once when I took my grand-daughter to the shop, and we 
had to hide in the back of the shop because shots were fired off at the 
end of the road…I've been in the car when a car has stopped right by 
the side of us, and the window wound down and I'm thinking we’re 
going to get shot here’ (Diana, WECH resident). 
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Diana, on a number of occasions, expressed worries about gangs. These 
worries were shared by other residents such as Barbara, a strong advocate 
of WECH, who noted how the area had been through periods of increased 
anti-social behaviour and other criminal activity. In an attempt to identify the 
source of this activity, Barbara noted; 
‘…we had some problems here, well not on the estate, but around the 
area, which were a bit dodgy’ (Barbara, WECH resident). 
Barbara suggests that such problems have their origins outside of the WECH 
area, or seemingly from individuals not resident in WECH property. This 
highlights an important issue about how the collective is affected by, and 
responds to, potential external influences. 
Interviewees highlighted how the costs borne by WECH members came from 
parties not within the collective. In a frank assessment of these costs, Ellie 
stated; 
‘…okay, the problems we have on the estates are often Westminster 
[City Council] residents, and we’ve had a number of those, and they’re 
not really dealt with’ (Ellie, WECH resident and Board member). 
Ellie’s statement is revealing on a number of levels. The final sentence 
highlights a perceived inadequacy in how Westminster City Council (WCC) 
deals with problematic tenants. The knock-on effects of this are quality of life 
costs for WECH residents. The quotation is also interesting because it 
suggests that an in-group mentality has developed, with problems explained 
in general terms by reference to an out-group (WCC tenants). 
Ellie is also perhaps highlighting issues that arise when housing is in 
disparate ownership. Housing management in such circumstances, it may be 
argued, becomes more complex. This was the perspective of George, who 
reflected on his experience as a ward councillor in Westminster. George 
highlighted how there were ‘50 housing associations with properties in our 
area’ which made simple housing management activities and tenancy 
transfers more complicated. George suggested that one of WECH’s key 
strengths is its localised, concentrated stock ownership.  
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Despite the nature and location of WECH’s stock, residents are still 
susceptible to material and psychological costs, which sometimes arose from 
individuals outside of the collective. Diana recounted instances of disputes 
with her neighbours; 
‘There’s a lot of private landlords, so these lot next door, every year the 
people that live there change…so you don’t get to know them. Or the 
only way I get to know next door is when I tell them to sort their garden 
out!’ (Diana, WECH resident). 
Diana is citing low level frustrations being caused by individuals that were not 
in WECH housing, and therefore beyond many of the interventions the 
organisation could make.  
Like WECH residents, members of Granby CLT highlighted how their 
location detrimentally affected residents in the area, notably as a result of the 
poor quality of the physical environment. Indeed, many of the efforts of CLT 
members, such as Beatrice, have been geared toward improving that 
environment. Granby residents have invested significant time in growing 
plants and vegetables, painting shutters and murals on walls, all in an effort 
to change what was an ‘awful and alienating environment’ (Beatrice, Granby 
resident and CLT Board member). The costs of living in such derelict 
environments are, according to some residents, severe. As Catherine noted, 
‘…that children should be born and go through their formative years 
surrounded by dereliction, that to me is such a crucial thing and that is 
how the council sees us or doesn't see us’ (Catherine, Granby resident 
and CLT Board member). 
For Catherine the physical environment, having a predominance of empty 
and derelict homes, imposes a heavy cost on those growing up in the area. 
As literature related to community ownership and co-operative housing 
suggests, there is often a collective motivation to improve local environments 
(Aiken, 2008; Clapham et al, 2001). This was certainly the aspiration for 
those developing Granby CLT, who in the face of seemingly worsening 
localised conditions, were trying to mitigate some of the costs associated. As 
Beatrice, a resident in Granby for several decades, noted; 
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‘…I think things are edgier this year than they were last year to be 
honest, but…that’s what makes me think that the next two 
years…though it may change if it’s all developed, so that could be very 
interesting to see how it does change’ (Beatrice, Granby resident and 
CLT Board member). 
The above quotation highlights how addressing the locational costs seen in 
Granby is contingent on other forces and factors. Beatrice, in projecting 
forward from the current ‘edgy’ conditions, hints at the possibility that 
conditions may get worse. She was unsure about the impact that the CLT 
and its projects would have in addressing these longstanding problems. This 
suggests that the organisational form and function of the CLT may provide 
only partial remedies to issues which have a range of external influences. 
The relationship between the costs and organisational form and function 
Members of WECH and Granby experience a range of costs linked to their 
geographic location. As the above shows, these costs cover physical threats 
to their safety, quality of life costs related to their neighbours’ behaviour, and 
also perhaps more psychological costs connected to living in poor physical 
environments.  
If the cause of these costs lies outside of the collectives, or beyond their 
influence, then it is hard to attribute these costs to the form and function of 
the collectives. If prostitution occurs in the house next door to a member, and 
this house is not under the control of the collective, then to what extent is this 
attributable to a collective’s organisational form? 
One legitimate response is to argue that the development of collective 
ownership schemes, in the form of WECH and Granby CLT, leads to more 
piecemeal ownership and management of housing, which makes addressing 
these localised issues more difficult. Strong housing management in the 
social rented sector, so the argument goes, relies on landlords not having 
dispersed stock (ODPM, 2003), though in reality policies such as Right to 
Buy have affected concentrations of ownership in most areas of England 
(Martin and Watkinson, 2003). The inherent complexity of such urban 
environments arguably requires large-scale co-ordinated management, in 
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order to address the structural factors underpinning the problems affecting 
neighbourhoods and local housing. Yet this runs counter to many of the 
intellectual premises upon which collective ownership is based. As noted in 
chapter two, collective ownership is often grounded in the logic of localism or 
an anarchic model that allows for highly localised governance. How does an 
organisational model built on such foundations address the costs discussed 
above? It is legitimate to ask whether WECH or Granby CLT would be better 
placed to deal with anti-social behaviour, or other issues effecting its 
members, if it owned all of the housing in its local area?  
For WECH, the history of concentrated local authority ownership of housing 
in the area suggests otherwise. One of the reasons WECH was formed was 
due to WCC’s lack of investment and management of the housing stock in 
the area, and the potential sell-off of the estate to increase private ownership 
(Hosken, 2006). Universal ownership then, is no guarantee of proactive 
housing management. Perhaps a solution for WECH would be to increase its 
share of property in the area, whilst retaining its governance structures. In 
the following exchange with George, a WCC councillor, this was seen as a 
worthwhile proposal; 
George:  ‘…what I would like is someone like WECH to take over the 
properties of the smaller landlords in the area, either by 
agreement or financially buying them off them.’ 
TA:  ‘Is the tension [for WECH]…their scale, isn’t it one of their 
fundamental things?’ 
George: ‘If they were to double in size they'd need a different option, 
but I'm sure the approach is about the culture of the 
organisation and you could develop that over time and 
WECH would grow organically’ (George, WECH supporter).
  
This exchange reveals a crucial set of dilemmas relating to issues of central 
or localised control, and of the suitable scale for collective models to function 
adequately. An increase in the scale of stock owned by WECH may help 
address housing management issues, but at what price? It could be 
hypothesised that control, and the benefits related to this, may diminish 
beyond certain thresholds in the number of members. WECH residents 
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showed some awareness of this dilemma, as Craig a Board member 
exemplified; 
‘…you either go the economies of scale route and become something 
else…We're very well run is the truth of it, and its personal, which 
makes it a much happier place to live’ (Craig, WECH resident and 
Board member). 
Exemplifying how individuals calculate the trade-offs between benefits and 
costs, Craig is clearly weighing up the benefits arising from a larger stock 
profile, against the potential costs of such a transformation, notably in terms 
of weaker internal relations. One perceived cost is the loss of something 
‘personal’, revealed in the previous chapter to be a key component of 
WECH’s housing and service quality. Whether the distinctive processes and 
functioning of WECH could survive such a period of expansion is open to 
question. 
Scholars suggest that resident control is an important factor in addressing 
locational costs. In their assessment of resident-controlled organisations 
operating in areas of deprivation, Clapham et al (2001) noted how such 
residents; 
‘…feel that they are either solving the key issues faced by their 
community, or that their organisation has given them a sense of control 
over their neighbourhoods’ (Clapham et al, 2001, p.3).  
However, the current research raises some crucial questions about this 
claim. It questions whether collective models of ownership are any better 
placed to assuage the costs, caused by broader socio-economic factors and 
agents outside of the collective, than other organisational forms. If a cost has 
its source beyond the influence of the collective, then its interventions can 
appear somewhat blunt. For instance, the powers a housing collective has to 
remedy the anti-social behaviour of another landlord’s tenant are minimal. 
This brings into focus the crucial issue of the scale and diversity of 
ownership, in terms of the remediation of such costs.  
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10.4. Financial costs  
The empirical evidence 
Through the course of interviews, document reviews and observations, the 
issue of financial costs to members was a recurring theme in Milton Park, but 
was seemingly absent in the data related to the other two cases; it is hence a 
strong within-case pattern. The source of such costs lie in the original design 
of CMP, the set of relations between each co-owner, and their financial 
autonomy as co-ops or OSBLs.  
As evidenced in chapter nine, residents in Milton Park pay less than the 
market price for their rents. However, evidence from numerous interviews 
with residents suggests large fluctuations in those rents, in response to 
various factors. Arabelle, a firm advocate of the housing co-op model, 
highlighted how; 
‘….in the last four years we have increased our rents by I think 40 per 
cent, because we had major work to be done and we wanted to finance 
it ourselves. So we jacked up the rents dramatically’ (Arabelle, Milton 
Park resident). 
Large rental increases were identified by other interviewees who suggested 
that ‘in the coming months’ their rents would have to rise by ‘seven, eight, 
nine per cent’ (Alan, Milton Park resident). Unforeseen maintenance work 
was a recurring explanation for why rents were increasing exponentially at 
certain times. Such decisions are clearly taken collectively, being jointly 
decided rather than imposed by some other body such as a landlord. 
Nonetheless, such large rent increases have a varying impact on 
households. Even allowing for low rents generally, percentage increases on 
the scale noted above would likely hit some households much harder than 
others. This had led some members, as Alan recounted, to ask ‘would it be 
okay if I could continue paying my old rent, I don’t care if you don’t do the 
repairs’. This points to a potentially damaging set of decision-making 
processes, with short-term individual self-interest over-riding the long-term 
imperative of maintaining the asset in good condition for current and future 
residents. 
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This issue of the distribution of financial costs, experienced more acutely by 
some members than others, is a crucial concern for Milton Park residents. In 
a general statement, Frank foresaw a time when the distribution of financial 
benefits and costs may become more polarised; 
‘I’m sure we will get to the point…where some people, some groups are 
doing very well and others not so well’ (Frank, OSBL manager). 
Perhaps herein lies an important critique of housing which is in highly 
localised collective ownership; it creates big inequalities and differentials in 
housing costs.  A number of interviewees suggested that higher financial 
costs are likely to be borne by lower income households. This outcome has 
certain historical causes, but is being exacerbated by current financial 
imperatives. As Alan, a housing co-op member noted, a number of historical 
factors have created differences in the rents charged by each co-op. 
Differences in the physical condition of the properties, the allocation of 
property taxes, and poor financial planning are just some of the reasons why 
certain co-ops were charging their members substantially more than others. 
As Alan noted in reference to one co-op; 
‘…all the units are small with no balconies or roof top terraces, no front 
or back yards...I guarantee you the rents…are higher than a lot of the 
rents in Milton Park…[where] people who have an entire flat for 
themselves’ (Alan, Milton Park resident). 
This issue of differential rents creates certain tensions. This is made more 
acute by the impending withdrawal of government subsidies. As the housing 
co-ops reach the end of their mortgage repayments, which would prima facie 
seem to enhance their financial stability, this coincides with the end of 
subsidies from the Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC). 
Crucially, as Arabelle highlighted in her interview, such subsidies support 
those households on low incomes. Losing such subsidies leaves each co-op 
with a choice; to carry on providing such subsidies to low income residents 
funding this through reserves or increased rental charges, or pass on such 
lost subsidy directly to those households in the form of rent increases. As 
Arabelle notes; 
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‘Our rents are on top but there is also some aid for people on low 
incomes…so when the grants from the CMHC will finish, well 
technically there's no more money, so we have to decide how much 
we're going to put aside. No, the first question is, do we want to put this 
aside [to subsidise low income residents] and what will be the rules?’ 
(Arabelle, Milton Park resident).  
Whilst Arabelle’s co-op seemed likely to support such households, other co-
ops appeared less willing. Camille, an active and long-standing member of 
her co-op, revealed;  
‘…[for] the two people who have very low incomes…we will not have 
any subsidy from the government…we don't know what will happen 
…we don't have this idea that we really want to help that much’ 
(Camille, Milton Park resident).  
Looking at the content of the above quotations reveals some important 
insights into collectivism in action. Member’s perceptions of those currently 
receiving the subsidy are seemingly affecting their more general approach 
and rule-setting on this issue. Such evidence highlights how individual 
relations between members, and their contribution to the collective, start to 
frame decisions in varied and unpredictable ways. 
What the above issues reveal is the persistent influence of self-interest. In 
chapter six, the efforts of Maison St. Louis were discussed, as they sought to 
take individualised ownership of property in Milton Park. Whilst such 
property-based claims are no longer apparent, self-interest still actively 
shapes how co-op members think and act. Some residents in Milton Park 
demonstrate self-sacrifice on behalf of the collective. However, many are 
accepting certain costs as a means to secure some other personal benefit. In 
this sense, financial costs are accepted as part of a trade-off for other 
benefits. A good example of this relates to the issue of equity ownership. In 
the Milton Park co-ops members do not (individually) own any equity in the 
housing, they are technically a tenant of the co-op. The implications of this 
for each member’s financial security was a prominent theme in the 
interviews. In response to questions about the difference between living in 
the co-op and owner occupation, Martin responded ‘half a million dollars…As 
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an accountant it breaks my heart’. Yet these costs are acceptable because of 
the lifestyle that low rents had allowed Martin to lead; 
‘…the fact that my wife and I have not saved a ton of money and put it 
aside is strictly our lifestyle choice…we have given ourselves little 
vacations here and there. If we'd have put the money in the bank we'd 
now have more than half a million dollars of equity, so that was a 
lifestyle choice in many ways’ (Martin, Milton Park resident).  
As Martin suggests such financial costs are accepted as an outcome of 
certain lifestyle or ethically driven choices. Margaret, who had been involved 
in the formation of her co-op and lived there ever since, discussed such 
sacrifices in the following exchange; 
Margaret ‘…many of our friends think we're crazy, as we don't own 
equity and we can't sell the place…every 2 or 3 years we 
have to re-explain to them that no, we can't sell our place. 
And no the social shares are $100 and that’s what we'll get 
back if we ever leave’. 
TA:  ͚Has that hindered you in any way?’ 
Margaret ‘…there have been times I have to admit when I have said, in 
particular when there's bickering going on in the co-op…why 
didn't we, because we had many opportunities to buy a 
house with friends or whatever…the only thing that I can 
reflect on is that yes it’s made it more difficult in terms of 
financial security, but it was a social choice’ (Margaret, Milton 
Park resident and CMP Board member). 
This exchange reveals how the benefits derived from collectivism combine 
with ideological and lifestyle choices to provide rationales for continued 
residency and membership. Sacrificing the accumulation of capital, in the 
form of property assets, is a clear cost which has to be borne by those living 
in Milton Park. 
Aside from testimony about future rent rises in WECH, or possible 
gentrification in Granby, there is little evidence to suggest residents and 
members in these areas were affected by, or worried about, the financial 
costs arising from collective ownership. Whilst this might be understandable 
given Granby CLT’s stage of development, WECH is sufficiently well 
developed to see any likely financial costs from collectivism. In observations 
of WECH Board meetings and the 2014 AGM, there was little evidence that 
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residents and members were suffering financial costs as a result of living 
under WECH. Indeed, during the 2014 AGM a field note was made about the 
significant surpluses the organisation carried forward, and attendee’s 
responses to this. When this substantial figure was revealed at the AGM 
there was little sign of dis-satisfaction or challenge. Perhaps this worry is 
removed by government subsidies to cover rents, but in a context where this 
is diminishing the future may hold greater pressures on rent reduction. In 
Milton Park it would seem that something inherent in the co-op and CMP 
model, when allied with other factors, was creating certain costs for certain 
members.  
The relationship between the costs and organisational form and function 
The varying rental charges across the co-ops in Milton Park is not a de facto 
product of this governance structure. As Alan noted in his interview, it is not 
inconceivable that some process for standardising rents could be introduced; 
‘I mean surely they could have had a proposal that there could be one 
per cent a year, that people might take in order to enable rents to be 
equalised for the other side slowly but surely over the course of the 
years’ (Alan, Milton Park resident). 
The differential in rental charges, therefore, would seem to be a product of 
each individual co-op’s financial autonomy. This autonomy is at the heart of 
the function of these organisations as it is what incentivises member 
participation. Individuals contribute their time and energy in the work and 
governance of the co-ops so they can exert some control over certain things 
such as rental charges, but in doing this, localised variations in prices can 
emerge. This draws attention again to the dual-role mechanism discussed in 
the last chapter. To standardise rents would be to remove some of the 
powers of residents as co-owners, and using the logic of the mechanism 
introduced, may diminish participation (or at least the perceived value of 
participation). Financial freedoms and resident and member participation are 
closely linked, and therefore differential rents may be a cost that is intrinsic to 
the nature of the Milton Park project. 
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In a similar vein the objectives of the Milton Park project may be mutually 
exclusive with individual equity ownership. It would seem difficult to devise a 
system whereby members could acquire equity, and yet land and property 
remains collectively owned, with the focus still fixed on housing low income 
households. Emerging Mutual Home Ownership (MHO) models in UK have 
tried to do this (Chatterton, 2015). In such models capital is held in shares 
rather than physical property, the freehold to which resides with the collective 
entity. When members leave they withdraw their capital and a share in the 
uplift of the value of the scheme, although this is indexed to local earnings 
not market prices. Such models still have an element of speculation in them, 
which would be at odds with a core aim of CMP. Furthermore, these MHO 
models are acknowledged to be unworkable for those ‘wageless and lowest 
income groups’ (Chatterton, 2015, p.136). The Milton Park project was 
devised specifically to protect those living in the area, and to provide housing 
for those on low incomes. So even if collective models for sharing equity 
gains could be implemented in Milton Park to address some of these 
financial costs, it could well conflict with the underlying objectives of CMP.  
As the evidence above shows, some residents in Milton Park are reconciled 
to not accumulating property-based equity. And whilst this is justified by 
some as a trade-off for other benefits, some members justify this decision as 
a ‘social choice’ (Margaret, Milton Park resident and CMP Board member). 
This makes a direct link back to the organisational form and function of CMP 
and the co-ops. Social objectives and political ideals are so deeply 
intertwined and reinforced in Milton Park, that costs can be rationalised on 
this basis. This draws attention again to how the rational self-interest of 
individuals can be modified by through the establishment of certain norms, 
particularly norms of co-operation (Bengtsson, 2001).   
The potential exclusion of low income households from the co-ops in Milton 
Park, and the extent to which this is a product of the organisational form and 
function of the co-ops, are important issues to explore. From the interviews 
with residents and organisational observations, there appears to be two 
factors that explain this; 1) financial imperatives for the collective’s future 
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budgeting and 2) the nature of internal relations.  As each co-op was due to 
lose its subsidy for low income households, this would start to affect their 
finances. This was creating a financial incentive not to take applicants from 
the lowest income categories, in order to remove the dilemma of whether to 
subsidise those households in the absence of CMHC funding. It would 
appear that in a model where some households are subsidised and others 
are not, there is a source for potential division or exclusion. And yet, it is hard 
to conceive how the co-ops could provide housing to those on the lowest 
incomes without somehow subsidising their rents (either from their reserves 
or via some external funding). 
The exclusion of low income households then, is a product of the dual-role 
mechanism introduced in the last chapter. Current residents and members 
have, in their role as a co-owner, the financial health of the co-op as a 
priority. In their role as a tenant they also have low rents as an individual self-
interest. Accepting those who require subsidy would seem to run counter to 
both of these positions as it may place financial burdens on the collective. 
These incentives appear to conflict with the wider objectives of CMP and 
what is written in the Declaration of Co-ownership, that co-ops must provide 
a percentage of housing to those on the lowest incomes. 
A degree of perspective is required however, before making this causal 
assertion. Milton Park is still providing affordable housing to large numbers of 
low-middle income households, in a city with limited subsidised provision 
(Moore and Skaburskis, 2004). It is reasonable to suggest that housing in 
Milton Park, in another form of tenure and ownership such as private 
landlordism, would deliver far less affordable housing than is currently 
available. The counter factual argument may be that greater numbers of 
affordable homes could have been developed for the same amount of public 
subsidy that has been invested in Milton Park. However, assessments of the 
subsidy programmes for housing co-ops in Canada has revealed higher 
value for money, compared to subsidy programmes for public housing 
(CMHC, 2003).  
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There is little evidence, as proposed in the literature related to co-operative 
governance, that the collectives studied are economically inefficient. There is 
little to suggest that such organisations impose high financial costs on 
members. Indeed, as noted in the previous chapter, WECH and Milton Park 
are providing housing at substantially less cost than other local provision. It is 
the variation in financial burdens, however, that is a more pressing and 
evident issue. 
Other propositions in the collective housing literature suggest that such forms 
have within them the ‘seeds of their own destruction’ (Best in CCMH, 2009, 
p.49). Such critics suggest that self-interested members within collectives 
can make financial gains at the cost of others. From the cases studied, there 
was indeed evidence of self-interest and associated financial costs for 
individuals. In Milton Park it is the distribution of costs and benefits that is the 
major issue. What this chapter has revealed is some of the formal and 
informal sanctions that are used to assuage self-interest, along with the 
different rationales adopted in accepting certain costs. Financial costs can be 
accepted in the name of collective utility (Bengtsson, 2001), but also as a 
trade-off for other benefits. Identifying these two distinct, but interlinked 
incentives, is a key contribution of this research, notably in the field of co-
operative housing. 
10.5. Relationship costs  
The empirical evidence 
In WECH and Milton Park, there are signs that participation in collectives 
creates a set of psychological costs associated with the relations between 
members and residents. As the literature suggests, such is the nature of 
collective ownership that it requires close collaboration, and this can give rise 
to strained relations and increased stress (Novelli et al, 1989). 
In WECH, a small number of interviews highlighted certain psychological and 
quality of life costs to them and others. WECH interviewees noted how 
relations between tenants and leaseholders had, in the past, been relatively 
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fraught. Francis recalled problems at the Board level when there was a 
‘mass resignation’. Francis suggested that in light of the majority of seats 
being held by tenants, leaseholder proposals and motions were constantly 
voted down. This period of tumultuous relations seems to have passed, but 
some leaseholders bear the scars of these encounters as they ‘still snipe 
from the sidelines’ (Francis, WECH resident).  
This raises questions about the strength of internal relations, and the effect 
of weaker relations on the performance of the collective. In their 2010 study, 
Ambrose and Stone found two key areas where WECH resident perceptions 
were, in comparative terms, negative. The first related to safety after dark. 
The second, surprisingly, related to how many people respondents felt they 
could trust in the area. Secondary data analysis revealed that only 19 
percent of WECH residents said they trusted ‘many’ people in the 
neighbourhood, compared with 47 percent nationally.  
Table 7: The extent of trust relations in WECH and nationally 
How many people would you say can be 
trusted in this area? 
WECH 
responses 
(per cent) 
National 
responses 
(per cent) 
Many  19 47 
Some 52 36 
A few 25 15 
None 4 2 
Source: Adapted from Ambrose and Stone, 2010, p.66 
This is a stark difference, and in their assessment of why this might be the 
case, Ambrose and Stone cited high levels of crime and fear of crime. Later 
work by Satsangi (2011) revealed that, whilst such levels of trust were below 
the national average, when compared to inner London WECH residents still 
trusted more people in their area. 
Deeper analysis however suggests that this issue is pertinent, if somewhat 
difficult to unravel. In Ambrose and Stone’s (2010) survey, WECH residents 
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were asked to compare their level of trust in their current neighbours, with 
levels of trust in their neighbours under a previous landlord. Whilst the shift 
was positive in terms of experiences under WECH, there was only a 
marginal change. This suggests that the organisational form and function of 
WECH was having a relatively minimal impact on perceptions of trust. And 
yet, when residents were asked similar comparative questions about their 
‘sense of mutual trust and support’, the positive shift in perceptions was 
much more pronounced.  
To explore this issue in more detail, further analysis has been performed on 
Ambrose and Stone’s data, as part of the current study. Resident responses 
to the following two questions were analysed, the first comprising a multiple 
choice, the second scored on a four-point scale; 
i. How many people would you say can be trusted in this area? 
ii. I feel more part of the neighbourhood and there is a sense of 
mutual trust and support 
There is a strong association, as might be expected, between those who 
trust ‘some’ or ‘many’ people and those who gave a positive response about 
mutual trust and support. However, when the responses of those who trust ‘a 
few’ people in the area are examined, an interesting pattern appears. Around 
80 percent of such respondents were positive about mutual trust and support 
in the area. This suggests that perceptions of mutuality are not reliant on 
extensive trust networks; individuals can trust only a few people and yet still 
feel part of a bigger set of reciprocal relations. Respondents were also asked 
how many people they knew from the area (‘to talk to in the street or local 
shops’), and this was cross-tabulated with respondent’s feelings of trust. 
Those who ‘know’ less than 21 people give a higher score on trust than 
those who know more. 
Such evidence suggests that whilst WECH residents may feel part of a 
relatively supportive, trusting and close knit community, this does not appear 
to be dependent on extensive networks of relations. In a membership 
organisation, premised on resident ownership and control, one might expect 
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to find more extensive networks of trusting relations. Whilst WECH residents 
trust their neighbours more than the average Inner London resident, they are 
still much less likely to have large sets of trusting relations compared to the 
national average. Such findings may be interpreted in two ways; 1) that being 
a being resident of WECH negates some of the sub-regional factors that 
diminish your levels of trust; or 2) that being a member of WECH does not 
sufficiently affect relations of trust to bring your perceptions into line with the 
national average. As discussed in the following sub-section, this raises 
important questions about the form and function of the organisation.  
A qualitatively different pattern in relationship costs emerges in Milton Park. 
Interviews with residents revealed certain psychological burdens that arose 
from close co-operation with members. Often such burdens were the product 
of conflictual relations. In the interview with Alan, an active member of his co-
op and an advocate for Milton Park, he revealed the struggles that have 
taken place within the co-ops, highlighting the ‘high amount of conflict that 
goes on’ and levels of ‘hostility’ that individuals have had from their 
neighbours. In a revealing insight Arabelle noted that ‘some co-ops really 
fight, they’ve got to call the cops’. This issue of conflict was a recurrent 
theme throughout the interviews. Those in positions that carry major 
responsibilities within the co-ops, appeared the most likely targets for such 
criticisms and experienced stress and anxiety as a result. Claudia noted, in 
reference to her extensive experience in her co-op, that ‘any Board member 
will be criticised very roughly, they are very harsh’. With co-op participation 
comes an accountability to other members, who may scrutinise and criticise 
your actions. Arabelle highlighted how conflictual relations in the governance 
process carry personal emotional costs. Reflecting on her emotional state 
before certain Board meetings, she noted; 
‘I’ve been going to general assemblies…And I’m in the elevator and I 
think, I don’t wanna go there, there’s going to be shit go down’ (Arabelle 
Milton Park resident). 
Such emotional responses point to certain psychological costs that are being 
borne by those involved. Acting as co-owners, there is evidence that power 
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struggles develop, which can lie at the root of individual tensions and stress. 
Mary, who showed signs of dissatisfaction with relations in her co-op, 
suggested that; 
‘This is a very small pond and people …can impose themselves and 
they can expand their egos in the co-op and it makes them feel like 
they're someone, they lose perspective…people are bullying and 
pushing and trying to impose themselves’ (Mary, Milton Park resident).  
Mary’s quote is important as it reveals processes of power and domination, 
which have had a detrimental effect on people’s lives. To continue to live in a 
co-op can require a tolerance of strained relations, or practices by others 
which one might find objectionable. Interviewees highlighted this issue in 
discussing the different competences among residents and members, 
notably in terms of their interpersonal skills and ability to co-operate. David a 
co-op member for 20 years revealed that; 
‘...it takes the work and then it takes…not the temperament, is it 
respect? You have to be tolerant maybe. You have to be aware that not 
everyone is going to agree with you, think the same way, and not 
everyone has the same level of understanding’ (David Milton Park 
resident).  
The above quote hints at the disparate and often divergent interests and 
priorities of members, but also that to live in such a way requires a certain 
psychological resilience. Processes within the co-ops can give rise to 
criticisms that become personalised, a recurring theme in the interviews. 
Reflecting on this issue, Arabelle noted how ‘people don’t see the difference 
between their personal opinion and the process’. Alan revealed a similar 
perspective, but made the link between such personalisation and its effects; 
‘…decisions are often made with a high amount of personalisation…I’ve 
known people who have lived in co-ops all their lives and been so 
miserable that they felt it’s not worth the time and effort’ (Alan, Milton 
Park resident). 
Alan’s quotation not only reveals some of the psychological costs of co-
operation, but also how individuals include such costs in their calculations 
about whether to stay in the organisation; it is part of a set of trade-offs that 
affect decisions. Such costs should not be seen as a permanent feature of 
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life in the co-ops, stress and acrimony would appear transient and episodic, 
rather than enduring. As Camille noted, problems with neighbours are not 
‘there all the time’.  
The cost of having close and reciprocal relations is a set of responsibilities 
that are not always welcome. Arabelle reflected on how living in co-op 
required a certain investment in relations, and the adoption of certain 
neighbourly behaviours; 
‘It’s the flipside of knowing everyone, you’re not anonymous anymore. If 
you're living in a co-op in a city, and you think you can preserve that 
'nobody knows me on this street and I don't have to say hi to anyone', 
you can't do that because they all know you, and if you're a bitch or 
whatever people will say 'what’s wrong with you today?’ (Arabelle, 
Milton Park resident). 
What the evidence above shows is that close and mutually beneficial 
relations often come at some certain psychological or emotional costs. These 
costs are often manifest in strained relations, personal criticism or in some 
form of domination by others. 
The relationship between the costs and organisational form and function 
It is reasonable to expect that an organisation such as WECH will strengthen 
relations between neighbours, more than individualised form of ownership. 
As a long sustained housing collective, where a significant percentage of its 
residents are members, and which is built upon historic acts of solidarity and 
co-operation, one may expect a prevalence of trusting relations.  
In some respects, there is evidence that WECH is mitigating some of the 
contextual factors affecting trust that are inherent in Inner London. And yet, 
when WECH residents compare their relations of trust with that experienced 
under a previous landlord, the change is only marginal. Added to this, 
comparisons with national averages suggest that WECH residents have 
smaller networks of trust. One may posit this as a cost, or at the very least, 
an unrealised potential benefit given the notions of collectivism that underpin 
these models.  
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The organisational model perhaps explains some of the subtleties of these 
findings in terms of trust and mutuality. Under a representative model of 
governance, only a small percentage of residents are likely to be actively 
involved in those governance processes. Whilst there is evidence that people 
are involved in WECH activities outside of the Board, as Ambrose and 
Stone’s data reveals (2010, p.64), this seems relatively small compared to 
the time given by members of Milton Park’s housing co-ops. It may be 
argued therefore that WECH’s organisational model, in light of its focus on 
representative processes, is not as effective as it could be in developing trust 
relations.  
The links between the WECH model and trust relations come into focus 
when one explores further the responses to Ambrose and Stone’s (2010) 
survey. As table 8 below reveals, residents are positive about WECH’s 
efforts to build relations and interactions between neighbours, compared to 
the efforts of their previous landlords. Despite this, only a marginal difference 
is seen in the levels of trust WECH residents have in their neighbours 
compared to such levels under their previous landlord. This perhaps adds 
weight to the suggestion that the organisation’s form and function is not 
impacting markedly on the extent that residents feel they can trust their 
neighbours.  
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Table 8: Perceptions of WECH efforts to build relations and levels of trust  
Question Previous landlord 
group responses 
Difference 
WECH 
(mean 
score) 
Previous 
landlord 
(mean 
score) 
Does WECH through events 
and other means help you to 
meet neighbours? 
3.29 1.67 +1.63 
Do you feel you can trust your 
neighbours? 
3.01 2.68 +0.33 
Source: Adapted from Ambrose and Stone (2010), p.46 
The costs incurred by residents in Milton Park are very different, and 
arguably more pronounced. The model of governance in the co-ops, in 
particular, seems causally related to the emotional and psychological costs 
experienced by those interviewed, as participation and responsibility for 
certain co-op functions can give rise to criticism and stress. 
However, there is an additional factor that should be considered, and that 
relates to the size of the co-ops. The co-ops contain only a small number of 
dwellings each, which means that only a limited number of individuals are 
engaged in running and managing the co-ops at any one time. This no doubt 
intensifies relations as Camille attested; 
‘You have to live with your neighbours. And the fun part is you know 
your neighbours and the bad part is you have to deal with your 
neighbours’ (Camille, Milton Park resident). 
As both co-owners and tenants, co-op residents are required to co-operate 
with their neighbours to govern such housing. This duality of roles, added to 
physical proximity and the small pool of residents, intensifies relationships. 
As Arabelle noted in her comparison of co-op housing and private renting; 
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‘…you don’t have to work with your neighbour in that case [private 
renting], whereas here if you’re fighting with your neighbour because of 
problems and have a general assembly on the Monday, well it’s a little 
particular because you’ve got to work together, be seated in the same 
room together’ (Arabelle, Milton Park resident). 
This quote exemplifies the very processes that give rise to relationship costs, 
and reasserts the notion of a dual-role mechanism introduced in the last 
chapter. In order to make relations function within the co-ops, and CMP, a 
set of norms has been established. David outlined the behavioural patterns 
and interpersonal skills that are encouraged, and what is received in return; 
’It takes a lot of energy to explain or try to convey or express your point 
of view, so it takes alot of work and the capacity to make concessions… 
but what you get in return is solidarity, security, a secure environment’ 
(David, Milton Park resident). 
David is articulating the trade-off being made by co-op members, which are a 
direct product of participation and internal relations. Co-operative behaviours 
are encouraged and fostered, because this is how some of the benefits 
outlined in chapter nine are secured. 
As the propositions in the literature suggest, the relations between members 
of collectives can become ‘fractious’ (CCMH, 2009). However, in the cases 
examined here, there is little to suggest that such forms are prone to 
‘endemic governance failure’ (Clark in CCMH, 2009, p.49). WECH and the 
co-ops in Milton Park have experienced internal divisions and conflict, but 
they are still longstanding, sustained organisations. Whether they will survive 
future events, such as losses in subsidy to the collective or their residents, it 
is difficult to say. 
Scholars have highlighted how close working relations, particularly where 
small groups have high levels of autonomy, can impact on individuals in 
substantial ways (Novelli et al, 1989). There was little evidence of this in the 
WECH case, but this may answer some other questions related to the extent 
of trusting relations. In Milton Park the intensity of relations has indeed led to 
psychological impacts on members. In chapter nine it was noted how 
participation in the governance of collectives may be beneficial in terms of 
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learning and confidence, a process Elster (1986) has described as self-
realisation. However, what price should members be willing to pay for this 
benefit? The costs in terms of time and energy can marry with stress and 
psychological consequences to represent a heavy burden.  
This research has connected costs associated with member and resident 
relations, with distinctive processes taking place in the collectives. The extent 
to which the mechanisms posited in the previous chapter explain the 
emergence of these costs, or whether new mechanisms are needed to 
generalise these processes, is an issue now addressed in this chapter’s 
conclusion.  
10.6. The perceived costs of housing collectivism: The value and 
limits of mechanistic explanations  
The outcomes from such collectivism, as perceived by residents and 
members, appear in complex patterns. Costs and benefits are woven 
together so that, for instance, differing levels of participation generated a 
range of psychological and financial benefits, which in turn translated into 
differing costs in time, energy and psychological burdens. Across the 
collectives these outcomes appeared intrinsically connected, or perhaps 
more precisely, as traded-off each another.  
Within the testimony of interviewees in this study, it was often apparent that 
individuals were engaged in a form of calculus, reflecting on whether their 
decision to stay in the collective, and receive the benefits of this, were worth 
the costs they were incurring. Should one accept stress and conflict with 
other residents for lower housing costs? Should costs associated with living 
in that location be accepted in return for good housing quality and services? 
Whilst important such rational calculations, on their own, did not explain the 
perception of outcomes by those within collectives. Personal costs were 
frequently accepted by interviewees on the basis of anticipated benefits for 
others, or ‘the collective’ at large. Individuals justified this as part of a ‘social 
choice’ (Margaret, Milton Park resident and CMP Board member), or in 
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pursuit of creating a ‘caring’ organisation (Craig, WECH resident and Board 
member). Collectivism can therefore be driven by a range of motives, both 
individualistic and also collectivistic, with the latter relating to shared goals, 
altruism, political ideals and social norms. This corroborates significant 
literature in this regard (Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Seyd and Whiteley, 2002; 
Birchall and Simmons, 2004).  
A central aim of this thesis has been to trace the processes in collectives to 
see if, and to what extent, any perceived benefits and costs are connected to 
their form and function. What has emerged is a causal picture, albeit a partial 
one, which shows how certain features of the cases drove certain patterns of 
outcomes. Some of the processes giving rise to perceived costs can be 
explained by the mechanisms posited in the previous chapter. 
Explaining perceived costs: Mechanisms and their explanatory value 
Three mechanisms were previously outlined; the form, rules and regulation 
mechanism, the dual-role mechanism and the residual history mechanism. 
How these mechanisms operate to generate certain perceived costs is 
summarised in Figure 28 and discussed in detail below. The discussion tries 
to show that, whilst valuable explanatory devices, the mechanisms are 
deeply integrated. 
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Figure 28: The overlapping mechanisms linking key observations and 
processes to cost patterns 
 
Legal and constitutional rules, alongside internal regulating activity, 
combined together in the collectives to give rise to certain costs. In Milton 
Park, the form of the collective, as a being a federation of co-ops and 
OSBLs, has created the potential for free-riding by residents and members, 
but also the possibility of effective incentives and sanctions to limit this. The 
condominium structure has created a ‘complete universe’ (Altshul, 1989, p.3) 
in which non-participation is both possible and highly undesirable. Form and 
rules have driven processes which create individualised burdens in time and 
energy. However, rules, in the form of co-op by-laws and constitutional 
directives, allow for sanctions to be imposed as a form of regulating activity, 
for instance, by charging market rents. This regulating activity has brought its 
own relational consequences, as Mary revealed a certain ‘creepy’ quality to 
such regulating effort (Mary, Milton Park resident).  
In WECH and Granby, representative governance models mean that a small 
number of individuals incur large time and energy costs, but the non-
participation of others was rarely depicted as free-riding. Collectivistic 
motives helped those involved frame and rationalise time and energy costs, 
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accepting the burdens in order to ‘save the estates’ (Charles, WECH resident 
and Board member) or to ‘keep this area’ and preserve its heritage 
(Catherine, Granby resident and CLT Board member). This is wholly 
reasonable given the legal form adopted in WECH and Granby CLT, which is 
geared towards ‘community benefit’ (HM Government, 2014a). Whilst not 
requiring high levels and equitable distribution of time and energy, such 
models lack the incentives for involvement. Activists were seen to be 
searching for ‘creative’ ways to secure participation in the ‘fiddly and time-
consuming’ business of collectivism (Beatrice, Granby resident and CLT 
Board member). The legal forms and constitutional rules demand different 
forms and quantities of participation, grounded in different motives, and 
which create different opportunities for internal regulation. These factors 
shaped the costs borne by individuals in each collective. 
However, time and energy costs were not only explicable in terms of rules 
and regulation, but can also be understood in terms of a dual-role 
mechanism. It is a feature of all of the organisations studied that residents in 
the collective, and potentially other members, occupy a dual-role as both 
beneficiary and co-owner. Free-riding and its regulation may be explained in 
reference to this dual-role. Free-riding is essentially offset in WECH by paid 
staff, where the governance demands of co-ownership are concentrated on 
small numbers of volunteers. These Board members focus simply on ‘cost 
oversight, fiscal responsibility and where we're going as an organisation’ 
(Craig, WECH resident and Board member). This is different to Milton Park 
where in the co-ops most adult residents were seen to have some 
organisational responsibilities. The nature of the dual-role in different 
collective forms determines the spread of time and energy costs.  
This duality of roles also underpins the processes giving rise to conflict, 
hostility and domination. Where most residents are active co-owners, 
responsible for some facet of internal management or governance, relational 
costs can emerge from situations where there is a ‘high amount of conflict’ 
(Alan, Milton Park resident). Yet, this is not purely a product of the dual-role. 
 317 
 
Internal nuances relating to different ownership forms affect this, as in 
WECH, where significant disputes between tenants and leaseholders have 
occurred. Property rights and rules governing ownership therefore entwine 
with dual-roles in governance processes. Furthermore, the continuance of 
these processes owes much to the persistence of the collectives’ history, 
built as they are on visions of co-operation and collective ownership. The 
continuing influence of the collective’s history means that certain processes 
are preserved, and therefore certain costs. 
Major variations in financial burdens, such as in Milton Park, were seen to 
arise from organisational forms and their governance rules. Where small 
autonomous co-ops were able to set their own rents and keep their charges 
low, evidence pointed to major fluctuations in those rents, along with 
processes to potentially exclude those on the lowest incomes. In WECH by 
contrast a centralised model of governance allowed for uniform rent setting, 
which meant that similar processes were not apparent. Furthermore, and for 
each of the cases studied, rules enshrining collective property ownership 
meant that certain types of financial loss, such as personal capital gains, had 
to be foregone as legal rules forcefully shaped this outcome.  
And the continuation of these costs was partly a result of the persistent 
influence of the collective’s history, as current action takes place against 
historic ideals of securing ownership against private or public interests. Yet, 
self-interest and the temptations of private ownership remained. Residents in 
each of the collectives reflected on missed opportunities to secure personal 
gains, having missed out on ‘half a million dollars of equity’ (Martin, Milton 
Park resident), or in accepting that they ‘can’t possibly see it as an 
investment any more’ (Catherine, Granby resident and CLT Board member).  
This commentary reveals that the mechanisms do not describe discrete 
processes, but rather they overlap, pointing toward different dimensions of 
the same phenomena.  
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The limits of the explanatory value of the mechanisms 
The mechanisms above do not account for a range of processes and 
perceived costs in the collectives. Firstly, any externalities are missed by the 
mechanisms since they focus on the internal dynamics of the collectives. A 
range of costs remain unaccounted for, notably those relating to the 
collectives’ location, where residents and members have been affected by 
poor physical environments, a sense of insecurity, or nuisance and anti-
social behaviour by others. If anything, these locational costs reveal the limits 
of collective processes in addressing such issues. Furthermore, the 
mechanisms do not account for the legacy of the original inputs into the 
collectives in creating certain costs, for instance, inadequacies in funding, or 
the nature of the physical buildings acquired, which in all of the cases have 
created major financial burdens. Hence, the mechanisms posited have a 
limited explanatory range, opening only partially the ‘black box’ in which the 
mechanics of cause and effect take place. 
Figure 29: The black box of causal mechanisms in collectives 
 
Despite the partial explanatory value of the mechanisms, they do provide a 
simplified set of models of the internal processes giving rise to certain costs 
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and benefits. The ways which they overlap hint at a more unified model 
which truncates and combines them to create a more general mechanism. 
One potentially fruitful idea, used by other scholars, is that of 
institutionalisation. 
Toward a general mechanism to explain costs and benefits 
Bengtsson (2001) in his study of Swedish housing estates sought to 
understand the processes sustaining resident co-operation. Observing 
patterns in residents’ actions, linked to collective housing forms, rules and 
norms, he draws on Scott’s (1995, p.33) definition of institutionalisation to 
explain how and why co-operation occurs; 
‘…institutions consist of cognitive, normative and regulative structures 
and activity that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour’. 
Bengtsson draws on this definition to try to explain how co-operation is 
possible, even when the purely rational calculations of residents should 
dictate that it is not feasible. Using ideas around institutionalisation, 
Bengtsson is suggesting that certain forms of organisations can embed 
norms and practices which can act as mechanisms to override individuals’ 
self-interested motivations. In essence, rather than being ‘prisoners’ in a 
dilemma between co-operation and defection, residents enter a ‘game of 
assurance’, where they are reassured that their co-operation will be matched 
by similar co-operation by others. 
These ideas help us understand how the collectives operate as institutions, 
nested within other institutional settings. In the three collectives studied, 
cognitive processes were evidenced in the rationales and justifications for 
bearing certain costs and for securing collective gains. These cognitive 
scripts were frequently rehearsed, owing their power and coherence to wider 
cultural material, for instance, internationally recognised co-operative 
principles and practices. Member practices show how such co-operation can 
be embedded through normative arguments by residents and members 
which have a moral quality (Scott, 1995). Regulatory processes, based on 
legal and internal rules, were used to reinforce these normative positions. 
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Perhaps then, the mechanisms posited here reveal some of the mechanics 
through which collectivism is institutionalised, going further than Bengtsson 
in linking these processes to the outcomes individuals perceive and 
experience. 
Aside from this useful categorisation of processes associated with 
institutions, using institutional theory could also be valuable in situating the 
collectives in broader structures and environments. The tensions outlined 
above, regarding the adequacy of rational choice models for explaining the 
benefits and costs created within collectives, mirror similar debates in 
institutional theory (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Meyer, 2007). Whilst certain 
scholars (for example, Kenneth et al, 1987) wish to see institutions as a 
product of rational agency, essentially a product of choices and calculus by 
individuals, others wish to assert that institutions themselves penetrate 
actors, significantly shaping their choices and potential action. As Meyer 
(2007, p.792) notes ‘actorhood, in this usage, is scripted by institutional 
structures’. Hence housing collectives, and the benefits they secure, are not 
the product of purely rational, independent choices by the residents and 
members within each collective, but heavily shaped by the scripts and 
parameters set at a cultural, wider systemic level. Indeed, the ‘norm of co-
operation’ apparent in the collectives is arguably not the pure product of 
rational choice, but taken from a script written by wider institutions; from long 
running intellectual traditions related to socialism, co-operation, common 
property; from legal processes which regulate organisational form and 
function; and shifting norms set by political processes and wider cultural 
dynamics.   
By focusing on individuals’ perceptions of costs and benefits in this study, 
individual agency has been privileged, and organisational mechanisms come 
to the fore. The insights from this are rich. However, such an approach 
forces a focus on the regulative and internal dynamics of the collectives. 
What remains for future study is a stronger focus on how the forms and 
functions of collectives are shaped and scripted by their position in wider 
cultural, financial and political institutions.     
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Chapter Eleven: Conclusion 
11.1. Introduction 
The following chapter reflects on the thesis to summarise its key findings, 
and identify its contributions to current knowledge. It offers a number of 
methodological reflections, whilst also highlighting the implications of the 
study for those developing and supporting housing collectives, and those 
tasked with finding solutions to contemporary housing issues. The chapter 
concludes with a suggested direction for future research. 
11.2. Summary of findings and contribution to knowledge 
This study has sought to answer two research questions. The first related to 
the development of collectives, exploring those factors which constrain and 
enable their growth. This arose from a detailed review of the literature, where 
insufficient attention has been paid to the processes underpinning such 
development. The research’s second question focused on the perceived 
outcomes of collectivism for members and residents. The literature in this 
field, whilst highlighting various perceived benefits and costs, failed to 
provide a firm understanding of the relationship between those outcomes 
and collective forms and functions. The findings in relation to each of these 
research questions are summarised below, detailing how this work confirms, 
questions and refines the existing literature, and the original contributions it 
makes. 
The factors constraining and enabling housing collectivism 
Applying the concepts of constraint and enablement, and differentiating 
between internal and external processes, the study provides original insights 
into the causal factors shaping the development of housing collectives.   
Tracing internal processes has revealed how received conditions influenced 
residents’ beliefs, which catalysed specific forms of action, and led to co-
ordinated action by multiple actors. This highlighted how, for instance, 
activists’ beliefs were shaped by historical struggles, ideological influences, 
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interpretations of place, and cultural norms. Key actors translated beliefs into 
action and made activism a way of life. Beliefs and certain character traits 
were the basis for varied forms of action in developing housing collectives, 
and a typology of action emerged showing agents engaged in both 
organisational tasks, as well as processes of organising. In synergy, the 
actions of individuals enabled the collectives to exert influence, highlighting 
the critical role of community organisers. Counterfactual questions 
highlighted how, without these key organisers, the enactment of the 
collectives would have been highly unlikely.  
An important contribution has been made in understanding the causal 
mechanisms underpinning these internal processes. It has been revealed 
how, by persuading and mobilising residents against a projected adversary, 
individuals in the cases initiated powerful belief-action cycles, which 
resembled self-fulfilling prophecies. As activists were mobilised and became 
increasingly successful in disrupting private sector-led development, and in 
proposing an alternative approach, their perceived efficacy grew (Bandura, 
2000), further solidifying beliefs in the possibility of collective action. Yet, 
such processes were shown to be far from inevitable or beyond influence. In 
a modification of Merton’s (1968) self-fulling prophecy mechanism, circuit 
breakers were conceptualised to explain how those opposed to collectivism 
could interrupt this cycle and constrain its development. An example of this 
was seen in Milton Park, where the MSL group engaged in very similar 
organising activity to pro-collective residents, and succeeded in constraining 
the collective’s development. 
These findings are important because the existing literature in this field is 
lacking in certain respects. This literature focuses on either the technical 
aspects of organisational tasks, for instance, navigating the legal, financial or 
planning requirements of such projects, or on a static understanding of the 
factors shaping development. This literature has often concentrated on the 
ingredients or conditions for collectivism, providing narrative descriptions 
rather than processual models (Birchall, 1988; Chatterton, 2015). The crucial 
value of this study is in providing an understanding of the flow of events, or 
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the mechanics of how residents’ beliefs form and shape their actions, and 
how certain actions performed by multiple actors can make collectivism 
possible. 
The study adds weight to assertions about the role of volunteers in such 
initiatives (Aird, 2009; Sungu-Eryilmaz and Greenstein, 2007; Moore, 2015), 
highlighting how collectives can become over-reliant on volunteers, and the 
potential for their burnout (Heywood, 2016; Young Foundation, 2011). 
Nonetheless, this study also shows how volunteers are critical enablers, 
bringing skills, forms of action, and representative powers that paid staff or 
contracted professionals could not.  
Such findings are allied with important insights into how housing collectives 
are shaped by external factors and relations. Applying a realist model for 
causal explanation, focus has been directed to the interactions between 
different entities who, possessing certain powers and liabilities, create the 
contingent conditions for collectivism. The analysis exposes how a 
collective’s local relations, such as with local governments, housing 
associations, private developers and advisors, can be shaped by other 
entities and forces operating at a wider geographic scale. National 
governments constrained and enabled the collectives through their rhetoric 
and policies concerning civil society and housing provision, through their 
legislation in creating new powers for different groups, and in their 
distribution of financial resources. Key interventions by governments 
included the development of large federal funding programmes for co-
operative housing, terminating large urban regeneration programmes, and 
creating new powers of ownership for tenants through legislation. These 
actions set conditions for both the collectives and the entities which they 
were in relation with locally.  
The cases also highlight the constraining and enabling influence of external 
factors which were harder to pin-down; the operations of housing markets 
and the fluctuating value of land and housing, the function and health of the 
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wider economy, political and ideological shifts, social or cultural norms 
around mutuality, social activism, and property ownership. 
By identifying and modelling the relations between the collectives and local 
external bodies, structures of relations became apparent. Each collective’s 
position in that structure affected the opportunities for the collectives to 
develop. In Milton Park, WECH and Granby, the local authorities’ initial 
preference for private sector-led development constrained collective action, 
but also unintentionally created the grievances needed to solidify internal 
relations. As private sector developers withdrew, the collectives could fill the 
vacuum with a proposal for collective ownership, exploiting each local 
authority’s financial liabilities and susceptibility to residents’ democratic 
powers. As the structure of relations became conducive for collectivism, 
unintentional constraints were apparent, for instance, in the grant or loan 
conditions of funders or lenders, and in the dominance exerted by advisors 
and supporters. Nonetheless, changes in the structure of local relations 
enabled the collectives to form, which could be conceptualised as 
opportunity structures. 
These findings make an important contribution since they address a paucity 
of insight into the causal processes in the development of collectives. It 
moves beyond a picture of pre-determined conditions for collectivism, 
towards an understanding of their fluid development in light of fluctuating 
powers, liabilities and actions of entities operating at various spatial scales. 
The findings reveal how the development of such housing forms is only partly 
in the gift of those residents and activists involved. Substantive contingencies 
reside in wider relations. 
The research adds weight and refines an existing literature on the central 
importance of support infrastructure for housing collectives (Aird, 2009; 
CCMH, 2009; Lang, 2015; Moore and Mullins, 2013). Advisors, and a wider 
support network, were critical to the development of the cases studied, as 
each navigated complex technical issues related to the legalities of property 
ownership and non-profit governance, development planning and 
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management of refurbishment programmes, and financial planning and 
fundraising. Despite this general conclusion, support took differing forms in 
each case, with the highly co-ordinated approach through the GRT in Milton 
Park, and the more piecemeal, trial-and-error approach in Granby CLT. 
Other constraints, noted in the existing literature (Moore and Mullins, 2013), 
appeared in relation to the role of supporters, and their potential to erode 
resident control. There was evidence of this in the development of Milton 
Park, where the body set up to manage the refurbishment and transfer 
process decided that, ‘a community Board would not necessarily have the 
ability…to own and manage £6.9m worth of property’ (Helman, 1987, p.133). 
This reveals tensions between the ideal of collective ownership, and the 
complexities and realities of their development, often demanding significant 
technical knowledge and skills. 
The perceived benefits and costs of housing collectivism for members and 
residents 
This study has sought to identify the range and combination of benefits and 
costs for individuals within the collectives studied, privileging their 
perceptions and supplementing this with insights from secondary data. In the 
cases studied four categories of benefits were identified relating to; 1) 
financial gains; 2) security; 3) learning and quality of life; and 4) housing and 
service quality.  
The housing collectives studied offered housing at less than market prices, 
and in certain cases below social rented prices, concurring with other 
literature in this regard (Davis and Stokes, 2009; Farrell Curtin & Bocarsly, 
2008; Paterson and Dayson, 2011). Some of the collectives studied were 
seen to offer enhancements in physical security, derived from stronger 
resident relations, and security of tenure giving rise to deeper notions of 
ontological security as residents perceived ‘a sense of a certain freedom’ 
from housing concerns (David, Milton Park Resident).  
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Linked to this, evidence from the cases refines the existing literature in 
regard to the effects of co-operation and collectivism on individual 
psychologies and quality of life (CMHC, 2003; Elster, 1986; Saegert and 
Winkel, 1996). Varied benefits were seen in terms of learning and fulfilment 
in handling housing management tasks, and other potential health and 
psychological benefits. On this latter issue of identifying and unpicking these 
more ‘intangible benefits’ (Moore and McKee, 2014, p.528), much work 
remains to be done. The subtleties of any psychological effects arising from 
collectively owning and managing housing remains under-explored, and 
addressing this requires dedicated research which traces how the functions 
within collectives translate to psychological responses. Added to these 
benefits, in the particular case of WECH, multiple evidence suggested 
residents benefited from a quality of housing management and services, 
perceived as superior to other social landlords (Rowlands, 2009; Satsangi 
and Clapham, 1990; TSA, 2009).  
This research shows how the individualised benefits of collectivism are often 
connected to individualised costs, or more precisely that they are traded-off 
one another. Unlike much of the advocacy literature in this field, this study 
shows how individuals perform a type of calculus in forecasting outcomes for 
themselves, to justify their decision to stay or leave the collective.  
Here, connections are made between individual outcomes and organisational 
forms and functions, and this is a notable contribution to knowledge. For 
instance, very low housing costs in Milton Park are achieved, in part, due to 
high time and energy costs arising from self-managed co-operatives. In 
WECH, under a more representational model, staff perform most of the 
housing management functions, thereby reducing the demands on residents. 
The trade-off from this is arguably weaker internal relations, and fewer 
opportunities to learn and self-realise (Elster, 1986). Hence, the form and 
function of the collectives, varying in their required levels of resident and 
member participation, dictate certain patterns of outcomes observed and the 
balance between costs and benefits. 
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These findings provide some clarity where there is a recognised gap in 
current knowledge. In generalising across the cases, mechanisms have been 
posited to describe the relationship between perceived outcomes and the 
organisational models adopted. A form, rules and regulation mechanism 
helps explain how certain costs and benefits arise in different forms of 
collectives. Legal rules concerning company law are seen to combine with 
collectives’ constitutional rules, which are interpreted and used to regulate 
activities and behaviours in consistent ways.  
Furthermore, how individuals are positioned as both beneficiary and co-
owner, creates a duality of roles. A dual-role mechanism explains why 
certain types of decisions are made, for instance, the setting of low rent 
levels.  As residents, there is an incentive to adopt low rent policies for their 
individual gain, but only to such a level that as co-owners they know will not 
jeopardise the collective’s financial health. A final mechanism helped explain 
how each collective’s history permeates present events, shaping behaviours 
in a way that preserves the original purpose of the collective. This is manifest 
in the training of new staff and residents, and ingrained beliefs about low 
rents and solidarity between members.  
This study has identified several perceived costs for residents and members 
involved in each collective.  In doing so the research offers important 
contributions, particularly in light of the limited literature on the negative 
outcomes that can arise for those in housing collectives. From the empirical 
evidence four types of cost were identified relating to; 1) time and energy 
demands; 2) costs associated with the collectives’ location; 3) financial 
losses; and 4) costs arising from internal relationships. Important patterns 
were revealed in the nature and quantity of time and energy costs 
experienced by individuals, providing greater empirical evidence to nuance 
insights from previous studies (CCMH, 2009; Clapham and Kintrea, 1992; 
Moore, 2015). Critically, it has been shown how time and energy costs can 
be inequitably distributed within collectives, feeding other relational issues 
and problems.  
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A range of perceived costs were identified relating to the location of the 
collectives’ housing. In Granby CLT and WECH, interview data and 
secondary sources highlighted feelings of insecurity out of the home, anti-
social behaviour and poor physical environments. The evidence shows the 
limits of each collective’s power in addressing these issues, and the 
shortcomings of relatively small-scale collective ownership.  
The study has also shown how, in the federated model of small housing co-
ops operating in Milton Park, variations in rent levels (over time and between 
co-ops) created the potential for wide disparities in rental prices, leading to 
perceived inequalities. Evidence of personalised decision-making, regarding 
the replacement of subsidies for low income households, showed the 
potential of such governance forms towards exclusion.  
The study provides crucial insights into the psychological stresses and 
strains which arise when residents have to work together to govern their 
housing. This makes connections to other literature related to similar 
processes in autonomous work groups (Novelli et al, 1989). In a succinct 
expression of how housing collectives can give rise to this type of cost, and 
how trade-off arrangements can occur, one interviewee noted that ‘the fun 
part is you know your neighbours, and the bad part is you have to deal with 
your neighbours’ (Camille, Milton Park resident).  
The study goes beyond the identification of costs, and unpicks some of the 
processes which give rise to them. Applying the mechanisms discussed 
above, costs can also be understood by reference to rules and regulation, 
residents’ dual-role in governance arrangements, and in terms of the residual 
histories of the organisations. Other causal processes are significant but 
have remained opaque. In tracing the processes creating certain costs, the 
deeply integrated character of the mechanisms became apparent, pointing 
towards a potential unified mechanism to simplify and generalise those 
processes. A candidate for this is the mechanism of institutionalisation, which 
Bengtsson (2001) used to explore the persistence of co-operative processes 
in Swedish housing estates. Conceptualising housing collectives as 
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institutions offers the potential to understand the regulative, normative and 
cognitive processes taking place in these organisations, but also how they 
are embedded within other institutions which set conditions and scripts for 
what happens within them.   
11.3. Reasserting the importance of place 
This thesis sought to identify similarities and differences between the cases, 
and to make general assertions through a thematic approach to analysis. 
Whilst this has sought to retain contextual information pertaining to the 
cases, ensuring dedicated space for each case in each thematic section, 
such a structure has risked losing the uniqueness of the three places 
studied. Each collective’s development is an unreplicable causal story, 
bound up with the ‘places’ in which they emerged. Places, one might argue, 
are material spaces defined and shaped by cultural and social processes 
(Gregory, 1951; Staeheli, 2003). In this sense, the collectives are both part-
product and part-producer of their places. Having situated each case in its 
local context in Chapter Six, and then having looked across those cases 
thematically in Chapters Seven-Ten, this section returns full circle to reassert 
some of the unique characteristics of the places studied.  
Walterton and Elgin 
Events in Walterton and Elgin in the 1980s were to shape the political history 
of the Borough of Westminster. As a Labour stronghold during the 
tumultuous years of Shirley Porter’s administration of WCC, this area was 
the testing ground for various physical and social interventions by WCC. The 
collective was borne out of the conflict between two starkly different visions 
for this place. Indeed, in neither of the other cases was party politics so 
visible, and this idiosyncrasy of the place, as a site of geo-political struggle, 
is critical to understanding the constraints and enablements for collectivism 
here.   
In the 1980s, whilst the area had a relatively diverse population, with some 
residents following ‘alternative lifestyles’ (George, WECH supporter), 
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Walterton and Elgin does not appear to have been a centre of radical 
thought. Here the differences with Milton Park become apparent. This area 
would be better described as a low-income neighbourhood, with an acute 
problem in housing conditions, and it was this which would eventually 
provide the motivation for collectivism. WECH grew from an intensifying 
grievance and hopelessness around the issue of housing quality, mobilised 
and modulated through effective community organising, and in response to 
local political opportunities.   
Like Milton Park, land and housing in this area was and is highly valuable, 
but the aesthetic is different here with rows of large townhouses sat 
alongside large modern housing blocks. Interviewees’ perceptions of this 
place contained certain worries and fears about the wider area. They 
highlighted a sense of internal cohesion between residents, but potential 
dangers from those outside the sphere of WECH.   
Granby CLT 
The Granby area is markedly different from the other cases, and this 
variation has created a different development pathway, entailing different 
constraints and enablements. At the start of this study, the majority of 
housing in the Granby Four Streets was empty, with visible signs of physical 
dereliction. The environment in this area was markedly different to the other 
two cases, and yet signs of intervention by residents hinted at the prospects 
for change. Visiting in 2013, the products of ‘guerilla gardening’ were 
obvious, with fruit trees and flowers lining the sides of Cairns Street, and 
murals on boarded-up properties stating residents’ resistance to demolition. 
Such an environment was deemed ‘awful’ by some interviewees, but at the 
same time offered opportunities to treat the streets as communal spaces, or 
as extensions of residents’ properties.   
Granby is a unique place in the context of the wider city of Liverpool. 
Historically, it has been the reception area for incoming migrants, and this 
has been reflected in its diverse population. This characteristic has become 
embedded in residents’ sense of place, with interviewees highlighting their 
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desire to retain the character and purpose of the place as diverse and 
welcoming.  
At the time of study Granby had seen several decades of depopulation, and 
this necessitated a different development journey for the CLT. Depopulation 
affected the potential for mass collective action. There were few signs that 
Walterton and Elgin or Milton Park ever suffered the levels of depopulation 
and empty housing seen in Granby. In these places there was potential for 
mass resident mobilisation. In Granby, however, depopulation made this 
more difficult meaning workloads were concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of residents, requiring differing tactics and internal processes to 
realise collective ownership. 
What is clear from the development of Granby CLT is how the place was 
shaped by wider political processes; the abandonment of the goal of urban 
‘regeneration’ at a national level, and subsequent reductions in public 
expenditure by both national and local governments following the 2008 
financial crisis. But, as has been seen, these wider economic conditions 
shaping places can create enablements for collectives, as well as 
constraints. 
Milton Park 
CMP and the co-operatives can be seen as a product of their time, emerging 
at the end of the modernist period in urban development, when demands for 
residents to own the process of urban change were becoming pronounced 
(Harvey, 2008). Initially suppressed by the grand visions for the urban 
development of Montreal, these modernist ideas lost traction in the late 
1960s. In a context of shifting local and national economic events, 
associated with the Montreal Olympics and global property slums in the mid-
1970s, the door was opened for local neighbourhood action.   
Allied with these changing trends were demographic and social changes 
making collectivism more likely. More than the other cases, Milton Park 
appeared as a hotbed for radical thought and the new vogue of community 
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organising. Wider cultural movements associated with the swinging-sixties 
were played out in Milton Park, with its population being particularly receptive 
to radical political ideas. In the development of the collective here, the 
centrality of local resources, skills, ideologies, and energies comes to the 
fore. 
In several interviews in Milton Park the location itself was deemed a precious 
commodity, from which benefits were derived, and this seemed to feed into 
residents’ beliefs and behaviours in powerful ways. In aesthetic terms, the 
streets in Milton Park are wide and leafy, giving a sense of enclosure and 
separation from the hustle and bustle of the neighbouring downtown area. 
This only reinforces the visual distinction of the place from adjacent streets.   
Milton Park is distinctive in this study for other reasons, being embedded in a 
different national jurisdiction, with implications particularly for both the nature 
of property ownership and organisational form. This case was always 
intended to provide a lens with which to sharpen the focus on factors 
associated with the national context and setting in England. In understanding 
the importance of condominium structures and sophisticated government 
programmes to support co-operative housing, this case has helped juxtapose 
Granby CLT and WECH, showing the constraints inherent in the English 
framework for housing collectivism. One conclusion to make from the 
findings above, is that whilst national contexts create important factors in the 
development of collectives, these are no more apparent than those 
associated with the era of development, the physical geography, local 
demographics and the character of the population.   
The collectives are a product of their place, but in a recursive sense, they 
have also made or redefined those places in social, geographic and 
economic terms. 
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11.4. Reflections on the methodology and methods 
The case study design and conceptual framework 
This research has developed a strong conceptual framework, employing 
dichotomous concepts in both the research questions. In practice, the key 
concepts of constraint and enablement, and benefit and cost, came from 
sources that would not have been predicted, and perhaps this justifies the 
wide reading in sociology and economics that was undertaken at the start of 
this research. 
These concepts played a critical organising role, and helped orientate data 
collection to causal processes. In an unforeseen but welcome outcome, the 
key concepts in the research questions helped target both the causes of 
development, but also the effects of collectivism on individuals. These 
concepts essentially created a research design which looked at ‘both sides of 
the causal equation' (Gerring, 2007, p.72), and the study is stronger for this 
in my view. Deeper insights about constraint and enablement arose when the 
data on perceived benefits and costs was analysed, and vice versa. For 
instance, in relation to the development of the collectives, they were enabled 
and constrained by individuals’ capacities and energies. However, these 
demands fed through to benefits and costs for such individuals, for instance, 
in their opportunities to learn, or the burdens on their time. Hence, the 
research questions complemented each other, deepening the understanding 
of the phenomena.  
Methodologists who support the use of case study approaches suggest that 
it enables researchers to see phenomena in their context, providing a holistic 
view of real-world events (Yin, 2003). This was indeed the case, and the 
value derived from contextualised study, and the importance of this when 
looking at causal processes, is asserted here. Gerring suggests that it is 
‘easier to establish the veracity of a causal relationship[s]’ in a small number 
of cases (Gerring, 2007, p.43) and this was indeed borne out. The current 
research shows how case study designs help interrogate processes, 
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practices, interactions between entities, and explore the connections which 
affect the flow of events.  
From methodological reading I knew this choice of approach could affect the 
potential to generalise to a wider population, or to maximise external validity.  
This is particularly apparent with regard to costs and benefits, where other 
methods to standardise or monetise outcomes would have supported wider 
generalisation. In thinking through the generalisation of findings from this 
study, notions of analytic generalisation (Yin, 2003) seemed unsatisfactory. 
The theoretical elements of this study do not provide general rules or 
propositions, and the comparison of case studies with Galileo’s experiments 
is misleading (Flyvbjerg, 2006). I have learnt that social phenomena are too 
complex, and the contingencies too great, to set up an experiment which 
results in generally applicable theory.  
One example of this relates to an outcome of case selection which meant 
that the study focused on collectives in large urban conurbations. If one 
accepts the qualitative differences between urban and rural settings, this 
decision would seem to affect the potential to generalise the findings to 
collectives in other environments. Different forms of state intervention, local 
governance structures, pressures on housing and services, and the nature of 
social relations, identifies but a few potential differences between urban and 
rural contexts. Future research would need to explore and account for these 
potential differences to establish whether they affect development pathways 
and outcomes for collectives in substantive ways. 
In focusing on certain types of collective (community benefit societies with 
different constitutions and co-operatives in a condominium structure), it is 
unclear whether the conclusions here can be extended to other collectivist 
forms. For instance, are the same constraints and enablements apparent for 
small co-housing groups, or large mutual housing organisations? To make 
this leap in generalisation, and to clarify whether the development processes 
and outcomes identified are general to all housing collectives, requires 
quantitative methods. This has led to reflections on how, in future studies, 
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qualitative methods might unpick causal processes and assert causal 
mechanisms in cases, with subsequent quantitative methods used to test 
their prevalence and distribution in a wider population of cases.  
The data collection 
The empirical work of this study is based on thirty one interviews, eight 
organisational observations and reviews of key historical and internal 
documents, spread relatively evenly across the three cases. As noted in 
chapter five, the differing age of each collective affected the nature and 
amount of information available to build detailed case histories. In Granby, 
where the collective was being enacted during the study, an absence of 
historical accounts meant a reliance on online sources and internal 
documents. This contrasted with Milton Park where extensive historical 
accounts had been written. This has had some bearing on the detail and 
content of the case descriptions. Various techniques were adopted to ensure 
at least some consistency in the development of the case descriptions, with 
timeline software used to identify and organise information from the 
document reviews. This proved valuable in pinpointing and connecting 
events with a clear significance in each case. 
The level of data collected per case, means that only a partial picture of their 
development and perceived outcomes was achieved. Reflecting on this, the 
depth of insight would certainly have been improved with more data, 
particularly interview data, which was invaluable in seeing how individual 
outcomes link to collective forms and functions. Perhaps a two-case design 
may have allowed for more extensive data collection and deeper 
interrogation of development factors and outcomes. However, this may have 
entailed sacrificing some of the breadth of insights that came from studying 
three cases in diverse historical and geographical settings. 
The study would have been strengthened by capturing more data from those 
opposed to the development of the collectives, or experiencing negative 
outcomes. The aim was never to gather sufficient data to make statistical 
generalisations about the prevalence of certain views, but nonetheless a 
 336 
 
spread of perspectives was required. The research would have been richer, 
for instance, had I spoken to those involved in Maison St. Louis, or residents 
who opposed the CLT in Granby. This has led to reflections about sampling 
methods, and how direct communication with potential interviewees, for 
instance by sending out flyers with my contact details, may have achieved a 
wider scope of views.  
In defence of the approach taken, critical voices were heard. With major 
gaps in the literature relating to the costs of housing collectivism, this thesis 
has provided new and valuable contributions. The quantity of data was 
relatively evenly distributed across the cases, allowing for a rigorous 
approach to triangulation and cross-case analysis. And the spread of data 
across the different data types provided insights into each collective from a 
variety of perspectives (both contemporary and historical). 
The procedure for data analysis 
A step-by-step process for analysis was developed in this study, which 
moved from finding patterns in the data to retroductive reasoning about 
causal mechanisms. Triangulation of data performed a critical function. In 
order to identify prominent patterns, and as a check against my established 
views, procedures were developed to identify similar or recurring themes 
across or within cases. Lessons were drawn from the Framework approach 
(Ritchie and Lewis, 2003), as data from NVivo was extracted and 
summarised in matrices which helped identify and visualise within and cross-
case patterns (see Table 5). This procedure provides a sequential model for 
those engaged in multiple case designs, which are geared toward 
understanding causal processes. It helps move from patterns in empirical 
data and events, to mechanisms which can explain these, using 
counterfactual reasoning to test the causal assertions being made. 
Applying this procedure, however, never quite removed dilemmas about 
which data merited inclusion or exclusion, and whether a pattern was 
sufficiently pronounced to warrant discussion. Even though data may 
correlate across sources and cases, this does not necessarily mean it is 
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valuable in answering the research questions. Furthermore, why should one 
assume that the testimony of actors and commentators in the case studies 
would reveal the deep mechanisms affecting change? Despite these 
questions, understanding the development of collectives, and any perceived 
outcomes, should not be divorced from the experiences of those involved. It 
is the job of the researcher, by employing techniques such as retroductive 
reasoning, to move from empirical evidence to mechanisms which help 
understand events.  
The approach to causal analysis and mechanism-based explanation 
Empirically grounded research to establish social mechanisms is rare 
(Bygstad and Munkvold, 2011), so for practising social scientists wishing to 
adopt similar approaches, this thesis shows their potential, or at the very 
least provides a model to be adapted and improved.  
The mechanisms presented here are abstractions from a complex set of 
phenomena, providing simplified explanations of processes in the cases. My 
approach has sought to produce a stripped-down or truncated picture of 
housing collectivism in practice (Hernes, 1998); a model which does not 
purport to be a direct representation of reality, but is practically adequate 
(Sayer, 1992) in explaining events and unlocking the workings of the 
phenomena studied. 
One reflection on the mechanisms developed is that they differ from some of 
the celebrated examples in the literature, for instance Granovetter (1978) 
and White (1970), which use singular mechanisms to explain varied social 
phenomena. The mechanisms posited here overlap one another, and are 
hard to disentangle. Despite the scope to refine the mechanisms posited, a 
valuable contribution has been made to the empirical application of this type 
of causal analysis.  
Critically, the mechanisms do not provide a complete causal explanation of 
how the collectives developed, or how they delivered the benefits and costs 
experienced. In this sense, the thesis does not set out all of the necessary 
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causes or sufficient conditions for such collectivism (Chakravartty, 2005). 
Simple counterfactual questions show, for instance, difficulties in 
ascertaining necessary causes. Could the collectives have developed even if 
private developers had not withdrawn in each case? Arguably so, if the 
collectives had acquired the finances to purchase the land and properties on 
the open market. Could the collectives have developed without their advisors 
and support infrastructure? Arguably so, if the required technical skills and 
capacity existed among their members and residents. Establishing those 
factors necessary to collective development, or those effects which are a 
necessary product of collectivism, is difficult. There is scope therefore to 
learn and apply different methods of causal analysis (Morgan, 2012) which 
may enhance insights into this field. 
Reflecting on these issues, I arrived at the work of Mackie (1965) late in the 
analysis process. Mackie directs causal analysis towards those causes 
which are necessary (but on their own insufficient) parts of wider conditions. 
In simple terms, this means identifying key causes which, when operating in 
certain conditions create certain events. Using these ideas one might 
propose necessary (but insufficient) causes for the development of housing 
collectives, for instance, the buy-in of local residents to collective ownership, 
the creation of organisational forms for such ownership, and the presence of 
housing and/or land. Without these there can be no collective ownership, but 
on their own they are not sufficient, since it has been seen that collectives 
may need external funding, a support infrastructure, and a conducive set of 
local relations. When housing collectivism is reduced down to its necessary 
ingredients, it requires committed people, institutional forms, and access to 
physical assets.  
11.5. Implications of the research 
For those developing or managing housing collectives 
This research offers a number of important insights to individuals and groups 
engaged in the development of housing collectives. Firstly, belief-action 
cycles, which build a perceived sense of collective efficacy, require 
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distinctive forms of action. They demand effective community organising, to 
identify and building on people’s grievances to mobilise them to effective 
action. To do this requires a rare set of qualities which includes the ability to 
persuade and induce the involvement of other people, and being resilient to 
opposing views working from a ‘solid philosophical base’ (Susan, Milton Park 
resident). Embryonic collectives may have members possessing these skills 
and traits, but those that do not may need to nurture them.   
In creating the conditions for collectivism, groups may also need to focus on 
interrupting the processes which lead to standard private sector-led 
development. In the cases studied, this entailed direct action to block private 
companies acquiring and developing sites, influencing public procurement 
processes, and developing collectivism first for opposition and then for 
property ownership. Here lessons from the community organising literature 
are valuable, to understand the necessary shifts from social action to locality 
development (Rothman, 1968).  
For those supporting housing collectives 
This research provides valuable lessons for those supporting, in various 
ways, the development of housing collectives. Infrastructure bodies, such as 
the CLT Network or the Confederation of Co-operative Housing (CCH), 
provide various forms of technical advice, training and financial backing. 
However, having observed in this study the importance of community 
organising skills and action, more might be done to nurture these skills. They 
might consider, for instance, forming a ‘School for Housing Organisers’, to 
hone and spread such skills, working with existing community organisation 
specialists (Citizens UK, 2016). This is particularly pertinent, given signs of 
increasing grievances in England related to the quality, security and 
affordability of housing (Generation Rent, 2015; Ipsos Mori, 2015).  The 
presence of these grievances creates opportunities to build social 
movements (Snow, 2013). Connecting the grievances of those, for instance, 
in poor quality rented accommodation, with practical solutions such as 
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housing collectivism, offers the potential for infrastructure bodies to reach 
and engage wider audiences.  
This will require using forms of mass communication currently unharnessed. 
In their popular book Switch (Heath and Heath, 2011), the authors discuss 
how attitudes to drink driving were shifted in the United States. They cite an 
example of how one Harvard professor took a phrase used in Scandinavia, 
‘designated driver’, and approached producers of TV programmes and other 
media to normalise the term to reduce drink driving. This resulted in the 
‘sprinkling [of] designated driver moments naturally into plots’ (Heath and 
Heath, 2011, p.233), including in national TV programme such as Cheers. 
One might consider how the introduction of a housing co-operative into the 
plot lines of EastEnders might affect interest in such housing models, and 
whether it could have a normalising effect. Whilst much effort is invested by 
advocates of housing collectivism in political lobbying or nuancing legal 
guidance, only visible increases in public interest and demand for these 
housing forms is likely stimulate a major growth in such housing. This 
suggests that if advocates wish to present housing collectives as a practical 
response to the housing crisis, more effort should be invested in creative and 
inventive forms of mass communication to widen interest.  
Those supporting collectives may also value the insights this thesis provides 
into the ways technical services are provided. Much can be learnt from the 
Technical Resource Groups (GRTs) that have emerged in Canada. Partly 
funded by the national government’s housing agency, CMHC, but also partly 
self-financed, the GRTs have provided a localised source of support for 
housing co-operatives, bringing together the various professional services 
required to develop such schemes. Similar models could be developed in 
England, pooling the skills and organisational resources of secondary co-
operatives, umbrella CLTs and other housing and community development 
bodies. However, political leadership would be required to formalise this 
infrastructure, and provide the incentives to create these organisations, 
alongside a strengthening of relationships between those representing and 
supporting different collective models (BSHF, 2016c).  
 341 
 
For those developing solutions to contemporary housing problems 
In situating this study in current housing issues, it was argued that housing 
collectives may help address certain problems in housing provision, including 
current levels of affordability, housing conditions and security of tenure. The 
potential of such organisations, in addressing some of these critical issues 
has been shown, albeit within constraints and with variable costs to 
individuals. 
Tempering enthusiasm, the case studies reveal the complexities and 
contingencies in the development of such schemes. To create more 
conducive conditions for collectivism, policy makers will need to enhance the 
support infrastructure, encourage and incentivise local authorities and 
landowners to work with emerging collectives and, critically, provide 
packages of financial support or reliefs. Combining these types of 
enablements one could envisage a form of local state intervention. Local 
authorities could designate broad areas as preferred locations for collective 
or ‘community-led’ development, through local plans or supplementary 
planning guidance. Allied with this, small financial incentives perhaps funded 
through Right to Buy receipts or recycled New Homes Bonuses, could 
provide incentives and initial seed-corn funding to groups. Drawing on the 
learning in this study, combining financial support with interventions which 
shift preferences away from private sector-led development, may create 
more conducive conditions for future collectivism.  
11.6. The direction of future research 
Using the data collected in this research further data analysis could be 
performed, using theories of institutionalisation to see if certain processes 
(Scott, 1995) are observable in the cases. Linked to this, there are 
opportunities to return to each collective, to present the mechanisms 
identified and allow residents and members to scrutinise them, providing 
opportunities for their critical reflection and to refine the mechanisms further. 
This was an opportunity missed in the current research, but could provide the 
platform for future studies.  
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Perhaps more significantly, future research is required to better understand 
the range and variation of constraints on housing collectivism. There exists 
little research on why some collectives fail to come to fruition or sustain 
themselves, although there is a connected literature on the failure or 
dissolution of co-operative enterprises (for instance, Elster, 1989c and 
Kramper, 2012). Whilst offering certain insights into constraints, this thesis 
does not directly address this gap in knowledge. Questions therefore 
emerge; are there recurrent sets of constraints, arising internally within 
collectives or through external relations, that have prevented the 
development of them? And if so, are these different to the constraints that 
have acted upon established and sustained collectives, such as those 
identified in this study? What is the causal significance of the urban setting, 
and are different constraints and enablements observable in different types 
of physical and social settings?  
These are essentially different questions to the ones posed in this research, 
and demand a different set of methods and the prioritisation of external 
validity. They are, however, fundamental to understanding the current 
marginality of these housing models in the UK, and the potential for them to 
scale-up in number, and scale-out in terms of their housing stock (Heywood, 
2016). Having adopted largely qualitative research methods to explore the 
subtleties and complexities of causal processes, there is now scope to adopt 
more quantitative research designs to establish the prevalence of certain 
constraints and enablements identified among the wider population of 
housing collectives. Using this research as a platform, the identified 
constraints and enablements would be tested for prevalence across a large 
sample of housing collectives, with the possibility of making statistical 
generalisations. A more quantitative research design could draw on methods 
and techniques, not explored in this thesis, which have the potential to 
enhance the causal analysis undertaken, mapping and depicting 
conjunctions of causal factors in visual networks (Elwert, 2013). This future 
research then should shift toward general propositions, focusing on the 
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factors which affect all collectives, and therefore the potential scale and 
numbers they could reach.  
In summary, this research has revealed some of the processes which shape 
the development of housing collectives, and how such organisations can give 
rise to specific outcomes for residents and members. It has provided original 
contributions to knowledge on the internal and external relations which shape 
the development of housing collectives, and the mechanisms through which 
certain costs and benefits arise. Further research is required to test and 
refine these ideas, and to make more robust generalisations. This research 
is much needed, since housing collectivism has been shown to offer some 
remedies to the prevalent and worsening symptoms of England’s housing 
crisis. 
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Appendices 
Appendix One: Fieldwork schedule 
Interviews 
Pseudonym and role Case Date 
Barbara (WECH resident) WECH 29/07/2014 
Charles (WECH resident and Board 
member) 
WECH 12/02/2014 
Clive (WECH officer) WECH 12/02/2014 
Craig (WECH resident and Board member) WECH 30/07/2014 
Diana (WECH resident) WECH 25/09/2014 
Dylan (WECH supporter) WECH 26/09/2014 
Edith (WECH resident) WECH 29/07/2014 
Ellie (WECH resident and Board member) WECH 30/07/2014 
Francis (WECH resident) WECH 24/09/2014 
George (WECH supporter) WECH 30/07/2014 
Kenneth (WECH supporter) WECH 30/07/2014 
Beatrice (Granby resident and Board 
member) 
Granby CLT 12/12/2013 
Mark (Granby CLT supporter) Granby CLT 12/12/2013 
Georgia (Granby CLT supporter and Board 
member) 
Granby CLT 28/01/2014 
Helena (Granby CLT supporter and Board 
member) 
Granby CLT 28/01/2014 
Shirley (Granby resident and Board 
member) 
Granby CLT 28/01/2014 
Catherine (Granby resident and Board 
member) 
Granby CLT 03/04/2014 
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Mike (Liverpool City Council (LCC) 
representative) 
Granby CLT 03/04/2014 
Avril (Granby resident and Board member) Granby CLT 15/05/2014 
Mary (Milton Park resident) Milton Park 10/06/2014 
Bethany (OSBL manager) Milton Park 09/06/2014 
Arabelle (Milton Park resident) Milton Park 08/06/2014 
Margaret (Milton Park resident and CMP 
Board member) 
Milton Park 09/06/2014 
Claudia (Milton Park resident) Milton Park 05/06/2014 
Camille (Milton Park resident) Milton Park 05/06/2014 
David (Milton Park resident) Milton Park 04/06/2014 
Frank (OSBL manager) Milton Park 06/06/2014 
Martin (Milton Park resident) Milton Park 10/06/2014 
Susan (Milton Park resident) Milton Park 04/06/2014 
William (CMP supporter) Milton Park 06/06/2014 
Alan (Milton Park resident) Milton Park 08/06/2014 
 
Observations 
Type Case Date 
Board meeting WECH 30/07/2014 
Board meeting WECH 12/02/2014 
AGM WECH 24/09/2014 
Locational 
observations 
WECH 26/11/2014 - 
28/11/2014 
Board meeting Granby CLT 03/04/2014 
Board meeting Granby CLT 12/12/2013 
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Board meeting Granby CLT 10/04/2013 
Locational 
observations 
Granby CLT 11/12/2013 - 
11/12/2013 
CMP Board meeting 
(via Skype) 
Milton Park 12/01/2015 
Fête des Voisin Milton Park 07/06/2014 
Locational 
observations 
Milton Park 06/06/2014 – 
08/06/2014 
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Appendix Two: An example interview topic guide (residents) 
 
Introduction/formalities 
 Introduction: 
o Student at Sheffield Hallam University 
o Studying how people can collectively own land and buildings 
and the benefits/costs resulting 
o Looking at three very similar organisations – 2 in UK, 1 in 
Canada  Interview will be semi-structured – some general topics to discuss 
but not prescribed  Can I record the interview? – Audio stored and transcribed  Data protection – Storage of audio, transcripts and fieldnotes  Confidentiality and anonymity within the study   Freedom to withdraw at any point  GO THROUGH THE CONSENT FORM 
 
I would like to start by asking you some questions about the 
Walterton and Elgin area… 
A. How long have you lived in Walterton and Elgin area?  
Prompts: housing tenure history, labour situation, length of WECH 
tenancy 
 
B. Why did you move here?   
   
C. What is the area like now? 
Prompts: Housing conditions, demography, social relations  
 
D. What are the best things about being a living in this area?   
Prompts: social, economic and environmental; Probe: connections 
to institutions 
 
E. And the worst things about living in this area?  
Prompts: social, economic and environmental; Probe: connections 
to institutions  
 
F. Has the area changed since you started living here? 
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Prompts: physical, social, institutional changes 
 
I would now like to ask you some questions about the WECH…  
 
G. To what extent do you think WECH is resident controlled? 
Probe: Awareness of governance model, Board elections, other 
opportunities to get involved in decision making 
 
H. To what extent do feel like you own and control the housing with the 
other tenants? 
 
I. Do you participate in any WECH activities, events or meetings? 
Prompt: Have you been involved in any decision-making? Have you 
played an active role in the past? 
 
J. To what extent is being a tenant of WECH different from renting 
privately or renting from another social landlord? 
Probe: What does being a WECH tenant mean in terms of day to 
day life? What does it mean in terms of housing control/autonomy?  
 
K. What are the benefits of being a tenant and member of WECH? 
Probe: Forms of capital benefit - financial (e.g. rents, housing 
standards, cost reductions), social (e.g. networks, interactions, 
reciprocity), cultural (e.g. learning new skills and knowledge) 
 
L. Are there any costs or compromises associated with being a tenant 
and member of WECH? 
Prompt: Time commitments, efficiency of decision making, Probe: 
Comparisons with owner occupation and other social landlords,  
 
M. Have these losses and gains changed over time? If so, how? 
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Appendix Three: An example interview topic guide (advisors) 
 
Introduction/formalities 
  Introduction: 
o Student at Sheffield Hallam University 
o Studying how people can collectively own land and buildings 
and the benefits/costs resulting 
o Looking at three very similar organisations – 2 in UK, 1 in 
Canada  Interview will be semi-structured – some general topics to discuss 
but not prescribed  Can I record the interview? – Audio stored and transcribed  Data protection – Storage of audio, transcripts and fieldnotes  Confidentiality and anonymity within the study   Freedom to withdraw at any point  GO THROUGH THE CONSENT FORM 
 
Introductory questions 
A. How did you become involved in the development of CMP? 
Prompt: What roles held? Resident? 
 
B. What has your professional life outside CMP looked like? 
Probe: Similar activism in other areas? Specialisms and expertise? 
 
I would like us to talk about the role of support organisations in the 
development of CMP 
   
C. Can you tell me a bit about the GRT? 
Prompts: What was it’s role in the development of CMP? Who was 
involved and how employed? How was it constituted? The wider 
Association des Groupes de Ressources Techniques du Québec 
(AGRTQ) 
 
D. How was the GRT funded?  
 
E. What support or expertise did the GRT provide in the development 
of CMP? 
Prompts: Legal, development, community organisation 
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F. What was GRT's relationship with residents? 
 Probe: How did it act inclusively/democratically, how was it 
accountable? 
 
G. What were the most significant challenges for GRT in supporting the 
creation of CMP? 
Probe: Finances, resident involvement, legal, physical development 
 
I'd now like us to think about the key things that hindered or enabled 
the development of CMP…  
 
H. Are there certain events that stand out as being important to CMP's 
development?  
Probe: Concordia pull out, CMHC intervention, community 
organisation 
 
I. What are the key ingredients for success of organisations like 
CMP? 
Probe: Agency, context/structures, cultural dimensions 
 
J. What barriers or obstacles hindered CMP's development? 
Probe: Are these still barriers/obstacles, what's changed? 
 
K. One of my interviewees in the UK has suggested there are 3 
phases in the development of organisations like theirs and CMP.  
The first when you don’t own anything and you are fighting to be 
heard; the second when you’ve just taken ownership and dealing 
with the practical realities and tensions of owning and developing; 
and the third phase when the organisation is settled and clear on its 
objectives and operations.  How does this characterisation compare 
with CMPs development?  
Probe: Transitions between phases, changes in operations/tactics, 
resources required  
 
I have a final question about the impact of CMP on residents in Milton 
Park… 
 
L. Do you think that being a member of the Milton Park Community is 
very different to living in the area and renting from a landlord or 
owning your own home? 
Probe: Forms of capital – does cultural and social capital replace 
financial capital from ownership 
 
